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INTRODUCTION	  
	  “We	   are	   approaching	   Luanda,	   but	   there	   is	   nobody	   at	   the	   airport.	   Our	   An-­‐12	  lands.	  I	  walk	  out.	  In	  front	  of	  me,	  I	  see	  an	  Angolan	  soldier,	  who	  stands	  ten	  to	  fifteen	  feet	  away.	  He	  carries	  an	  American	  automatic	  rifle,	  hanging	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  rope.	  His	  eyes	  are	  blank.	  Holding	  his	  finger	  on	  the	  trigger,	  he	  aims	  at	  my	  stomach.	  Whoever	  is	  in	  charge	  at	  the	  airport	  is	  unclear.	  I	  cannot	  reach	  him	  because	  he	  will	  open	  fire	  and	  riddle	  me	  with	  bullets.	   He	   stares	   at	   me	   meaninglessly;	   and	   I	   assume	   that	   he	   does	   not	   even	   know	  Portuguese.	   I	  was	  rescued	  by	  the	  chief	  of	  airport	  security,	  an	  Angolan,	  who	  knew	  me	  well.	   He	   ran	   towards	   me	   for	   like	   hundred	   and	   fifty	   meters,	   shouting,	   'Boris.'	   This	  helped	  me.	  Then	  we	  were	  accompanied	  to	  our	  hotel.”1	  Thus	   Boris	   Putilin,	   a	   Soviet	   military	   intelligence	   officer,	   recalls	   arriving	   at	  Angola’s	   capital	   Luanda	   on	   11	   November	   1975,	   the	   day	   scheduled	   to	   mark	   the	  independence	  of	  Angola,	  Portugal’s	   largest	  remaining	  colony.	  Putilin	  had	  arrived	  as	  a	  part	   of	   a	   delegation	   led	   by	   Yevgeniy	   Afanasenko,	   the	   Soviet	   Ambassador	   to	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	  who	  had	  been	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  independence	  celebrations	  and	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  Popular	  Movement	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola	  (MPLA;	  Movimento	  
Popular	   de	   Libertação	  de	  Angola)	   as	   the	   new	   government	   of	   Angola.	   Putilin	   recalled	  that	   at	   11am,	   their	   delegation	   was	   accompanied	   to	   Luanda’s	   city	   hall	   for	   the	  inauguration	   of	   MPLA’s	   President	   Agostinho	   Neto	   as	   the	   first	   President	   of	   Angola.	  Yevgeniy	  Afanasenko	  addressed	  the	  crowds	  from	  a	  balcony	  of	  the	  city	  hall,	  passing	  on	  greetings	  from	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (CPSU)	  and	  the	  Soviet	  people	  in	   a	   show	   of	   solidarity	   with	   the	   MPLA.2	  These	   were	   no	   ordinary	   celebrations,	   as	  Putilin’s	  account	  of	  their	  arrival	  at	  the	  airport	  clearly	  indicated.	  	  Celebrations	   were	   short,	   taking	   place	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   Angola’s	   slide	  into	  a	  bloody	  civil	  war.	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  earlier,	  fighting	  had	  broken	  out	  between	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Boris	   Putilin,	   "My	   Obespechivali	   MPLA	   Oruzhiem."	   Vospominaniya	   Neposredstvennykh	   Uchastnikov	   i	   Ochevidtsev	  
Grazhdanskoi	   Voyny	   v	   Angole:	   Ustnaia	   Istoriia	   Sabytykh	   Voin.	   Eds.	   Vladimir	   Shubin	   and	   Andrey	   Tokarev	   (Moscow:	  Memories,	  2009),	  pp.	  23-­‐24.	  2	  Ibid.,	  p.	  24.	  
	   10	  MPLA	   and	   the	   other	   two	   liberation	  movements	   contending	   for	   power	   in	  Angola:	   the	  National	   Front	   for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Angola	   (FNLA;	  Frente	  Nacional	  de	  Libertação	  de	  
Angola)	   and	   the	   National	   Union	   for	   Total	   Independence	   of	   Angola	   (UNITA;	   União	  
Nacional	   para	   a	   Independência	   Total	   de	   Angola).	   By	   November,	   the	   FNLA,	   armed	   by	  Zaire,	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  had	  amassed	  troops	  outside	  of	   Luanda,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   take	  over	   the	  MPLA-­‐controlled	   capital.	  On	  10	  November,	  the	   FNLA	   launched	   a	   major	   assault	   on	   Luanda,	   but	   the	   MPLA,	   armed	   with	   Soviet	  weapons	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  team	  of	  Cuban	  Special	  Forces,	  retaliated.	  At	  midnight	  on	  11	  November,	  crowds	  crammed	  themselves	  into	  Luanda’s	  stadium,	  cheering	  and	  firing	  weapons	  into	  the	  night	  sky	  as	  the	  MPLA’s	  red	  and	  black	  flag	  was	  raised	  to	  the	  sounds	  of	   the	   new	   national	   hymn,	   Angola	   Avante	   ("Forward	   Angola!").3	  11	   November	   thus	  marked	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Angola,	  a	  country	  that	  had	  already	  become	  a	  bone	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  11	   November	   1975	   was	   also	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   history	   of	   European	  imperialism.	  The	  Portuguese	  empire	  had	  crumbled	  following	  a	  military	  coup	  in	  Lisbon	  on	   25	   April	   1974,	   which	   put	   an	   end	   to	   almost	   half	   a	   century	   of	   dictatorial	   rule	   by	  António	  Oliveira	  Salazar	  and	  his	  successor	  Marcelo	  Caetano.	  To	  a	  great	  extent,	  the	  coup	  of	   25	   April	   was	   spurred	   by	   fourteen	   years	   of	   colonial	   wars,	   waged	   by	   the	   army	   in	  Mozambique,	  Angola,	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  from	  1961	  until	  1974.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  coup,	  Lisbon	   launched	   negotiations	   on	   decolonization	   of	   the	   colonies	   with	   the	   liberation	  movements	   that	   had	   spearheaded	   the	   armed	   struggle	   against	   colonial	   rule.	   On	   10	  September	   1974,	   Portugal	   transferred	   power	   to	   the	   Party	   for	   the	   Independence	   of	  Guinea	   and	   Cape	   Verde	   (PAIGC;	   Partido	   Africano	   da	   Independência	   da	   Guiné	   e	   Cabo	  
Verde)	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   and	   on	   25	   June	   1975	   to	   the	   Mozambique	   Liberation	   Front	  (FRELIMO;	  Frente	  de	  Libertação	  de	  Moçambique)	  in	  Mozambique.	  On	  10	  November,	  the	  last	  Portuguese	  soldiers	  left	  Luanda	  for	  Lisbon	  by	  sea,	  signaling	  the	  formal	  dissolution	  of	  the	  last	  colonial	  empire.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  "Angola:	  A	  Brief	  Ceremony,	  a	  Long	  Civil	  War,"	  Time	  24	  November,	  1975.	  
	   11	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   trace	   the	  history	  of	  Soviet	  relations	  with	   the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  until	  independence	  in	  1975,	  during	  fourteen	  years	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns.	  The	  Soviet	   contribution	   to	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	   struggles	  was	  celebrated	  as	  a	  major	  achievement	   in	   the	  1970s,	  but	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	   the	  General	  Secretary	  of	   the	  CPSU	  since	  1985,	  was	  not	  particularly	   interested	   in	   the	  Third	  World	  and	   scaled	   down	   Soviet	   involvement	   by	   the	   late	   1980s.	   The	   very	   essence	   of	   Soviet	  policy	   in	   the	   Third	  World	  was	   passionately	   debated	   during	   Gorbachev’s	   perestroika	  until	   the	  very	  end	  of	  1991	  when	   the	  dissolution	  of	   the	  USSR	  put	  a	   temporary	  end	   to	  those	   debates	   since	   all	   the	   institutions	   and	   policies	   of	   the	   CPSU	   no	   longer	   seemed	  valid.4	  The	   Soviet	   role	   in	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies	   or	  Africa	  in	  general	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  subject	  of	  public	  debate,	  remaining	  a	  topic	  of	  discussion	  for	   a	  narrow	  circle	  of	   experts	   and	   former	  participants.	   If	   so	   little	   connects	  us	   to	   this	  history	  today,	  why	  does	  the	  study	  of	  this	  episode	  in	  Soviet	  history	  matter?	  	  My	  personal	  source	  of	  a	  potential	  answer	  lies	  in	  a	  story	  told	  to	  me	  by	  my	  late	  grandfather,	   Moisey	   Slutskiy,	   who	   in	   1945	   was	   a	   twenty-­‐three-­‐year-­‐old	   Red	   Army	  officer	   in	   a	  mounted	   artillery	   regiment.	   My	   grandfather,	   having	   been	   present	   at	   the	  legendary	  meeting	  between	  the	  Red	  Army	  soldiers	  and	  their	  American	  counterparts	  on	  the	  Elbe,	  was	   invited	  with	  his	   fellow	  officers	   to	  a	  dance	  hosted	  by	   the	  Americans.	  He	  found	   himself	   dancing	   with	   a	   young	   American	  woman,	   who	   looked	   dark-­‐skinned.	   A	  fluent	   English	   speaker,	   my	   grandfather	   rather	   innocently	   asked	   the	   young	   woman	  whether	  she	  was	  from	  the	  South	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Instantly	  offended	  at	  his	  remark,	  the	  woman	  broke	  down	  crying,	  as	  she	  inferred	  that	  my	  grandfather’s	  question	  alluded	  to	  her	  black	  ancestry.	  The	  Americans	  accused	  my	  grandfather	  of	  insulting	  the	  woman	  by	   asking	   this	   question,	   leading	  my	   grandfather	   to	   explain	   that	   being	   black	  was	   not	  considered	  an	  insult	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Attitudes	  towards	  race	  among	  ordinary	  people	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  not	  as	  uniformly	   positive	   as	   state-­‐sponsored	   propaganda	   would	   like	   you	   to	   believe.	   There	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  discussion,	  see:	  Sovremennyi	  Etap	  Razvitiya	  Stran	  Azii	  i	  Afriki	  i	  Dvizhenie	  Solidarnosti:	  Materialy	  Siskussii.	  Ed.	  Komitet	  Solidarnosti	  Stran	  Azii	  i	  Afriki	  (Moskva:	  1991).	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  was	  also	  state-­‐sponsored	  anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  of	  which	  my	  grandfather	  himself	  was	  a	  victim.	  However,	  this	  story	  shows	  that,	  for	  millions	  of	  Soviet	  citizens,	  the	  explicitly	   non-­‐racist	   ideology	   of	   Marxism-­‐Leninism	   was	   not	   an	   empty	   slogan,	   but	  formed	   part	   of	   a	   bold	   world-­‐making	   project,	   which	   envisioned	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  socialist	  commonwealth	  where	  class	  would	  supersede	  race,	  ethnicity,	  and	  nationality.	  The	   USSR	   is	   long	   gone,	   but	   nostalgia	   for	   the	   ideals	   that	   this	   project	   represented	  remains	  with	  us	   today,	  however	   flawed	   its	   implementation.	  Unfortunately,	  debate	  on	  Soviet	  history	   in	  Russia	   is	  stifled	  by	   the	  current	  political	  elites,	  who	  often	   invoke	   the	  populism	  of	  the	  USSR	  without	  its	  egalitarianism.	  My	  intention	  is	  thus	  to	  stimulate	  free	  discussion	   of	   this	   period,	   and	   maybe	   help	   the	   new	   generation	   formulate	   a	   new	  conception	  of	  Russia’s	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  Before	  proceeding	  to	  outline	  the	  substantive	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  worth	  pausing	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  that	  has	  informed	  and	  inspired	  my	  work.	  One	  set	  of	  authors	  dealt	  specifically	  with	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC:	  their	   leaders,	   the	   twists	   and	   turns	   of	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns,	   intra-­‐movement	  feuds,	   and	   diplomatic	   strategies.	   Among	   the	   earliest	   narrators	   of	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	   were	   left-­‐wing	   European	   and	   American	   intellectuals,	   such	   as	   the	   famous	  British	  journalist	  and	  political	  activist	  Basil	  Davidson,	  who	  ventured	  into	  the	  so-­‐called	  “liberated	  areas”	  of	  Angola,	  Mozambique,	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  the	  early	  1970s	  motivated	  by	  a	  moral	  imperative	  to	  attract	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  wars.	  Given	   that	   the	   central	   premise	   of	   the	   Salazarist	   propaganda	  machine	  was	   to	   dismiss	  the	  liberation	  movements	  as	  communist	  creations,	  these	  authors	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  portray	   these	   organizations	   as	   genuinely	   popular	   and	   independent	  movements.5	  The	  Soviet	   scholarship	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	   is	   limited	   to	   accounts	   by	   journalists	  like	   Oleg	   Ignatyev,	   who	   wrote	   about	   the	   liberation	   movements	   from	   an	   insider’s	  perspective.	   If	  Western	   intellectuals	   limited	   their	   discussion	   to	   foreign	   influences	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Basil	  Davidson,	   In	  the	  Eye	  of	   the	  Storm:	  Angola's	  People	   	   (Harmondsworth:	   1975);	  Basil	  Davidson,	  The	  Liberation	  of	  
Guiné:	   Aspects	   of	   an	   African	   Revolution	   	   (Harmondsworth:	   Penguin,	   1969);	   Barbara	   Cornwall,	   The	   Bush	   Rebels:	   a	  
Personal	  Account	  of	  Black	  Revolt	  in	  Africa	  	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1972);	  Iain	  Christie,	  Samora	  Machel:	  
a	  Biography.	   2nd	   (London:	   Panaf,	   1989);	   Patrick	   Chabal,	  Amilcar	  Cabral:	  Revolutionary	  Leadership	  and	  People's	  War.	  African	  studies	  series	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1983).	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  the	   liberation	   movements,	   Soviet	   journalists,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   often	   highlighted	   a	  connection	   between	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns	   and	   the	   international	   communist	  movement,	  and	  did	  not	  shy	  away	   from	  underlining	  Soviet	  contributions	   to	   the	  cause.	  Both	   pictured	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	   in	   a	   very	   positive	   light,	   often	  paying	   very	   little	   attention	   to	   more	   controversial	   aspects	   of	   the	   struggle. 6 	  John	  Marcum’s	   two-­‐volume	   Angolan	   Revolution	   is	   a	   notable	   exception,	   as	   he	   provided	   a	  fairly	   impartial	   account	  of	  Angola’s	   liberation	  movement	  prior	   to	  1975,	  unrivalled	   in	  detail	  and	  coverage.7	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   recent	   trends	   has	   been	   to	   re-­‐examine	   the	   history	   of	   the	  liberation	   struggles	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   subalterns,	   to	   look	   at	   the	   traumatic	  experiences	  of	  common	  people	  as	  they	  faced	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  colonial	  system	  and	  the	  coercion	  of	  the	  guerrillas.8	  Overall,	  this	  represents	  one	  aspect	  of	  a	  broader	  tendency	  to	  write	   more	   critically	   about	   the	   heavily	   mythologized	   history	   of	   the	   liberation	  movement.	  Examples	   include	   such	  works	  as	  Mustafa	  Dhada’s	  Warriors	  at	  Work,	   João	  Cabrita’s	   The	   Torturous	   Road	   to	   Democracy,	   and	   Lara	   Pawson’s	   In	   the	   Name	   of	   the	  
People,	  even	  though	  the	  political	  views	  and	  interpretations	  of	  these	  authors	  are	  quite	  different.9	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   enthusiasm	   for	   individual	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  has	  dried	  up,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  Sarah	  LeFanu’s	  biography	  of	  Mozambique’s	  first	   president	   Samora	   Machel,	   S	   for	   Samora,	   or	   by	   the	   publication	   of	   numerous	  volumes	  on	  the	  PAIGC’s	  first	  leader,	  Amílcar	  Cabral.10	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  Angolan	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   Próprio	   (1962-­‐1977):	   Ensaio	   de	   História	   Política.	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  Press	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  João	  M.	  Cabrita,	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  Road	  to	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  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave,	  2000);	  Lara	  Pawson,	  In	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  Angola's	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  (London:	  I.B.	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  2014).	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  Sarah	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   A	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   Samora	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   (London:	   Hurst	   &	   Company,	   2012);	   John	  Fobanjong	  and	  Thomas	  Ranuga,	  The	  Life,	  Thought,	  and	  Legacy	  of	  Cape	  Verde's	  Freedom	  Fighter	  Amilcar	  Cabral	  (1924-­‐
1973):	   essays	   on	   his	   liberation	   philosophy	   	   (Lewiston,	   N.Y.:	   Edwin	   Mellen	   Press,	   2006);	   Carlos	   Lopes,	   Africa's	  
Contemporary	  Challenges:	   the	   Legacy	   of	  Amilcar	  Cabral	   	   (London:	   Routledge,	   2010);	   Firoze	  Manji,	   ed.	  Claim	  No	  Easy	  
Victories:	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Amilcar	  Cabral	  2013).	  
	   14	  While	  scholarship	  on	  the	  liberation	  movements	  is	  quite	  substantial,	  the	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  has	  not	  received	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  attention.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  Western	  scholars	  studying	  Soviet	  interventions	  in	  southern	  Africa	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  was	  to	  analyze	  the	  reasons	  for	  interventions	  and	  to	  predict	  future	  behavior.	   Some	   observed	   that	   Soviet	   policy	   was	   essentially	   expansionist,	   driven	   by	  competition	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  conducted	  through	  so-­‐called	  proxies,	  such	  as	  the	   GDR,	   Bulgaria,	   Czechoslovakia,	   and	   Cuba.11 	  Others	   attempted	   to	   analyze	   the	  trajectory	  of	  Soviet	  views	  on	  the	  liberation	  movements	  with	  a	  bit	  more	  complexity	  by	  looking	  at	  publicly	  available	  documents.	  Galia	  Golan,	   for	  example,	  managed	  to	  trace	  a	  long	   record	   of	   internal	   Soviet	   debates	   about	   the	   liberation	  movements,	  with	   the	   so-­‐called	  dogmatists,	  who	  often	  favored	  support	  for	  the	  movements	  as	  manifestations	  of	  worldwide	  revolution,	  aligned	  against	  the	  realists	  or	  pragmatists,	  who	  were	  generally	  skeptical	   about	   the	   revolutionary	  potential	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements.12	  Mark	  Katz	  surveyed	  the	  military	   literature	  on	  the	  subject	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  Soviet	  military	  were	  enthusiastic	  supporters	  of	  wars	  of	  national	  liberation,	  with	  the	  party	  leadership	  coming	  around	   to	  accept	   the	  military's	   view	   in	   the	  1970s	  after	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  reached	  nuclear	  parity	  with	  the	  United	  States.13	  Soviet	  involvement	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  MPLA	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  numerous	  studies,	  with	  each	  author	  giving	  different	  weights	  to	  ideology	  vs.	  strategic	  interests,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  competition	  with	  the	  US	  vs.	  with	  China	  in	  Soviet	  considerations,	  but	  with	  all	  underlining	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  become	  more	  assertive	  in	  the	  1970s	  because	  of	  changes	  in	  strategic	  capabilities.14	  One	  problem	  with	  these	  case	  studies,	   like	  David	  Kempton’s	  Soviet	  Strategy	  Towards	  Southern	  Africa,	  was	  the	  attempt	   to	  view	   the	  practice	  of	   Soviet	  policy	   in	  Africa	   through	  a	  political	   science	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   example:	   Alvin	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  Moscow's	   Third	  World	   Strategy	   	   (Princeton,	   New	   Jersey:	   Princeton	   University	  Press,	   1988);	   Richard	   Shultz,	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Revolutionary	   Warfare:	   Principles,	   Practices	   and	   Regional	  
Comparisons	  	  (Standord:	  Hoover	  Institution	  Press,	  1988).	  12	  Galia	   Golan,	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  National	  Liberation	  Movements	   in	   the	  Third	  World	   	   (Boston,	  MA:	   Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1988).	  13	  Mark	  Katz,	  The	  Third	  World	  in	  Soviet	  Military	  Thought	  	  (Baltimore,	  MD:	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1982).	  14	  The	  substantive	  works	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  Colin	  Legum	  and	  Tony	  Hodges,	  After	  Angola:	  the	  War	  over	  Southern	  Africa	  	  (London,:	  1976);	  Arthur	  Jay	  Klinghoffer,	  The	  Angolan	  War:	  a	  Study	  in	  Soviet	  Policy	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  Westview	  Studies	  on	  Africa	  (Boulder,	   Colo.:	   Westview	   Press,	   1980);	   Keith	   Somerville,	   Angola:	   Politics,	   Economics	   and	   Society.	   Marxist	   Regimes	  Series	   (London:	   Pinter,	   1986);	   Fernando	   Andresen	   Guimarães,	   The	   Origins	   of	   the	   Angolan	   Civil	   War:	   Foreign	  
Intervention	  and	  Domestic	  Political	  Conflict	  	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave,	  2001).	  
	   15	  framework.15	  Yet	   another	   problem	  was	   the	   lack	   of	   any	  primary	   sources,	   since	   Soviet	  archives	   were	   inaccessible,	   which	   meant	   that	   most	   of	   the	   narrative	   was	   inevitably	  based	  on	  conjecture.	  	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  transformed	  the	  literature	  on	  Soviet	  engagement	  with	   the	   liberation	   movements	   in	   two	   important	   ways.	   One	   trend	   has	   been	   to	  rediscover	  the	  role	  of	  ideology	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Arne	  Westad	  argued	  in	  
The	   Global	   Cold	  War	   that	   both	   superpowers	   were	   driven	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   Third	  World	  because	  of	   their	   respective	   ideologies,	   but	  Westad	  also	  went	  much	   further	  by	  explaining	   how	   Third	   World	   elites	   responded	   to	   and	   aligned	   themselves	   with	   the	  competing	   ideologies,	   often	   with	   devastating	   consequences.	   Westad	   devoted	   one	  chapter	   to	   the	  Cold	  War	   interventions	   in	  southern	  Africa	  and	  reconstructs	  a	  detailed	  narrative	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  Angola	  following	  the	  1974	  coup	  d'état	  in	  Lisbon.	  He	  explained	  Soviet	   interventions	   in	   Africa	   through	   the	   change	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   strategic	  capabilities	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  1970s,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  confidence	  in	  the	  prospects	  of	  socialism	  felt	  by	  the	  cadres	  of	  the	  International	  Department	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  His	  discussion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Angola	  –	  based	  on	  a	  unique	  collection	   of	   primary	   sources	   and	   interviews	   with	   former	   participants	   –	   depicted	   a	  slow	   build-­‐up	   of	   assistance	   to	   the	   MPLA,	   with	   Fidel	   Castro	   constantly	   prodding	  Moscow	   to	   commit	   greater	   resources	   to	   the	   cause,	   and	   with	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	  finally	   opting	   for	   all-­‐out	   assistance	   after	   the	   invasion	   by	   the	   South	   African	   Defense	  Force	  in	  October	  1975.16	  
Conflicting	  Missions	   by	  Piero	  Gleijeses	   is	   an	   excellent	   example	   of	   the	   trend	   to	  recover	   the	   importance	   of	   regional	   or	   non-­‐superpower	   actors	   in	   the	   Cold	   War.	   He	  convincingly	  argues	   that	  Cuba’s	  assistance	   to	   revolutions	   in	  Africa	  had	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	   instructions	   from	   Moscow,	   but	   that	   Fidel	   Castro	   fashioned	   himself	   as	   a	  revolutionary	  leader	  in	  his	  own	  terms,	  and	  that	  Cubans	  sacrificed	  much	  more	  than	  the	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  Daniel	   Kempton,	   Soviet	   Strategy	   toward	   Southern	   Africa:	   the	   National	   Liberation	   Movement	   Connection	   	   (London:	  Praeger,	  1989).	  16	  Odd	   Arne	   Westad,	   The	   Global	   Cold	   War:	   Third	   World	   Interventions	   and	   the	   Making	   of	   our	   Times	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  
	   16	  Soviets	  had	  ever	  done	   for	   the	  cause	  of	   liberation	  and	  revolutionary	  change	   in	  Africa.	  Gleijeses	   disagrees	   with	  Westad	   about	   certain	   aspects	   of	   Cuban	   involvement	   in	   the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War,	  taking	  issue	  in	  particular	  with	  Westad’s	  argument	  that	  the	  Soviets	  threw	   their	   support	   behind	   the	   MPLA	   after	   Pretoria	   invaded	   southern	   Angola	   in	  October	  1975.17	  In	  The	  Hot	  Cold	  War,	  Vladimir	  Shubin,	  who	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  support	  of	  the	  liberation	   movements	   in	   Southern	   Africa	   as	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	  Committee	   (1969-­‐1979)	   and	   Head	   of	   the	   African	   Section	   of	   the	   CPSU	   International	  Department	  (1982-­‐1991),	  built	  his	  narrative	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  was	  productive	  and	  that	  it	  was	  motivated	  by	  the	  Leninist	  principle	  of	  proletarian	   internationalism.	   Shubin	   reminded	   us	   that	   one	   has	   to	   understand	   the	  progress	  of	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	   struggles	   in	  order	   to	   see	  what	  policy	  options	   the	  Soviet	  cadres	   actually	   had	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   liberation	   movements.	   Perhaps	   most	  importantly,	  Shubin	  recovered	  the	  contributions	  of	  many	  Soviet	  men	  (there	  were	  very	  few	   women	   at	   the	   highest	   ranks	   of	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy	   apparatus)	   –	   the	   “unsung	  heroes”	  as	  he	  calls	  them	  –	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  African	  leaders	  in	  explaining	  the	  reasons	  for	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  Southern	  Africa.18	  The	  broad	   surveys	   of	   the	  Cold	  War	  do	  not	   challenge	   the	   general	   narrative	  of	  Soviet	   intervention	   in	  Angola	  constructed	  by	  Westad	  and	  Gleijeses,	  but	  differ	   in	  their	  interpretative	   emphasis	   depending	   on	   the	   specific	   arguments	   of	   each	   author.	   	   “Why	  would	   Leonid	  Brezhnev,	   in	   his	   declining	   years,	   go	   adventuring	   in	   places	   like	  Angola,	  Mozambique,	   Somalia,	   Ethiopia,	   and	   Afghanistan?”	   asked	   John	   Lewis	   Gaddis	   in	   his	  1997	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  We	  Now	  Know.	  This	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  efforts	  of	  old	  revolutionaries,	  he	  answered	  himself,	  for	  “reasons	  more	  sentimental	  than	  rational,”	  to	  convince	  themselves	  that	  the	  compromises	  they	  had	  to	  make	  while	  coming	  to	  power	  were	   not	   all	   in	   vain,	   that	   revolution	   had	   to	   succeed.19	  In	   For	   the	   Soul	   of	   Mankind,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Piero	   Gleijeses,	   Conflicting	  Missions:	  Havana,	  Washington,	   and	  Africa,	   1959-­‐1976	   	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   University	   of	   North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2002).	  18	  Vladimir	  Shubin,	  The	  Hot	  Cold	  War:	  the	  U.S.S.R	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  	  (London:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2008).	  19	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  We	  Now	  Know:	  Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  history	  	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  187.	  
	   17	  Melvyn	  Leffler	   argues	   that	  Brezhnev	   and	  his	   comrades,	  who	   “took	   their	   communism	  seriously”	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  jeopardize	  détente,	  were	  spurred	  into	  action	  by	  Cuba’s	   leadership,	  which	   “maneuvered	   the	  Kremlin	   into	   giving	  more	   aid	   than	   Soviet	  leaders	  had	  intended,”	  and	  by	  the	  South	  African	  military	  intervention.20	  	  In	   Failed	   Empire,	   Vladislav	   Zubok	   suggests	   that	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy	   from	  Stalin	   to	   Gorbachev	   could	   be	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   “revolutionary-­‐imperial	  paradigm,”	   a	  mix	   of	   Stalin’s	  Realpolitik	   and	  Marxism-­‐Leninism.	  While	   it	   helped	   forge	  alliances	   between	   the	   ideologues,	   the	   military,	   and	   the	   managers	   of	   the	   military-­‐industrial	   complex,	   this	   paradigm	   also	   imprisoned	   the	   Soviet	   leadership,	   which	  became	  unable	   to	  walk	   away	   from	   commitments	   that	   often	   led	   to	   spending	   at	   home	  and	  adventurism	  abroad.	  Zubok	  argues	  that	  under	  Brezhnev,	  a	  certain	  myopic	  attitude	  set	  in.	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  became	  “incapable	  of	  bold	  schemes	  and	  initiatives,”	  which	  meant	  that	  it	  took	  other	  dynamic	  players,	  such	  as	  Angola’s	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  Ethiopia’s	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam,	   and	  Cuba’s	   Fidel	   Castro,	   to	   “drag	   the	   Soviet	   leaders	   into	   the	  African	  gambit.”21	  John	   Haslam,	   in	   his	   most	   recent	   study	   Russia’s	   Cold	   War,	   agrees	   with	   the	  prevailing	  view	  that	  ideology	  did	  matter	  for	  the	  Soviet	  leadership,	  but	  goes	  further	  by	  suggesting	   that	   Moscow	   often	   pursued	   a	   quite	   aggressive	   strategy	   towards	  revolutionary	  goals.	  He	  devotes	  two	  chapters	  to	  Soviet	  policy	  in	  Portugal	  after	  the	  coup	  of	  25	  April	  1974,	  arguing	  that	  Moscow	  acted	  decisively	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  “luring	  Portugal	  into	   the	  Soviet	  camp	  and,	  at	   the	  very	   least,	  ensuring	   the	  emergence	  of	   its	  colonies	   in	  Africa	   as	   states	   under	   communist	   auspices.”22	  While	   ideology	   emerges	   as	   one	   of	   the	  key	  explanatory	  variables	   for	  Soviet	  policy	   in	   southern	  Africa,	   there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  differences	  as	  to	  how	  much	  the	  Soviets	  were	  “pulled	  in”	  to	  each	  of	  these	  engagements	  by	  various	  third-­‐party	  actors.	  	  The	   historiography	   is	   thus	   heavily	   focused	   on	   the	   1970s,	   with	   the	   Soviet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Melvyn	  P.	  Leffler,	  For	  the	  Soul	  of	  Mankind:	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  2007),	  p.	  255.	  21	  Vladislav	  Zubok,	  A	  Failed	  Empire	  	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press	  	  2007),	  p.	  251.	  22	  Jonathan	  Haslam,	  Russia's	  Cold	  War:	  from	  the	  October	  Revolution	  to	  the	  Fall	  of	  the	  Wall	  	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  pp.	  286-­‐287.	  
	   18	  leadership	  depicted	  as	  being	  spurred	   into	  action	  by	  so-­‐called	  peripheral	  actors.	  Tony	  Smith	   summarized	   this	   argument	   when	   he	   wrote:	   “Moscow	   was	   long	   doubtful	   that	  Africa	  was	  an	   interesting	  place	   for	   it	   to	  pursue	   its	   interests,	   and	   it	   took	  Castro	  –	  not	  Africans	   –	   to	  persuade	  Moscow	   it	   should	  become	   involved	   there,	   something	   that	  did	  not	  occur	  until	  1975.”23	  This	  interpretation	  lacks	  any	  substantial	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  that	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   struggles	   in	   the	   former	   Portuguese	   colonies	   played	   in	   Soviet	  calculations,	  starting	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  and	  continuing	  until	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War	  in	  1975.	  More	  specifically,	   there	   is	   little	  explanation	  of	  exactly	  why	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	  and	   their	   counterparts	   in	   Czechoslovakia,	   Bulgaria,	   the	   GDR,	   and	   elsewhere	   became	  committed	  to	  supporting	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  was	  not	  clear	  from	  these	  accounts	  as	   to	  whom	  was	  driving	   this	  engagement	   forward,	  and	  how	  this	  changed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  What	  is	  more,	  there	  is	  a	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  Angola	  in	  the	  existing	  historiography,	  but	  very	  little	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	   that	   the	   liberation	  movement	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  played	   in	   Soviet	   policy	   in	  Africa.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  gaps.	  	  I	  make	  three	  main	  contributions	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	   liberation	  movements	   during	   the	  Cold	  War.	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   the	   timing	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.	  I	  argue	  that	  despite	  the	  general	  emphasis	  on	  the	  1970s,	  it	  was	  during	  a	  major	  popular	  revolt	  against	  colonial	  rule	  in	  Angola—known	  as	  the	   Angolan	   Uprising	   of	   1961—when	   the	   Cold	   War	   initially	   spread	   to	   Portuguese	  Africa.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  during	  that	  year	  that	  competition	  between	  superpowers	  over	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  originally	  began,	  spurred	  by	  demands	  for	  assistance	  from	  the	  radical	  African	  nationalists	   in	  an	  environment	  of	  mounting	   international	   tensions.	   	   It	  was	   in	  1961	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  provided	   its	   first	  assistance	  package	   to	   the	  MPLA,	  while	  the	  United	  States	  became	  committed	  to	  their	  main	  rival,	  the	  FNLA	  (or	  rather	  its	  predecessor),	   thus	   internationalizing	   the	   divisions	   befalling	   the	   Angolan	   liberation	  movement.	   This	   thesis	   thus	   contributes	   to	   what	   James	   Hershberg	   termed	   a	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  Tony	  Smith,	  "New	  Bottles	  for	  New	  Wine:	  A	  Pericentric	  Framework	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,"	  Diplomatic	  History,	  24	  4	  (2000):	  p.	  576.	  
	   19	  “retroactive	  de-­‐bipolarization”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.24	  My	   second	   contribution	   is	   towards	   a	   debate	   on	   Soviet	   goals	  and	   strategy.	   In	  terms	   of	   goals,	   I	   agree	   that	   the	   driving	   motivation	   for	   Soviet	   involvement	   with	   the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  ideological	  imperative	  of	   Marxist-­‐Leninism,	   defined	   by	   a	   system	   of	   beliefs	   that	   essentially	   envisioned	   the	  world	   in	   terms	  of	   competition	  between	   the	   two	   systems	  of	   capitalism	  and	   socialism.	  Ideological	  considerations	  were	  also	  instrumental	  in	  the	  process	  of	  selecting	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	   and	   the	   PAIGC	   for	   donor	   status	   and	   determining	   levels	   for	   assistance.	  However,	   the	   Soviet	   revolutionary	   goals	   were	   implemented	   with	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  pragmatism,	  consideration	  for	  military	  realities	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  often	  with	  a	  great	  deal	   of	   caution.	   While	   ideology	   did	   define	   the	   engagements	   with	   the	   liberation	  movements,	   this	   was	   a	   rather	   low-­‐priority	   area,	   especially	   for	   the	   members	   of	   the	  highest-­‐ranking	  organ	  in	  the	  Soviet	  hierarchy:	  the	  Politburo	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (hereafter	  CC	  CPSU).25	  My	   final	   and	   perhaps	  most	   important	   contribution	   relates	   to	   the	   question	   of	  
agency	   driving	   Soviet	   involvement	   with	   the	   liberation	   movements	   in	   the	   former	  Portuguese	   colonies.	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   was	   primarily	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  who	  pulled	  the	  superpowers	  into	  their	  struggles,	  through	  the	  relationships	  they	   forged	  with	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	   at	   various	   levels	  of	   the	  Soviet	  bureaucracy,	  including	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department,	  the	  Military,	  the	  KGB,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  diplomatic	   community.	   	   I	   show	   that	   it	   is	   only	   by	   taking	   into	   account	   these	   personal	  bonds	   that	  we	   can	  explain	  how	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  managed	   to	  sustain	   and	   expand	   the	   commitment	   of	   the	   socialist	   countries	   to	   their	   cause	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  I	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  only	  by	  considering	  the	  actions,	  urgings,	  and	  proddings	  of	  the	  MPLA	  leadership,	  the	  personal	  relationships	  forged	  at	   various	   levels	  between	   the	  Soviet	  bureaucrats	   and	   the	  African	  nationalists,	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  James	  G.	  Hershberg,	  "The	  Crisis	  Years,	  1958-­‐1963."	  Reviewing	  the	  Cold	  War:	  Approaches,	  Interpretations,	  Theory.	  Ed.	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad	  (London:	  Frank	  Cass,	  2000),	  p.	  304.	  25	  The	  Politburo	  was	  renamed	  Presidium	  at	  the	  Nineteenth	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU	  1952.	  Presidium	  was	  then	  renamed	  Politburo	  at	  the	  Twenty-­‐Third	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU	  in	  1966.	  	  	  
	   20	  and	   the	   international	   environment	   that	   one	   can	  understand	   the	  pivotal	   event	   in	   this	  thesis:	  the	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War	  in	  1975.	  	  The	   full	   story	   of	   this	   period	   remains	   buried	   in	   the	   archives	   of	   the	   Russian	  Federation,	  because	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Soviet-­‐era	  documents	  for	  this	  period	  and	  topic	  are	  still	   classified.	  Of	   the	   few	  resources	   that	  are	  available,	   I	  have	  used	   the	  records	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Committee	  for	  Solidarity	  with	  the	  Countries	  of	  Asia	  and	  Africa	  (SKSNAA	  or	  Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee;	   Sovetskiy	   Komitet	   Solidarnosti	   s	   Narodami	   Azii	   i	   Afriki)	  located	  at	   the	  State	  Archive	  of	   the	  Russian	  Federation	  (GARF;	  Gosudarstvennyi	  Arkhiv	  
Rossiiskoi	  Federatsii).	  I	  also	  looked	  at	  the	  newly	  declassified	  records	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	   Youth	   Organizations	   (KMO;	   Komitet	   Molodezhnykh	   Organizatskiy)	   at	   the	   Russian	  State	   Archive	   of	   Socio-­‐Political	   History	   (RGASPI;	   Rossiiskii	   Gosudarsvennyi	   Arkhiv	  
Sotsialno-­‐politicheskoi	  Istorii)	  and	  documents	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  partially	   declassified	   at	   the	   Archive	   of	   Foreign	   Policy	   of	   the	   Russian	   Federation	  (AVPRF;	  Arkhiv	  Vneshnei	  Politiki	  Rossiiskoi	  Federatsii).	  While	   records	   of	   the	   CC	   CPSU	  for	   this	   period	   remain	   largely	   classified,	   I	   have	   used	   documents	   of	   the	   CPSU	  Propaganda	  Department	   and	   those	   collected	  under	   the	   title	   “fond	  89,”	  housed	  at	   the	  Russian	   State	   Archive	   of	   Contemporary	   History	   (RGANI;	   Rossiiskii	   Gosudarsvennyi	  
Arkhiv	  Noveishei	  Istorii).	  The	  files	  of	  the	  two	  main	  Soviet	  intelligence	  services,	  the	  First	  Directorate	   of	   the	   Committee	   for	   State	   Security	   (KGB;	   Komitet	   Gosudarstvennoy	  
Bezopasnosti)	   and	   the	   Chief	   Intelligence	   Directorate	   (GRU;	   Glavnoe	   Razvedyvatelnoe	  
Upravlenie),	   remain	   completely	   closed.	   To	   at	   least	   partially	   fill	   those	   gaps,	   I	   have	  looked	   at	   the	   archives	   of	   the	   former	   ruling	   communist	   parties	   of	   the	   German	  Democratic	   Republic,	   Czechoslovakia,	   Bulgaria,	   and	   Poland.	   I	   have	   to	   specifically	  acknowledge	   the	   records	   of	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Security	   Services	   (StB;	   Státní	  
Bezpečnost)	   for	   their	   help	   in	   partially	   reconstructing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   intelligence	  services	  in	  this	  story.26	  	  I	   have	   also	   greatly	   benefited	   from	   the	  memoirs	   of	   the	   former	   Soviet	   cadres,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  the	  full	  list	  of	  archives	  used	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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  such	  as	  Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  Vasiliy	  Solodovnikov,	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	  Alexander	  Dzasokhov,	  Vadim	  Kirpichenko,	  Georgiy	  Kornienko,	  Anatoliy	  Chernyaev,	  and	  Karen	  Brutents,	  who	  were	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another	   involved	   with	   the	   liberation	   movements	   during	   this	  period.27	  As	   for	   primary	   sources	   on	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   I	   used	   collections	   of	  documents,	  interviews,	  and	  memoirs	  by	  former	  participants,	  such	  as	  the	  MPLA’s	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  FRELIMO’s	  Joaquim	  Chissano,	  Sérgio	  Vieira,	  and	  the	  PAIGC’s	  Aristides	  Pereira.28	  While	   the	   historical	   record	   is	   far	   from	   complete,	   the	   partial	   opening	   of	   the	   archives,	  especially	   in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  allows	  us	  to	  reconstruct	  a	  more	  detailed	  story	  of	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  African	  colonies.	  	  Chapter	   One	   offers	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   as	   to	   why	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  Czechoslovakia	  offered	  assistance	  to	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  1961,	  the	  same	  year	  that	  Angola	  erupted	  into	  spasms	  of	  racial	  violence	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	   locked	   horns	   over	   the	   status	   of	  West	   Berlin.	   It	   argues	   that	   1961	  was	   the	   key	  moment	  when	  the	  Cold	  War	  spread	  to	  Portuguese	  colonies,	  because	  it	  was	  during	  this	  year	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  aligned	  with	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  United	  States	  with	  the	  rival	  group	  UPA,	  establishing	  the	   ideologically-­‐charged	  system	  of	  alliances	   in	  the	  region.	   It	  also	  shows	  that	  from	  this	  time	  onwards	  there	  gradually	  emerged	  a	  group	  of	  people	  –	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	  across	  various	  departments	  -­‐	  who	  become	  personally	  invested	  in	  the	  cause.	  	  Chapter	   Two	   traces	   the	   trajectories	   of	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns	  waged	   by	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  between	  1963	  and	  1966	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  military	   strategy.	   It	   shows	   that	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  managed	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 	  For	   recollections	   of	   Soviet	   diplomats	   who	   worked	   in	   Africa	   including	   Petr	   Yevsyukov,	   Pavel	   Danilov,	   Vasiliy	  Solodovnikov,	  and	  others,	  see	  a	  three-­‐volume	  collection	  published	  by	  the	  Africa	  Institute	  in	  Moscow:	  Aleksey	  Vasilyev,	  ed.	   Afrika	   v	   Vospominaniiakh	   Veteranov	  Diplomaticheskoi	   Sluzhby.	   3	   vols	   (Moscow:	   Institut	   Afriki	   RAN,	   2000-­‐2004);	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	  "V	  Ognennom	  Koltse	  Blokady."	  Vneshnyaya	  Razvedka.	  Ed.	  Vladimir	  Karpov	  (Moscow:	  XXI	  Vek-­‐Soglasie,	  2000);	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin,	   "Superderzhavy	   i	   Sobytiya	   v	   Angole,"	   Novaya	   i	   Noveyshaya	   istoriya,	   4	   	   (2005);	   Vadim	  Kirpichenko,	   Razvedka:	   Litsa	   i	   Lichnosti	   (Moscow:	   Geya,	   1998);	   Karen	   Brutents,	   Tridtsat'	   Let	   na	   Staroy	   Ploshchadi	  	  (Moscow:	   Mezhdunarodnye	   otnosheniya,	   1998);	   Georgiy	   Kornienko,	   Kholodnaia	   Voina:	   Svidetel'stvo	   ee	   Uchastnika	  	  (Moscow:	   OLMA	   Press,	   2001);	   Anatoliy	   Chernyaev,	   Sovmestnyi	   Iskhod:	   Dnevnik	   Dvukh	   Epokh,	   1972-­‐1991	   	   (Moscow:	  Rosspen,	  2008);	  Aleksander	  Dzasokhov,	  Chelovek	  i	  Politika	  	  (Moscow:	  Rossiyskaya	  Gaseta,	  2009).	  28	  For	  an	  official	  history	  of	  the	  MPLA,	  see	  a	  three-­‐volume	  collection	  of	  documents	  compiled	  by	  Lúcio	  Lara:	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  ed.	  Um	  Amplo	  Movimento:	   Itinerário	  do	  MPLA	  Através	  de	  Documentos	   e	  Anotações	  3vols	   (Luanda:	   Lúcio	   e	   Ruth	   Lara,	  1997-­‐2008);	   Lúcio	   Lara:	   Tchiweka:	   Imagens	   de	   um	   Percurso...	   80	   anos...até	   à	   Conquista	   da	   Independência	   	   (Luanda:	  Associação	  Tchiweka	  de	  Documentação,	  2009);	  Sérgio	  Vieira,	  Participei,	  por	  isso	  Testemunho.	  3	  (Maputo:	  Ndjira,	  2011);	  José	  Vicente	   Lopes,	  Aristides	  Pereira:	  Minha	  Vida,	  Nossa	  História	   	   (Lisboa:	   Spleen,	   2012);	  Drumond	   Jaime	   and	  Hélder	  Barber,	   eds.,	   Angola:	   Depoimentos	   Para	   a	   História	   Recente	   	   (Luanda:	   Edição	   dos	   Autores,	   1999);	   Tor	   Sellström,	   ed.	  
Liberation	  in	  Southern	  Africa:	  Regional	  and	  Swedish	  voices	  	  (Uppsala:	  Nordiska	  Afrikainstitutet,	  1999).	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  sustain	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  socialist	  countries	  to	  their	  cause	  by	  means	  of	  vigorous	  diplomacy,	   and	   shows	   that	   Nikita	   Khrushchev’s	   fall	   from	   power	   in	   October	   1964	  actually	   led	   to	   the	  expansion	  of	  Soviet	  aid	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements.	  This	   chapter	  also	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  during	  this	  period	  that	  the	  Soviet	  military	  became	  increasingly	  engaged	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  Chapter	   Three	   looks	   at	   the	   ideological	   and	   organizational	   transformations	   of	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  between	  1966	  and	  1970,	  and	  analyzes	  the	  reaction	  of	   the	   Soviet	   cadres	   to	   these	   changes.	   It	   shows	   that	  while	   the	  Soviets	  were	   skeptical	  about	   the	   revolutionary	   prospects	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements	   around	   1966,	   their	  attitudes	  changed	  because	  they	  saw	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  were	  increasingly	   adopting	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   ideology	   and	   certain	   organizational	   practices	  that	   borrowed,	   at	   least	   in	   rhetorical	   terms,	   from	   the	   Soviet	   experience.	   These	  experiences,	   coupled	   with	   the	   successes	   of	   the	   Soviet-­‐backed	   North	   Vietnamese	  regime,	  meant	  that	  by	  1969,	  the	  cadres	  of	  the	  CPSU	  International	  Department	  became	  quite	  optimistic	  about	  the	  revolutionary	  prospects	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	  	  Chapter	  Four	  builds	  on	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  explaining	  why	  this	  growing	  confidence	  provided	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  Soviet	  aid	  to	  the	  liberation	   efforts	   in	   the	   early	   1970s.	   It	   then	   proceeds	   to	   explain	   how	   not	   only	   the	  international	   environment,	   but	   also	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   colonial	   wars	   (which	   saw	  major	  Portuguese	  offensives	  in	  all	  three	  territories)	  frustrated	  the	  Soviet	  expectations	  for	  serious	  advances	   in	   the	  Portuguese	  colonies.	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  years	  1970-­‐1974	  –	  the	  peak	  of	  détente	   	  –	  was	  actually	  a	  period	  of	   frustrated	  expectations	  for	  the	  Soviets	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	  	  Chapter	  Five	   shows	  how	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	   responded	   to	  events	   following	  the	  25	  April	  1974	  coup	   in	  Lisbon.	   It	  argues	  that	   the	  Soviets	  were	  very	  anxious	  about	  developments	   in	   Portugal	   and	   tried	   to	   tread	   very	   carefully	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	  Portuguese	   communists	   part	   of	   the	  political	   process,	  which	   constrained	   their	   role	   in	  the	  decolonization	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	  Mozambique.	   Chapter	   Five	   also	   reveals	   that	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  the	  Soviet	  decision	  to	  arm	  the	  MPLA	  in	  late	  1974	  was	  inspired	  by	  their	  anxieties	  about	  an	   international	   conspiracy	  underway	   in	  Angola,	   a	  belief	   consistently	   spurred	  by	   the	  MPLA,	  which	  was	  locked	  in	  a	  bitter	  and	  increasingly	  violent	  competition	  with	  the	  local	  rivals.	  It	  shows	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  April,	  some	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	  who	  had	  already	  been	   invested	   in	   the	  political	   fate	  of	   the	  MPLA	  became	   increasingly	  skeptical	  about	  a	  non-­‐violent	   solution	   in	   Angola	   and	   thus	   campaigned	   for	   greater	   commitment,	  ultimately	   swinging	   the	   general	   consensus	   in	   favor	   of	   all-­‐out	   support	   following	  independence	   on	   11	  November	   1975.	   The	   conclusion	   positions	   the	   history	   of	   Soviet	  involvement	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  a	  broader	  framework.	  What	   follows	   is	   the	   story	   of	   fourteen	   years	   of	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns,	   of	   the	  people	   who	   led	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   movements	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies,	   the	  bureaucrats	  they	  encountered	  in	  Moscow,	  East	  Berlin,	  Prague,	  Sofia,	  and	  Warsaw,	  and	  the	   international	   environment	   they	   faced.	   On	   one	   level,	   this	   thesis	   investigates	   the	  policies	   adopted	  by	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   communist	   parties	   in	  Moscow,	  East	  Berlin,	  Prague,	  and	  Warsaw	  towards	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.	  It	   investigates	   their	   goals	   and	   tactics,	   but	   also	   the	   personal	   relationships	   developed	  between	  cadres	  in	  the	  capitals	  of	  the	  socialist	  countries	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  national	  liberation	   movements.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   study	   of	   decolonization	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.	   It	  explains	  how	  nationalist	   leaders	   from	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  used	  the	   international	  environment	  to	  advance	  their	  cause	  by	  means	  of	  war	  and	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  how	  this	  environment	  affected	  their	  struggle.	  The	  title	  of	  this	  dissertation	  –	  Our	  Sacred	  
Duty	   –	   is	   a	   direct	   quotation	   from	   the	  main	   instigator	   of	   Soviet	   involvement	  with	   the	  liberation	  movements,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  but	   is	  also	  an	  allusion,	  describing	  how	  the	  cadres	   in	   the	   socialist	   countries	   viewed	   their	   commitment	   during	   this	   time	   period.	  Before	  going	  any	   further,	   I	  pause	  briefly	   to	  outline	   the	  Soviet	  views	  on	  the	   liberation	  movements	   in	   historical	   context	   and	   the	   development	   of	   the	   national	   liberation	  movements	  in	  Portuguese	  Africa.	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Soviet	  Policy	  towards	  the	  Liberation	  Movements:	  from	  Lenin	  to	  Khrushchev	  The	   founder	   of	   the	   Russian	   Bolshevik	   Party,	   Vladimir	   Ilyich	   Lenin,	   first	  developed	  his	  views	  on	  national	  liberation	  movements	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  in	  essays	  and	  works	   such	  as	   Imperialism:	  the	  Highest	  Stage	  of	  Capitalism	   and	  Notebooks	  
on	  Imperialism.	  He	  believed	  that	   the	  proletariat	  must	  help	  oppressed	  nations	  achieve	  political	   separation.	   “Otherwise,	   the	   internationalism	   of	   the	   proletariat	   would	   be	  nothing	  but	  empty	  words,”	  wrote	  Lenin	  in	  an	  essay	  published	  in	  1916.29	  Lenin	  believed	  that	   the	   national	   liberation	   movements	   in	   the	   “underdeveloped,	   backward,	   and	  oppressed	   nations”	   complemented	   the	   struggle	   of	   the	   proletariat	   against	   the	  bourgeoisie	  in	  the	  advanced	  countries.30	  	  The	  Bolsheviks	   seized	  power	   in	  Russia	   on	  25	  October	  1917,	   and	  Lenin	   could	  thus	  transform	  theory	   into	  practice.	  At	   the	   international	  meeting	  of	  communists	  held	  from	  2	  to	  6	  March	  1919,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Russian	  Civil	  War,	  Lenin	  and	  his	  comrades	  founded	  the	  Third	  International	  (hereafter	  the	  Comintern),	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   communist	   revolution,	   deemed	   crucial	   to	   the	   survival	   of	   Soviet	  Russia.	  Under	  the	  strict	  control	  of	  the	  Bolsheviks,	  the	  Comintern	  grew	  into	  a	  massive	  and	   complex	   organization,	   which	   recruited,	   trained,	   and	   funded	   communist	   cells	  around	   the	   world	   in	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s.	   In	   Africa,	   Lenin	   attributed	   the	   greatest	  importance	  to	  South	  Africa:	  as	  the	  most	  industrialized	  country	  on	  the	  continent,	  it	  had	  the	  greatest	  potential	   for	  a	   socialist	   revolution.	   In	  August	  1921,	  a	  number	  of	  Marxist	  organizations	  in	  South	  Africa	  established	  a	  united	  party	  called	  “The	  Communist	  Party	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Section	  of	  the	  Communist	  International.”	  In	  early	  1922,	  the	  party	  was	  admitted	   into	   the	   Comintern.31	  In	   1928,	   the	   Comintern	   founded	   the	   International	  Trade	   Union	   Committee	   of	   Negro	  Workers	   (ITUCNW)	   as	   a	   sub-­‐section	   of	   the	   trade	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  Quoted	  in	  Kevin	  Anderson,	  Lenin,	  Hegel	  and	  Western	  Marxixm:	  a	  Critical	  Study	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  140.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.	  143.	  31	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  Comintern	  and	  its	  activities	  in	  South	  Africa	  see:	  Irina	  Filatova	  and	  Apollon	  Davidson,	  
The	  Hidden	  Thread:	  Russia	  and	  South	  Africa	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Era	  	  (Johannesburg:	  Jonathan	  	  Ball	  Publishers,	  2013).	  
	   25	  union	  movement,	   in	  order	  to	  promote	  revolution	  among	  the	  black	  populations	  of	   the	  USA,	  the	  West	  Indies,	  and	  “Black	  Africa.”	  George	  Padmore,	  a	  black	  Trinidadian	  activist	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  US	  Communist	  Party,	  was	  appointed	  its	  organizing	  secretary.	  	  Lenin’s	  successor	  –	   the	  General	  Secretary	  of	   the	  CC	  CPSU,	   Joseph	  Stalin	  –	  also	  believed	   in	   providing	   support	   for	   the	   worldwide	   communist	   revolution,	   but	   he	   was	  increasingly	   concerned	   with	   safeguarding	   the	   interests	   of	   Soviet	   Russia,	   especially	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  increasingly	  imminent	  security	  threat	  emanating	  from	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  in	  the	  1930s.	  This	  danger	  demanded	  that	  Stalin	  improve	  relations	  with	   Britain	   and	   France,	   both	   major	   colonial	   powers.	   The	   Comintern	   therefore	  drastically	   curtailed	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   ITUCNW,	   with	   articles	   on	   colonial	   matters	  almost	  disappearing	  from	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  Negro	  Worker	  in	  1933.	  Padmore,	  like	  many	  other	   black	   revolutionaries,	   Communist	   and	   non-­‐Communist	   alike,	   felt	   betrayed	   by	  what	  they	  perceived	  as	  Stalin’s	  betrayal	  of	  the	  black	  liberation	  struggle.	  Padmore	  thus	  resigned	  from	  the	  ITUCNW,	  an	  act	  of	  disobedience	  for	  which	  he	  was	  officially	  expelled	  from	  the	  Communist	  movement	   in	  February	  1934.32	  Padmore	  became	  very	  critical	  of	  Stalin’s	  policies,	  like	  many	  of	  his	  generation,	  but	  still	  retained	  faith	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   the	   merits	   of	   a	   socialist	   planned	   economy.	   The	   ranks	   of	   the	   Comintern	   were	  thoroughly	   purged	   in	   the	   late	   1930s,	   and	   the	   Comintern	   was	   officially	   abolished	   in	  1943	   because	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   and	   Stalin's	   prioritizing	   the	  maintenance	  of	  good	  relations	  with	  his	  allies	   in	  the	  Grand	  Alliance	  did	  not	  match	  the	  Comintern’s	  goal	  of	  promoting	  a	  worldwide	  communist	  revolution.	  Consumed	  by	  post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   and	   mounting	   tensions	   between	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   the	  West	  after	   the	  Second	  World	  War,	  Stalin	   remained	  uninterested	   in	  other	  powers'	   colonies.	  Soviet	  policy	  thus	  remained	  unchanged	  until	  his	  death	  on	  5	  March	  1953.	  	  The	  renewal	  of	  Soviet	   interest	   in	   the	  Third	  World	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Nikita	  Sergeevich	   Khrushchev,	   who	   succeeded	   Stalin	   in	   the	   post	   of	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   General	  Secretary	   (renamed “First	   Secretary”	   in	   1953).	   Khrushchev	   believed	   that	   the	   Soviet	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  James	  Young,	  Socialism	  Since	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   26	  Union	  should	  provide	  developmental	  assistance	  and	  advice	  to	  the	  newly	  independent	  states.	  On	  a	  lengthy	  state	  visit	  to	  India	  in	  1955,	  Khrushchev’s	  challenged	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	   capitalist	   states	   to	   “verify	   in	   practice	   whose	   system	   is	   better”	   and	   “compete	  without	   war.”33	  His	   first	   major	   success	   came	   in	   September	   1955,	   when	   Egyptian	  president	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser	  announced	  an	  agreement,	  brokered	  by	  Khrushchev,	   to	  purchase	  some	  $320	  million	  worth	  of	  Soviet-­‐made	  weapons	  from	  Czechoslovakia.	  	  Khrushchev’s	   interest	   in	   the	   developing	   world	   was	   primarily	   rooted	   in	  pragmatism.	   He	   realized	   that	   decolonization	   gave	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   a	   perfect	  opportunity	  to	  “extend	  a	  helping	  hand”	  to	  leaders	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	  states	  and,	  thus,	  win	  new	  friends	  for	  the	  Soviet	  side.34	  However,	  that	  was	  not	  his	  only	  motivation.	  While	   the	   prospects	   of	   socialism	   in	   the	   Western	   hemisphere	   were	   dim,	   the	   newly	  independent	   states	   provided	   a	   new	   frontier.	   Khrushchev	   saw	   that	   many	   nationalist	  leaders	   proclaimed	   their	   adherence	   to	  Marxism,	   which	  made	   him	   conclude	   that	   the	  chances	  of	  socialism	  developing	  in	  those	  countries	  were	  high.	  “There,	   in	  the	  colonies,	  the	   almost	   forgotten	   dream	   of	   revolution	   was	   reborn.	   It	   seemed	   to	   father	   that	   the	  world	  was	   beginning	   to	   stir,	   that	  with	   only	   a	   small	   effort	   there	  would	   be	   progress,”	  recalled	  Khrushchev’s	  son	  Sergey.35	  It	   was	   not	   by	   chance	   that	   Czechoslovakia	   became	   the	   intermediary	   for	  Khrushchev’s	   deal	  with	  Nasser.	  When	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Czechoslovakia	   (CPC)	  took	   absolute	   control	   of	   the	   country	   in	   February	   1948,	   Czechoslovakia	   already	   had	  commercial	   relations	   with	   several	   African	   countries,	   including	   Ethiopia,	   the	   Belgian	  Congo,	  Nigeria,	  and	  South	  Africa.	  By	  the	  late	  1950s,	  Czechoslovakia	  had	  also	  developed	  an	  advanced	  arms	  manufacturing	  industry,	  having	  previously	  supplied	  weapons	  to	  the	  Little	  Entente—including	  Czechoslovakia,	  Romania,	   and	  Yugoslavia—in	   the	  1920s,	   to	  Soviet	  Russia	  in	  the	  1930s,	  and	  to	  Israel	  in	  1948.	  Moreover,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CPC,	   Antonín	   Novotný,	   was	   not	   a	   popular	   figure	   at	   home	   and	   relied	   on	   continuous	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  Quoted	  in	  Alexander	  Fursenko	  and	  Timothy	  Naftali,	  Khrushchev's	  Cold	  War:	  the	  Inside	  Story	  of	  an	  American	  Adversary.	  1st	  (New	  York:	  Norton,	  2006),	  p.	  57.	  34	  Georgiy	  Mirskiy,	  "Na	  	  znamenatel'nom	  rubezhe,"	  Vostok,	  	  6	  (1996):	  131.	  35	  Sergey	   Khrushchev,	  Nikita	   Khrushchev:	   Creation	   of	   a	   Superpower	   	   (University	   Park:	   Pennsylvania	   State	   University	  Press,	  2000),	  p.	  436.	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  support	   from	   Moscow.	   Khrushchev’s	   new	   policy	   in	   the	   Third	   World	   thus	   allowed	  Novotný	   and	   the	   CC	   CPC	   Politburo	   to	   carve	   out	   a	   new	   significant	   role	   for	  Czechoslovakia,	  both	  in	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  and	  in	  the	  international	  arena.36	  The	   leadership	   of	   the	   Bulgarian	   Communist	   Party	   (BCP)	   also	   became	   quite	  interested	   in	   Africa	   for	   reasons	   that	  were	   quite	   similar	   to	   the	   Czechoslovaks.	   Todor	  Zhivkov,	  the	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  BPC	  in	  power	  since	  1954,	  had	  staked	  his	  political	  career	   on	   close	   relations	   with	   the	   Soviet	   leadership.	   Bulgaria,	   thus,	   followed	   Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  to	  the	  letter.	  The	  BCP	  had	  had	  long-­‐standing	  connections	  with	  the	  CPSU,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  cadres	  coming	  of	  age	  during	  the	  interwar	  period,	  and	  a	  few	  had	  been	   involved	   in	   the	  Comintern’s	  activities	  abroad.	  One	  example	  was	  Dimo	  Dichev,	  a	  long-­‐time	   functionary	   in	   the	   BCP,	   who	   in	   the	   1960s	   became	   the	   head	   of	   the	   BCP’s	  “Foreign	   Policy	   and	   International	   Relations	   Department”	   (hereafter	   the	   Bulgarian	  International	   Department),	   the	   Bulgarian	   equivalent	   of	   the	   CPSU’s	   International	  Department.	   Having	   spent	   most	   of	   his	   youth	   in	   prison	   for	   his	   participation	   in	   the	  communist	  underground,	  Dichev	  moved	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  study	  and	  then	  served	  in	   the	  Red	  Brigades	  during	   the	  1936-­‐1939	  Spanish	  Civil	  War.37	  While	  one	  example	   is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  generalize	  about	  the	  experiences	  of	  every	  member	  of	  the	  BCP’s	  Central	  Committee,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  many	  Eastern	  European	  communists	  had	  shared	   similar	   experiences,	   which	   made	   them	   share	   the	   worldview	   of	   their	   Soviet	  counterparts.	  Because	  of	  these	  connections,	  the	  Bulgarian	  leadership	  shared	  not	  only	  a	  close	  personal	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviets,	  but	  also	  a	  very	  similar	  worldview.	  By	  the	  early	   1960s,	   then,	   Czechoslovakia	   and	   Bulgaria	   had	   become	   active	   players	   on	   the	  African	  continent,	  supplying	  arms,	  developmental	  assistance,	  and	  technical	  expertise.	  	  Khrushchev	  unveiled	  his	   foreign	  policy	  doctrine	  at	   the	  Twentieth	  Congress	  of	  the	   CPSU	   in	   February	   1956.	   Khrushchev	   announced	   that	   a	   new	  world	   war	   was	   not	  fatalistically	  inevitable,	  that	  different	  countries	  could	  take	  different	  roads	  to	  socialism,	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   further	   information,	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   Zídek	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   Československo	   a	   Subsaharská	  Afrika	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   Letech	   1948-­‐1989	  	  (Prague:	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  Mezinárodních	  Vztahů,	  2007),	  p.	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World	  politics,	  15	  3	  (April	  1963):	  406.	  37	  Personal	   file	  of	  Dimo	  Dichev,	  Rossiiskii	  Gosudarsvennyi	  Arkhiv	  Sotsialno-­‐politicheskoi	   Istorii	   (hereafter	  RGASPI),	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  and	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   would	   strive	   for	   “peaceful	   coexistence”	   with	   the	   West.	  Khrushchev	  heralded	   the	  disintegration	  of	   the	  colonial	   system	  and	   invited	   the	  newly	  independent	   states	   to	   join	   together	   to	   form	  a	   “zone	  of	   peace.”	  The	  most	   famous	   and	  momentous	  part	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Congress	  was	  Khrushchev’s	  unpublished	  address	  to	  the	   Congress	   (known	   as	   the	   “secret	   speech”),	   in	   which	   he	   denounced	   Stalin	   for	   his	  megalomania,	   for	  his	  central	   role	   in	  mass	  arrests	  and	  executions	  of	   the	  party	  cadres,	  for	  mass	  deportations,	  and	  for	  arrogance,	  which	  cost	  thousands	  of	  lives	  during	  the	  war.	  Khrushchev’s	  promise	  was	  to	  revitalize	  the	  party	  and	  Soviet	  socialism	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  “Leninist	  principles”,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  “proletarian	  internationalism”	  alongside	  “peaceful	  co-­‐existence”	  was	  one	  of	  those	  principles.	  Khrushchev’s	  new	  foreign	  doctrine	  was,	  thus,	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  his	  de-­‐Stalinization	  campaign,	  which	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  the	  partial	  liberalization	  of	  Soviet	  society	  known	  as	  “Khrushchev’s	  Thaw.”	  Changes	   in	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy	   required	   a	   new	   theoretical	   foundation.	   This	  task	   fell	   to	   a	   group	   of	   experts	   working	   for	   the	   Institute	   of	   World	   Economy	   and	  International	  Relations	  in	  Moscow.	  Soviet	  experts	  would	  formulate	  a	  concept	  of	  “non-­‐capitalist	  development,”	  whereby	  a	  third-­‐world	  country	  could	  skip	  the	  capitalist	  stage	  of	   development	   towards	   socialism	   via	   an	   intermediary	   stage	   characterized	   by	   heavy	  industrial	   development	   led	   by	   a	   “vanguard	   party.”	   Georgiy	  Mirskiy,	  who	  was	   part	   of	  that	   expert	   group,	   wrote	   that	   even	   those	   of	   his	   colleagues	   who	   were	   critical	   of	   the	  Soviet	   system	  believed	   in	   the	   general	   crisis	   of	   capitalism	   and	   agreed	   that	   capitalism	  could	   not	   provide	   solutions	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   the	   developing	   countries.	   Mirskiy	  recalled:	   “We	   felt	   like	   innovators,	   working	   against	   Stalin’s	   dogmatism,	   one	   can’t	  understand	  this	  outside	  the	  historical	  context	  of	   the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress	  which	  changed	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  country	  within	  days.”38	  	  Khrushchev’s	   new	  policy	   in	   the	  Third	  World	   raised	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  CC	  CPSU	   International	   Department,	   which	   became	   responsible	   for	   expanding	   Soviet	  contacts	   with	   the	   liberation	   movements.	   The	   International	   Department	   was	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  Mirskiy,	  "Na	  	  znamenatel'nom	  rubezhe,"	  p.	  132.	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  responsible	  for	  setting	  the	  policy	  agenda,	  coordinating	  the	  work	  of	  the	  various	  Soviet	  public	   organizations,	   and	   allocating	   cash	   allowances	   for	   communist	   parties	   and	  liberation	   movements	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   “International	   Trade	   Union	   Fund	   for	  Assistance	  to	  Left	  Workers’	  Organizations.”39	  Given	  that	  the	  International	  Department	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  foreigners,	  its	  cadres	  were	  recruited	  from	  academia,	  journalism,	  and	  research	  institutes,	  and	  were	  thus	  on	  average	  better	  educated	  than	  their	  counterparts	  who	  had	  made	   their	  careers	  by	  climbing	  up	   the	  party	  ranks.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  major	  priorities	   were	   established	   by	   the	   head	   of	   the	   International	   Department,	   Boris	  Nikolayevich	  Ponomarev.	  	  Ponomarev	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  Comintern	  era	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  Born	  in	  1905,	  Ponomarev	   received	   his	   training	   at	   Moscow	   University	   and	   the	   University	   of	   Red	  Professors	   in	  1932,	   after	  which	  he	  was	   appointed	  deputy	  director	   of	   the	   Institute	   of	  Party	  History	  and	  served	  as	  a	  personal	  assistant	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Comintern,	  Georgiy	  Dimitrov.	  Karen	   Brutents,	   who	   was	   one	   of	   the	   senior	   advisers	   at	   the	   International	  Department	   in	   the	   1970s,	   recalled	   that	   for	   Ponomarev,	   internationalism	   was	   not	  simply	   a	   slogan	   but	   a	   personal	   choice. Brutents	   recalled	   that	   Ponomarev	   was	  undoubtedly	  a	   staunch	  anti-­‐Stalinist,	  but	  he	  still	  possessed	   the	  mentality	  of	  a	   former	  Comintern	  activist	  because	  he	  believed	  in	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  CPSU,	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  preach,	  and	  often	  relied	  on	  KGB	  agents	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  foreign	  Communist	   parties	   and	   liberation	   movements	   would	   not	   deviate	   too	   far	   from	   the	  policy	  preferences	  established	  by	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department.40	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  International	  Department	  has	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  debate.	  One	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  goals	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  KGB	  in	  internal	  affairs.	  This	  task	  fell	  to	  a	  young	  and	  ambitious	  leader	  of	  the	  Komsomol	  youth	  organization,	   Alexander	   Shelepin,	   whom	   Khrushchev	   promoted	   to	   the	   post	   of	   KGB	  Chairman	   in	  1958.	   Shelepin	  had	   graduated	   from	   the	  prestigious	  Moscow	   Institute	   of	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   a	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   1937,	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   Boris	  Ponomarev,	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  Philosophy,	   Literature,	   and	   History,	   but	   his	   key	   career	   success	   came	   when	   he	   was	  working	  at	  the	  Moscow	  section	  of	  the	  Komsomol	  and	  recruited	  an	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  female	  student	  named	  Zoya	  Kosmodemyanskaya,	  whose	  martyrdom	  during	  partisan	  actions	  against	   invading	  German	   forces	  became	   the	   symbol	  of	  wartime	  resistance.	  When	   the	  story	  of	  Zoya’s	  sacrifice	  appeared	  in	  the	  Soviet	  press,	  the	  young	  Shelepin	  was	  noticed	  by	  Stalin	  and	  quickly	  promoted	  through	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bureaucracy.	  Shelepin	  fully	   supported	   Khrushchev	   during	   the	   succession	   struggle,	   which	   is	   why	   the	   First	  Secretary	  trusted	  him	  with	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  security	  service.41	  One	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  Khrushchev	  wanted	  to	  reduce	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  KGB	  was	  by	   redirecting	   their	   attention	   abroad,	   and	   Shelepin	   obliged.	   Given	   that	   the	  International	  Department	  was	  the	  decision-­‐making	  agency	  in	  all	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  liberation	   movements,	   the	   KGB	   and	   GRU	   intelligence	   officers	   actually	   fulfilled	   a	  supportive	   role,	   collecting	   information	   and	   implementing	   the	   International	  Department's	  policy	  agenda.	  Vadim	  Zagladin,	  one	  of	  Ponomarev’s	  deputies,	  argued	  in	  a	  2006	   interview,	   that	   the	   KGB	   “never	   bossed	   us	   around, it was completely out of the 
question, while the opposite was actually the case.”42	  No	  matter	  how	  many	  disagreements	  arose	  between	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  International	  Department,	  their	  aims	  were	  ultimately	  the	  same:	   to	   facilitate	   the	  eventual	  victory	  of	  socialism	  worldwide.	  However,	  one	  can	  not	   really	   speak	   about	   the	   KGB’s	   activities	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   in	   the	   late	   1950s	  because	  only	   in	  1960	  did	   the	  Agency	  send	   their	   first	  officers	   to	   the	  Congo,	  as	  will	  be	  further	  explained.	  Only	  in	  1958	  did	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  enact	  a	  series	  of	  steps	  to	  expand	  Soviet	  influence	  in	   Africa,	   based	   on	   discussions	   of	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy	   experts	   at	   the	   closed-­‐door	  “Conference	   of	   Soviet	   Orientalists,”	   held	   between	   28	   October	   and	   1	   November.	   The	  Central	   Committee	   thus	   released	   two	   top-­‐secret	   decrees,	   instructing	   various	   Soviet	  ministries	   to	   magnify	   radio	   and	   print	   propaganda	   in	   Africa,	   expand	   the	   number	   of	  scholarships	   for	   African	   students,	   and	   train	   a	   network	   of	   Soviet	   Africanists.	   The	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  bibliography	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   31	  Foreign	  Ministry	  was	  also	  instructed	  to	  establish	  a	  specialized	  desk	  to	  deal	  with	  newly	  independent	  countries	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  A	  special	  role	  was	  given	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘public	   organizations’:	   the	   All-­‐Union	   Central	   Soviet	   of	   Trade	   Unions	   (VTsSPS;	  
Vsesoyuznyi	   Tsentralnyi	   Sovet	   Proffessionalnykh	   Soyuzov),	   the	   Committee	   of	   Youth	  Organizations	  (KMO;	  Komitet	  Molodezhnykh	  Organizatskiy),	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Committee	  for	   Solidarity	   with	   the	   Countries	   of	   Africa	   and	   Asia	   (SKSNAA;	   Sovetskiy	   Komitet	  
Solidarnosti	   s	   Narodami	   Azii	   i	   Afriki).	   The	   CPSU	   entrusted	   these	   organizations	   with	  expanding	   ties	   with	   the	   corresponding	   organizations	   in	   African	   countries,	  strengthening	  their	  contacts	  with	  the	  national	  liberation	  and	  workers’	  movements,	  and	  giving	  these	  movements	  full-­‐fledged	  assistance.43	  Of	   these	   three	   organizations,	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   would	   become	  the	  most	  important	  one	  in	  dealing	  with	  leaders	  of	  the	  national	  liberation	  movements.	  The	  Committee	  was	  established	  in	  1956	  as	  a	  Soviet	  branch	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  People’s	  Solidarity	  Organization	  (AAPSO)	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  1955	  Bandung	  Conference.	   Cairo	   became	   the	   headquarters	   of	   the	  AAPSO’s	   “Permanent	   Secretariat,”	  which	  was	  led	  by	  the	  famous	  Egyptian	  writer	  Yusuf	  Al-­‐Sibai.	  Thus,	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	   was	   officially	   a	   public	   organization,	   funded	   by	   the	   Soviet	   people	   who	  donated	   to	   the	  World	  Peace	  Council.	   Its	  main	  decision-­‐making	  organ,	   the	  Presidium,	  included	  well-­‐known	  members	  of	  the	  Soviet	  intelligentsia,	  such	  as	  writers,	  journalists,	  and	  academics,	  thus	  providing	  an	  avenue	  for	  the	  Soviet	  intelligentsia	  to	  participate	  in	  political	   life.	   While	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   was	   overseen	   by	   the	   CC	   CPSU	  International	   Department,	   it	   acquired	   a	   certain	   influence	   of	   its	   own,	   given	   that	   the	  officials	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  Committee	  would	  often	  be	  the	  first	  point	  of	  contact	  for	  foreign	  revolutionary	  leaders	  visiting	  the	  USSR.44	  	  Khrushchev	  was	  a	  pragmatist,	  but	  ideology	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  his	  turn	  towards	   the	   Third	   World.	   He	   saw	   decolonization	   as	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   Soviet	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  Union	  to	  cultivate	  new	  friends	  or	  even	  allies,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  his	  own	  international	  prestige	  and,	  thus,	  strengthen	  his	  standing	  in	  the	  party.	  The	  Soviet	  Union's	   activist	   policy	   in	   the	   Third	   World	   also	   provided	   opportunities	   for	   career	  advancement	   for	   young	  men	   and	  women,	   often	   recruited	   from	   the	   Soviet	   peripheral	  republics,	   thus	   also	   strengthening	   Khrushchev’s	   domestic	   power	   base.	   However,	  Khrushchev	  also	  thought	   that	   in	   the	  Third	  World,	  socialism	  might	  advance	  with	   little	  effort.	   Khrushchev	   was	   a	   “Trotskyist,”	   explained	   Filipp	   Bobkov,	   an	   unreformed	  Stalinist	  who	  made	  a	  career	  of	  chasing	  after	  dissidents	  while	  working	  at	  the	  KGB	  in	  the	  1960s.	   “When	   Khrushchev	   came	   to	   power,	   he	   started	   fulfilling	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   world	  revolution,”	  argued	  Bobkov	   in	  a	  2007	   interview.45	  Khrushchev’s	  policy	  of	   third-­‐world	  engagement	   found	   support	   not	   only	   among	   many	   senior	   and	   middle-­‐ranking	   party	  who	   still	   remembered	   the	   heyday	   of	   the	   Comintern,	   but	   also	   among	   many	   young	  cadres	   who	   believed	   that	   Khrushchev’s	   reforms	   could	   lead	   to	   the	   revitalization	   of	  Soviet	  society.	  	  
The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Africa	  Unfolds	  Just	   like	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   the	   United	   States	   did	   not	   have	   any	   long-­‐term	  economic	   or	   strategic	   interests	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   but	   had	   a	   long-­‐standing	   anti-­‐colonial	   tradition,	   rooted	   in	   its	   history	   of	   resistance	   against	   British	   rule.	   During	   the	  First	   World	   War,	   US	   President	   Woodrow	   Wilson	   had	   ignited	   the	   aspirations	   of	  nationalists	  around	  the	  world	  with	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  European	  colonial	  system	  and	  his	  rhetoric	   of	   “self-­‐determination.”	   For	   millions	   of	   colonial	   subjects,	   this	   meant	   a	  transformation	  of	  the	  international	  order,	  based	  on	  equality	  and	  national	  sovereignty.	  His	   use	   of	   the	   term	   was	   largely	   misinterpreted,	   argued	   the	   historian	   Erez	   Manela.	  Wilson	  meant	  to	  apply	  the	  principle	  of	  “self-­‐determination”	  to	  Europe,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  colonial	  subjects.	  The	  history	  of	  race	  relations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  itself	  had	  influenced	  Wilson	  to	  believe	  that	  equality	  of	  peoples	  was	  only	  possible	  within	  the	  framework	  of	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   33	  European	   tutelage.	  When	   colonial	   intellectuals	   attended	   the	   Paris	   Peace	   Conference	  hoping	   to	   find	   support,	   they	   were	   deeply	   disappointed	   to	   find	   that	   the	   European	  powers	   had	   no	   inclination	   to	   give	   up	   their	   colonial	   possessions;	  Wilson	   drafted	   his	  proposals	   for	   the	   “League	   of	   Nations”	   without	   any	   mention	   of	   national	   self-­‐determination.46	  Following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  affairs,	  a	  position	  known	  as	  “isolationism”	  in	  US	  foreign	  policy.	  	  US	   President	   Franklin	   Delano	   Roosevelt	   again	   raised	   the	   colonial	   question	  during	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   Roosevelt	   had	   a	   particular	   distaste	   for	   European	  colonialism,	   an	   issue	   on	   which	   he	   often	   clashed	   with	   his	   allied	   partners,	   most	  notoriously	  with	  British	  Premier	  Winston	  Churchill.	   Like	  his	  predecessors,	  Roosevelt	  shared	   the	   prevailing	   view	   that	   much	   of	   the	   colonial	   world	   was	   not	   yet	   ready	   for	  independence	   and	   that	   immediate	   independence	   would	   only	   lead	   to	   conflict,	   yet	   he	  believed	  that	  decolonization	  was	  inevitable	  and	  promoted	  his	  vision	  both	  in	  numerous	  private	  conversations	  with	  his	  European	  counterparts	  and	  in	  public	  speeches.47	  The	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  meant	  that	  the	  military	  preparedness	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Western	  alliance	  trumped	  any	  concerns	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  colonized	  peoples.	   The	  United	   States	   needed	   strong	   European	   powers	   to	   resist	   communism	   in	  Europe,	  and	  European	  colonial	  powers	  needed	  their	  empires	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  their	  war-­‐torn	  economies.	  The	  United	  States,	  therefore,	  did	  not	  press	  its	  post-­‐war	  allies	  on	  decolonization,	  and	  even	  gave	  a	  helping	  hand	  to	  the	  colonial	  powers	  fighting	  anti-­‐colonial	   nationalists,	   most	   infamously	   to	   the	   French	   in	   Indochina.	   European	  governance	   provided	   a	   guarantee	   that	   the	   colonial	   peoples	   would	   not	   succumb	   to	  communism.	  US	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  did	  not	  devote	  much	  attention	  to	  Africa	  in	   his	   first	   presidential	   term,	   as	   he	   preferred	   slow-­‐paced	   decolonization	   under	  European	  control.	  His	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  once	  remarked	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	   that	   none	   of	   the	   African	   colonies	   were	   capable	   of	   self-­‐government	   any	   time	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   34	  soon.48	  However,	   this	   attitude	   started	   to	   change	  during	  Eisenhower’s	   second	   term	   in	  office,	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  offensive.	  Change	  began	  in	  1957,	  when	  Vice	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  made	  his	  first	  long	  tour	   of	   Africa.	   He	   came	   back	   convinced	   that	   the	   continent	   would	   become	   the	   next	  battlefield	  between	  the	  West	  and	  the	  Soviet	  bloc.	  ”Communist	  leaders	  consider	  Africa	  today	  as	  important	  in	  their	  designs	  for	  world	  conquest	  as	  they	  considered	  China	  to	  be	  twenty-­‐five	   years	   ago,”	   argued	   Nixon	   in	   his	   report	   to	   Eisenhower.	   He	   therefore	  recommended	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  “strengthen	  its	  operations	  and	  programs,”	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  propaganda	  effort,	  and	  reinforce	  its	  representation	  in	  Africa.49	  Eisenhower	   and	   Dulles	   agreed	   to	   a	   policy	   review,	   and	   on	   23	   August,	   the	  National	   Security	   Council	   approved	   their	   final	   report,	   NSC	   5719/1.	   “Communist	  control”	   in	   Africa	   could	   threaten	   NATO-­‐bloc	   communications	   and	   strategic	   facilities	  and	  could	   lead	  to	  “economic	  dislocation”	   in	  Western	  Europe,	  according	  to	  the	  report,	  and	   thus	   the	   United	   States	   was	   to	   “combat	   Communist	   subversive	   activities”	   and	  support	  “constructive	  non-­‐Communist,	  nationalist,	  and	  reform	  movements”	  in	  Africa.50	  While	   Khrushchev’s	   motivation	   to	   engage	   with	   Africa	   was	   motivated	   in	   part	   by	   his	  ideological	   idealism,	   the	   guiding	   principle	   of	   US	   policy	   in	   Africa	   was	   to	   deny	   the	  continent	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  developed	  peacefully	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  as	   both	   sides	   focused	   on	   economic	   relations.	   The	   first	   subject	   for	   competition	   was	  Ghana,	   formerly	   the	   British	   colony	   of	   the	   Gold	   Coast,	   which	   was,	   in	   1957,	   the	   first	  colonized	   country	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   to	   achieve	   independence,	   with	   Kwame	  Nkrumah	  as	   the	   first	  Prime	  Minister.	  A	   leading	  pan-­‐Africanist,	  Nkrumah	  held	   radical	  ideas,	  specifically	  arguing	  that	  socialism	  was	  more	  adaptable	  to	  African	  socio-­‐cultural	  circumstances	   than	   capitalism,	   a	   doctrine	   that	   came	   to	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   “African	  socialism.”	  Nkrumah	  was	  thus	  a	  fitting	  candidate	  to	  introduce	  socialism	  in	  Africa,	  but	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   35	  early	  Soviet	  efforts	  to	  establish	  formal	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Ghana	  and	  break	  the	  British	   monopoly	   on	   the	   Ghanaian	   cocoa	   trade	   proved	   difficult.	   Washington	   and	  London	   used	   all	   of	   their	   influence	   to	   keep	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   out	   of	   Ghana	   as	   long	   as	  possible.	  Soviet	  efforts	  proved	  more	  fruitful	  in	  Guinea,	  a	  former	  French	  colony	  in	  West	  Africa.	  	  Guinea	   was	   a	   fairly	   unique	   case	   because	   of	   its	   decision	   to	   leave	   the	   French	  community	   after	   a	   successful	   referendum	   run	   by	   a	   radical	   nationalist	   leader,	   since	  1958	  the	  first	  president	  of	  independent	  Guinea,	  Ahmed	  Sékou	  Touré.	  Touré	  fashioned	  himself	   a	   radical	   leader	   and	   a	   staunch	   critic	   of	   colonialism.	   He	   wanted	   to	   pursue	   a	  neutralist	   policy,	   but	   he	   was	   left	   with	   little	   choice	   but	   to	   seek	   assistance	   from	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  when	  Paris	  cut	  all	  economic	  ties	  with	  Guinea	  following	  independence.	  In	  1959,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   signed	   a	   series	   of	   agreements	   with	   Guinea,	   including	   the	  provision	  of	  140	  million	   roubles	   in	   loans,	   repayable	   in	   twelve	  years	  with	   an	   interest	  rate	   of	   2.5%,	   which	   Guinea	   could	   use	   to	   buy	   Soviet	   equipment	   and	   technology	   and	  repay	  with	  its	  own	  goods.	  Soviet	  experts	  also	  began	  working	  on	  the	  “socialist	  concept	  of	  development,”	  which	  was	   to	  provide	  an	  alternative	   to	  a	   capitalist	  model	  based	  on	  principles	   of	   free	   trade	   and	   private	   enterprise.	   The	   Soviet	   establishment	   held	   high	  hopes	  for	  this	  project	  and	  were	  quite	  optimistic	  it	  would	  succeed.51	  Khrushchev’s	   optimism	   regarding	   Eisenhower	   and	   the	   benefits	   of	   peaceful	  competition	  steadily	  declined	  in	  1960.	  Khrushchev	  was	  frustrated	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  progress	  on	   his	   proposals	   for	   arms	   limitations,	   and	   he	  was	   shocked	  when	   the	   U-­‐2	   spy	   plane	  piloted	  by	  Francis	  Gary	  Powers	  was	  discovered	  and	  shot	  down	  over	  Soviet	  territory	  on	  1	  May	   1960.	   	   To	   add	   insult	   to	   injury,	   Eisenhower	   had	   lied	   to	   Khrushchev,	   trying	   to	  cover	   up	   US	   involvement.	   Yet	   another	   important	   reason	   for	   Khrushchev’s	   growing	  hostility	   towards	   the	   Eisenhower	   administration	   was	   the	   crisis	   in	   the	   Congo.	   The	  Congo,	  otherwise	  referred	  to	  as	  Congo-­‐Léopoldville,	  was	  a	  vast	  Belgian	  colony	  located	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Africa,	  known	  for	  its	  vast	  mineral	  wealth,	  including	  much	  of	  the	  world’s	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   Cold	  War	  
History,	  12	  4	  (November	  2012).	  Also	  see:	  Mazov,	  Distant	  Front.	  
	   36	  supply	  of	  copper,	  cobalt,	  and	  uranium,	  mostly	  located	  in	  the	  south-­‐western	  provinces	  of	   Katanga	   and	   Kasai.	   Following	   several	   years	   of	   violent	   protests	   in	   major	   cities,	  Brussels	  decided	  to	  grant	  independence	  to	  the	  Congo	  in	  early	  1960.	  Following	  the	  first	  nationwide	   elections,	   radical	   nationalist	   leader	   Patrice	   Lumumba	  was	   appointed	   the	  first	  prime	  minister,	  while	  on	  30	  June	  the	  more	  conservative	  Joseph	  Kasavubu	  became	  the	   country’s	   first	  president.	  However,	   a	   relatively	  peaceful	   transition	   turned	  violent	  less	  than	  a	  week	  later,	  when	  the	  Congolese	  army	  mutinied	  over	  pay	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  Belgian	  officers	   in	  the	  army.	  This	  revolt	  was	  quickly	  followed	  by	  a	  workers’	  strike,	  general	  chaos	  and	  violence	  against	  white	  citizens,	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  Belgian	  army,	  and	  the	  secession	  of	  the	  Katanga	  province	  under	  a	  local	  strongman,	  Moïse	  Tshombe.	  	  Lumumba	   interpreted	   the	   Belgian	   intervention	   as	   a	   neo-­‐colonial	   coup	  rather	  than	   a	   rescue	  mission,	   and	   thus	   appealed	   to	   the	   international	   community,	   including	  Nikita	   Khrushchev,	   to	   put	   pressure	   on	   Brussels	   to	  withdraw	   support	   for	   Tshombe’s	  gendarmerie.	  However,	  Lumumba	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  obtain	  adequate	  support	  from	  the	  West	   and	   therefore	   turned	   to	   Khrushchev,	   who	   offered	   Lumumba	   two	   and	   a	   half	  million	  roubles	   in	  economic	  aid,	   ten	   thousand	  tons	  of	   food,	  and	   logistical	  support	   for	  military	   operations	   against	   the	   secessionist	   provinces. 52 	  Meanwhile,	   the	  administration	   of	   US	   President	   Dwight	   Eisenhower	   and	   the	   Chief	   of	   the	   Central	  Intelligence	  Organization	  (CIA),	  Allen	  Dulles,	  saw	  Lumumba	  as	  a	  dangerous	  pro-­‐Soviet	  nationalist,	   “like	  Castro	  or	  worse,”	  and	  started	  planning	   for	  his	  overthrow.53	  Over	  the	  summer,	  Khrushchev	  grew	  increasingly	  frustrated	  about	  the	  Congo,	  as	  he	  believed	  that	  UN	   Secretary	   General	   Dag	   Hammarskjold	   had	   colluded	   with	   President	   Eisenhower,	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye	   to	  Katanga’s	  secession.	   “He	  was	  depressed	  by	  his	  own	   impotence	  and	  irritated	  by	  the	  arrogance	  of	  the	  West,”	  wrote	  his	  son	  Sergey.54	  This	  was	  precisely	  when—in	  July	  1960—the	  KGB	  and	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  extended	  their	  collaboration	  to	  intelligence	  operations	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	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  Lise	  Namikas,	  Battleground	  Africa:	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Congo,	  1960-­‐1965.	  Cold	  War	   International	  History	  Project	  Series	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  p.	  68.	  53	  See,	  for	  example:	  Larry	  Devlin,	  Chief	  of	  station,	  Congo:	  a	  Memoir	  of	  1960-­‐67.	  1st	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2007).	  54	  Khrushchev,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  p.	  405.	  
	   37	  The	   KGB	   and	   the	   corresponding	   Czechoslovak	   State	   Security	   (StB;	   Státní	  
Bezpečnost)	   had	   developed	   close	   ties	   since	   the	   Soviet-­‐sponsored	   takeover	   of	  Czechoslovakia	   by	   the	   CPC	   in	   1948.	   Like	   KGB	   Chairman	   Alexander	   Shelepin,	   the	  Czechoslovak	   Minister	   of	   the	   Interior,	   Rudolf	   Barák,	   was	   a	   rising	   star	   in	   the	   party	  hierarchy.	  He	  was	  particularly	   influential	   because,	   as	   the	  Minister	   of	   the	   Interior,	   he	  supervised	   the	   state	   security	   apparatus	   and	   the	   StB’s	   First	   Directorate,	   which	   was	  responsible	  for	  foreign	  intelligence.55	  Barák	  was	  an	  ambitious	  and	  dynamic	  man	  with	  a	  taste	  for	  foreign	  affairs	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  took	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  liberation	  movements.	   Many	   even	   believed	   that	   Rudolf	   Barák	   was	   planning	   to	   supersede	   the	  unpopular	   Novotný	   as	   CC	   CPC	   General	   Secretary. 56 	  Not	   much	   is	   known	   about	  Shelepin’s	  personal	  relations	  with	  Barák,	  but	  we	  do	  know	  that	  Barák’s	  term	  as	  Minister	  of	   the	   Interior	   ushered	   in	   a	   new	   era	   of	   cooperation	   between	   the	   KGB	   and	   the	  Czechoslovak	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   on	   a	   number	   of	   issues,	   including	   joint	  intelligence	  operations	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  	  Meeting	   in	   Prague	   in	   July	   1960,	   Shelepin	   and	   Barák	   presided	   over	   the	   first	  consultative	  meeting	  of	   the	  Soviet	  and	  Czechoslovakian	   intelligence	  chiefs,	  where	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  StB	  signed	  an	  agreement	  pledging	  to	  cooperate	  on	  intelligence	  operations	  across	  all	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  including	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic,	  Guinea,	  Mali,	  the	  Congo,	  Ghana,	  Angola,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  Zanzibar	  in	  Africa.57	  One	  month	  later,	  the	  KGB	   established	   their	   first	   eight-­‐man	   desk	   to	   work	   specifically	   on	   intelligence	  operations	  in	  Africa.	  Vadim	  Kirpichenko,	  who	  was	  part	  of	  the	  team,	  remembered:	  “We	  started	   seriously	   working	   on	   Africa	   only	   in	   1960,	   the	   year	   that	   the	   United	   Nations	  proclaimed	  as	  the	  Year	  of	  Africa.”58	  While	  there	  is	  no	  hard	  proof	  that	  these	  initiatives	  were	  undertaken	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  U-­‐2	  Spy	  Incident	  or	  the	  Congo	  Crisis	  or	  both,	  the	   timing	   is	   not	   coincidental,	   and	   most	   certainly	   reflected	   Khrushchev’s	   growing	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  In	  this	  thesis,	   the	  StB’s	  First	  Directorate	   is	  mostly	  referred	  to	  as	  “Czechoslovak	  Intelligence,”	  as	  per	  the	  established	  convention.	  	  56	  František	  August	  and	  	  David	  Rees,	  Red	  Star	  Over	  Prague	  	  (London:	  The	  Sherwood	  Press,	  1984).	  57	  For	  details,	  see:	  Pavel	  Žázek,	  "Czechoslovak	  and	  Soviet	  State	  Security	  Against	  the	  West	  Before	  1968	  "	  The	  Contours	  of	  
Legitimacy	  in	  Central	  Europe:	  New	  Approaches	  in	  Graduate	  Studies,	   	   	   (2002):	  p.	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   to	   look	  at	   this	  document	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  According	  to	  Kirpichenko,	  this	  department	  was	  established	  in	  August	  1960.	  Kirpichenko,	  Razvedka,	  88.	  
	   38	  discontent	   with	   the	   United	   States	   and	   personal	   frustration	  with	   Eisenhower.	   In	   any	  case,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  operations	  that	  the	  KGB	  would	  undertake	  was	  their	  mission	  in	  the	  Congo.	  	  On	  6	  August,	  a	  team	  of	  KGB	  intelligence	  officers	  arrived	  in	  the	  Congo’s	  capital,	  Léopoldville.	   	   According	   to	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin,	   who	   was	   part	   of	   the	   team,	   they	   bore	  instructions	   from	  Moscow	   to	   find	   out	  more	   information	   about	  Western	   plans	   in	   the	  country.59	  Nazhestkin	   also	  wrote	   that	   one	  of	   his	   tasks	  was	   to	   establish	   contacts	  with	  Angolans	  living	  in	  Léopoldville.60	  However,	  their	  mission	  soon	  came	  to	  an	  end	  because	  on	   14	   September,	   the	   chief	   of	   the	   Congolese	   army,	   Joseph	   Mobutu,	   staged	   a	   coup,	  dismissing	  Lumumba	  from	  power	  and	  ordering	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Czechoslovak	  diplomats	  to	  leave	  Léopoldville	  within	  the	  next	  twenty-­‐four	  hours.	  Khrushchev,	  who	  heard	  about	  the	   coup	   aboard	   a	   ship	   mid-­‐way	   to	   New	   York,	   was	   distraught.	   Speaking	   at	   the	   UN	  General	   Assembly,	   Khrushchev	   lashed	   out	   at	   the	  West	   generally	   and	   at	   UN	   General	  Secretary	   Dag	   Hammarskjöld	   personally	   for	   conniving	   to	   overthrow	   Lumumba,	   and	  proposed	  an	  overhaul	   of	   the	  UN’s	   governing	  body.61	  Many	   radically-­‐minded	  heads	  of	  state,	   such	  as	  Kwame	  Nkrumah,	  grew	   increasingly	   sympathetic	   toward	  Khrushchev’s	  viewpoint,	   but	   the	   reality	   remained	   that	   the	   Soviets	   had	   lost	   the	   first	   round	   of	  competition	  for	  the	  Congo.	  	  The	  events	  of	  1960	  were	   to	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  Khrushchev’s	   thinking	  and	  subsequent	  policy	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  Khrushchev	  had	  thought	  that	  socialism	  and	  capitalism	  could	  compete	  peacefully	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	  but	  the	  Congo	  Crisis	  revealed	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  simply	  could	  not	  compete	  with	  the	  West	  when	   it	  came	  to	  projecting	  military	  capabilities	  over	   long	  distances,	  but	  beyond	  that,	  the	   crisis	   showed	   that	   the	   capitalist	   countries	  were	  willing	   to	   use	   force	   to	  maintain	  their	   interests	   in	   the	   former	   colonies.	   Moreover,	   Khrushchev	   was	   frustrated	   in	   his	  attempts	  to	  reach	  any	  sort	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  US	  on	  arms	  limitations.	  The	  U-­‐2	  Spy	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  Oleg	   Nazhestkin,	   "Gody	   kongolezskogo	   krizisa,	   1960-­‐1963.	   Zapiski	   Razvedchika,"	   Novaya	   i	   Noveishaia	   istoria,	  	  	  (2003):	  155.	  60	  Nazhestkin,	  "V	  Ognennom	  Koltse	  Blokady,"	  p.	  235.	  61	  For	  details	  of	  this	  episode,	  see,	  for	  example:	  Fursenko	  and	  Naftali,	  Khrushchev's	  cold	  war,	  pp.	  307-­‐320.	  
	   39	  Incident	   was	   particularly	   infuriating	   for	   Khrushchev,	   especially	   after	   he	   discovered	  that	   Eisenhower	   himself	   had	   tried	   to	   conceal	   the	   truth	   about	   the	   incident.	  Khrushchev’s	  belief	   that	  peaceful	  competition	  between	  the	  two	  systems	  was	  possible	  faltered,	  and	  thus	  he	  authorized	  the	  KGB	  to	  launch	  intelligence	  operations	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	   including,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	   This	  meant	   that	   Khrushchev	  was	  increasingly	  willing	  to	  pursue	  aggressive	  tactics	  in	  essentially	  ideologically-­‐driven	  competition	  over	  the	  Third	  World.	  	  	  
The	  Portuguese	  Empire	  in	  Africa	  “Portugal	  is	  Not	  a	  Small	  Country,”	  read	  an	  inscription	  across	  a	  map	  displayed	  at	  the	  First	  Colonial	  Exhibition	  held	  in	  Porto	  between	  June	  and	  September	  1934.	  The	  map	  showed	  the	  areas	  of	  Portuguese	  colonies	  –	  Angola,	  Mozambique,	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  Cape	  Verde,	  Sao	  Tome	  and	  Principe,	  and	  Macau	  –	  overlaying	  the	  political	  map	  of	  Europe.	  A	  chart	   attached	   to	   the	   map	   showed	   the	   surface	   area	   of	   Portugal	   and	   its	   colonies:	  2,168,077	   square	   kilometers,	   which	   was	   bigger	   than	   the	   combined	   total	   area	   of	  continental	   Spain,	   France,	   England,	   Italy	   and	   Germany,	   which	   was	   then	   2,091,639	  square	  kilometers.	  With	  over	  five	  hundred	  pavilions,	  which	  took	  five	  months	  to	  build,	  the	  exhibition	  displayed	  various	  aspects	  of	  colonization,	  such	  as	  the	  natural	  and	  human	  resources	   of	   overseas	   possessions,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   industries	   and	   economies	   of	   the	  colonies.	  The	  exhibition	  guide	  extolled	  Portugal	  as	  a	  country	  that	  had	  “given	  worlds	  to	  the	   world,”	   using	   “highly	   original	   colonial	   methods.”	   The	   Exhibition	   closed	   with	   a	  colorful	  “colonial	  procession”	  illustrating	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  discoveries	  and	  colonial	  expansion.	  Having	  attracted	  one	  million	  visitors,	  the	  exhibition	  was	  truly	  a	  propaganda	  feat	  for	  the	  newly	  established	  authoritarian	  regime,	  the	  Estado	  Novo,	   led	  by	  prime	  minister	  António	  de	  Oliveira	  Salazar.62	  Salazar	  rose	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  1926	  coup	  d'état,	  which	  had	  overthrown	   the	   First	   Portuguese	   Republic	   and	   inaugurated	   a	   period	   known	   as	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  Patrícia	  Ferraz	  de	  Matos,	  The	  Colours	  of	  the	  Empire:	  Racialized	  Representations	  during	  Portuguese	  Colonialism	  	   (New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  2012),	  pp.	  176-­‐189.	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  “Ditadura	  National”	  (National	  Dictatorship).	  Salazar	  was	  born	  on	  29	  April	  1889,	  into	  a	  religious	   peasant	   family.	   Having	   received	   primary	   education	   at	   a	   seminary,	   Salazar	  decided	  against	  becoming	  a	  priest,	  going	  on	  to	  study	  and	  then	  teach	  economics	  at	  the	  prestigious	   University	   of	   Coimbra.	   Known	   for	   his	   ascetic	   lifestyle,	   Salazar	   never	  married	   and	   remained	   a	   devout,	   conservative	   Catholic	   throughout	   his	   life.	   In	   1928,	  president	   António	   Carmona	   invited	   Salazar	   to	   serve	   as	   Finance	   Minister	   in	   his	  government,	   and	   in	   1932	   appointed	   him	   prime	   minister.	   One	   year	   later,	   Salazar	  introduced	  a	  new	  constitution,	  which	  inaugurated	  a	  new	  regime,	  the	  Estado	  Novo.	  He	  based	  the	  regime	  on	  principles	  of	  fundamentalism,	  traditionalism,	  anti-­‐liberalism,	  and	  anti-­‐communism.	   Salazar	   promised	   to	   bring	   order,	   fight	   corruption,	   and	   achieve	  economic	   revival	   after	   years	   of	   political	   instability	   and	   economic	   collapse.	   He	  designated	  a	  key	  role	  for	  the	  empire	  in	  this	  project	  of	  conservative	  nationalism.	  Salazar	  used	  the	  colonies	  to	  contribute	  to	  Portugal’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  by	  selling	  goods	  on	  the	  world	  market,	  and	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  source	  of	  raw	  materials	   for	  Portuguese	   industry.	  Only	   through	   empire	   did	   Salazar	   believe	   Portugal	   could	   gain	   the	   status	   of	   a	   great	  European	   power.	   Through	   re-­‐establishing	   commitment	   to	   Empire	   as	   Portugal’s	  “historical	   mission,”	   he	   sought	   to	   revive	   the	   Portuguese	   nation.63	  In	   a	   1934	   speech,	  Salazar	   conveyed	   this	   message	   to	   the	   First	   Congress	   of	   União	   Nacional	   (National	  Union),	   the	   only	   legal	   political	   party	   in	   Portugal:	   “Amongst	   the	   dominant	  characteristics	  of	  our	  nationalism	  –	  Characteristic,	  which	  clearly	  distinguish	  it	  from	  all	  other	  nationalisms,	  adopted	  by	  the	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  Europe	  –	  is	  the	  colonizing	  aptitude	  of	  the	  Portuguese,	  a	  force	  which	  is	  not	  of	  recent	  growth	  but	  has	  been	  rooted	  in	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  nation	  for	  centuries.”64	  The	  Portuguese	  presence	  in	  Africa	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  “Age	  of	  Discovery”	   in	  the	  15th	   century,	   when	   Prince	   Henrique,	   otherwise	   known	   as	   “Henry	   the	   Navigator,”	  encouraged	   the	   exploration	   of	   Africa.	   Henrique	   was	   motivated	   by	   economic	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  For	   two	   sides	   of	   the	  debate	   on	   the	  Portuguese	   empire,	   see:	  Gervase	  Clarence-­‐Smith,	  The	  Third	  Portuguese	  Empire,	  
1825-­‐1975:	  a	  Study	  in	  Economic	  Imperialism	  	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1985);	  Anne	  Pitcher,	  Politics	  in	  
the	  Portuguese	  Empire:	  the	  State,	  Industry,	  and	  Cotton,	  1926-­‐1974	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  64	  Quoted	  in	  Heriberto	  Cairo,	  "Portugal	  is	  not	  a	  Small	  Country:	  Maps	  and	  Propaganda	  in	  the	  Salazar	  Regime,"	  Geopolitics,	  11	  3	  (2006):	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  372.	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  opportunism	  and	  desire	  to	  establish	  an	  alliance	  with	  Prester	  John	  in	  his	  quest	  against	  Islam.	   John	   was	   a	   legendary	   powerful	   Christian	   ruler,	   rumored	   to	   be	   residing	  somewhere	   in	   northeast	   Africa.	   One	   of	   Henrique’s	   favorite	   captains,	   Nuno	   Tristão,	  reached	   the	  coast	  of	  present	  day	  Senegal	  around	  1446,	  only	   to	  die	   from	  a	  poisonous	  arrow	   shot	   by	   one	   of	   the	   African	  warriors.	   Portuguese	  maritime	   expansionism	   then	  slowed	   down,	   but	   twenty	   years	   after	   Henrique’s	   death,	   João	   II	   renewed	   interest	   in	  African	   exploration.	   The	   renewed	   interest	   was	   driven	   by	   an	   interest	   in	   finding	   an	  ocean	  route	  to	  India,	  and	  enabled	  by	  advances	   in	  nautical	   technology.	   In	  1482,	  Diogo	  Cão	  reached	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  Zaire	  River	  as	  he	  sailed	  down	  the	  West	  coast	  of	  Africa.	  Cão	  established	  contact	  with	  the	  Bakongo	  rulers	  of	  the	  Kongo	  kingdom.	  The	  kingdom,	  at	   its	   height,	   stretched	   across	   the	   northern	   parts	   of	   present-­‐day	   Angola	   and	   the	  southwestern	  Congo.	  In	  1498,	  Vasco	  da	  Gama	  rounded	  the	  continent,	  stopping	  on	  the	  way	  at	  the	  port	  cities	  along	  the	  east	  coast	  of	  Africa,	  before	  sailing	  off	  to	  India.	  	  Having	   forged	   initial	   contacts	   in	  Africa,	   the	  Portuguese	  established	  a	  network	  of	   trading	  posts	  along	  the	  coastline.	  They	  coexisted	  alongside	  African	  kingdoms,	  with	  which	   the	   Portuguese	   engaged	   in	   lucrative	   trade	   of	   silver,	   gold,	   ivory,	   pepper,	   and,	  above	   all,	   slaves.	   Modern-­‐day	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   was	   once	   part	   of	   a	   vast	   Portuguese	  trading	  enterprise	  in	  the	  area	  where	  a	  series	  of	  great	  rivers	  –	  the	  Senegal,	  the	  Gambia,	  the	  Niger,	  the	  Benin,	  and	  the	  Cacheu	  –	  flow	  into	  the	  sea	  from	  West	  Africa.	  Competition	  among	  Europeans	  in	  this	  part	  of	  Africa	  was	  intense.	  The	  Portuguese	  ultimately	  focused	  on	   a	   territory	   they	   called	   the	   Rivers	   of	   Guinea,	   which	   was	   their	   original	   source	   of	  slaves,	   shipped	   via	   trading	   ports	   at	   Cacheu	   and	   Bissau	   to	   the	   originally	   uninhabited	  archipelago	  of	   Cape	  Verde	   en	   route	   to	  Europe	   and	   the	  Americas.	  Over	   the	   centuries,	  soldiers,	   royal	  officials,	   adventurists,	   traders,	   and	   “outcasts,”	  mostly	  of	  Cape	  Verdean	  origin,	   settled	  at	   coastal	  anchorages.	  This	  cluster	  of	   settlements	  grew	  over	   the	  years,	  reaching	  recognition	  as	  Portuguese	  Guinea	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  The	  Portuguese	  preferred	  to	  use	  a	  mixture	  of	  infiltration	  and	  persuasion.	  They	  entered	   into	  alliances	  with	   local	  rulers,	  but	  did	  not	  hesitate	   to	  use	   force	   if	  necessary.	  
	   42	  Following	   Diogo	   Cão’s	   exploratory	   mission	   of	   1498,	   Lisbon	   co-­‐opted	   the	   Bakongo	  rulers	   of	   the	   Kongo	   kingdom,	   who	   adopted	   Christianity	   and	   welcomed	   Christian	  missionaries.	  However,	   further	  to	  the	  south,	  the	  Ndongo	  were	  more	  suspicious	  of	  the	  Portuguese.	   Convinced	   that	   the	   Ndongo	   possessed	   rich	   silver	   mines,	   in	   1579	   the	  monarchy	   dispatched	   Paulo	   Dias	   de	   Novais	   to	   subdue	   the	   Ndongo	   by	   force,	   thus	  unleashing	   more	   than	   a	   century	   of	   wars,	   most	   notably	   with	   Queen	   Nzinga	   of	  Muthemba	   and	   the	   Ndongo	   in	   the	   seventeenth	   century.	   Neither	   Novais	   nor	   any	  subsequent	  expedition	  found	  silver,	  and	  the	  Portuguese	  settled	  on	  slaving	   in	  the	  vast	  interior	   of	   this	   territory	   they	   called	   “Angola.”	   On	   the	   east	   coast	   of	   Africa,	   the	  Portuguese	  gradually	  replaced	  the	  Arab,	  Persian,	  and	  Swahili	  traders	  and	  established	  a	  garrison	  at	  Mozambique	  Island,	  which	  became	  the	  main	  point	  of	  export	  for	  ivory,	  gold,	  and	  slaves.	  Seduced	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  finding	  gold,	  the	  Portuguese	  advanced	  into	  the	  interior	   of	   the	   Monomotapa	   Kingdom,	   founding	   garrisons	   at	   Sena	   and	   Tete	   on	   the	  Zambezi	   River.	   By	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   the	   Portuguese	   had	  managed	   to	   entrench	  their	   presence	   in	   various	   locations	   in	   Angola,	   Mozambique,	   and	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  especially	   along	   the	   coastlines,	   but	   they	   did	   not	   have	   control	   of	   the	   interior,	   still	  dominated	  by	  African	  kingdoms.65	  The	   nineteenth	   century	   was	   a	   period	   of	   major	   change	   in	   the	   way	   that	  Europeans	  interacted	  with	  Africans.	  Competition	  between	  colonial	  powers	  intensified,	  with	   all	   looking	   to	   Africa	   as	   source	   of	   natural	   resources	   and	   potential	  markets.	   The	  slave	  trade	  was	  abolished,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  gradual	  reorientation	  of	  African	  economies.	  Cape	  Verde	  was	  revived	  as	  a	  coaling	  station	  for	  British	  steamships.	  Angola	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   produced	   cash	   crops	   for	   Portuguese	   industry	   and	   the	   world	   market,	   while	  Mozambique’s	   economy	   evolved	   into	   a	   source	   of	   cheap	   labor	   for	   British	   mines	   in	  Nyasaland,	   Transvaal,	   and	   South	   Rhodesia.	   At	   the	   1884-­‐85	   Berlin	   Conference,	  European	  powers	  defined	  their	  colonial	  possessions	  and	  came	  to	  a	  settlement,	  which	  produced	   arbitrary	   borders.	   Thanks	   in	   part	   to	   British	   patronage,	   Portugal	   extended	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  Anthony	   Disney,	   A	   History	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   Portugal	   and	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   Portuguese	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   43	  formal	   rule	   over	   Angola,	   Mozambique,	   and	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   Additionally,	   European	  powers	  agreed	  that	  imperial	  claims	  could	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  effective	  occupation,	  which	  included	  a	  provision	  for	  economic	  development	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  stamp	  out	  slavery.	   International	   pressure	   thus	   demanded	   occupation	   of	   the	   interior.	   This	   was	  achieved	   by	   extending	   effective	   control,	   often	   by	   leasing	   large	   territories	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   concession	   companies	   that	   brought	   in	   white	   administrators	   and	   encouraged	  white	   settlement	   in	   the	   interior,	   and	   by	   “pacification	   campaigns”	   conducted	   by	   the	  army	   if	   the	   local	   population	   did	   not	   comply.	   This	   process	  was	   accompanied	   by	   land	  expropriation,	  introduction	  of	  forced	  labor,	  and	  immigration	  controls.	  	  This	   new	   stage	   of	   imperialism	   encountered	   resistance	   throughout	   the	  Portuguese	   empire.	   In	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   almost	   every	  ethnic	   group	   resisted	  Portuguese	  attempts	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  interior.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  resistance,	  the	  Portuguese	  participated	   in	   no	   fewer	   than	   eighty-­‐one	   campaigns,	   expeditions,	   and	   operations	  between	   1841	   and	   1936.66	  Only	   in	   1895	   did	   the	   Portuguese	   manage	   to	   defeat	   the	  legendary	   Gungunhana,	   the	   last	   emperor	   of	   the	   “Gaza	   Empire”	   of	   southern	  Mozambique,	   but	   regional	   revolts	   flared	   up	   quite	   frequently,	   most	   notably	   led	   by	  Makonde	  and	  Yao	  chiefs	  of	  the	  north	  and	  the	  Barue	  of	  the	  central	  Zambezi	  region.	  The	  Ovimbundu	  kingdoms	  of	  Angola’s	  highlands	  revolted	  in	  1902	  against	  forced	  relocation	  of	  laborers	  to	  Sao	  Tome,	  and	  so,	  in	  1913,	  did	  the	  Bakongo	  of	  the	  northwest	  of	  Angola.67	  The	   history	   of	   this	   so-­‐called	   “native	   resistance”	   would	   become	   the	   foundation	   of	  nationalist	  mythology	  for	  the	  post-­‐war	  liberation	  struggles	  in	  the	  colonies.	  	  The	  turn	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  also	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  “nativist”	  movement	  in	  the	   empire.	   Over	   the	   centuries,	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   Portuguese	   and	   African	  populations	   led	   to	   the	   emergence	  of	  mixed-­‐blood	  persons,	   collectively	   referred	   to	   as	  “mestizos,”	   who	   gravitated	   towards	   centers	   of	   Portuguese	   settlement,	   serving	   as	  interpreters,	  local	  officials,	  and	  slave	  masters.	  However,	  their	  status	  declined	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  white	  immigrants	  from	  Portugal.	  “Nativists”	  spoke	  against	  abuses	  committed	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   44	  by	  the	  colonial	  administrations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  given	  to	  the	  white	  settler	  community.	  They	  did	  not	  demand	   independence,	  but	  wanted	  systemic	   reform	  and	  greater	   local	  autonomy.	  Nativists	  were	  also	  active	   in	   the	  Pan-­‐African	  movement,	  which	   was	   facilitated	   by	   the	   First	   Pan-­‐African	   Congress	   of	   1919.	   Among	   the	   native	  activists	  was	  António	  de	  Assis,	   Junior,	  a	  solicitor,	  publicist,	  and	  novelist,	  who	  became	  famous	   advising	   the	   native	   population	   on	   such	   issues	   as	   land	   expropriation	   and	  campaigning	   for	   reform	   of	   the	   colonial	   administration.	   He	   also	   co-­‐founded	   Liga	  
Angolana,	  an	  affiliate	  of	  Liga	  Africana,	  which	  was	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  confederation	  for	   all	   the	   African	   associations	   from	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies.	   After	   the	   1926	   coup	  d'état,	   the	  movement	  was	   suppressed.	  Despite	   the	   backlash,	   it	   served	   as	   a	   source	   of	  inspiration	  for	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  nationalist	  leaders.68	  The	   1930	   Colonial	   Act	   formalized	   pre-­‐existing	   racial	   distinctions	   between	  
indigenas	  (indigenous)	  and	  não-­‐indigenas	  (non-­‐indigenous).	   Indigenas	  constituted	  the	  majority	   of	   the	   black	   African	   population,	   who	   received	   rudimentary	   primary	  education,	  mostly	  in	  missionary	  schools.	  This	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  was	  routinely	  subjected	   to	   forced	   labor	  and	   immigration	  controls.	  The	  não-­‐indigenas	  were	   formally	  regarded	   as	   Portuguese	   citizens,	   but	   they	   were	   de	   facto	   sub-­‐divided	   into	   white	  Portuguese,	   mixed-­‐race	   mestizos,	   and	   a	   tiny	   group	   of	   black	   natives	   known	   as	  
assimilados.	  To	  become	  assimilado	  one	  had	  to	  swear	  loyalty	  to	  the	  colonial	  state,	  speak	  only	  Portuguese	  at	  home,	  abandon	  traditional	  beliefs,	  and	  pay	  a	  substantial	  sum	  to	  the	  colonial	  authorities.	   In	  return,	  assimilados	  obtained	  greater	  access	  to	  educational	  and	  employment	   opportunities	   and	   were	   freed	   from	   forced	   labor	   and	   immigration	  controls.	  In	  practice,	  assimilados,	  mestizos,	  and	  even	  whites	  born	  in	  the	  colonies	  were	  treated	  as	   second-­‐class	   citizens.	  This	   system	  would	   remain	  virtually	  unchanged	  until	  1961,	  when	  reform,	  albeit	  minimal,	  would	  be	  forced	  upon	  Salazar.	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   45	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  saw	  a	  general	  crisis	  of	  imperialism	  as	  colonial	   subjects,	   who	   had	   fought	   alongside	   metropolitan	   citizens	   during	   the	   war,	  called	   for	   the	   same	   rights	   as	   those	   bestowed	   upon	   their	   European	   counterparts.	  Europeans	   did	   not	   want	   to	   dispose	   of	   the	   colonies,	   especially	   in	   Africa,	   but	   were	  increasingly	   pressured	   to	   invest	   in	   costly	   developmental	   schemes.	   These	  developments	   were	   reflected	   in	   the	   final	   resolution	   of	   the	   1945	   Fifth	   Pan-­‐African	  Congress,	   held	   in	   Manchester:	   “The	   delegates	   of	   the	   Fifth	   Pan-­‐Africanist	   Congress	  believe	  in	  peace…	  Yet	  if	  the	  Western	  world	  is	  still	  determined	  to	  rule	  mankind	  by	  force,	  then	  Africans,	   as	   last	   resort,	  may	  have	   to	  appeal	   to	   force	   to	  achieve	   freedom,	  even	   if	  force	  destroys	  them	  and	  the	  world.”	  One	  of	  the	  main	  organizers,	  the	  Ghanaian	  Kwame	  Nkrumah,	  also	  recalled	  that	  the	  Congress,	  attended	  by	  twenty	  delegates	  from	  twenty-­‐six	   countries,	   rejected	   capitalist	   reformist	   solutions	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   Africa	   and	  unanimously	   endorsed	   the	   doctrine	   of	   “African	   socialism,”	   a	   concept	   that	   involved	  trying	  to	  integrate	  socialist	  principles	  organically	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  African	  society.69	  	  While	  some	  major	  European	  colonial	  powers,	  such	  as	  Britain	  and	  France,	  gave	  their	   colonies	   varying	   degrees	   of	   autonomy	   and	   encouraged	   economic	   development,	  Portugal	  had	  neither	  the	  resources	  nor	  the	  willingness	  to	  institute	  any	  major	  changes	  in	   the	   colonies.	   Time	   and	   again,	   Lisbon	   would	   fail	   to	   prevent	   the	   devastating	  consequences	   of	   frequent	   droughts	   in	   Cape	   Verde,	   leaving	   thousands	   to	   starve	   to	  death.	  Education	  of	  the	  “indigenous”	  population	  was	  relegated	  to	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  while	  only	  a	   few	  colleges	  offered	  education	  up	   to	   the	  secondary	   level	   for	  a	   tiny	  elite.	  The	   district	   officers,	   known	   as	   chefes	  do	  posto,	   had	   absolute	   judicial	   power	   over	   the	  indigenous	   population.	   Additionally,	   they	   were	   entitled	   to	   conscript	   forced	   labor,	  which	  was	  used	  on	  a	  massive	  scale	   for	   the	  private	  sector	   in	  Angola	  and	  Mozambique	  and	   for	   public	   works	   in	   Guinea.	   This	   formed	   the	   shared	   experiences	   of	   a	   new	  generation	  of	  young	  colonial	  intellectuals,	  who	  converged	  around	  the	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	   colonies	   and	   at	   university	   towns	   in	   Portugal.	   They	   started	   to	   express	   their	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   46	  grievances	   by	   means	   of	   poetry,	   creative	   writing,	   and	   the	   visual	   arts,	   trying	   to	  rediscover	   and	   celebrate	   the	   African	   culture	   of	   their	   ancestors,	   but	   many	   ended	   up	  leading	  armed	  struggles	  against	  the	  colonial	  regime.	  Out	  of	  this	  socio-­‐political	  milieu,	  there	  gradually	  emerged	  the	  liberation	  movements	  that	  represented	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  radical	  African	  elites:	   the	  Popular	  Movement	   for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola	  (MPLA;	  
Movimento	  Popular	  de	  Libertação	  de	  Angola)	  and	  the	  Party	  for	  Independence	  of	  Guinea	  and	  Cape	  Verde	  (PAIGC;	  Partido	  Africano	  da	  Independência	  da	  Guiné	  e	  Cabo	  Verde).	  The	  MPLA	  was	   founded	  by	  a	  group	  of	   left-­‐wing	   intellectuals	  based	   in	  Luanda.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  ones	  was	  Viriato	  Clemente	  da	  Cruz.	  Born	  in	  Porto	  Amboim	  on	   25	  March	   1928	   to	   Abel	   Francisco	   da	   Cruz,	   a	   businessman,	   and	   Clementina	   (Ana)	  Clemente	  da	  Cruz,	   a	  housewife,	  Viriato	  moved	   to	  Luanda	  when	  his	  parents	  divorced.	  He	   started	  writing	   critical	   poetry	   and	   enmeshed	  himself	   in	   the	   cultural	   and	   political	  milieu	   of	   Luanda.	   This	   was	   the	   time	   when	   a	   group	   of	   young	   people,	   who	   called	  themselves	  the	  “New	  Intellectuals	  of	  Angola,”	  embarked	  on	  a	  search	  for	  the	  traditional	  culture	  and	  history	  of	  Angola	  in	  protest	  against	  assimilationist	  policies	  imposed	  from	  Lisbon.	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   became	   part	   of	   this	   movement,	   befriending	   other	   leading	  intellectuals	  of	   the	   time	  such	  as	   Ilídio	  Machado,	  Tomas	   Jorge	  Vieira	  da	  Cruz,	  António	  Jacinto	  do	  Amaral	  Martins,	  and	  Mário	  António	  de	  Oliveira.70	  In	  1951,	  he	  became	  editor	  in	   chief	   of	   the	   Luanda-­‐based	   literary	   journal	   Mensagem,	   which	   published	   poetry,	  literary	   essays,	   and	   ideological	   pieces,	   celebrating	   Angolan	   culture	   and	   criticizing	  colonial	   practices.	   Only	   four	   issues	   of	   the	   journal	   saw	   print,	   but	  Mensagem	   was	   of	  major	   importance	   to	   a	   whole	   generation	   of	   young	   people	   campaigning	   against	   the	  colonial	  regime.	  	  In	   1955,	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz,	   together	  with	   Ilídio	  Machado,	   António	   Jacinto,	   and	  Mário	  António	  de	  Oliveira,	   founded	   the	  Angolan	  Communist	  Party	   (PCA).71The	  PCA’s	  founders,	  writes	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  quickly	  realized	  that	  a	  communist	  party	  would	  not	  acquire	  a	  broad	  appeal,	  and	  therefore	  in	  1956,	  the	  group	  published	  a	  manifesto	  that	  called	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Emmanuel	   Akyeampong	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  the	  unification	  of	  “all	  anti-­‐imperialist	  forces”	  without	  regard	  for	  “political	  colour,	  social	  status,	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  philosophy”	  and	  called	  on	  the	  people	  to	  organize	  “thousands	  and	  thousands”	  of	  organizations	  throughout	  the	  country	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  a	  broad	  Popular	  Movement	   for	   the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola,	   the	  MPLA.	  The	  manifesto	  also	  called	  upon	  Angolans	   to	   fight	   against	   Portuguese	   colonialism	   and	   domination	   by	   European	  and	   North	   American	   monopolies,	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   a	   democratic	   and	   popular	  government	  with	  the	  working	  class	  at	  the	  forefront.72	  Most	  probably,	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  manifesto	   believed	   that	   the	   PCA	  would	   co-­‐exist	  with	   other	   nationalist	   organizations,	  which	   would	   spring	   up	   across	   the	   country	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   appeal	   The	   MPLA	  leadership	   would	   later	   appropriate	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   Manifest	   as	   the	   official	  foundation	  date	   for	   the	   organization,	   but	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   in	  1956,	   the	  movement	  was	  little	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  individuals	  inspired	  by	  left-­‐wing	  ideas.73	  Meanwhile,	   a	   rather	   different	   conception	   of	   Angolan	   nationalism	   germinated	  among	   the	   500,000-­‐strong	   community	   of	   Bakongo	   in	   northern	   Angola.	   In	   1956,	   a	  group	   of	  Angolan	   émigrés	   based	   in	   the	   Congolese	   capital	   of	   Léopoldville	   established	  the	  Union	  of	  the	  Peoples	  of	  the	  North	  of	  Angola	  (UPNA;	  União	  das	  Populações	  do	  Norte	  
de	   Angola).	   The	   group	   was	   dedicated	   to	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   ancient	   “Kongo	  kingdom,”	   a	   Bakongo	   kingdom	   that	   had	   occupied	   present-­‐day	   northern	   Angola	   and	  western	  Congo	  before	   the	  Portuguese	  conquest.	  Among	  the	   leaders	  of	   the	  movement	  was	   Barros	   Necaca,	   and	   he,	   unlike	   the	   Luanda-­‐based	   intellectuals,	   believed	   that	   the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  part	  of	   the	  problem	  but	  part	  of	   the	   solution	   for	  Angola.	  When	  Portugal	   joined	   the	   United	   Nations	   in	   1955,	   the	   Léopoldville	   group	   petitioned	   for	  Angola	   to	   be	   placed	   under	   UN	   authority	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   Trusteeship	   of	   the	   United	  States	  and	  declared	  that	  they	  opposed	  ‘Communist	  penetration’	  into	  their	  country.74	  In	  January	   1958,	   seeking	   to	   obtain	   exposure	   for	   the	   newly	   established	   UPNA,	   Necaca	  wrote	   to	   George	   Houser,	   an	   American	   civil	   rights	   activist	   and	   the	   founder	   of	   the	  American	  Committee	  on	  Africa.	  Houser	  referred	  Necaca	  to	  George	  Padmore,	  who	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Lara,	  ed.,	  Amplo	  Movimento,	  	  1:23-­‐29.	  73	  Interview	  with	  Lúcio	  Lara	  in	  Jaime	  and	  Barber,	  eds.,	  Angola.	  74	  Marcum,	  Angolan	  Revolution,	  1:61-­‐62.	  
	   48	  the	  working	  with	  Ghanaian	  president	  Kwame	  Nkrumah.	  Padmore	  invited	  the	  UPNA	  to	  participate	   in	   the	   ‘First	  All-­‐African	  People’s	   Conference’	   in	  Accra,	   Ghana,	   and	  Necaca	  chose	  his	  nephew,	  Holden	  Roberto,	  to	  represent	  the	  UPNA.75	  Holden	  Roberto	  would	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  movement.	  Roberto	  was	  born	  in	  Sao	   Salvador,	   northern	   Angola,	   but	   had	   spent	   most	   of	   childhood	   and	   youth	   in	   the	  Belgian	  Congo.	  He	   studied	  at	   the	  Baptist	  Missionary	  School	   in	  Léopoldville.	   Later,	   he	  worked	   as	   an	   accountant	   for	   the	   Belgian	   colonial	   administration	   before	   his	   uncle	  enlisted	   him	   to	   work	   for	   the	   nationalist	   cause.76	  In	   1958,	   he	   went	   to	   the	   “First	   All-­‐African	  People’s	  Conference”	  in	  Accra,	  where	  he	  encountered	  many	  influential	  African	  leaders,	  including	  George	  Padmore,	  Kwame	  Nkrumah,	  Guinean	  president	  Sékou	  Touré,	  and	   the	   Congolese	   nationalist	   leader	   Patrice	   Lumumba,	   who	   advised	   Roberto	   to	  broaden	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  organization.	  He	  dropped	  the	  “do	  Norte”	  from	  the	  name,	  and	  the	  UPA	  emerged.	  Holden	  Roberto	  stayed	  on	  in	  Accra,	  where	  he	  worked	  with	  George	  Padmore	  at	  the	  Ghanaian	  Bureau	  of	  African	  Affairs.	  Roberto	  also	  became	  a	  friend	  and	  admirer	   of	   Franz	   Fanon,	   the	   ideologue	   of	   the	   Algerian	   revolution,	   and	   began	   to	  contemplate	  military	  action	  in	  Angola.77	  Although	   the	  MPLA	  was	  established	   in	  Luanda,	   the	  movement	  would	  become	  associated	  with	  a	  close-­‐knit	  group	  of	  African	  student	  activists	  based	  at	  the	  universities	  of	  Lisbon	  and	  Coimbra.	  Students	  from	  the	  colonies	  had	  begun	  to	  arrive	  in	  Portugal	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  They	  were	  predominantly	  from	  the	  major	  cities,	  and	  thus	  represented	  the	   sons	   and	   daughters	   of	   the	   relatively	   privileged	   colonial	   elite.	   The	   Portuguese	  authorities	  believed	  that	  the	  African	  students	  would	  absorb	  Portuguese	  culture	  during	  their	   studies	   and	   return	   home	   convinced	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   empire.	   Instead,	   the	  politically	   charged	  atmosphere	  of	   the	  colonies	  became	  a	  perfect	  breeding	  ground	   for	  future	   revolutionary	   leaders.	   Student	   activists	   converged	   at	   the	   government-­‐sponsored	   Casa	   dos	   Estudantes	   dos	   Império,	   which	   was	   established	   as	   a	   self-­‐help	  organization	   to	   provide	   accommodation	   and	   scholarships.	   It	   turned	   into	   a	   meeting	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  place	   for	   student	   activists	  who	  would	  meet	   and	   discuss	   their	   grievances	   against	   the	  colonial	   system.	   Among	   these	   were	   Amílcar	   Cabral	   from	   Cape	   Verde,	   Mário	   de	  Andrade,	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  and	  Lúcio	  Lara	  from	  Angola,	  and	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  from	  Mozambique.	  In	  1951	  they	  founded	  a	  group	  called	  Centro	  dos	  Estudantes	  Africanos	  as	  a	  workshop	  to	  discuss	  African	  history,	  culture,	  and	  politics.	  They	  also	  participated	  in	  the	  resistance	  movement	  against	  the	  Salazarist	  dictatorship,	  dominated	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  Communist	  Party	  (PCP),	   to	  such	  an	  extent	   that	  Neto,	   for	  example,	  sat	  on	  the	  steering	  committee	   of	  Movimento	   de	   Unidade	   Democrática	   (MUD-­‐Juvenil),	   a	   youth	   wing	   of	   a	  broad	  anti-­‐Salazarist	  front	  affiliated	  with	  the	  PCP.	  Before	  going	  any	  further,	  we	  have	  to	  pause	   to	   explore	   the	  backgrounds	  of	   the	  people	  who	  would	  play	   central	   roles	   in	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  in	  Portuguese	  Africa.	  Amílcar	   Cabral	   (12	   September	   1924	   –	   20	   January	   1973)	  was	   the	   first	   of	   the	  group	  to	  establish	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  Cape	   Verde.	   Born	   in	   Bafatá,	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   Cabral	   was	   a	   son	   of	   Juvenal	   António	   da	  Costa	   Cabral,	   a	   well-­‐respected	   schoolteacher	   and	   a	   politically	   conscious	  man	  with	   a	  particular	   interest	   in	   the	   economic	   problems	   of	   Cape	   Verde	   and	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   His	  mother	  Iva	  Pinhel	  Evora	  owned	  a	  small	  business,	  but	  then	  had	  to	  take	  up	  a	  number	  of	  low-­‐paying	  jobs	  after	  divorcing	  her	  husband.	  While	  Cabral’s	  father	  instilled	  in	  him	  the	  “seeds	  of	  political	   education,”	  his	  mother	   taught	  him	  about	   gender	   inequality,	  writes	  Cabral’s	   biographer	   Patrick	   Chabal.	   Amílcar	   would	   later	   argue	   that	   it	   was	   the	  experience	  of	   extreme	  poverty	  during	  adolescence	   that	  pushed	  him	   to	   revolt	   against	  the	   colonial	   system	   later	   in	   his	   life.78	  Cabral	   studied	   agronomy	   at	   the	   University	   of	  Lisbon.	   Despite	   graduating	   at	   the	   top	   of	   his	   class,	   he	   was	   unable	   to	   find	   a	   job	   in	  Portugal	  due	  to	  his	  skin	  color,	  so	  he	  took	  up	  a	  job	  in	  Bissau	  as	  a	  research	  officer	  at	  an	  agricultural	   research	   station,	   where	   he	   was	   put	   in	   charge	   of	   conducting	   the	   first	  agricultural	  survey	  of	  the	  country.	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   50	  In	   Bissau,	   Cabral	   continued	   political	   mobilization	   for	   independence	   and	  gradually	  acquired	  a	  network	  of	   loyal	   supporters.	  One	  of	   them	  was	  his	  younger	  half-­‐brother	  Luís,	  who	  was	  trained	  as	  an	  accountant	  and	  worked	  for	  Casa	  Gouveia,	  a	  branch	  of	   Companhia	  União	   Fabril,	   Guinea-­‐Bissau’s	   largest	   monopoly.	   Aristides	   Pereira	   was	  another	  Cabral	  supporter.	  Pereira	  was	  born	  on	  17	  November	  1923	   in	  Boa	  Visa,	  Cape	  Verde,	   to	   Porfirio	   Pereira	   Tavares,	   a	   highly	   respected	   priest	   and	  music	   teacher,	   and	  Maria	  das	  Neves	  da	  Cruz	  Silva,	  an	  agricultural	  worker.	  Like	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Cape	  Verdeans,	   Pereira	   was	   deeply	   affected	   by	   the	   experience	   of	   living	   in	   the	   famine-­‐stricken	   archipelago.	   He	   wished	   to	   study	   in	   Portugal,	   but	   was	   unable	   to	   obtain	   a	  scholarship.	   Therefore,	   he	   trained	   as	   a	   radiotelegraph	   technician,	   later	   moving	   to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  where	  he	  worked	  for	  the	  Bissau	  Telegraph	  and	  Telephone	  Services.79	  In	  1954,	   Cabral	   organized	   a	   sports	   and	   recreation	   club	   for	   young	   people.	   The	   secret	  police	  soon	  discovered	  that	   the	  club	  also	  encouraged	  political	  discussion	  and	  banned	  Cabral	   from	   ever	   residing	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   though	   he	   was	   allowed	   to	   return	   for	   a	  short	   time	   to	   visit	   family.80	  	   During	   one	   of	   his	   visits	   to	   Bissau,	   Cabral	  met	  with	   Luís	  Cabral,	   Aristides	   Pereira,	   Fernando	   Fortes,	   and	   Eliseu	   Turpin,	   which	   led	   to	   their	  founding	  an	  organization.	  After	  several	  name	  changes,	  it	  became	  known	  as	  the	  African	  Party	   for	   the	   Independence	   of	   Guinea	   and	   Cape	   Verde	   (PAIGC;	   Partido	   Africano	   da	  
Independência	  da	  Guiné	  e	  Cabo	  Verde)	  on	  19	  September	  1956.	  	  António	  Agostinho	  Neto	  (17	  September	  1922	  –	  10	  September	  1979)	  was	  from	  the	   village	   of	   Catete,	   Icolo	   e	   Bengo,	   near	   Luanda.	   His	   father	   Agostinho	   Neto	   was	   a	  Methodist	   pastor,	   and	   his	  mother	  Maria	   da	   Silva	   Neto	  was	   a	   teacher.	   A	   diligent	   and	  quiet	  student	  at	   the	  Liceu	  Salvador	  Correia	   in	  Luanda,	  Neto	  supplemented	  his	   income	  by	  working	  as	  a	  secretary	  for	  the	  Methodist	  bishop	  Ralph	  Dodge.	  He	  worked	  for	  three	  years	   for	   the	   colonial	   healthcare	   administration	   in	   Luanda.	   In	   1947,	   he	   went	   to	  Portugal	  to	  study	  medicine	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Lisbon	  on	  a	  scholarship	  provided	  by	  the	  Methodist	  church.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  Neto	  developed	  into	  an	  influential	  poet,	  publicist	  and	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   51	  theoretician.	   From	   Negritude,	   a	   literary	   and	   cultural	   movement	   developed	   by	  francophone	   black	   intellectuals	   during	   the	   1930s,	   he	   borrowed	   a	   demand	   for	  repatriation	   of	   traditional	   culture	   and	   land.	   In	   his	   lengthy	   poem	   “Saturday	   in	   the	  Musseques,”	  Neto	  depicted	   the	  poverty	  and	   the	  anxiety	  of	   the	  musseques,	   or	  Angolan	  shantytowns,	  but	  also	  celebrated	  them	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Angolan	  culture	  and	  pride.	  The	  last	   verse	   reads:	   "Saturday	   mingled	   the	   night/in	   the	   musseques/with	   mystic	  anxiety/and	  implacably/unfurls	  heroic	  flags/in	  the	  enslaved	  souls.”81	  Neto	  was	  in	  and	  out	  of	  prison	   for	   the	  most	  of	   the	  1950s	   for	  his	   criticism	  of	   the	  Salazarist	   regime	  and	  association	   with	   the	   PCP,	   thus	   acquiring	   admiration	   from	   a	   whole	   generation	   of	  radically	  minded	  students	  in	  Portugal	  for	  his	  unwavering	  stance.	  	  	  Mário	   Pinto	   de	   Andrade	   (21	   August	   1928	   –	   26	   August	   1990)	   was	   born	   at	  Golungo	  Alto,	   close	   to	  Luanda.	  His	   father,	   Jose	  Cristino	  Pinto	  de	  Andrade,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  Liga	  Africana	  in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period.	  Like	  Neto,	  Mário	  also	  studied	  at	  the	  Liceu	  Salvador	  Correia	  and	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  the	  revival	  of	  Angolan	  culture,	  before	  leaving	  for	  Lisbon	  in	  1948.	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  wrote	  poetry	  both	  in	  Kimbundu	  and	  in	  Portuguese	  and	  would	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  critics	  of	   “Lusotropicalism”,	  a	  popular	   theory	  adopted	  by	  Salazar,	  which	  postulated	   that	   the	  Portuguese	   were	   better	   colonizers	   than	   other	   European	   nations.	   Both	   Neto	   and	  Andrade	   maintained	   contact	   with	   Luanda	   and	   published	   work	   in	   the	   short-­‐lived	  
Mensagem.	  Fleeing	  police	  persecution,	  Andrade	  relocated	   to	  Paris	   in	   the	  early	  1950s,	  where	  he	  continued	  his	   studies	  at	   the	  Sorbonne,	   after	  which	  he	  worked	   for	  Présence	  
Africaine,	  an	   influential	   journal	   founded	  by	  Alioune	  Diop,	  a	   famous	  Senegalese	  writer	  and	  a	  key	   figure	   in	   the	  Negritude	  movement.	  While	  working	  at	   the	   journal,	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  developed	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  contacts	  with	  African	  nationalist	   leaders	  residing	  in	  Paris	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Marcelino	  dos	   Santos	   (born	  20	  May	  1929)	  was	   one	  of	   the	   rare	  Mozambicans	  who	   managed	   to	   study	   in	   Portugal.	   Born	   in	   Lumbo	   on	   the	   eastern	   coast	   of	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  Quoted	   in	   Irene	   Margues,	   "Postcolonial	   African	   Consciousness	   and	   the	   Poetry	   of	   Agostinho	   Neto,"	   Comparative	  
Literature	  and	  Culture,	  5	  4	  (2003).	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  Mozambique,	  he	  was	  raised	  in	  the	  capital,	  Lourenço	  Marques.	  His	  father	  Firmindo	  dos	  Santos	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  one	  of	  the	  Mozambican	  associations,	  which	  called	  for	  unity	  and	  revitalization	  among	  Mozambicans	  in	  pursuit	  of	  justice	  and	  social	  equality.	  Heavily	  influenced	   by	   Marxism-­‐Leninism,	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   became	   a	   regular	   at	   the	  various	  youth	  conferences,	  seminars,	  and	  cultural	  events	  held	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	   in	   the	  1950s.	  Pavel	   Shmelkov,	  who	  was	   responsible	   for	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   at	   the	   Soviet	   Friendship	   Association	   with	   Foreign	   Countries	   (SSOD)	   recounts	  meeting	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  along	  with	  Mário	  de	  Andrade,	  and	  Agostinho	  Neto	  at	  one	  such	  poetry	  reading	  in	  early	  1960s	  Moscow.82	  Lúcio	  Gouveia	  Barreto	  de	  Lara	   (born	  9	  April	  1929)	  was	  born	   to	  a	  white	   sisal	  farmer,	  Lúcio	  Gouveia	  Barreto,	  and	  a	  mestizo	  mother,	  Clementina	  Leite.83	  He	  spent	  his	  early	   childhood	  at	  his	   father’s	   sisal	   plantation.	   Later,	   his	   family	   sold	   the	   farm	  due	   to	  financial	  difficulties	  and	  moved	  to	  Huambo.	  While	  living	  in	  Huambo,	  he	  studied	  at	  the	  
Colégio	  Alexandre	  Herculano,	  an	  experience	  that	  was	  only	  affordable	  to	  a	  select	  few.	  His	  experience	   there	   left	   a	   lasting	   impression	   of	   racial	   prejudice	   and	   abusive	   Catholic	  priests	  upon	  the	  young	  Lara.84	  After	  completing	  secondary	  school,	  Lúcio	  Lara	  travelled	  to	  Portugal	  to	  study	  economics	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Coimbra.	  In	  1955	  he	  married	  Ruth	  Pflüger,	   a	   white	   woman	   of	   German	   parentage	   who	   was	   an	   activist	   in	   MUD-­‐Juvenil.	  Actively	   involved	   in	   opposition	   politics	   during	   his	   student	   days,	   Lúcio	   Lara	   would	  remain	  one	  of	  Agostinho	  Neto’s	  closest	  associates	  throughout	  his	  life.85	  In	   1957,	   student	   activists	   in	   Lisbon	   received	   the	  MPLA’s	   “Manifesto”	   and	   the	  “Statutes	  of	  the	  Angolan	  Communist	  Party,”	  with	  instructions	  from	  Luanda	  to	  mobilize	  African	  students	  in	  Europe	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  independence	  for	  the	  colonies.86	  This	  led	  to	  the	   establishment	   of	   the	   first	   umbrella	   organization	   for	   nationalists	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82 Pavel	   Shmelkov,	   "Obshestvennue	   Svyasi	   S	   Afrikoi.	   Kak	   Oni	   Nachinalis."	   Afrika	   V	   Vospominaniyah	   Veteranov	  
Diplomaticheskoi	  Sluzhbu.	  Ed.	  Aleksey	  Vasilev	  (Moscow:	  Institut	  Afriki	  RAN,	  2000),	  29.	  	  83	  Later,	  Lara	  would	  assume	  ‘Tchiweka’	  meaning	  ‘fire’	  as	  his	  nome	  de	  guerre.	  	  84	  Lara	  recalled:	  “One	  of	  the	  priests	  who	  opened	  my	  eyes	  was	  the	  one	  who	  treated	  black	  priests	  at	  mass	  badly,	  which	  was	  revolting,	  and	  who	  once,	  for	  pedagogical	  and	  academic	  reasons,	  beat	  me	  up	  in	  a	  classroom,	  which	  installed	  in	  me	  animosity	  towards	  priests,	  after	  which	  I	  stopped	  being	  religious.”	  See:	  Interview	  with	  Lúcio	  Lara	  in	  Jaime	  and	  Barber,	  eds.,	  Angola,	  	  p.	  36.	  85	  Lúcio	  Lara:	  Tchiweka.	  86	  Lara,	  ed.,	  Amplo	  Movimento,	  	  1:37.	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  Portuguese	   colonies,	   the	   Anti-­‐Colonial	   Movement	   (MAC;	   Movimento	   Anti	  
Colonialista).87	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	   then	  unexpectedly	  arrived	   in	  Lisbon	  on	  October	  1957,	  fleeing	   persecution	   by	   the	   Portuguese	   Secret	   Police	   (PIDE;	  Polícia	   Internacional	   e	  de	  
Defesa	   do	   Estado).	   From	   Lisbon,	   Viriato	   fled	   to	   Paris,	   where	   he	   joined	   Mário	   de	  Andrade	   and	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos.	   The	   trio	   began	   to	   organize	   a	   press	   campaign	  against	   Portuguese	   colonialism.	   That	   same	  month,	   Lara	  was	   invited	   to	   participate	   in	  the	   Fifth	   Congress	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   Communist	   Party.	   During	   the	   Congress,	  independence	  for	  the	  colonies	  was	  embraced	  in	  the	  party	  program	  for	  the	  first	  time.88	  	  During	  the	  same	  time	  period,	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz,	  Mário	  de	  Andrade,	  and	  Marcelino	  dos	   Santos	   came	   to	   the	   “First	   Afro-­‐Asian	   People’s	   Writers’	   Conference”	   held	   in	  Tashkent,	  Soviet	  Uzbekistan,	  in	  October	  1958.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  as	  to	  whom	  they	   met	   in	   Tashkent,	   it	   is	   probable	   that	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz,	   Lúcio	   Lara,	   and	   Mário	   de	  Andrade	  established	  first	  contacts	  with	  Ivan	  Potekhin,	  one	  of	  the	  "founding	  fathers"	  of	  Soviet	   African	   studies,	   who	   had	   taught	   at	   the	   Comintern-­‐affiliated	   “Communist	  University	  of	  the	  Toilers	  of	  the	  East”	  in	  the	  1930s.	  That	  Potekhin	  knew	  of	  the	  Angolan	  activists	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  June	  1959,	  he	  dispatched	  a	  circular	  letter	  to	   Mário	   de	   Andrade,	   notifying	   him	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Friendship	  Association	  with	  the	  African	  Peoples	  and	  asking	  whether	  the	  recipients	  could	  put	  him	  in	  touch	  with	  “cultural	  figures,	  mass	  and	  youth	  organizations	  in	  their	  country.”89	  Mário	  de	   Andrade	   responded	   by	   asking	   for	   scholarships	   for	   students	   from	   the	   Portuguese	  colonies.	   Potekhin,	   who	  was	   appointed	   the	   first	   Head	   of	   the	   Friendship	   Association,	  had	   to	   decline:	   the	   “Friendship	   Organization”	   still	   did	   not	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   offer	  scholarships	  for	  Africans	  to	  study	  in	  the	  USSR.90	  While	   the	   British	   and	   the	   French	   eventually	   began	   a	   process	   of	   negotiations	  with	   local	   nationalist	   leaders	   to	   transition	   to	   independence,	   violent	   Portuguese	  repression	  of	  political	  protest	  in	  the	  colonies	  only	  intensified.	  In	  1959,	  violent	  protests	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Ibid.	  88	  Ibid.,	  1:39.	  89	  Ibid.,	  1:209.	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  Ibid.,	  1:206.	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  broke	   out	   in	   the	   Belgian	   Congo.	   Fearing	   that	   the	   same	  would	   happen	   in	   Angola,	   the	  colonial	  administration	  arrested	  and	  jailed	  fifty	  Angolans	  suspected	  of	  involvement	  in	  nationalist	   agitation.	   One	   of	   the	   jailed	   was	   Ilídio	   Machado,	   one	   of	   the	   founding	  members	   of	   the	   Angolan	   Communist	   Party.	   On	   3	   August	   1959,	   the	   police	   shot	   at	  peaceful	  protesters	  at	  the	  Pidjiguiti	  docks	  in	  Bissau,	  killing	  fifty	  protesters	  and	  injuring	  many	  more.	   The	   PAIGC	   leadership,	   who	   took	   responsibility	   for	   agitating	  workers	   to	  strike,	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   non-­‐violent	   resistance	   was	   not	   working.	   The	  leadership	   pushed	   the	   peasantry	   to	   agitate	   for	   a	   rural-­‐based	   armed	   resistance	  movement.	   In	   Mozambique,	   too,	   a	   similar	   pattern	   emerged.	   In	   June	   1960,	   a	   few	  hundred	  Makonde	  gathered	   in	   front	  of	  a	  governor’s	  house,	  protesting	   for	   the	  release	  the	   leaders	  of	  a	  Mozambican	  self-­‐help	  organization	  based	   in	   the	  neighboring	  British-­‐held	   territory	   of	   Tanganyika.	   In	   response,	   the	   police	   fired	   at	   the	   crowd,	   killing	  (according	   to	   some	   estimates)	   up	   to	   600	   people.	   Although	   historians	   have	   since	  disputed	   the	   eyewitness	   account	   of	   events	   during	  what	  would	   be	   called	   the	   “Mueda	  Massacre,”	  this	  occurrence	  did	  prove	  the	  need	  for	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Mozambique.91	  	  
The	  Liberation	  Movement	  on	  the	  Eve	  of	  the	  Uprising,	  1960	  	  The	   Second	   All	   African	   People’s	   Conference,	   which	   opened	   in	   Tunis	   on	   25	  January	   1960,	   was	   very	   different	   in	   spirit	   from	   the	   first	   conference,	   held	   in	   Accra,	  Ghana,	   in	   1957.	   By	   1960,	   the	   Algerian	   War	   had	   come	   to	   constitute	   what	   historian	  Matthew	   Connelly	   had	   called	   a	   “diplomatic	   revolution,”	   not	   only	   because	   the	   rebels	  chose	   the	   international	   arena	   as	   a	   weapon	   against	   the	   French,	   but	   also	   because	   it	  became	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  and	  inspired	  other	  Third	  World	  revolutionaries.92	  Although	   the	   Conference	   represented	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   political	  views,	  it	  was	  Franz	  Fanon,	  the	  ideologue	  of	  the	  Algerian	  Revolution	  and	  adviser	  to	  the	  
Front	   de	   Libération	   Nationale	   (FLN),	   who	   personified	   the	   militant	   mood	   at	   the	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  Michel	  Cahen	  has	  discovered	  that	  the	  real	  numbers	  killed	  in	  those	  events	  were	  between	  9	  and	  36,	  that	  the	  petitioners	  who	  had	  come	  were	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Mozambique	  African	  Association	  of	  Tanga,	  a	  rival	  of	  the	  MANU,	  and	  that	  their	  goal	  was	   to	  negotiate	   the	   return	  of	   the	  Mozambican	   community	   to	  Tanganyika.	  Michel	  Cahen,	   "The	  Mueda	  Case	  and	  Maconde	  Political	  Ethnicity,"	  Africana	  Studia,	  2	  	  (November	  1999).	  92	  Matthew	  J.	  Connelly,	  A	  Diplomatic	  Revolution:	  Algeria's	  Fight	  for	  Independence	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Post-­‐cold	  War	  Era	  	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	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  conference.	   Participants	   agreed	   to	   create	   an	   African	   “volunteer	   corps”	   and	   make	  regular	   financial	   contributions	   to	   the	   cause.	   Delegates	   also	   agreed	   to	   intensify	   their	  struggle	  for	  independence	  and	  decided	  to	  establish	  a	  committee	  to	  coordinate	  aid	  from	  independent	  states	  to	  the	  nationalist	  movements.93	  In	  Tunis,	  Franz	  Fanon	  called	  on	  Angolans	  to	   learn	  from	  the	  Algerian	  example.	  That	  was	   the	   first	   time	   that	  Mário	   de	   Andrade,	   Lúcio	   Lara,	   and	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   had	  attended	   a	   conference	   in	   Africa,	   and	   they	   immediately	   clashed	   with	   Fanon.	   Their	  previous	   encounter	   had	   occurred	   a	   year	   earlier,	   when	   Fanon	   had	   approached	   the	  MPLA	   leadership	   at	   the	   Second	   Congress	   of	   Negro	  Writers	   and	   Artists	   in	   Rome	   and	  proposed	   that	   they	   should	   send	   “eleven	  young	  people”	   for	  military	   training	  with	   the	  FLN.	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  had	  travelled	  to	  Luanda	  to	  select	  the	  appropriate	  cadre	  in	  August	  of	   1959.	   He	   returned	   empty-­‐handed,	   since	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   activists	   had	   been	  arrested.	  Lúcio	  Lara	  writes	   that	   they	   tried	   to	  explain	   the	   complexity	  of	   the	   situation,	  but	   Fanon	   was	   still	   disappointed	   and	   insisted	   that	   that	   they	   should	   begin	   military	  action	  immediately	  in	  order	  to	  relieve	  pressure	  on	  the	  FLN.	  Lara	  also	  writes	  that	  Fanon	  believed	  the	  MPLA	  were	  “people	  from	  the	  city,”	  while	  Holden	  Roberto	  was	  “connected	  with	   the	   masses.”	   Negotiations	   between	   Fanon	   and	   the	   MPLA	   broke	   down,	   while	  Holden	   Roberto	   agreed	   to	   send	   his	   men	   for	   military	   training	   at	   the	   FLN	   camp	   in	  Tunisia.94	  Holden	   Roberto	   was	   in	   a	   much	   better	   position	   to	   start	   any	   kind	   of	   military	  action	  in	  Angola.	  Roberto	  was	  much	  more	  prepared	  to	  follow	  Fanon’s	  advice	  because	  he	   had	   already	   become	   convinced	   of	   the	   need	   for	   armed	   struggle.	   “Cousin,	   without	  bloodshed	   liberation	   is	   not	   possible,”	   wrote	   Roberto,	   in	   Fanon’s	   style,	   in	   1958.95	  Moreover,	   Roberto	  was	   already	  well	   acquainted	  with	  many	  African	   leaders	   from	  his	  fairly	  long	  stay	  in	  Accra,	  and	  he	  had	  acquired	  some	  international	  prominence	  in	  1959,	  when	  he	  became	   the	   first	  Angolan	   to	   speak	   in	   front	  of	   the	  General	  Assembly	   in	  New	  York,	   arguing	   for	   the	   UN	   to	   assume	   jurisdiction	   over	   Angola.	   Holden’s	   biggest	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   56	  advantage	  was	  that	  the	  UPA	  had	  already	  established	  a	  base	  in	  the	  Belgian	  Congo,	  which	  was	   the	   ideal	   launching	   pad	   for	   military	   operations	   in	   neighboring	   Angola.	   Holden	  Roberto	  recalled	  that	  Patrice	  Lumumba	  was	  his	  “personal	  friend”	  and	  promised	  him	  to	  support	  the	  UPA	  if	  he	  came	  to	  power	  in	  the	  Congo.96	  The	  UPA	  was	  thus	  well	  positioned	  to	   take	   advantage	   of	   Congolese	   independence,	   scheduled	   for	   June.	   In	   Tunis,	   Roberto	  arranged	   with	   Fanon	   to	   send	   his	   men	   for	   military	   training	   with	   the	   FLN,	   and	   also	  established	   a	   relationship	   with	   the	   Tunisian	   president,	   Habib	   Bourgiba,	   who	   would	  send	  the	  first	  arms	  for	  the	  UPA.97	  The	   Tunis	   Conference	   also	   provided	   a	   platform	   for	   talks	   between	   the	   MPLA	  leadership	  and	  the	  Guinean	  delegation,	  including	  Sékou	  Touré’s	  brother,	  Ismail	  Toure,	  who	  agreed	   that	   the	  MPLA	   could	   establish	   their	  headquarters	   in	  Conakry.	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	   relocated	   to	  Conakry	  shortly	  after	   the	  conference,	   and	   the	   rest	   soon	   followed.98	  The	  move	  to	  Conakry	  was	  considered	  a	  temporary	  necessity,	  since	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  the	   MPLA	   leadership	   was	   to	   establish	   a	   base	   in	   Congo-­‐Léopoldville,	   neighboring	  Angola.	  Lúcio Lara	  argued	  that	  when	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  met	  Lumumba	  in	  Conakry	  shortly	  after	  Congolese	   independence,	   they	   tried	   to	  persuade	  him	  that	   it	  was	  Holden	  Roberto	  who	  did	  not	  want	   to	  unite	   into	  a	  common	  front,	  and	  that	  Lumumba	  allowed	  them	   to	   move	   their	   headquarters	   to	   Léopoldville. 99 	  Meanwhile,	   Agostinho	   Neto	  returned	   to	   Luanda,	   where	   he	   started	   a	   private	   medical	   practice,	   but	   continued	  mobilizing	   for	   the	   nationalist	   cause.	   Neto	   sent	   Manuel	   Pedro	   Pacavira	   to	  meet	   with	  Lúcio	  Lara	  and	  discuss	  a	  joint	  strategy.	  In	  April	  1960,	  Lúcio	  Lara	  flew	  to	  meet	  Pacavira	  in	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	   where	   the	   two	   agreed	   to	   mobilize	   the	   population	   in	   the	  countryside,	   but	   wait	   until	   international	   opinion	   towards	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies	  “matured”	  before	  proceeding	  with	  any	  kind	  of	  armed	  action,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  loss	  of	  lives.	  They	  also	  agreed,	  writes	  Lara,	  that	  the	  sides	  would	  exchange	  a	  sign	  to	  alert	  the	  other	  as	  to	  when	  this	  would	  take	  place.	  However,	  Pacavira	  was	  arrested	  by	  the	  secret	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   57	  police,	   along	  with	  Neto	  and	  a	  group	  of	   their	   supporters,	   shortly	  after	   returning	   from	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville.100	  While	   the	   MPLA’s	   organization	   inside	   Angola	   was	   shattered,	   the	   MPLA	  leadership	  in	  Conakry	  continued	  to	  organize	  and	  mobilize	  support	  for	  the	  movement.	  On	   June	  9,	  MPLA’s	   leadership	   in	  Conakry	   formalized	   the	  organizational	   structure	   for	  the	  movement,	   electing	  Mário	   de	   Andrade,	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz,	   Luiz	   de	   Azevedo,	  Matias	  Miguéis,	  Eduardo	  dos	  Santos,	  and	  Hugo	  de	  Menezes	  from	  São	  Tomé	  and	  Príncipe	  to	  the	  MPLA’s	   first	   Steering	   Committee.101	  The	   MPLA	   also	   continued	   to	   campaign	   for	   a	  common	  front	  with	  the	  UPA,	  but	  grew	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  recurrent	  failures.	  When	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  spoke	  to	  representatives	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  in	  August,	  he	  stated	  that	  the	  UPA	  was	  a	  “rather	  racist	  organization	  and	  due	  to	  its	  ties	  with	  the	  USA,	  a	   reactionary	  one.”102	  Moreover,	   their	  plan	   to	   transfer	   their	  headquarters	   to	  the	   Congo	   failed	   because	   of	   Patrice	   Lumumba's	   fall	   from	  power	   in	   September	   1960.	  Speaking	   at	   the	   London	   Conference	   for	   Nationalist	   Leaders	   from	   the	   Portuguese	  Colonies	   on	   6	   December,	   Mário	   de	   Andrade	   declared	   that	   while	   the	   liberation	  movements	  preferred	  a	  “pacific	  solution	  to	  the	  colonial	  problem,”	  they	  would	  resort	  to	  “direct	   action”	   if	   faced	   with	   continuous	   Portuguese	   intransigence.	   The	   MPLA	   would	  later	  claim	  that	  this	  was	  the	  signal	  they	  had	  agreed	  on	  with	  Pacavira	  to	  launch	  military	  operations.103	  The	  MPLA	  was	   definitely	   preparing	   to	   use	   force,	   and	   the	   first	   country	  they	  turned	  to	  for	  concrete	  support	  was	  Czechoslovakia.	  	  Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   travelled	   to	   Prague	   in	   January	   of	   1961,	   accompanied	   by	   his	  close	  friend	  and	  deputy	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  MPLA,	  Matias	  Miguéis.	  Their	  goal	  was	  to	   discuss	   a	   request	   for	   scholarships,	   placements	   for	  military	   training,	   financial	   aid,	  and	  weapons,	   which	   they	   had	   already	   transmitted	   via	   the	   Czechoslovak	   embassy	   in	  Conakry.104 	  On	   28	   January,	   while	   talking	   with	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Deputy	   Foreign	  Minister,	   Ján	   Bušniak,	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   explained	   that	   the	   MPLA	   represented	   the	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   58	  Angolan	  people	  and	  that	  they	  aspired	  to	  establish	  a	  common	  national-­‐liberation	  front,	  but	   that	   these	   ambitious	   were	   hampered	   by	   the	   UPA.	   “Only	   the	   UPA,	   founded	   and	  supported	   by	   the	  United	   States,	   stands	   apart,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   have	   support	   from	   the	  Angolan	  people,”	  da	  Cruz	  complained.	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  also	  said	  that	  although	  he	  did	  not	  believe	   in	   nonviolent	   liberation	   of	   Angola,	   the	   situation	   was	   “not	   ripe	   for	   armed	  struggle	  at	  the	  moment.”105	  While	  the	  MPLA	  was	  seriously	  sourcing	  means	  for	  an	  anti-­‐colonial	  campaign,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  the	  leadership	  had	  any	  concrete	  plans	  in	  mind.	  	  The	  MPLA’s	  move	   to	  Conakry	   also	  paved	   the	  way	   for	  Amílcar	  Cabral	   and	   the	  PAIGC.	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  moved	  to	  Conakry	  in	  August,	  taking	  a	  job	  in	  peanut	  cultivation	  at	  the	  Guinean	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture.	  He	  also	  set	  up	  a	  school	  to	  train	  recruits,	  where	  Cabral	  would	  himself	  famously	  teach.	  If	  Conakry	  could	  only	  serve	  as	  a	  temporary	  base	  for	  the	  MPLA,	  Guinea	  at	   least	  shared	  a	   long	  border	  with	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  and	  was	  thus	  an	   ideal	   launching	  pad	   for	  armed	  struggle.	  During	  a	  visit	   to	  Beijing	   in	  August,	  Cabral	  negotiated	   to	   send	  his	   cadres	   for	   short-­‐term	  military	   training	  at	   the	  Nanjing	  Military	  Academy. 106 	  In	   early	   1961,	   the	   first	   recruits,	   including	   Constantino	   Tersheira,	  Francisco	   Mendes,	   João	   Bernardo	   Vieira,	   Domingo	   Ramos,	   Victorino	   Costa,	   Victor	  Gomes,	   and	  Manuel	   Saturnino,	   travelled	   to	   Beijing.	   This	   is	  when	   they	   received	   their	  first	  impressions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  during	  a	  stopover	  in	  Moscow:	  “Me	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  others	  decided	  that	  we	  have	  to	  visit	  the	  Red	  Square	  at	  all	  costs,	  to	  visit	  the	  mausoleum,	  to	  see	  Lenin.	  I	  took	  the	  underground	  –	  it	  was	  my	  first	  trip	  –	  I	  arrived	  to	  the	  center	  and	  came	   to	   the	   Red	   Square.	   This	   stayed	   in	  my	  memory	   for	   the	   rest	   of	  my	   life:	  my	   first	  encounter	   with	   Moscow,	   snow,	   frost,	   and	   a	   long	   line	   for	   the	   mausoleum,”	   recalled	  Constantino	  Tersheira.107	  The	  PAIGC	  was	  not	   the	  only	  nationalist	   organization	  based	   in	  Guinea	   looking	  for	  support	  from	  the	  socialist	  countries.	  One	  rival	  group	  was	  led	  by	  an	  individual	  called	  Luís	   da	   Silva,	   who	   had	   gained	   patronage	   from	   the	   Guinean	   authorities	   even	   before	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   59	  Cabral’s	   arrival.	   On	   17	   January	   1961,	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   GDR	   Trade	   Mission	   in	  Conakry	  Joaquim	  Neumann	  wrote	  to	  Berlin,	  reporting	  that	  da	  Silva	  had	  approached	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Chinese	  embassies	  in	  Conakry	  and	  that	  he	  had	  received	  invitations	  to	  visit	  Moscow	  and	  Beijing.	  The	  Soviets	  had	  promised	  da	  Silva	   scholarships	   to	   enroll	   at	   the	  Lumumba	  People’s	  Friendship	  University	  in	  Moscow.	  However,	  as	  Cabral	  and	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	   told	   Neumann,	   da	   Silva	   had	   attempted	   to	   sell	   those	   scholarships	   in	   Dakar,	  Senegal.	  The	  Chinese	  also	  complained	  of	  his	  arrogance,	  as	  Neumann	  discovered.	  If	  da	  Silva	  and	  his	  group	  were	  “dangerous	  careerists	  who	  put	  their	  personal	  interests	  at	  the	  forefront,”	   the	   PAIGC	   was	   “the	   only	   organization	   of	   political	   emigrants	   from	  Portuguese	  Guinea	  and	  Cape	  Verde	  which	  should	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  which	  should	  receive	  our	  support,”	  Neumann	  concluded.108	  One	  of	  the	  first	  men	  who	  established	  regular	  contacts	  with	  Cabral	  was	  Miroslav	  Alter,	   the	   deputy	   resident	   of	   Czechoslovak	   Intelligence	   (StB’s	   First	   Directorate)	   in	  Conakry.	   It	   seems	   that	   his	   task	   was	   in	   line	   with	   the	   plan	   for	   joint	   intelligence	  operations,	  which	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  StB	  had	  signed	  in	  July.	  Guinea’s	  capital	  Conakry	  was	  one	   of	   the	   locations	   where	   both	   intelligence	   services	   had	   established	   rezidenturas.	  Alter’s	   task	   was	   thus	   to	   establish	   relations	   with	   persons	   of	   interest	   to	   the	   StB	   in	  Conakry.	   On	   22	   November	   1960,	   he	   invited	   Cabral	   for	   lunch	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	  information	   about	   this	   country	   “in	   accordance	   with	   our	   plan	   of	   our	   work	   in	   the	  Portuguese	  colonies,”	  as	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  report.	  Alter	  continued:	  “The	  meeting	  took	   place	   in	   a	   friendly	   atmosphere,	   even	   if	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	   extract	   any	  information	  during	  the	  first	  meeting,	  our	  conversation	  was	  rather	  general.”109	  Over	   the	   following	  months,	   their	  meetings	  became	  quite	  regular,	  and	  the	  pair	  would	   regularly	   discuss	   current	   events.	   On	   13	   January	   1961,	   Cabral	   asked	   Alter	  whether	  he	  could	  visit	  Prague	  after	  a	  trip	  to	  Moscow,	  where	  he	  wanted	  to	  discuss	  aid.	  Cabral	  explained	  that	  he	  could	  have	  received	  assistance	  from	  the	  capitalist	  countries,	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  (Naumann)	  to	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  January	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  "The	  Situation	  in	  Portuguese	  Guinea,"	  Politisches	  Archiv	  des	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   60	  but	  would	  not	  do	  this	  for	  political	  reasons.	  Czechoslovakia	  did	  not	  attach	  any	  political	  conditions	  to	  aid,	  said	  Cabral,	  while	  “western	  imperialists”	  wanted	  to	  build	  capitalism	  in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau:	   the	   US	   and	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   (FRG)	   were	   already	  exploring	  ways	  to	  tap	  into	  unexploited	  deposits	  of	  petroleum	  and	  bauxites.	  The	  PAIGC	  had	  all	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  launch	  an	  armed	  struggle	  in	  1961	  or	  the	  following	  year,	  argued	   Cabral,	   which	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   rebellion	   in	   other	   Portuguese	  colonies,	  Angola	  in	  particular.110	  1960	   was	   the	   year	   when	   pressure	   from	   international	   actors	   such	   as	   Franz	  Fanon	   and	   internal	   rivals	   such	   as	   UPA	   in	   Angola	   intensified	   for	   the	   liberation	  movements	  to	  proceed	  from	  nationalist	  agitation	  to	  armed	  struggle.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  was	  essential	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  socialist	  countries,	  because	  only	  they	   were	   willing	   to	   provide	   aid.	   The	   MPLA	   was	   increasingly	   tied	   into	   a	   cycle	   of	  competition	  with	  Holden	  Roberto’s	  UPA,	  which	  had	  already	  been	  gathering	  support	  for	  armed	  struggle.	  Although	  the	  MPLA	  tried	  to	  construct	  a	  “common	  front”	  with	  the	  UPA,	  Holden	  Roberto	  was	  not	   interested	  an	  alliance	  of	  equals.	   Increasingly	   frustrated	  with	  the	   UPA,	   the	   MPLA	   leadership	   began	   to	   construct	   the	   image	   of	   their	   rival	   as	   “pro-­‐American.”	   While	   the	   MPLA	   was	   clearly	   getting	   ready	   for	   armed	   action,	   conditions	  were	   not	   right	   for	   the	  movement	   to	   proceed,	   and	   the	   organization	   did	   not	   have	   any	  concrete	  plans	  for	  the	  uprising.	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  were	  actually	  in	  a	  much	  better	  position	  to	  launch	  an	  armed	  uprising	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  and	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  they	  would	  do	  so	  in	  the	  nearest	  future.	  	  	  However,	   the	  nationalist	   leaders	  were	  running	  out	  of	   time.	  Angola	  was	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   an	   economic	   recession.	  A	   few	  years	   earlier,	  world	  prices	   of	   coffee,	   Angola’s	  largest	  export	  commodity,	  had	  dropped,	   leading	  to	  wage	  cuts	   in	  the	  coffee	  producing	  areas	  of	  the	  north.	  In	  addition,	  1960	  was	  not	  a	  good	  year	  for	  the	  cotton	  farmers	  of	  the	  Kassange	  (Malanje)	  region.	  There	  is	  very	  little	  information	  about	  this	  revolt.	  According	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   61	  to	  John	  Marcum,	  an	  established	  authority	  on	  the	  Angolan	  liberation	  movement,	  it	  was	  led	  by	  António	  Mariano,	  a	  member	  of	  a	  Christian	  sect	  devoted	   to	   the	  Virgin	  Mary.	   In	  January	   1961,	  wage	   cuts	   spurred	   a	  wave	   of	   protests,	  which	  were	   soon	   answered	   by	  arrests.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  full-­‐blown	  rebellion	  against	  the	  system	  of	  forced	  cotton	  growing	  in	   the	   area,	   with	   farm	   laborers	   burning	   crops	   and	   destroying	   infrastructure.	   The	  Portuguese	  responded	  with	  massive	  reprisals,	  killing	  thousands.111	  This	  revolt	  and	  the	  reprisals	  –	  known	  as	  “Maria’s	  War”	  and	  the	  “Massacre	  of	  the	  Lower	  Kassange”	  –	  passed	  relatively	   unnoticed	   by	   the	   word	   press.	   This	   was	   primarily	   due	   to	   strict	   censorship	  imposed	  by	  the	  authorities,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  uprising	  was	  fairly	  spontaneous.	  The	  issue	  of	  Portuguese	   colonialism	  did	   come	  up	  a	   few	   times	  during	  deliberations	   at	   the	  United	   Nations	   in	   1960;	   however,	   developments	   in	   the	   colonies	   were	   still	   out	   of	  international	  headlines.	  This	  changed	  on	  23	  January	  1961,	  when	  a	   luxury	  Portuguese	  liner,	  the	  Santa	  Maria,	  was	  hijacked	  by	  a	  group	  of	  political	  activists	  led	  by	  66-­‐year-­‐old	  Henrique	  Galvão.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Marcum,	  Angolan	  Revolution,	  pp.	  124-­‐126.	  
	   62	  
CHAPTER	  ONE	  
	  
Our	  Sacred	  Duty:	  The	  Angolan	  Uprising	  and	  its	  Aftermath,	  
1960–1963	  
	  “Portugal:	   Revolt	   on	   the	   High	   Seas,”	   ran	   a	   headline	   in	   Time	   magazine	   on	   3	  February	   1961.	   Henrique	   Galvão	   was	   a	   long-­‐term	   opponent	   of	   the	   Salazarist	  dictatorship.	  A	  former	  high-­‐ranking	  colonial	  official,	  Galvão	  believed	  that	  Portugal	  had	  a	   right	   to	   rule	   in	  Africa.	  The	  continuation	  of	   exploitative	   colonial	  practices,	  however,	  did	  not	  coincide	  with	  his	  romantic	  notion	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  civilizing	  mission.	  Galvão	  had	  been	  imprisoned	  in	  1952	  on	  charges	  of	  plotting	  a	  coup	  d’etat,	  after	  he	  had	  publicly	  criticized	  the	  government	  for	  failing	  to	  improve	  conditions	  for	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  the	  colonies.	  However,	  he	  managed	  to	  escape	  to	  Latin	  America,	  from	  where	  he	  began	  to	  plan	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Salazarist	  regime.	  When	  he	  and	  his	  crew	  seized	  the	  liner	  
Santa	  Maria	  in	  January	  1961,	  rumors	  spread	  that	  the	  ship	  was	  sailing	  towards	  Angola,	  where	   Galvão	   would	   launch	   a	   coup.	  Reporters	   thus	   flocked	   to	   Luanda	   awaiting	   the	  ship's	   arrival.	   After	   navigating	   the	   Atlantic	   for	   10	   days,	   Galvão	   ultimately	   docked	   at	  Recife,	   Brazil.	   Galvão	   claimed	   that	   his	   goal	   was	   indeed	   to	   launch	   a	   coup	   d’etat	   in	  Angola,	  but,	  pursued	  by	  the	  US	  navy,	  the	  crew	  probably	  realized	  that	  the	  mission	  was	  unattainable	   and	   sought	   a	   safe	   harbor	   for	   political	   asylum.	   Galvão	   and	   his	   crew	  succeeded	  in	  attracting	  the	  world’s	  attention	  to	  Portuguese	  colonialism.112	  Only	  a	  few	  journalists	   remained	   in	   Luanda,	   but	   those	   who	   stayed	   were	   to	   witness	   a	   series	   of	  events	  that	  would	  change	  the	  course	  of	  Angola’s	  history.	  	  On	  4	  February,	   at	  dawn,	  around	  150	  black	  men	  armed	  with	   clubs	  and	  knives	  attacked	  the	  police	  station,	  Sao	  Paolo	  prison,	  the	  military	  detention	  barracks,	  the	  radio	  station,	   and	   the	   airport	   in	   Luanda.	   By	   the	   evening,	   six	  white	   policemen,	   one	   African	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  See:	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  Portugal	  trans.	  William	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  (London:	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  army	  corporal,	  and	  fourteen	  so-­‐called	  rebels	  had	  been	  killed.	  The	  next	  day,	  interracial	  violence	  erupted	  again	  at	  the	  large	  public	  funeral	  of	  those	  had	  been	  killed	  the	  previous	  day.	   On	   10	   February,	   the	   prison	   was	   again	   under	   attack,	   leaving	   seven	   dead	   and	  seventeen	  wounded.	  Only	  after	  a	  week	  of	  violent	  clashes	  between	  the	  white	  and	  black	  residents,	   punitive	   sweeps	   of	   the	   Luandan	   slums,	   midnight	   arrests,	   and	   vigilante	  shootings	   was	   the	   revolt	   put	   down.113	  However,	   events	   in	   Luanda	   did	   not	   end	   the	  violence	  in	  Angola,	  because	  just	  one	  month	  later,	  on	  15	  March,	  another	  major	  uprising	  swept	   across	   northern	   Angola.	   The	   Northern	   Uprising	   grew	   into	   a	   massive	   revolt	  against	   the	   colonial	   system	  of	   forced	   labor	   in	   the	   north,	  which	  was	   only	   suppressed	  after	   six	  months	   of	  military	   operations	   conducted	  with	   overwhelming	   force,	   leaving	  thousands	  killed,	  wounded,	  and	  displaced	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  racial	  divide.114	  The	  Angolan	  Uprising	  of	  1961	  shattered	  the	  myth	  of	  harmonious	  race	  relations	  in	  Angola	  and	  thrust	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  into	  the	  Cold	  War.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  issue	  of	  Portuguese	   colonialism	  became	  a	   salient	   international	   topic.	  The	   timing	  was	  important	   because	   the	  Angolan	  Uprising	   coincided	  with	   a	   spike	   in	   tensions	   between	  the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   the	   United	   States	   over	   the	   status	   of	   West	   Berlin.	   Khrushchev	  initially	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  engage	  in	  peaceful	  competition	  with	  the	  West	   in	   the	   Third	   World.	   However,	   he	   became	   increasingly	   disillusioned	   with	   this	  possibility,	   especially	   during	   the	   1960	   Congo	   Crisis.	   Khrushchev	   had	   had	   great	  expectations	  of	  the	  newly	  elected	  US	  president,	  John	  Fitzgerald	  Kennedy,	  but	  yet	  again,	  Khrushchev’s	   expectations	   proved	   futile,	   as	   Kennedy	   ordered	   a	   build-­‐up	   of	  conventional	   and	   nuclear	   arms	   and	   sanctioned	   a	   CIA	   plan	   to	   invade	   Cuba	   and	  overthrow	  Fidel	  Castro.	  At	  the	  Vienna	  Summit	  in	  June	  1961,	  Khrushchev	  responded	  by	  challenging	   Kennedy	   over	   Western	   rights	   of	   access	   to	   West	   Berlin.	   This	   initiated	  another	  period	  of	  heightened	  tension	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States,	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  "Angola:	  Land	  of	  Brotherly	  Love,"	  Time,	  February	  17,	  1961.	  114	  It	   is	   incredibly	  difficult	   to	   count	   the	  death	   toll	   in	   the	   conflict.	   Some	  estimate	   that	   the	  Angolan	  uprising	   led	   to	   the	  deaths	  of	  7,000	  white	  settlers	  and	  up	  to	  20,000	  “natives”	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1961.	  See:	  Tom	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  John	  Mitchell,	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World	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  Military	  History,	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  Publishing,	  1984),	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   64	  ultimately	  leading	  to	  the	  1962	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.115	  	  While	  escalation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  forced	  Kennedy	  to	  moderate	  his	  pressure	  on	  Salazar	  due	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  losing	  the	  Azores	  base,	  the	  effect	  on	  Soviet	  policy	  was	  quite	  the	   opposite.	   Khrushchev	   responded	   to	   his	   own	   failed	   expectations	   of	   peaceful	  competition	  by	  upping	  the	  ante	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  Khrushchev	  was	  thus	  more	  willing	  to	  challenge	  the	  US	  by	  supporting	  anti-­‐colonial	  uprisings	  throughout	  the	  world.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1961,	  therefore,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Czechoslovakia,	  and	  Bulgaria	  approved	  their	  first	  assistance	  packages	   for	   the	  MPLA.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1961	  therefore,	  Czechoslovakia	  also	   forged	   a	   clandestine	   relationship	   with	   the	   PAIGC’s	   leader	   Amílcar	   Cabral,	  providing	  him	  with	  the	  first	  weapons	  they	  obtained	  from	  abroad,	  along	  with	  material	  assistance	   and	   training.	   While	   FRELIMO	   would	   only	   be	   formed	   in	   1962,	   the	   Soviet	  decision	  to	  provide	  assistance	  in	  1963	  would	  follow	  similar	  logic.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1963,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  tie	  themselves	  to	  the	  political	  fates	  of	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC.	  	  	  
The	  Angolan	  Uprising,	  February–March	  1961	  There	   has	   been	  much	   speculation	   about	  who	   initiated	   the	   first	   attacks	   of	   the	  Angolan	   Uprising	   and	   what	   their	   objectives	   were.	   Both	   the	   MPLA	   and	   the	   UPA	  leadership	   claimed	   that	   the	   initiative	   belonged	   to	   their	   supporters	   in	   Luanda.	   Most	  recently,	   Dalia	   and	   Álvaro	   Mateus	   have	   discovered	   that	   the	   attacks	   organized	   in	  Luanda	  were	  not	  connected	  with	  either	  organization.	  Their	  objectives	  were	  to	  free	  the	  political	   prisoners	   incarcerated	   at	   the	   Sao	   Paolo	   prison	   and	   to	   express	   desire	   for	  independence. 116 	  The	   reality	   did	   not	   matter	   to	   Governor	   Álvaro	   Tavares,	   who	  immediately	   blamed	   “Communist	   agitators”	   for	   the	   attacks	   and	   promised	   to	   reveal	  documents	  that	  the	  uprising	  had	  been	  planned	  from	  abroad,	  while	  Lisbon	  argued	  that	  arms	   made	   in	   Czechoslovakia	   had	   been	   found	   with	   the	   rebels.	   The	   colonial	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  overview	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  the	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  see:	  Jeffrey	  Sachs,	  To	  Move	  the	  World:	  	  JFK's	  
Quest	  for	  Peace.	  Google	  Play	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2013).	  116	  Dalila	  Cabrita	  Mateus	  and	  Álvaro	  Mateus,	  Angola	  61	  –	  Guerra	  Colonial:	  Causas	  e	  Consequências.	  O	  4	  de	  Fevereiro	  e	  o	  15	  
de	  Março	   	   (Lisbon:	  Texto,	   2011).	  The	   leader	  of	   the	   group	  was	  Manuel	  Agostinho	  Domingos,	   a	  painter	   from	  Malange.	  Others	  included	  António	  Domingos	  Francisco,	  António	  Bento,	  Christopher	  Raul	  Deião,	  Virgil	  Francisco	  Sotomayor,	  Paiva	  Domingos	  da	  Silva,	  Bendinha	  Adam	  Neves,	  and	  Adam	  Manuel	  Mateus.	  The	  majority	  were	  from	  Icolo	  e	  Bengo	  region	  
	   65	  administration	  instituted	  strict	  censorship,	  arresting	  journalists,	  confiscating	  cameras,	  and	  seizing	  film	  to	  silence	  the	  coverage	  of	  events	  in	  Luanda.117	  	  From	  the	  few	  available	  reports,	  we	  know	  that	  white	  vigilantes	  turned	  on	  blacks	  with	  a	  vengeance;	  hundreds	  of	  blacks	  were	  dragged	  from	  their	  huts,	  mostly	  at	  night,	  and	  many	  were	  beaten,	  shot,	  and	  left	  to	  die	  on	  the	  streets.118	  The	  Santa	  Maria	   incident	  and	  the	  bloody	  events	   in	  Luanda	  placed	  Portuguese	  colonialism	  on	   the	   international	  agenda.	   “Angola:	   the	  Land	  of	  Brotherly	  Love,”	  stated	  
Time	  magazine,	  mocking	  the	  words	  spoken	  by	  Angolan	  Governor	  General	  Tavares	  only	  a	   few	   days	   before	   tensions	   in	   the	   capital	   escalated	   into	   full-­‐blown	   racial	   violence.	  “Freedom	   Will	   Come	   to	   Angola,”	   proclaimed	   the	   headline	   in	   the	   CPSU	   mouthpiece	  
Pravda	  on	  5	  February	  1961.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  article	  in	  Pravda	  was	  Mário	  de	  Andrade,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Conakry-­‐based	  MPLA.	  Although	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  would	  later	  claim	  it	  gave	  the	  signal	  for	  the	  uprising	  in	  Luanda,	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  in	  Conakry	  did	  not	   actually	   know	   anything	   about	   it.	   In	   his	   article	   for	   Pravda,	   Mário	   de	   Andrade	  introduced	   the	   MPLA	   as	   originating	   from	   a	   “Marxist	   circle”	   established	   in	   October	  1955.	  He	  also	  heralded	  the	  hijacking	  of	  the	  Santa	  Maria,	  but	  did	  not	  mention	  that	  the	  MPLA	  were	  behind	   the	  events	   in	  Luanda.119	  What	  mattered	  was	   that	  media	  attention	  was	   finally	   focused	   on	   Angola.	   Shortly	   after	   the	   events	   in	   Luanda	   took	   place,	   Libya	  introduced	  a	  motion	  to	  put	  Angola	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  	  The	  newly	  elected	  US	  president,	   John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  had	  quite	  a	  different	  stance	  on	   the	   colonial	   issues	   than	  his	  predecessor.	  While	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  had	  generally	  preferred	   gradual	   decolonization	   under	   European	   patronage,	   Kennedy	   believed	   that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  engage	  with	  the	  African	  nationalist	  leaders	  in	  order	  to	  appeal	  to	   the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  movement	   and	   sway	   them	   to	   the	   side	   of	   the	   “free	  world.”120	  Then-­‐Senator	   Kennedy	   had	   denounced	   the	   French	   colonial	   war	   in	   Algeria	   in	   a	   passionate	  speech	   to	   the	   US	   Congress	   on	   2	   July	   1957,	   which	   had	   scandalized	  Washington	   and	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  "Angola:	  Land	  of	  Brotherly	  Love."	  118	  Marcum,	  Angolan	  Revolution,	  p.	  129.	  119	  Mario	  de	  Andrade,	  "Svoboda	  Pridet	  v	  Angolu,"	  Pravda,	  February	  6,	  1961,	  	  p.	  3.	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  Robert	  B.	  Rakove,	  Kennedy,	  Johnson,	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  Nonaligned	  World	  	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	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   66	  Paris	   but	   had	   earned	   the	   respect	   of	   many	   African	   leaders.121	  While	   Kennedy’s	   main	  motivation	  was	   to	   prevent	   the	   spread	   of	   communism	   to	  Africa,	   he	   promised	   that	   he	  would	  no	   longer	  hesitate	   in	  putting	  pressure	  on	  allies	  regarding	  colonial	   issues.	  On	  7	  March,	   the	  Secretary	  of	   State,	  Dean	  Rusk,	   instructed	   the	  US	  Ambassador	   to	  Portugal,	  Charles	   Burke	   Elbrick,	   to	   tell	   Salazar	   that	   Portugal	   should	   move	   towards	   “full	   self-­‐determination	   within	   a	   realistic	   timetable”	   and	   promised	   economic	   aid	   if	   Salazar	  agreed.	  Rusk	  also	  warned	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  trouble	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  predicting	  that	  inaction	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   government	   would	   lead	   to	   “catastrophic	  upheavals	  of	  Congo	  type	  or	  worse.”122	  Washington’s	  policy	  towards	  Holden	  Roberto	  is	  less	  clear.	  Roberto	  first	  visited	  the	   US	   in	   1959,	  when	   he	   allegedly	  met	   Kennedy,	   then	   still	   a	   senator	   famous	   for	   his	  stance	   on	   African	   affairs.	   Holden,	   who	   admired	   Kennedy’s	   courageous	   stance	   on	  Angola,	   recalled:	   “We	   agreed	   that	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   do	   something	   to	   prevent	   the	  communists	   from	   taking	   over	   the	   Angolan	   liberation	   movement.”123	  Holden	   again	  travelled	   to	   the	   US	   in	  March	   1961,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  whom	   he	  met	   during	   the	   trip.	  Richard	  Mahoney	  writes	  that	  Roberto	  met	  with	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  Robert	  Kennedy,	  John	   F.	   Kennedy’s	   brother,	   who	   was	   impressed	   by	   him,	   and	   that	   in	   late	   April,	   the	  National	  Security	  Council	  authorized	  covert	  assistance	  for	  Roberto,	  at	  a	  sum	  of	  $6,000	  per	  year.124	  However,	  as	  Roger	  Hilsman,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  bureau	  of	   intelligence	   and	   research,	   explained	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Kennedy’s	   national	   security	  adviser,	   McGeorge	   Bundy,	   the	   CIA	   had	   been	   giving	   assistance	   to	   Roberto	   “for	   some	  years”	  and	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  had	  decided	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  to	  advance	  any	  further	   funds	   for	   Roberto.125	  While	   in	   Washington,	   Roberto	   apparently	   met	   with	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   67	  representatives	   of	   the	  US	   State	  Department.	   Allegedly,	   they	   tried	   to	   convince	   him	   to	  abandon	   violence,	   but	   Roberto	   responded	   that	   in	   order	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   “pro-­‐Soviet	  MPLA”	  he	   could	  not	   do	   so.126	  What	  Roberto	   had	  been	  planning	   for	   some	   time	  was	  to	  initiate	  an	  uprising	  of	  the	  Bakongo	  people	  against	  the	  system	  of	  forced	  labor	  in	  the	  north,	  and	  he	   timed	   it	   to	  coincide	  with	  a	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  debate	  on	  Angola	  scheduled	  for	  15	  March.127	  The	  UN	  debate	  had	  hardly	  begun	  when	  a	  massive	  rural	  uprising	  broke	  out	   in	  northern	  Angola.	   According	   to	   Roberto’s	   official	   version,	   the	   uprising	   began	  with	   an	  incident	  at	  a	  “Primavera”	  coffee	  plantation,	  during	  which	  workers	  gathered	  in	  front	  of	  the	  house	  of	  the	  plantation	  owner	  demanding	  pay,	  which	  was	  six	  months	  overdue.	  The	  owner	  refused	  to	  listen	  and	  shot	  at	  the	  workers.	  In	  retaliation,	  he	  and	  his	  family	  were	  hacked	   to	   death.	   When	   rumors	   spread	   about	   the	   incident,	   other	   plantation	   owners	  started	   using	   violence	   against	   their	   black	   laborers,	   launching	   a	   cycle	   of	   violence	  between	  white	  settlers	  and	  black	  workers	  in	  the	  north.	  The	  UPA	  wanted	  to	  portray	  the	  uprising	  as	  a	  “spontaneous	  combustion”	  triggered	  by	  the	  cruelty	  of	  the	  colonial	  system,	  but	   in	   fact,	   the	  uprising	  had	  been	  pre-­‐planned	  by	  Holden	  Roberto,	  who	  probably	  did	  not	  predict	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  violence	  that	  would	  be	  unleashed	  in	  north	  Angola.128.	  Only	  a	   few	   days	   after	   the	   first	   attacks,	   news	   appeared	   of	   the	   Bakongo	   attacking	   isolated	  farms,	   destroying	   infrastructure,	   burning	   crops,	   and	   killing	   white	   settlers	   –	   men,	  women,	  and	  children.	  Holden	  Roberto	  deplored	   the	  extreme	  violence,	   saying	   that	  his	  men	  had	   only	   ordered	   a	   campaign	   of	   sabotage	   and	   general	   disobedience,	  which	   had	  gotten	  out	  of	  hand	  due	  to	  brutal	  repression.129	  Lisbon	   was	   initially	   slow	   to	   respond.	   The	   colonial	   administration	   had	   not	  predicted	  the	  uprising,	  and	  it	  had	  taken	  place	  in	  a	  remote	  location	  with	  little	  military	  presence.	  In	  April,	  opposition	  to	  Salazar’s	  colonial	  policy	  was	  mounted	  from	  inside	  his	  government;	  the	  Defense	  Minister,	  Botelho	  Moniz,	  argued	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola	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   68	  required	  urgent	  reforms	  and	  called	  on	  Salazar	  to	  resign.130	  The	  coup	  failed,	  and	  Salazar	  took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  crush	  the	  uprising	  with	  overwhelming	  terror.	  The	  army	  would	  bomb	  and	  raid	  whole	  villages	   looking	   for	  suspects,	  killing	   thousands	  on	  the	  spot	  and	  arresting	  many	  more.	   Even	   the	   conservative	  Time	  magazine	   stated	   that	   the	   violence	  unleashed	  by	  the	  “black	  rebels”	  was	  rivaled	  by	  Portuguese	  brutality,	  famously	  quoting	  one	  unnamed	  Portuguese	  officer	  as	  saying,	  “I	  estimate	  we	  have	  killed	  30,000	  of	  these	  animals	  already.	  There	  are	  perhaps	  100,000	  of	   them	  in	  revolt—and	  we	   intend	  to	  kill	  every	  one	  of	  them	  when	  the	  dry	  season	  starts	  late	  in	  May.”	  The	   violence	   unleashed	   by	   Lisbon	   was	   bad	   news	   for	   Washington.	   “Ruthless	  Portuguese	   retaliation”	   would	   hurt	   Portugal	   and	   “its	   allies	   around	   the	   world”	   when	  “details	  of	   the	   true	  situation	   in	  Angola	   inevitably	   come	   to	   light,”	  wrote	  Dean	  Rusk	   to	  Ambassador	   Bruce	   Elbrick	   on	   23	   April.	   “We	   are	   also	   fearful,”	   he	   continued,	   that	   the	  Soviets	   would	   be	   increasingly	   inclined	   to	   “send	   arms	   to	   the	   Angolan	   underground,”	  which	   would	   diminish	   the	   chances	   of	   “orderly	   change.”	   The	   Secretary	   of	   State	   thus	  proposed	  putting	  pressure	  on	  Portugal	  at	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Council	  and	  working	  with	  Britain	   and	   France	   to	   put	   further	   pressure	   on	   Salazar. 131 	  Washington	   also	  contemplated	  what	  to	  do	  with	  Holden	  Roberto.	  The	  CIA	  was	  proposing	  to	  extend	  aid	  to	  the	   UPA,	   while	   the	   State	   Department	   believed	   it	   was	   not	   necessary	   to	   extend	   any	  further	  funds.132	  Meanwhile,	  Prague	  approved	  a	  package	  of	  assistance	  for	  the	  MPLA.	  On	  18	  April,	  the	   Politburo	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Czechoslovakia	   (CPC)	   pledged	   to	   provide	  monthly	  financial	  assistance	  worth	  three	  hundred	  Czech	  crowns	  to	  the	  MPLA	  office	  in	  Conakry,	   allocated	   twenty	   annual	  university	   scholarships	   and	   twenty	  placements	   for	  military	  training	  in	  Czechoslovakia,	  and	  promised	  to	  support	  the	  Angolan	  cause	  at	  the	  UN.	  Prague	  did	  not	  approve	  a	  request	  for	  arms,	  but	  decided	  to	  “discuss	  the	  issue	  with	  the	   Soviet	   colleagues.”	   The	   customary	   explanatory	   note	   attached	   to	   the	   resolution	  mentioned	  that	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  –	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  and	  Matias	  Miguéis	  –	  had	  good	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  knowledge	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	  and	   envisioned	   the	   construction	  of	   a	   “socialist	   type	  society.”	  The	  MPLA	  also	  enjoyed	  support	  among	   the	   “popular	  masses,”	   in	  contrast	   to	  their	  main	  rival,	  the	  “reactionary”	  UPA.	  The	  author	  cautioned	  that	  the	  UPA	  could,	  in	  the	  future,	  obtain	  such	  support	  thanks	  to	  American	  sponsorship.	  Aid	  to	  the	  MPLA	  was	  thus	  necessary	  to	  counter	  the	  UPA.	  “Shortage	  of	  material	  means,	  of	  scholarships	  is	  the	  main	  obstacle	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Marxist-­‐orientated	  MPLA,	  while	   the	  USA	   enables	  the	   reactionary	   UPA	   to	   obtain	   a	   position	   in	   the	   country,”	   summarized	   the	   author.	  Prague	   had	   already	   adopted	   a	   notion	   that	   the	   UPA	   was	   pro-­‐American,	   or	   had	   even	  been	  established	  by	  the	  Americans	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  MPLA.	  Czechoslovak	  officials	  clearly	  accepted	  that	  interpretation	  from	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  and	  Matias	  Miguéis,	  who	  had	  argued	   that	   the	   UPA	   was	   “created	   and	   supported	   by	   the	   USA”	   during	   their	   visit	   to	  Prague	  in	  January	  1961.133	  Meanwhile,	   Khrushchev	   grew	   increasingly	   frustrated	   with	   Kennedy:	   firstly	  with	   his	   decision	   to	   increase	   the	   numbers	   of	   conventional	   and	   nuclear	   arms	   and,	  secondly,	   with	   Kennedy’s	   approval	   of	   the	   CIA-­‐sponsored	   invasion	   of	   Cuba	   in	   April	  1961.134	  The	   change	   of	  mood	   in	   the	   Kremlin	   was	   evident	   from	   the	   strongly	   worded	  statement,	   “The	   Situation	   in	   Angola:	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Government,”	   which	  appeared	  on	  the	  front	  page	  of	  Pravda	  on	  27	  May.	  After	  outlining	  crimes	  committed	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  army	   in	  Angola,	   the	  declaration	  put	   the	  blame	  on	   foreign	  monopolies	  and	   other	   colonial	   powers	   for	   allowing	   Lisbon	   to	   evade	   punishment.	   In	   a	   thinly	  disguised	  criticism	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  declaration	  stated	  that	  while	  “several	  great	  powers”	  voted	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  UN	  resolution	  condemning	  Portugal,	   “those	  same	  great	  powers”	  had	  done	  nothing	   to	  restrain	  Portugal	  at	   the	  NATO	  Council	  meeting	   in	  Oslo.	  “As	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  like	  all	  the	  genuine	  friends	  of	  the	  oppressed	  peoples,	  it	  would	  not	   remain	   indifferent	   to	   Angola's	   fate.”135	  The	   emerging	   rift	   between	   Kennedy	   and	  Khrushchev	  would	   soon	  burst	   into	   the	  open,	  precipitating	  one	  of	   the	  major	   crises	  of	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  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Kennedy,	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis,	  June–December	  1961	  On	   3	   June,	   Khrushchev	  met	   Kennedy	   at	   the	   Vienna	   Summit.	   On	   the	   first	   day,	  Khrushchev	  was	  already	  in	  a	  bellicose	  mood	  as	  he	  challenged	  Kennedy	  about	  US	  policy	  in	  Angola,	   Algeria,	   and	   the	   Congo,	   saying	   that	  whenever	   the	  United	   States	   “supports	  anti-­‐colonialism	   for	   tactical	   reasons,	   its	   voice	   is	   very	   quiet”	   and	   reaffirming	   Soviet	  support	   for	   the	   “wars	   of	   national	   liberation”	   that	   he	   defined	   as	   a	   “sacred	   duty.”136	  	  Khrushchev’s	   boldest	   move	   was	   yet	   to	   come.	   The	   following	   day,	   Khrushchev	   told	  Kennedy	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  sign	  a	  separate	  peace	  treaty	  with	  the	  GDR,	  which	  would,	   he	   said,	   terminate	   the	   four-­‐power	   agreement	   allowing	  American,	  British,	   and	  French	   access	   rights	   to	  West	   Berlin.	   Khrushchev	   insisted	   that	   the	   decision	  was	   final	  and	   that	   if	   they	   (the	   US)	  wanted	   to	   start	   a	   war	   over	   Berlin,	   there	  was	   “nothing	   the	  USSR	   could	   do	   about	   it.”137	  Kennedy	   refused	   to	   relinquish	   the	  Western	   presence	   or	  access	   rights	   to	  West	   Berlin	   and	   ordered	   a	  military	   build-­‐up	   to	   defend	   the	   city.	   The	  1961	   Berlin	   Crisis,	   which	   began	  with	   Khrushchev’s	   provocation	   and	   ended	  with	   the	  construction	  of	   the	  Berlin	  Wall	   to	  prevent	   the	  outflow	  of	  Germans	   from	  East	   to	  West	  Germany,	  had	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  Soviet	  and	  US	  policies	  towards	  Angola.	  	  The	  Berlin	  Crisis	  weakened	  Kennedy’s	   resolve	   to	  confront	  Salazar.	  On	  9	   June,	  the	  United	  States	  joined	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  a	  vote	  at	  the	  UN’s	  Security	  Council,	  calling	  on	  Portugal	  to	  stop	  all	  “repressive	  measures”	  in	  Angola.	  Lisbon	  protested	  vehemently,	  with	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Portuguese	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Franco	   Nogueira,	   stating	  clearly	   in	   a	   conversation	  with	   the	   US	   Ambassador	   Elbrick	   that	   Lisbon	  would	   rather	  endanger	  NATO’s	   security	   than	   lose	  Angola.138	  While	   the	  African	  Bureau	   at	   the	   State	  Department,	   led	   by	   Mennen	   Williams,	   argued	   that	   Washington	   should	   keep	   the	  pressure	   on	   Salazar,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Rusk	   and	   the	   General	   Staff	  were	   against	   any	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   71	  measures	   that	   might	   endanger	   US	   access	   to	   the	   Azores,	   and	   which	   could	   as	   a	  consequence	  reduce	  NATO’s	  capability	  to	  support	  military	  missions	  to	  Berlin,	  Western	  Europe,	   and	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   Africa.139	  On	   17	   July,	   Kennedy	   finally	   approved	   a	  compromise	   version	   of	   a	   National	   Security	   Action	   Memorandum,	   which	   outlined	  several	   measures	   to	   put	   pressure	   on	   Salazar,	   but	   which	   also	   stipulated	   that	   it	   was	  essential	  to	  “minimize	  the	  possibility	  of	   losing	  the	  Azores.”140	  The	  CIA	  was	  allowed	  to	  continue	   “intermittent”	   payments	   to	   Roberto	   under	   cover	   of	   third	   parties	   and	   at	   a	  magnitude	   that	   would	   not	   allow	   the	   purchase	   of	   arms.141	  While	   the	   Berlin	   Crisis	  weakened	  Kennedy’s	   resolve	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   nationalist	   liberation	  movements,	   the	   opposite	   was	   true	   of	   Khrushchev.	   One	   of	   the	   first	   indications	   that	  Moscow	  was	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  was	  that,	  in	  1961,	  the	  CC	   CPSU	   International	   Department	   recruited	   a	   case	   officer	   to	   deal	   specifically	   with	  them.	  His	  name	  was	  Petr	  Nikitovich	  Yevsyukov.	  Yevsyukov	  was	  born	  on	  3	   January	  1921	   in	  Harbin,	   China.	  He	   graduated	   from	  the	   Military	   Institute	   of	   Foreign	   Languages	   in	   1949,	   after	   which	   he	   worked	   as	   a	  university	   professor	   and	   an	   editor	   of	   the	   foreign-­‐language	   press.	   Yevsyukov	   was	  brought	   in	   as	   an	   expert	   on	   the	   Portuguese	   language	   (he	   had	   authored	   a	   popular	  textbook)	   to	   work	   under	   Petr	   Manchkha,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Africa	   Section	   at	   the	  International	   Department.	  When	   he	   joined	   the	   International	   Department,	   Yevsyukov	  started	   receiving	   a	   stream	   of	   articles,	   briefings	   and	   analytical	   notes	   from	   the	   Soviet	  embassies,	   the	  KGB,	   the	  Directorate	   of	  Military	   Intelligence	   (GRU),	   the	   foreign	  press,	  and	  the	  Telegraph	  Agency	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (TASS),	  and	  thus	  gradually	  became	  the	  man	  who	  was	  best	  informed	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.	  Like	  many	  other	   middle-­‐ranking	   functionaries	   in	   the	   party	   apparatus,	   Yevsyukov	   believed	   that	  decolonization	   was	   an	   inevitable	   process	   and	   that	   the	   socialist	   countries	   had	   an	  internationalist	   duty	   to	   support	   the	   national	   liberation	  movements.	  He	   believed	   that	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  the	  victory	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  had	  shifted	  the	  world	  balance	  of	  forces	  in	  favor	  of	   progress,	   and	   that	   it	   was	   natural	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   to	   respond	   to	   appeals	   for	  help.142	  The	   MPLA,	   of	   course,	   urgently	   required	   assistance	   to	   compete	   with	   Holden	  Roberto’s	   UPA,	   and	   the	   Soviets	   were	   now	   willing	   to	   offer	   that	   help.	   On	   9	   June,	   the	  MPLA	  leadership	  in	  Conakry	  released	  a	  communiqué	  celebrating	  events	   in	  Luanda	  as	  the	   beginning	   of	   the	   armed	   struggle	   launched	   by	   their	   supporters	   and	   appealing	   for	  international	   support.143	  On	   that	   very	   same	   day,	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Mukhetdin	  Bakhitov,	  conversed	  with	  Pascal	  Luvualu,	  the	  leader	  of	   the	   Angolan	   trade	   union	   organization	   affiliated	   with	   the	  MPLA,	   who	   was	   visiting	  Moscow.	  Luvualu	  told	  Bakhitov	  that	  during	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  Conference	   of	   Nationalist	   Organizations	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   Colonies	   (CONCP;	  
Conferência	   das	   Organizações	   Nacionalistas	   das	   Colónias	   Portuguesas),	   held	   in	   April	  1961	   in	   Casablanca,	   the	   leaderships	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	   had	   agreed	   to	   rely	  primarily	   on	   assistance	   from	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	   bloc	   and	   the	   socialist	   countries. 144	  Bakhitov	   informed	   Luvualu	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   had	   reached	   the	  decision	   to	   offer	   “money,	   medicines,	   and	   food”	   to	   the	   MPLA	   and	   also	   considered	  supplying	  weapons.	  Luvualu	  wrote	  to	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  later	  that	  day,	  informing	  him	  of	  this	  conversation	  and	  advising	  da	  Cruz	  to	  contact	  Soviet	  representatives	  in	  Conakry	  or	  write	  directly	  to	  Moscow.145	  Meanwhile,	   the	   KGB	   and	   the	   StB	   were	   drafting	   their	   response	   to	   the	   Berlin	  Crisis.	  On	  26	  June,	  the	  KGB’s	  Chairman	  Alexander	  Shelepin	  and	  the	  chiefs	  of	  the	  KGB’s	  intelligence	  departments	  met	  their	  Czechoslovak	  colleagues,	  including	  Deputy	  Premier	  Rudolf	   Barák,	   the	   new	   Interior	   Minister	   Lubomír	   Štrougal,	   and	   Deputy	   Interior	  Minister	  Josef	  Kudrna,	  in	  Prague	  for	  a	  four-­‐day	  joint	  consultation	  session.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  a	   twenty-­‐eight-­‐page	  document,	  which	  outlined	   the	  main	  spheres	  of	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  intelligence	  and	  counterintelligence	  operations	  around	  the	  world,	  with	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  fighting	   the	   “main	   enemy	   –	   the	   US	   and	   its	   allies.”	   The	   KGB	   and	   the	   StB	   agreed,	   for	  example,	   to	   encourage	   the	   neutrality	   of	   the	   non-­‐European	   world,	   to	   undermine	   the	  influence	  of	  pro-­‐American	  governments	  and	  policymakers,	  and	  to	  recruit	  “progressive	  agents”	  among	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements.146	  Cooperation	  on	  intelligence	  operations	   in	   Angola	   was	   also	   included	   in	   this	   paper,	   with	   both	   sides	   pledging	   to	  explore	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola,	  to	  identify	  the	  “progressive	  forces,”	  and	  to	  assist	  them	  in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   common	   front. 147 	  Approximately	   one	   month	   later,	   Shelepin	  presented	   a	   similar	   plan	   to	   Nikita	   Khrushchev,	  which	   included	  measures	   to	   activate	  anti-­‐colonial	   mass	   uprisings	   in	   Kenya,	   Rhodesia,	   and	   Portuguese	   Guinea	   by	   arming	  rebels	  and	  training	  military	  cadres	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  tying	  down	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  during	  the	  settlement	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis.	  On	  1	  August,	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  approved	  Shelepin’s	  proposals.148	  While	   this	   “master	   plan”	   did	   not	   specifically	   mention	   any	   particular	  organization,	   assisting	   the	   MPLA	   would	   become	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   Soviet	   policy	   in	  Angola.	  On	  22	  July	  1961,	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  and	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  arrived	  in	  Moscow	  for	  talks	   with	   officials	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee,	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   at	   the	  International	   Department,	   and	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Secretary,	   Nuritdin	  Mukhitdinov.	   It	   was	  unusual	   for	   a	   high-­‐ranking	  party	  member	   such	   as	  Mukhitdinov	   to	   receive	   somebody	  like	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  or	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz.	  The	  highly	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bureaucratic	  system	  meant	   that	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  would	  almost	  never	  personally	  meet	  with	  the	  relatively	  unknown	  leaders	  of	  a	  national	  liberation	  movement.	  The	  very	  fact	   that	   Nuritdin	  Mukhitdinov	   did	   have	   a	   personal	  meeting	  with	  Mário	   de	   Andrade	  and	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   shows	   that	   Angola	   was	   definitely	   on	   the	   agenda	   for	   the	   Soviet	  leadership.	   Cruz	   and	   Andrade	   talked	   about	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola,	   their	   party,	  prospects	   for	   armed	   struggle,	   and	   “disagreements”	   with	   the	   UPA,	   and	   asked	   for	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   74	  financial	   assistance,	   humanitarian	   aid	   to	   Angolan	   refugees	   (medicines,	   food,	   etc.),	  moral	   support,	   training	   of	   party	   cadres	   in	   the	   USSR,	   and	   arms.149	  The	   CC	   CPSU	  approved	  an	  early	  financial	  allocation	  of	  $25,000	  for	  1961	  and	  1962,	  while	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	   Committee	   began	   supplying	  material	   aid.	   There	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	   suggest	  that	  the	  Soviets	  promised	  any	  arms	  to	  the	  MPLA.150	  	  The	   implementation	   of	   the	   KGB’s	   tasks,	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	   “master	   plan”	   of	  August	  1961,	  became	  possible	  due	  to	  a	  temporary	  settlement	  of	   the	  political	  crisis	   in	  the	  Congo.	  Following	  the	  arrest	  and	  imprisonment	  of	  Patrice	  Lumumba,	  his	  followers,	  led	   by	   Antoine	   Gizenga	   from	   Stanleyville,	   tried	   to	   organize	   a	   campaign	   against	   the	  newly	   installed	   authorities	   in	   Léopoldville,	   but	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   obtain	   the	  necessary	   resources	  and	   therefore	  agreed	   to	  negotiate.151	  Following	  a	  meeting	  of	   the	  various	  political	  parties	   in	   July	   at	   the	  University	  of	  Lovanium	   in	  Léopoldville,	   Joseph	  Kasavubu	   remained	   the	   president,	   the	  moderate	   Cyrille	  Adoula	  was	   elected	   the	   new	  prime	   minister,	   and	   Antoine	   Gizenga	   became	   his	   deputy.	   Moscow	   supported	   the	  negotiating	   process	   and	   recognized	   the	   new	   government.	   Therefore,	   Léopoldville	  agreed	  to	  re-­‐establish	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  Adoula	  approved	  the	  MPLA’s	  application	  to	  move	  their	  headquarters	  to	  Léopoldville.	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	  who	  was	  part	  of	   the	  KGB	   intelligence	   team	  that	  moved	  with	  the	   Soviet	   diplomats	   from	   Gizenga’s	   headquarters	   in	   Stanleyville	   to	   Léopoldville	   in	  September,	  recalled	  that	  one	  of	  his	  tasks	  was	  to	  establish	  contacts	  primarily	  among	  the	  “pro-­‐Western”	   organizations	   of	   Angolan	   exiles,	   especially	   within	   Roberto’s	   UPA,	   in	  order	   to	   “unite	   them	   in	  one	   anti-­‐colonial	   front.”152	  This	   is	  what	   the	  MPLA	   leadership	  also	  wanted.	  On	  8	  September,	  the	  MPLA	  organizing	  secretary,	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  speaking	  to	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  GDR	  trade	  mission	  in	  Conakry,	  Joachim	  Naumann,	  spelled	  out	  the	  MPLA’s	  tactics:	  to	  isolate	  Holden	  Roberto,	  who	  was	  the	  “man	  of	  the	  Americans,”	  and	  to	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   75	  win	   over	   the	   “progressive	   forces”	   in	   the	   UPA.	   Lara	   concluded:	   “The	  MPLA	   does	   not	  want	   to	   liquidate	   the	   UPA	   as	   a	   party,	   but	   to	   alter	   its	   character	   in	   order	   to	   find	   a	  common	  platform	  in	  armed	  revolutionary	  struggle.”153	  Confrontation	   between	  Kennedy	   and	   Khrushchev	   at	   the	   Vienna	   Summit	   over	  access	   to	   West	   Berlin	   produced	   different	   responses	   in	   Moscow	   and	   Washington.	  Khrushchev	   intensified	   support	   for	   revolutionary	   movements	   around	   the	   world	   in	  order	   to	  challenge	  Western	  power,	  and	   thus	   the	  MPLA	  received	   their	   first	  assistance	  package.	   Kennedy,	   however,	   realized	   the	   limits	   of	   “engagement”	   with	   the	   African	  leaders,	   given	   the	   perceived	   strategic	   importance	   of	   the	   Azores	   base.	   Still,	   the	   US	  became	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   fate	   of	   Holden	   Roberto.	   Dean	   Rusk	   telegraphed	   the	   US	  Ambassador	   in	  the	  Congo,	  Edmund	  Gullion,	  warning	  him	  that	  Holden	  Roberto	  was	   in	  danger	  of	   losing	  control	  and	  urging	  Gullion	   to	   tell	   the	  Prime	  Minister,	  Cyrille	  Adoula,	  that	  Roberto	  was	  a	  “genuine	  non-­‐Communist	  nationalist.”154	  Meanwhile,	   Salazar	   emerged	   victorious	   from	   the	   crisis.	   Having	   crushed	   the	  Angolan	   Uprising	   by	   September,	   he	   announced	   a	   set	   of	   reforms	   of	   the	   colonial	  administration,	   abolishing	   the	   distinctions	   between	   subjects	   of	   the	   “overseas	  provinces”	  based	  on	  race,	  language,	  or	  place	  of	  birth.	  While	  even	  these	  concessions	  to	  Africans	  may	  have	  come	  as	  result	  of	  pressure	  from	  Washington,	  reforms	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	   to	   offer	   any	   kind	  of	   alternative	   to	   independence:	   the	   legal	   abolition	   of	   racial	  difference	  did	  not	  translate	  into	  any	  meaningful	  attempt	  to	  alleviate	  the	  institutionally-­‐imbued	   prejudices	   against	   non-­‐white	   subjects	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   empire	   or	   to	   grant	  any	   real	   political	   autonomy	   to	   the	   colonized	   peoples.	   “The	   Portuguese,	   having	   given	  three	  Angolans	  a	  university	  education,	  were	  now	  about	  to	  embark	  on	  their	  second	  five-­‐hundred-­‐year	  plan,”	  ran	  an	  often-­‐quoted	  joke	  at	  the	  White	  House.155	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   76	  and	  the	  UPA	  had	  to	  prepare	  for	  a	  lengthy	  military	  campaign.	  Both	  organizations	  had	  to	  establish	   military	   units,	   begin	   the	   recruiting	   process,	   and	   obtain	   further	   foreign	  resources	   in	   order	   to	   continue	   the	   armed	   struggle.	   When	   the	   MPLA	   moved	   their	  headquarters	   from	   Conakry	   to	   Léopoldville	   in	   September	   1961,	   they	   established	   a	  center	  for	  Angolan	  refugees,	  set	  up	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  organized	  a	  recruitment	  drive	  to	  entice	   young	   Angolans	   to	   join	   their	   ranks	   in	   Léopoldville.	   The	   MPLA	   received	   cash	  from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Czechoslovakia,	   which	   was	   passed	   on	   to	   Lúcio	   Lara	   via	  Soviet	  and	  Czechoslovak	  intelligence	  officers	  in	  Léopoldville.156	  Sofia	  also	  commenced	  providing	   aid	   to	   the	  MPLA	   in	   early	   1962,	   after	  Mário	   de	  Andrade	  met	   and	   talked	   to	  Bulgarian	   representatives	   in	   New	   York	   and	   Conakry.	   On	   17	   January	   1962,	   the	  Bulgarian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Georgiy	  Kumbiliev,	  wrote	   to	   the	  BCP	  Central	  Committee,	  proposing	  the	  provision	  of	  aid	  for	  the	  MPLA	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  a	  “communist	  organization,”	   and	   also	   because	   assistance	   could	   “establish	   lasting	   connections	   for	  future	  trade	  relations	  between	  our	  country	  and	  the	  Angolan	  people.”157	  On	  25	  January	  1962,	  the	  CC	  BCP	  approved	  the	  provision	  of	  light	  weaponry	  and	  medical	  supplies,	  to	  be	  shipped	   to	   the	   MPLA	   office	   in	   Conakry. 158 	  However,	   despite	   significant	   foreign	  assistance,	  the	  MPLA’s	  standing	  in	  the	  Congo	  became	  increasingly	  insecure.	  	  While	  unification	  of	  all	  the	  Angolan	  nationalist	  groups	  remained	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  MPLA,	   this	   prospect	  was	   increasingly	   unlikely.	   First	   of	   all,	   relations	   between	   the	  MPLA	  leadership	  and	  Holden	  Roberto	  plunged	  to	  a	  new	  low	  in	  December	  1961,	  when	  militants	  affiliated	  with	  the	  UPA	  captured	  and	  executed	  a	  group	  of	  MPLA	  guerrillas	  on	  a	  march	  to	  northern	  Angola.	  The	  MPLA’s	  main	  ally	  in	  the	  Congo,	  Antoine	  Gizenga,	  was	  arrested	   and	   imprisoned	   in	   early	   1962	   because	   he	  would	   not	   return	   to	   Léopoldville	  from	   his	   stronghold	   in	   Stanleyville	   and	   join	   the	   coalition	   government.	  While	   Joseph	  Kasavubu,	   Cyrille	   Adoula,	   and	   the	   chief	   of	   the	   army,	   Joseph	   Mobutu,	   remained	  committed	   to	   supporting	   Holden	   Roberto,	   the	  MPLA	   no	   longer	   had	   any	  major	   allies	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  among	  the	  Congolese	  politicians.	  Yet	  another	  major	  blow	  to	  the	  MPLA	  came	  in	  March,	  when	   Holden	   made	   a	   deal	   with	   a	   number	   of	   Bakongo-­‐based	   nationalist	   groups,	  establishing	  the	  National	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola	  (FNLA;	  Frente	  Nacional	  de	  
Libertação	  de	  Angola).	  One	  week	  later,	  he	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Angolan	   Government	   in	   Exile	   (GRAE;	   Govêrno	   Revolucionário	   de	  Angola	  no	   Exílio).	  Visiting	  Moscow	  in	  July,	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  complained	  that	  the	  Congolese	  authorities	  were	  actively	  harassing	  the	  MPLA	  operations	  in	  Léopoldville	  because	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  US	  State	  Department.159	  The	   MPLA’s	   leadership	   therefore	   decided	   to	   change	   tactics	   and	   distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  socialist	  countries.	  In	  May,	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  –	  known	  for	  his	  strong	  Marxist	  beliefs	  –	  was	  ousted	  from	  the	  post	  of	  the	  MPLA’s	  secretary	  general.	  On	  24	  May,	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  submitted	  a	  special	  report	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Committee	  on	   Territories	   under	   Portuguese	   Administration,	   arguing	   that	   the	   MPLA	   was	  determined	  to	  follow	  positive	  neutralism	  in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  avoid	  entanglement	  in	  the	   Cold	   War.160	  The	   MPLA’s	   Honorary	   President,	   Agostinho	   Neto,	   continued	   this	  strategy	  after	  he	  arrived	  in	  Léopoldville	  in	  July	  1962,	  having	  escaped	  from	  house	  arrest	  in	  a	  dramatic	  operation	  organized	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  Communist	  Party	  and	  assisted	  by	  the	  governments	  of	  Morocco	  and	  Czechoslovakia.161	  	  Neto,	   who	   immediately	   assumed	   the	   role	   of	   actual	   president	   of	   the	   MPLA,	  believed	  that	  the	  movement	  had	  to	  diversify	  its	  international	  contacts.	  This	  tactic	  was	  actually	   borrowed	   from	   the	   Algerian	   liberation	   front,	   the	   FLN,	   which	   had	   governed	  independent	   Algeria	   since	   July	   1962.	   Mário	   de	   Andrade	   and	   Lúcio	   Lara	   actually	  travelled	   to	   Algeria	   in	   November,	  where	   they	   received	   assurances	   of	   public	   support	  and	  an	  offer	  to	  train	  the	  MPLA	  military	  cadres	  from	  President	  Ahmed	  Ben	  Bella.162	  In	  December,	  Neto	   chaired	   the	   first	  MPLA	  Conference	   in	   Léopoldville,	  which	   confirmed	  him	   as	   president,	   elected	   a	   new	   seven-­‐member	   Steering	   Committee,	   and	   proclaimed	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  Soviet	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  Minister),	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  Marcum,	  Angolan	  Revolution,	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  (Foreign	  Minister,	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  pp.	  2:62-­‐65.	  
	   78	  that	   the	   MPLA	   stood	   for	   the	   “aspirations	   of	   the	   peasant	   masses”	   and	   a	   principle	   of	  “non-­‐alignment”	  in	  foreign	  relations.163	  This	  is	  also	  when	  Agostinho	  Neto	  first	  met	  KGB	  officer	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	  who	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  important	  contact	  in	  the	  future.	  Oleg	   Nazhestkin	   was	   first	   assigned	   to	   develop	   contacts	   with	   Angolan	  nationalists	  when	  he	  originally	  arrived	  at	  Léopoldville	  in	  1960,	  shortly	  after	  the	  Congo	  achieved	   independence.	   Back	   in	   Léopoldville	   after	   the	   restoration	   of	   diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  Congo	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1961,	  Nazhestkin	  was	  tasked	  with	  meeting	  Neto	   upon	  his	   arrival	   in	   Léopoldville.	  Nazhestkin	  wrote	   that	   he	  was	   at	   first	  somewhat	   dazzled	   by	  Neto’s	   personality.	   “Instead	   of	   a	   dashing	   commander	   as	   I	   had	  imagined	   him	   to	   be,	   I	   saw	   a	   gentle,	   polite,	   and	   shy	   man	   who	   was	   speaking	   slowly,	  almost	  lost	  in	  thought	  but	  also	  clearly	  capable	  of	  expressing	  his	  ideas	  clearly	  and	  with	  a	  great	  sense	  of	  purpose,”	  he	  recalled.	  Neto	  reassured	  Nazhestkin	  that	  the	  MPLA	  would	  not	   compromise	  with	   the	   imperialists	   like	  other	   leaders	  did,	  but	  he	  also	  emphasized	  that	  it	  was	  too	  soon	  to	  speak	  of	  building	  a	  communist	  society	  in	  Angola	  because	  their	  task	   was	   to	   unite	   all	   sections	   of	   society	   in	   a	   struggle	   for	   independence,	   and	   not	   to	  alienate	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  population	  by	  adopting	  a	  communist	  program.164	  Nazhestkin	  wrote	  he	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  whole	  conversation,	  so	  much	  that	  he	  did	   not	   even	   mention	   any	   details	   in	   a	   report	   to	   Moscow.	   He	   clearly	   enjoyed	   the	  company	  of	  Neto’s	  wife	  Maria	  Eugénia,	  whom	  he	  found	  very	  beautiful,	  charming,	  and	  intelligent.	   Over	   time,	   Nazhestkin	   would	   develop	   a	   very	   good	   personal	   relationship	  with	   Neto,	   whom	   he	   would	   come	   to	   respect	   as	   a	   man	   of	   strong	   will	   and	   a	   good	  organizer,	  and	  would	  act	  as	  one	  of	  Neto’s	  key	  advocates	  in	  Moscow.165	  Neto	  continued	  with	  his	  plan	  to	  diversify	  MPLA’s	   international	  support	  base,	  and	  around	  October,	  he	  approached	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  US	  embassy	  in	  Léopoldville,	  looking	  to	  establish	  contacts.166	  	  Neto’s	  timing	  could	  not	  have	  been	  worse.	  Early	  on	  16	  October	  1962,	  Kennedy	  discovered	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  placed	  nuclear	  missiles	  in	  Cuba,	  setting	  in	  motion	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   79	  one	   of	   the	   tensest	   periods	   in	   history	   of	   the	   Cold	  War,	   known	   as	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	  Crisis.	  The	  importance	  of	  an	  agreement	  over	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Azores	  base,	  which	  was	  being	   negotiated	   at	   that	   time	  with	   the	   Portuguese	   government,	   could	   not	   have	   been	  higher.	  That	  is	  why,	  when	  on	  23	  October,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  the	  assistant	  secretary	  of	  state	   for	  African	  Affairs,	  Mennen	  Williams,	  wrote	   to	  Dean	  Rusk	  arguing	  that	  Washington	  should	  re-­‐engage	  with	  Holden	  Roberto	  and	  establish	  contacts	  with	   Agostinho	   Neto,	   Under-­‐Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Political	   Affairs	   George	   McGhee	  angrily	   responded	   that	  he	   should	  not	   raise	   the	   subject	   again.167	  Neto	   travelled	   to	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1962,	  but	  he	  returned	  to	  Léopoldville	  empty-­‐handed.168	  Evidence	   is	   lacking	  as	   to	  how	  exactly	   the	  Soviets	  reacted	  to	  Neto’s	  attempt	  to	  develop	   relations	   with	   officials	   from	   the	   US	   and	   Western	   Europe.	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin	  recalled	   that	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   International	   Department	   was	   very	   suspicious	   of	   Neto,	  instructing	  the	  rezidentura	  to	  investigate	  with	  whom	  Neto	  had	  been	  meeting	  in	  the	  US,	  even	  though	  they	  had	  recommended	  that	  he	  develop	  contacts	  with	  American	  officials	  who	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  US's	  official	  policy	  towards	  Portugal.169	  Nazhestkin	  believed	  that	   the	   real	   reason	  why	  Moscow	  had	  come	   to	  dislike	  Neto	  was	  his	   independence	  of	  mind,	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  make	  public	  announcements	  and	  sign	  petitions	   in	  support	  of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   did	   not	   hesitate	   to	   criticize	   certain	   cadres	  “straight	  to	  their	  face.”170	  What	  also	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  very	  important	  was	  that	  Neto,	  unlike	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  and	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz,	   seemed	  aloof	  and	  did	  not	  consult	  with	  his	   interlocutors	   on	   any	   policy	   matters.	   The	   Czechoslovak	   intelligence	   report	   of	  October	  1967	  noted:	  “One	  negative	  feature	  of	  our	  contacts	  with	  Neto	  was	  that	  he	  never	  informed	  us	  of	  any	  decisions	  and	  did	  not	  possess	  a	  clear	  vision	  for	  the	  movement.”171	  Despite	   these	   issues,	   the	   MPLA	   continued	   receiving	   aid	   from	   the	   socialist	  countries.	  When	  Neto	   arrived	   in	  Moscow	   after	   his	   failed	   trip	   to	   the	  US	   and	  Western	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  the	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  (PhD	  Dissertation:	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  School	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   80	  Europe,	  asking	  for	  money,	  arms,	  and	  material	  aid,	  the	  International	  Department	  raised	  the	   allocation	   for	   the	   MPLA	   from	   $25,000	   in	   1961	   and	   1962	   to	   $50,000	   a	   year	   in	  1963. 172 	  In	   East	   Berlin,	   Agostinho	   Neto	   and	   Deolinda	   Rodriques	   made	   a	   good	  impression	   on	   the	   chief	   of	   the	   Africa	   Section	   at	   the	   GDR	   Foreign	  Ministry,	   Gottfried	  Lessing:	  “Dr.	  Neto	  and	  his	  companion	   left	  a	  very	  good	  impression.	  They	  appear	  to	  be	  decisive	   and	  objective.”173	  The	   two	  were	   received	   less	   enthusiastically	   in	  Prague:	   “At	  the	  meeting	  with	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Neto	  brought	  along	  a	   list	  of	  material	  aid	  which	  seemed	  to	  be	  improvised,	  and	  one	  could	  see	  he	  did	  not	  know	  what	  he	   wanted,”	   according	   to	   a	   report	   prepared	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs.	  Nevertheless,	  Prague	  continued	  supplying	  humanitarian	  aid	   for	   the	  MPLA-­‐run	  center	  for	  Angolan	  refugees	  in	  Léopoldville.174	  	  	  While	  Kennedy	  and	  Khrushchev	   initiated	  a	  series	  of	  measures	   to	   reduce	  Cold	  War	   tensions	   following	   the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  Khrushchev	  did	  not	  plan	   the	  scaling	  down	   of	   support	   for	   the	   liberation	   movements.	   On	   10	   June	   1963,	   speaking	   to	   the	  leader	  of	  the	  British	  Labor	  Party,	  Harold	  Wilson,	  Khrushchev	  argued	  that	  the	  colonized	  peoples	  in	  Africa	  had	  a	  right	  to	  wage	  armed	  struggle	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  assist	  such	  struggles.	  “If	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  colonies	  come	  to	  us	  with	  a	  request	  to	  help	  them	  with	  arms,	  we	  will	  consider	  it	  our	  sacred	  duty	  to	  help,”	  Khrushchev	  declared.175	  While	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   remained	   committed	   to	   the	   MPLA	   in	   spite	   of	   Neto’s	  flirtation	   with	   the	   West,	   a	   subsequent	   series	   of	   events	   would	   put	   the	   relationship	  under	  major	  strain.	  	  	  
The	  MPLA	  in	  Crisis,	  1963	  On	  29	  June	  1963,	  the	  Congolese	  Prime	  Minister,	  Cyrille	  Adoula,	  announced	  that	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   81	  Léopoldville	  would	  extend	  de	  jure	  recognition	  to	  the	  GRAE	  as	  the	  only	  representative	  of	   the	  Angolan	   liberation	  movement.	  The	  MPLA	  did	  not	  expect	   this	  decision,	  because	  only	   three	   days	   earlier,	   on	   26	   June,	   Adoula	   had	   allegedly	   reassured	   the	   MPLA	  leadership	  that	  he	  would	  not	  extend	  unilateral	  recognition	  to	  the	  GRAE.	  When	  Adoula	  made	   the	   surprise	   announcement	   on	   29	   June,	   the	  MPLA	   inferred	   that	   the	   push	   had	  come	   from	  Washington,	   since	   the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Mennen	  Williams,	  had	  been	  in	  Léopoldville	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  evaluation	  was	  accurate.	  Mennen	  Williams	  knew	  that	   the	  Kennedy	   administration	   did	   not	  want	   to	   annoy	   Salazar,	   not	   only	   due	   to	   the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  the	  Azores,	  but	  also	  because	  Washington	  required	  Portuguese	  support	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   Moïse	   Tshombe	   would	   not	   mount	   another	   secessionist	  campaign	   in	   the	   Congolese	   province	   of	   Katanga	   from	   bases	   in	   Angola.	   Williams	  apparently	   wanted	   to	   dissuade	   Adoula	   from	   making	   a	   statement	   in	   support	   of	   the	  GRAE,	  which	  seems	  plausible.176	  The	  initiative	  indeed	  lay	  with	  Adoula.	  He	  had	  become	  increasingly	   anxious	   about	   the	   chaos	   on	   the	   Congolese	   doorstep	   and	   decided	   to	  assume	  a	  leadership	  position	  on	  Angola.177	  Stunned	   by	   the	   decision,	   Neto	   made	   a	   series	   of	   miscalculations	   that	   made	  matters	   worse.	   First	   of	   all,	   he	   decided	   to	   unite	   the	   MPLA	   with	   a	   number	   of	   small	  Bakongo-­‐based	   nationalist	   groups	   under	   one	   umbrella	   organization,	   in	   order	   to	  strengthen	  his	  position	  in	  the	  coming	  debate	  on	  Angola	  at	  the	  Council	  meeting	  of	  the	  Organization	   of	   African	   Union	   (OAU).	   Many	   in	   the	   leadership,	   such	   as	   Mário	   de	  Andrade,	  believed	  that	  this	  merger	  was	  a	  mistake,	  because	  many	  of	  these	  groups	  were	  suspected	  of	  having	  links	  to	  the	  colonial	  administration.	  The	  most	  forceful	  opposition	  came	  from	  a	  faction	  led	  by	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  and	  Matias	  Miguéis,	  who	  accused	  Neto	  and	  his	  associates	  of	  elitism	  and	  of	  not	  doing	  more	  to	  form	  a	  common	  front	  with	  Roberto’s	  FNLA.	  The	  bitter	  leadership	  struggle	  came	  down	  to	  a	  physical	  fight	  over	  access	  to	  the	  Léopoldville	  office,	  only	  to	  be	  broken	  up	  by	  the	  Congolese	  police.178	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   82	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  was	  well-­‐known	  to	  the	  Soviets,	  while	  Neto,	  who	  had	  spent	  the	  previous	   decade	   in	   and	   out	   of	   prison,	   was	   new.	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   recalled	   that	   the	  confrontation	   between	   Agostinho	   Neto	   and	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   bewildered	   him	   and	   his	  colleagues	   at	   the	   International	   Department.179	  Secondly,	   when	   the	   OUA	   Council	   of	  Ministers	  convened	  in	  July	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola,	  Neto	  made	  a	  very	  weak	  case	  in	  support	  of	  the	  MPLA.	  Neto’s	  presentation,	  coupled	  with	  pressure	  applied	  by	  the	  Congolese	   government,	   contributed	   to	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   voting	   in	   favor	   of	  recognizing	   the	   GRAE	   as	   the	   only	   representative	   of	   the	   Angolan	   national-­‐liberation	  movement,	  thus	  delivering	  a	  heavy	  blow	  to	  the	  MPLA’s	  prestige.	  While	   the	   decision	   deeply	   concerned	   the	   socialist	   countries,	   they	   adopted	   a	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	   approach.	   On	   14	   August,	   the	   Foreign	   Ministry	   of	   the	   GDR	   asked	   its	  embassy	  staff	   in	  Moscow	  to	  discuss	  the	  matter	  with	  their	  Soviet	  colleagues	  and	  come	  up	  with	  a	  joint	  plan	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  situation.	  The	  fear	  was	  that	  the	  GDR	  would	  lose	   out	   by	   associating	   exclusively	   with	   the	   MPLA.180	  Czechoslovakia	   continued	   to	  maintain	   links	   with	   both	   “MPLA-­‐Neto”	   and	   “MPLA-­‐da	   Cruz,”	   but	   terminated	   their	  regular	  financial	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance.181	  Moscow	  also	  chose	  to	  wait.	  Bulgaria’s	  leadership	  was	  more	  positive.	  The	  Bulgarian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Ivan	  Bashev,	   informed	  the	  CC	  BCP	  that	  Neto	  had	  approached	  Bulgarian	  representatives	  in	  Léopoldville,	  saying	  that	   the	   OAU’s	   decision	  was	   a	   victory	   for	   neo-­‐colonialism	   and,	   in	   particular,	   for	   the	  USA.	   Bashev	   also	   explained	   that	   the	   Soviet	   comrades	   still	   had	   a	   negative	   attitude	  towards	  Roberto’s	  government-­‐in-­‐exile,	  and	  thus	  he	  proposed	  giving	  a	  further	  10,000	  Bulgarian	  leva	  to	  the	  movement.182	  The	  chief	  of	  the	  CC	  BCP	  International	  Department,	  Dimo	   Dichev,	   supported	   Bashev’s	   proposal,	   writing	   that	   according	   to	   a	   special	   note	  received	   by	   the	   Bulgarian	   embassy	   in	   Moscow,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   would	   continue	  supporting	  the	  MPLA.	  On	  5	  February	  1964,	  the	  Politburo	  of	  the	  CC	  BCP	  approved	  these	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   83	  recommendations,	  including	  the	  additional	  funding.183	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Congo	   had	   erupted	   into	   another	   round	   of	   civil	   war.	   The	  Lovanium	  consensus	  had	  broken	  down	  as	  far	  back	  as	  1962,	  when	  Antoine	  Gizenga	  had	  been	  arrested	  and	  imprisoned.	  Many	  opposition	  leaders	  formerly	  linked	  to	  Lumumba’s	  party,	  the	  MNC,	  still	  remained	  in	  parliament,	  but	  they	  remained	  increasingly	  isolated,	  as	   the	   Adoula–Kasavubu	   government	   finally	  managed	   to	   defeat	  Moïse	   Tshombe	   and	  end	  Katanga’s	  bid	  for	  secession	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1963.	  In	  September,	  the	  Adoula–Kasavubu	   government	   dismissed	   parliament	   on	   the	   pretext	   that	   it	   was	   no	   longer	  effective,	   causing	   opposition	   leaders,	   such	   as	   Christopher	   Gbenye	   and	   Bocheley	  Davidson,	   to	   move	   to	   Brazzaville,	   where	   they	   organized	   the	   National	   Liberation	  Council	   (NLC)	  and	  started	  planning	   for	  an	  uprising.	  One	  of	   the	  NLC’s	   leaders,	  Gaston	  Soumialot,	   went	   to	   mobilize	   people	   in	   the	   eastern	   Kivu	   province,	   where	   he	   found	  support	  from	  Tutsi	  refugees	  from	  Rwanda.	  Simultaneously,	  Pierre	  Mulele	  mobilized	  for	  a	   rebellion	   in	   Kwilu,	   western	   Congo.184	  By	   the	   end	   of	   1963,	   the	   pro-­‐Lumumbist	  uprising,	  known	  as	  the	  "Simba	  Rebellion,"	  had	  begun,	  and	  Léopoldville	  was	  no	  longer	  prepared	   to	   tolerate	   anybody	  with	   links	   (real	   or	   potential)	   to	   the	   opposition.	   Given	  that	  both	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  Soviets	  were	  linked	  with	  the	  Simba	  leaders,	  the	  MPLA	  was	  ordered	  to	  leave	  the	  Congo	  on	  2	  November	  1963.	  The	  Simba	  rebellion	  also	  sealed	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Soviet	  mission	  in	  the	  Congo.	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin	   recalled	   that	   the	   International	   Department	   ordered	   their	   rezidentura	   in	  Léopoldville	   to	  maintain	   regular	   contact	  with	   the	   Congolese	   opposition	   leaders,	   and	  therefore	   the	   resident	   spy,	   Boris	   Voronin,	   would	   regularly	   travel	   across	   the	   Congo	  River	   to	  neighboring	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	   the	  headquarters	  of	   the	  opposition.	  One	  day,	  Voronin	  and	  Yuriy	  Myakotnykh,	  the	  embassy	  attaché,	  were	  returning	  from	  Brazzaville	  when	  Congolese	  gendarmes	  stopped	  their	  car	  and	  discovered	  documents	  proving	  that	  Soviet	  officials	  had	  been	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  opposition.	  Voronin	  and	  Myakotnykh	  were	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   84	  beaten	   up,	   thrown	   into	   a	   jeep,	   and	   driven	   to	   the	   headquarters	   of	   the	   Congolese	  intelligence	  service,	  where	  they	  were	  interrogated	  and,	  as	  Nazhestkin	  wrote,	  even	  put	  in	  front	  of	  a	  firing	  squad	  by	  Mobutu.	  While	  the	  two	  managed	  to	  escape	  execution	  and	  were	  released	  the	  following	  day,	  the	  Soviet	  diplomatic	  mission	  was	  ordered	  to	  pack	  up	  and	   leave	  within	   the	   next	   forty-­‐eight	   hours.185	  With	   the	   expulsion	   of	   the	  MPLA,	   and	  with	   it	   the	   Soviet	   and	   Czechoslovak	  missions,	  Moscow	  had	   lost	   their	   foothold	   in	   the	  Congo.	  The	   Soviet	   Union	   remained	   committed	   to	   the	   MPLA	   despite	   a	   relaxation	   of	  superpower	  tensions	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.	  The	  Congo	  was	  still	  beset	  by	  the	  power	  rivalries	  dating	  back	  to	  1960,	  and	  the	  MPLA	  was	  still	  seen	  as	  pro-­‐Soviet	  while	  the	  UPA	  was	  regarded	  as	  pro-­‐American.	  The	  MPLA	  leadership	  realized	  that	  such	  a	  reputation	  was	  damaging,	  and	  they	  tried	  to	  adopt	  the	  Algerian	  international	  strategy	  and	  forge	  international	  links	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  Cold	  War	  divide;	  nevertheless,	  the	  MPLA	   leadership	   continued	   reinforcing	   the	   Cold	   War	   stereotypes	   by	   explaining	   its	  difficulties	  as	  resulting	  from	  American	  pressure	  on	  the	  Congolese	  government.	  In	  late	  1963,	   the	  MPLA	   again	   found	   itself	   on	   the	  wrong	   side	   of	   the	   political	   divide	   and	  was	  forced	   to	   close	   its	  operations	   in	   the	   country.	   Faced	  with	  disarray	   in	   the	   ranks	  of	   the	  MPLA,	  officials	  in	  Moscow,	  Berlin,	  and	  Prague	  contemplated	  the	  best	  way	  to	  respond.	  	  
The	  Angolan	  Uprising	  and	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  February–December	  
1961	   The	   news	   of	   the	   bloody	   events	   of	   4	   February	   1961	   in	   Luanda	   was	   as	  unexpected	  for	  the	  nationalist	  revolutionaries	  from	  Cape	  Verde	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  as	  it	  was	  for	  the	  Angolans	  living	  in	  Conakry.	  One	  of	  the	  PAIGC’s	  leading	  members,	  the	  Cape	  Verdean	   Aristides	   Pereira,	   recalled	   that	   they	   only	   heard	   about	   events	   in	   Luanda	   by	  listening	  to	  the	  BBC	  and	  the	  Voice	  of	  America.186	  Pereira	  had	  joined	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  in	  Conakry	   one	   year	   earlier	   and	   had	   become	   responsible	   for	   logistical	   issues.	   Soon	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   85	  enough,	   he	   would	   become	   one	   of	   Cabral’s	   closest	   associates.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   MPLA	  leadership	   in	   Conakry	   allegedly	   insisted	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   should	   launch	   the	   armed	  struggle	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  distract	  the	  Portuguese	  forces	  from	  Angola.	  The	  Soviet	   journalist	   Oleg	   Ignatev	   wrote	   that	   Amílcar	   Cabral	   later	   recounted	   the	  disagreements	  in	  a	  party	  meeting:	  “When,	  in	  1961,	  our	  comrades	  from	  the	  MPLA	  told	  us	   that	   they	  had	  begun	  an	  armed	  struggle	   in	  Angola,	  and	  had	   told	  us	   that	  we	  should	  also	  begin,	  we	  replied	  to	  them	  directly	  that	  this	  was	  premature,	  because	  if	  we	  started	  war	  now,	  we	  would	  have	  damaged	  not	  only	  ourselves	  but	  also	  Angola.”187	  	  The	   PAIGC	   was definitely	   unprepared	   to	   launch	   armed	   struggle	   as	   the	  movement	  neither	  had	  the	  weapons	  nor	  people	  with	  military	  training,	  but	  Cabral	  was	  definitely	   laying	   his	   hopes	   for	   sponsorship	   on	   Moscow	   and	   Prague.	   In	   March,	   he	  departed	  for	  his	  first	  trip	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  trip	  of	  which	  there	  remains	  only	  one	  unsigned	  report	  prepared	  by	  either	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  or	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  Cabral	  was	  particularly	  critical	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  Africa,	  saying	  that	  many	  newly	  independent	  African	  countries	  still	  de	  facto	  remained	  the	  “colonial	  possessions	  of	  the	  imperialist	  countries.”188	  Cabral	  also	  attacked	  the	  concept	  of	  “African	  socialism”	  as	   a	   lie.	   “In	   his	   words,	   there	   only	   exists	   scientific	   socialism	   that	   takes	   into	   account	  specific	   features	   of	   a	   particular	   country.”189	  Cabral	   also	   visited	   Leningrad,	   where	   he	  was	  taken	  to	  the	  Aurora	  and	  wrote	  in	  the	  guestbook	  that	  the	  battleship	  was	  a	  “symbol	  of	   the	   new	   day	  made	   possible	   by	   Soviet	   Russia.”	  When	   taken	   to	   a	   textile	   factory	   in	  Leningrad,	   Cabral	   stated	   that	   his	   party	   hoped	   to	   emulate	   Soviet	   success	   and	   attract	  women	  into	  production	  and	  administration	  in	  the	  workplace.	  “Cabral	  marveled	  at	  the	  massive	   scale	   of	   housing	   construction	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   the	   care	   for	   children,	   the	  high	   culture	  of	  workers,”	   and	  asked	  whether	  his	   eight-­‐year-­‐old	  daughter	   could	  go	   to	  the	  Soviet	  ballet	  school,	  apparently	  saying:	  “Only	  in	  the	  USSR	  can	  a	  daughter	  obtain	  the	  best	   education	   and	   good	   Marxist	   education.”	   The	   unnamed	   author	   of	   the	   report	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   86	  concluded	   that	   Cabral’s	   statements	   seemed	   sincere.190	  Cabral’s	   seemingly	   genuine	  interest	  in	  Soviet	  achievements	  and	  his	  rejection	  of	  African	  socialism	  clearly	  made	  him	  a	  potentially	  perfect	  candidate	  for	  Soviet	  sponsorship.	  That	  said,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	   suggest	   Cabral	   discussed	   any	   concrete	   demands	   beyond	   his	   request	   for	   Marxist	  literature,	   mentioned	   in	   the	   report.	   From	   Moscow,	   Cabral	   flew	   to	   Prague,	   where	  Aristides	  Pereira	  joined	  him.	  In	   Prague,	   Cabral	   and	   Pereira	   were	   received	   by	   the	   top	   Czechoslovak	  leadership.	   Aristides	   Pereira	   recalled	   that	   the	   two	   spoke	   at	   length	  with	   the	   Interior	  Minister,	  Rudolf	  Barák.	  It	  was	  very	  rare	  for	  the	  leaders	  of	  liberation	  movements	  to	  be	  received	  at	  such	  a	  high	  level,	  and	  such	  a	  meeting	  took	  place	  because	  the	  deputy	  chief	  of	  station	  had	  advocated	  Cabral	  as	  a	  particularly	  useful	  contact.	  Pereira	  recalled:	  “During	  our	   conversation,	   the	  minister	   [Barák]	   became	   convinced	   that	  we	  were	   a	  movement	  like	  no	  other	  and	  the	  one	  thing	  we	  needed	  was	  arms.”	  Pereira	  claimed	  that	  Barák	  had	  promised	  to	  deliver	  arms	  if	  they	  received	  a	  go-­‐ahead	  from	  the	  Guinean	  authorities.191	  There	   is	   no	   record	   of	   Cabral	   and	   Pereira	   ever	   meeting	   Barák	   in	   Prague,	   perhaps	  because	  within	  a	  year	  Barák	  would	  be	  demoted	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Deputy	  Premier,	  then	  arrested	  and	  imprisoned	  for	  embezzlement	  of	  party	  funds	  in	  1962.	  Cabral	  and	  Pereira	  did	  meet	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Deputy	  Interior	  Minister,	  Karel	  Klima,	  whom	  they	  asked	  for	  weapons,	   financial	   assistance,	   and	   training	   experts	   in	   security	   and	   instructors	   in	  “subversive	   activities.”192	  Upon	   their	   return	   to	   Conakry,	   Cabral	   asked	   the	   Guinean	  President,	  Sékou	  Touré,	  whether	  he	  would	  allow	  the	  PAIGC	  to	  receive	  arms	  in	  Conakry.	  Pereira	   recalled	   that	   Touré	   immediately	   agreed	   to	   Cabral’s	   request,	   instructing	   him	  that	   weapons	   from	   Czechoslovakia	   could	   be	   shipped	   directly	   to	   Conakry,	   to	   the	  Guinean	  Ministry	  of	  Defense.193	  	  	  On	  21	  June,	  Miroslav	  Alter	  wrote	  to	  Rudolf	  Barák	  from	  Conakry:	  “I	  propose	  to	  recruit	  'SEKRETAR,'	  real	  name	  Amílcar	  Cabral,	  born	  12	  September	  1924	  in	  Portuguese	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  Guinea,	  an	  agronomist,	  general	  secretary	  of	  the	  African	  Party	  of	  Independence	  (Partido	  
Africana	   da	   Independenza	   –	   PAI).”194	  In	   other	   words,	   Alter	   was	   proposing	   to	   enlist	  Cabral	   into	  working	   for	   the	   StB.	   Alter	   argued	   that	   he	   had	   already	   developed	   a	   very	  close	  relationship	  with	  Cabral,	  who	  had	  already	  been	  acting	  as	  a	  “conscious	  informant”	  providing	  useful	  information	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  American	  policy	  in	  Africa.	  Moreover,	  Cabral	  had	  already	  become	  an	  important	  figure	  in	  Guinea	  and	  in	  the	  national	   liberation	   movement	   for	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   and	   could	   potentially	   occupy	   a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  country	  after	  independence,	  “which	  we	  could	  exploit	  to	  implement	  the	   politics	   of	   influence.”195	  “Conditions	   for	   liberation	   of	   Guinea	   Bissau,”	   continued	  Alter,	   were	   “very	   promising”	   because	   the	   colony	   was	   adjacent	   to	   Guinea	   and	   the	  Guinean	   authorities	   had	   allowed	   the	   transportation	   of	   arms	   via	   its	   territory	   to	   the	  border.	  Alter	  hoped	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  with	  Cabral	  once	  Prague	  had	  decided	  to	  approve	  the	   assistance	   package	   to	   the	   PAIGC,	   which	   would	   be	   very	   useful	   because	   “Cabral	  would	  think	  like	  he	  owes	  me.”	  Alter	  proposed	  that	  he	  would	  tell	  Cabral	  that	  their	  aims	  in	   Africa	   were	   the	   same	   and	   would	   ask	   him	   to	   supply	   regular	   information	   about	  development	   in	   Africa.	   “I	   expect	   that	   Cabral	   will	   accept	   my	   proposal	   because	   apart	  from	  the	  above	  he	  is	  tied	  in,	  as	  he	  has	  accepted	  from	  us	  90,000	  Guinean	  francs	  for	  the	  information.”196	  Within	  the	  next	  two	  months,	  the	  Czechoslovak	  leadership	  decided	  it	  was	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  recruit	  Cabral	  and	  provide	  necessary	  assistance	  to	  the	  PAIGC,	   including	  arms.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  KGB	  knew	  about	  this	  plan	  or	  participated	  in	  it.	  On	   one	   hand,	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   they	   did	   not	   given	   that	   the	   level	   of	   cooperation	  between	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  StB	  was	  very	  strong.	  Miroslav	  Alter	  submitted	  his	  proposal	  to	   recruit	   Cabral	   on	   21	   June.	   Only	   five	   days	   later,	   Barák	   hosted	   the	   KGB	   for	   their	  second	   coordination	  meeting	   in	   Prague.	   Although	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  was	   not	   specifically	  mentioned	   in	   the	  KGB–StB	  plan,	   it	  was	   agreed	   that	   both	   sides	  would	   try	   and	   recruit	  agents	  among	  the	  leaderships	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  around	  the	  world	  and	  that	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   88	  the	   KGB	   and	   the	   StB	   would	   share	   information	   at	   the	   level	   of	   local	   intelligence	  stations.197	  One	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   still	   remains	   a	   possibility	   that	   this	   was	   the	  initiative	   of	   a	   local	   operative	   like	  Miroslav	   Alter	   and	   that	   the	   Czechoslovaks	   did	   not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  share	  that	  kind	  of	  information	  with	  their	  colleagues.	  	  On	  21	  July,	   the	  Czechoslovak	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Václav	  David,	  sent	   the	  General	  Secretary,	   Antonín	   Novotný,	   a	   proposal	   which	   outlined	   Prague's	   commitment	   to	  provide	  monthly	   financial	   assistance	  worth	  2,500	  Czech	   crowns,	   send	   light	  weapons	  for	   3,000	   guerrillas,	   and	   organize	   six-­‐month	   courses	   to	   train	   three	   instructors	   in	  “illegal	  and	  subversive	  work”	  and	  two	  experts	  in	  security	  matters	  –	  in	  total,	  aid	  worth	  1,210,000	  Czech	  crowns.198	  The	  note	  attached	  to	  the	  resolution	  praised	  Cabral,	  whose	  political	  philosophy	  aligned	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Czechoslovak	  government.	  Cabral	  did	  not	  like	   the	   thesis	   that	   there	   was	   no	   working	   class	   in	   Africa	   and	   rejected	   the	   notion	   of	  “African	  socialism.”	  Cabral	  expressed	  a	  “deep	  knowledge”	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,	  which	  he	  had	  acquired	  as	  a	  political	  activist	   in	  Portugal,	  where	  he	  was	  also	  acquainted	  with	  the	   Portuguese	   communists.	   The	   PAIGC	   had	   already	   organized	   an	   illegal	   network	   in	  the	   countryside	   and	   was	   prepared	   to	   move	   arms	   across	   the	   Guinea/Guinea-­‐Bissau	  border.	  The	  report	  concluded	  that	  the	  Soviet	  colleagues	  were	  to	  be	  informed	  about	  the	  decision	   and	   that	   support	   for	   the	   MPLA	   was	   to	   be	   discussed	   and	   coordinated	   with	  Moscow.199	  On	  29	  July,	  the	  KGB	  Chief,	  Alexander	  Shelepin,	  sent	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  StB–KGB	  “master	  plan,”	  which	  included	  a	  statement	  that	  the	  KGB	  would	  help	   to	   organize	   anti-­‐colonial	   uprisings	   in	   British	   Kenya,	   Rhodesia	   and	   Portuguese	  Guinea	   “by	   arming	   rebels	   and	   training	   military	   cadres.”200	  Why	   did	   Moscow	   not	  provide	  assistance	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  1961,	  after	  Cabral’s	  first	  visit?	  Mustafa	  Dhada,	  one	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  of	   the	  most	  detailed	  narrators	  of	   the	  PAIGC’s	   liberation	  struggles,	  speculates	  that	   the	  Soviets	  may	  have	  been	  deterred	  by	  Cabral’s	   links	  with	  the	  Chinese.201	  Yet,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	   in	   the	   East	   European	   archives	   to	   suggest	   that	   this	   was	   the	   case.	   All	  evaluations	   of	   Cabral	   were	   overwhelmingly	   positive,	   and	   the	   Soviets	   were	   not	   too	  concerned	   about	  Chinese	   influence	   at	   that	   point.	  One	   explanation	   for	   Soviet	   inaction	  could	  have	  been	  that	  the	  Soviets	  negotiated	  with	  Prague	  that	  Czechoslovakia	  would	  act	  as	   their	   “vanguard”,	   as	   had	   occurred	  most	   famously	   in	   1955,	  when	   Khrushchev	   had	  decided	  to	  provide	  weapons	  to	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser	   in	  Egypt	  via	  Czechoslovakia.	   It	   is	  also	   possible	   that	  when	   Cabral	   visited	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	  March,	   he	   simply	   did	   not	  meet	   officials	   who	   were	   high-­‐ranking	   enough	   to	   make	   any	   such	   decision.	   Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  who	  was	  the	  key	  Soviet	  official	  responsible	  for	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  at	  the	  CC	  CPSU	   International	  Department,	  does	  not	  even	  mention	  Cabral’s	  USSR	  visit	   in	  March,	   and	   he	   probably	   did	   not	   even	   meet	   him	   at	   that	   point.202	  On	   1	   August,	   the	  Politburo	  of	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Communist	  Party	  approved	  its	  assistance	  package	  to	  the	  PAIGC.203	  In	  Conakry,	  Miroslav	  Alter	  could	  now	  tell	  Cabral.	  On	  13	  August	  1961,	  Alter	  invited	  Cabral	  to	  his	  house	  to	  inform	  him	  that	  Prague	  had	   approved	   his	   requests.	   Cabral	  was	   very	   happy	   to	   receive	   the	   news.	   Alter	   began	  with	   the	   good	   news	   on	   purpose:	   his	   main	   goal	   was	   to	   formalize	   the	   relationship	  between	  Cabral	  and	  the	  Czechoslovakian	  intelligences.	  Alter	  told	  Cabral	  that	  both	  the	  PAIGC	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  conducted	  policy	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  African	  people,	  and	   thus	   Prague	   would	   require	   even	   more	   precise	   information	   about	   the	   political	  situation	   in	   African	   countries	   and	   the	   liberation	  movements.	   Cabral	   clearly	   realized	  what	  was	  going	  on	  and	  was	  probably	  prepared	  for	  this	  to	  happen:	  “SEKRETAR	  [Cabral]	  reacted	  very	  well	  …	  He	  reassured	  me	  that	  he	  has	  some	  political	  contacts	  in	  Guinea	  and	  he	  will	  do	  everything	  he	  can	  as	  per	  his	  abilities.	  As	  for	  the	  conferences	  that	  he	  would	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   90	  participate	   in,	   he	  would	   inform	   us	   and	   give	   detailed	   information,”	   Alter	   reported.204	  There	   is	   no	   evidence	   in	   Alter's	   report	   to	   suggest	   that	   Cabral	   signed	   any	   papers	  formalizing	  any	  kind	  of	  relationship,	  but	  from	  then	  on,	  officers	  of	  the	  Czechoslovakian	  intelligence	   service	  would	   refer	   to	   13	   August	   1961	   as	   the	   date	  when	   they	   recruited	  Cabral	  as	  their	  “trusted	  agent.”	  There	   is	   no	  written	   evidence	   to	  prove	   that	   the	   Soviets	   in	   any	  way	   instructed	  their	  Czechoslovak	  colleagues	   to	  recruit	  Cabral,	  but	   they	  probably	  knew	  about	   it	  and	  expected	   Prague	   to	   do	   just	   what	   they	   did.	   The	   1960	   Czech–Soviet	   intelligence	   plan	  reflected	  the	  turning	  of	  Soviet	  policy	  to	  the	  Third	  World,	  with	  the	  intelligence	  services	  of	  both	  countries	  now	  expected	  to	  cover	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic,	  Ghana,	  Mali,	  Sierra	  Leone,	   Zanzibar,	   the	   Congo,	   Angola,	   and	   Guinea.205	  The	   initiative	   to	   recruit	   Amílcar	  Cabral	  to	  inform	  for	  the	  StB	  came	  from	  a	  Czech	  agent	  in	  Conakry	  –	  Miroslav	  Alter	  –	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  his	  proposal	  was	  based	  on	  general	  instructions	  that	  he	  had	  received	  in	  1960.	  It	  was	  Alter	  who	  developed	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Cabral	  and	  lobbied	  on	  his	  behalf	  in	  Prague.	  We	  do	  not	  have	  any	  information	  on	  Cabral’s	  communications	  with	  the	   KGB	   agents	   in	   Conakry,	   but	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   there	   were	   none,	   given	   the	  abovementioned	   decision to establish contacts with representatives of liberation 
movements in the Third World.	  As	  the	  Angolan	  Uprising	  and	  the	  Berlin	  Crisis	  unfolded	  over	   the	  course	  of	  1961,	  Prague	  and	  Moscow	  upped	   the	  ante	  by	   including	   the	  whole	  world	  as	  a	  playing	  field	  for	  competition	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Although	  the	  KGB	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  recruit	  members	  of	  the	  communist	  parties,	  this	  principle	  did	  not	  apply	  to	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements,	   and	   the	   StB	   decided	   to	   recruit	   Cabral	   as	   an	  informant.	  The	   relationship	   between	   Cabral	   and	   the	   StB	   would	   develop	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  mutual	  advantage:	  Czechoslovakia	  needed	  “insider	  information”	  on	  events	  and	  actors	  in	  Africa,	  while	   Cabral	   obviously	   needed	  money,	   equipment,	   and	   arms	   to	   proceed	   to	  “direct	   action,”	   which	   they	   pledged	   to	   do	   in	   solidarity	   with	   the	   MPLA.	   From	   the	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  to	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  14	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   91	  Czechoslovak	   perspective,	   Cabral	   would	   become	   a	   valuable	   ally,	   a	   beacon	   of	   their	  influence	   in	  Africa.	  However,	   this	  would	  have	  never	  happened	  had	  there	  not	  been	  an	  understanding	  that	  his	  political	  views	  were	  very	  similar,	  if	  not	  the	  same,	  as	  those	  of	  the	  cadres	   in	   Moscow	   and	   Prague.	   His	   criticism	   of	   imperialism,	   denunciation	   of	   African	  socialism,	   and	   admiration	   of	   Soviet	   achievements	  were	  not	   just	   for	   show,	   yet	   Cabral	  was	  a	  very	  practical	  man	  and	  realized	  the	  limitations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opportunities	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  offered.	  As	  a	  leader	  of	  movement	  for	  independence	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  Cape	  Verde	  –	   two	   tiny	  spots	  on	  a	  world	  map	  –	  Cabral	  knew	  that	   it	  was	  up	   to	  him	   to	  convince	  his	  interlocutors	  that	  supporting	  the	  PAIGC	  was	  worth	  the	  trouble.	  	  	  
Cabral’s	  Quest	  for	  Arms,	  1961–1963	  In	  November	  1961,	  Cabral	  visited	  East	  Berlin.	  Talking	   to	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  GDR	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Horst	  Brasch,	  and	  the	  GDR’s	  liaison	  officer	  in	  Cairo,	  Henry	  Eggebrecht,	  Cabral	  confirmed	  that	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  viable	  option	  and	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   decided	   not	   only	   to	   prepare	   for	   armed	   struggle,	   but	   also	   to	  start	  training	  cooperative	  and	  trade	  union	  cadres	  who	  could	  take	  over	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  governing	  the	  country	  after	  independence.	  Therefore,	  he	  asked	  for	  scholarships	  and	  material	   aid	   (transistors,	  watches,	  binoculars)	   from	   the	  GDR.	  Brasch	   told	  Cabral	   that	  Berlin	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  push	  for	  a	  signature	  on	  a	  peace	  treaty	  between	  the	  GDR	  and	  Western	  powers,	  a	  treaty	  which	  would	  allow	  for	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  GDR,	  thus	   alleviating	   existing	   tensions	   surrounding	   the	   status	   of	   divided	  Germany.	  Brasch	  therefore	   asked	  Cabral	   to	   advocate	   in	   favor	  of	   this	  plan	   in	  Africa.	   “Cabral	   responded	  that	  he	  would	  try	  to	  use	  his	  many	  acquaintances	  with	  African	  politicians	  to	  propagate	  for	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   peace	   treaty,	   expressing	   his	   full	   agreement	   with	   our	   point	   of	  view.”206	  The	  desire	  for	  international	  recognition	  drove	  the	  GDR's	  foreign	  policy.	  Even	  though	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  dropped	   the	   idea	  of	   signing	  a	  unilateral	  peace	   treaty	  with	  the	  GDR	  after	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  went	  up	  in	  August,	  Walter	  Ulbricht	  was	  still	  pushing	  for	  it	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   92	  to	   go	   through.	   Cabral,	   agreeing	   to	   support	   the	   GDR	   in	   Africa,	  must	   have	   pleased	   his	  hosts	   –	   the	   GDR	   approved	   the	   provision	   of	   scholarships	   and	   technical	   aid	   to	   the	  PAIGC.207	  Having	   secured	   arms	   from	   Czechoslovakia,	   Cabral	   and	   his	   associates	   were	  planning	   to	   unleash	   active	   destabilization	   of	   the	   colonial	   administration	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  When	  Cabral	  returned	  from	  the	  GDR	  and	  from	  another	  trip	  to	  Czechoslovakia	  –	  where	  he	  was	  briefing	  the	  StB	  on	  the	  first	  conference	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  in	  Belgrade	  –	  he	  met	  up	  with	  his	  contact,	  Miroslav	  Alter,	  and	  Farsky,	  Alter’s	  replacement	  in	   Conakry,	   telling	   them	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   was	   “finishing	   off	   preparations	   for	   armed	  struggle.”	  The	  Guinean	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	  Keita	  Fodeba,	  had	  promised	  Cabral	  that	  he	  would	   provide	   trucks	   to	   transport	   arms	   to	   the	   border	   with	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   he	  explained.208	  In	   December	   1961,	   his	   younger	   brother,	   Luís	   Cabral,	   travelled	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  to	  attend	  the	  Tenth	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Congress.	  Luís	   briefed	   his	   interlocutors	   –	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	  Committee,	  Mukhetdin	   Bakhitov,	   and	   the	   desk	   officer	   on	   Portuguese	   colonies	   at	   the	  International	   Department,	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   –	   about	   the	   rivals	   vying	   for	   power	   with	  their	   organization	   and	   about	   their	   plans	   to	   begin	   military	   operations	   by	   the	   end	   of	  December.	  The	  party	  had	  already	  had	  military	  commanders	  trained	  in	  Czechoslovakia	  and	   China	   and	   had	   also	   already	   formed	  military	   units	   who	   had	   received	   arms	   from	  Czechoslovakia,	   said	   Luís	   Cabral.209	  His	   brother,	   Amílcar,	   had	   already	   forwarded	   a	  letter	  to	  the	  CPSU	  outlining	  a	  list	  of	  requirements	  and	  would	  visit	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  discuss	   this.210	  It	   is	   not	   clear	  why	   Luís	   Cabral	  was	   saying	   that	   they	   had	   “distributed	  arms”	  to	  the	  military	  units.	  When	  Czechoslovak	  arms	  arrived	  in	  Conakry	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1962,	   they	   were	   seized	   by	   Guinean	   authorities,	   apparently	   on	   the	   initiative	   of	   the	  Defense	  Minister,	  Keita	  Fodeba,	  who	  did	  not	  want	   to	  spoil	   relations	  with	   the	  Federal	  Republic	   of	   Germany	   by	   supporting	   an	   armed	   uprising	   against	   NATO	   member	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   93	  Portugal.211	  Meanwhile,	   Cabral	   flew	   to	   Moscow	   for	   his	   second	   visit	   in	   early	   1962.	   Petr	  Yevsyukov	   recalled	   in	   vivid	  detail	   their	   first	  meeting	   at	   the	   airfield	   of	   Sheremetyevo	  Airport	   in	  Moscow:	  “I	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clue	  what	  he	   looked	  like.	   I	  only	  stood	  there	  and	  waited	  for	  a	  black	  man.	  I	  had	  the	  right	  to	  approach	  the	  airplane	  ramp	  and	  so	  I	  waited	  for	  an	  African	  to	  appear.	  After	  all	  passengers	  came	  out,	  on	  the	  ramp	  there	  appeared	  a	  man	  –	  not	  particularly	  black,	  below-­‐average	  height;	  he	  was	  dressed	  in	  a	  warm	  coat	  and	  a	  knitted	  hat.	  A	  whole	  batch	  of	  such	  hats	  was	  a	  present	  from	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  many	  [PAIGC]	  party	  members	  started	  wearing	  them.	  I	  have	  a	  portrait	  of	  Cabral	  in	  this	  hat	  in	  my	  home.	  For	  me,	   it	   is	  a	  dear	  relic.	  The	  man	  went	  down	  the	  ramp,	  and	  I	  approached	  him	  to	  ask	  whether	  he	  was	  Amílcar	  Cabral.	  He	  smiled	  with	  a	  good	  smile	  and	  answered,	  'Yes.'	  My	  second	  question	  was	  whether	  to	  call	  him	  ‘Señor’	  or	  ‘Comrade’.	  He	  answered,	  ‘Comrade,	  of	  course’.”212	  From	   the	   first	   moments	   it	   seemed	   that	   Cabral	   had	   managed	   to	   win	   over	  Yevsyukov,	  who	  would	  become	  one	  of	  his	  greatest	  fans	  and	  would	  support	  most	  of	  his	  appeals	   for	   assistance.	   “Cabral	  made	   a	   surprisingly	   pleasant	   first	   impression	   on	  me.	  The	  man	  had	   a	  unique	   ability	   for	   everyone	   to	  warm	   to	  him.	  Physically	   attractive,	   he	  was	  highly	  erudite	  and	  could	  convince	  people	  that	  his	  mission	  and	  his	  views	  were	  just.	  It	  was	  pleasant	  to	  talk	  to	  him,	  to	  debate	  and	  to	  argue	  something	  that	  was	  opposite	  to	  his	   opinion.	   He	   could	   respect	   the	   opinions	   presented	   by	   his	   interlocutors	   and	   often	  agreed	   with	   them,”	   continues	   Yevsyukov.213	  Although	   Cabral	   definitely	   made	   a	   very	  good	   impression	   in	  Moscow,	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   the	   aid	   that	   he	   received	   after	   his	   first	  visit	   is	   not	   known.	   We	   know	   that	   the	   International	   Department	   allocated	   a	   sum	   of	  $35,000	  in	  1962	  and	  $50,000	  in	  1963.214	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  also	  allocated	  scholarships	  for	   young	   cadres	   to	   undergo	   short-­‐term	   training	   at	   the	   Komsomol	   School	   in	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   94	  Moscow.215	  Nothing	  is	  known	  regarding	  the	  shipment	  of	  arms.	  Given	  that	  the	  Guinean	  authorities	   had	   detained	   the	   shipment	   of	   arms	   from	  Czechoslovakia,	   and	   that	   Soviet	  relations	   with	   Conakry	   were	   at	   their	   lowest	   point	   since	   the	   establishment	   of	  diplomatic	  relations,	  probably	  no	  weapons	  had	  been	  sent.216	  Nevertheless,	   Cabral	   was	   determined	   to	   obtain	   arms	   despite	   the	   delays	  imposed	  by	   the	  Guinean	   authorities.	  He	   asked	   the	  Czechoslovaks	   to	   supply	   arms	   for	  100	  men,	  who	  were	  to	  conduct	  an	  operation	  codenamed	  “BETA,”	  designed	  to	  attack	  a	  Portuguese	  garrison	  at	  Bedanda	  and	  seize	  a	  lot	  of	  weapons.	  On	  29	  December	  1962,	  the	  new	   Interior	   Minister,	   Lubomír	   Štrougal,	   approved	   the	   operation,	   and	   the	   weapons	  were	   transferred	   to	   Conakry	   via	   Morocco.217	  Aristides	   Pereira	   never	   mentioned	   the	  operation	  –	  perhaps	  because	   it	   never	  went	   ahead	   –	  but	  he	  did	   argue	   that	   the	  PAIGC	  started	  smuggling	  weapons	   from	  Morocco	   to	  Conakry	  after	  Cabral	  had	  spoken	   to	   the	  newly	   enthroned	   King	   Hassan	   II.	   The	   king,	   recalled	   Pereira,	   wanted	   to	   continue	   his	  father’s	   legacy	  and	  offer	   support	   for	   the	   liberation	  movements.	  He	  allowed	  Cabral	   to	  choose	   the	   arms	   he	   wanted	   but	   told	   him	   that	   he	   would	   have	   to	   arrange	   for	  transportation	   himself.	   The	   PAIGC	   would	   load	   up	   the	   carriages	   and	   transport	   them	  onto	  small	  boats	  that	  would	  transport	  weapons	  to	  Conakry.218	  Simultaneously,	   the	   PAIGC	   launched	   a	   recruitment	   and	  mobilization	   drive	   in	  the	  countryside	  and	  began	  small	  acts	  of	  sabotage.	  Pereira	  travelled	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  July	  and	  told	  his	   interlocutors	  that	  they	  had	  already	  begun	  “concrete	  action:	  mass-­‐scale	  sabotage,	  dislocation	  of	  bridges,	  disruption	  of	  road	  networks,	  [and]	  the	  arson	  of	  Portuguese	   property.” 219Finally,	   in	   December,	   the	   PAIGC	   finally	   received	   official	  endorsement	   from	   the	   Guinean	   authorities	   at	   the	   Sixth	   Congress	   of	   the	   Democratic	  Party	   of	   Guinea	   (DPG).	   Amongst	   the	   men	   who	   provided	   support	   for	   Cabral	   at	   the	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  over	   the	  behavior	  of	   the	  Soviet	  ambassador,	  Daniel	  Solod.	  Allegedly,	  SékouTourédeveloped	  a	  personal	  animosity	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador,	  who	  had	  maintained	  links	  with	  the	  opposition	  and	  often	  behaved	  in	  a	   paternalistic	   fashion.	   Solod	   was	   ordered	   to	   leave	   the	   country	   and	   it	   was	   only	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   95	  Congress	   was	   Saïfoulaye	   Diallo,	   the	   DPG’s	   Political	   Secretary,	   who	   had	   been	   a	   long-­‐time	   supporter	  of	   the	  PAIGC.	  Cabral	   showed	  up	  at	   the	  Congress,	   but	   so	  did	  his	  main	  rival,	   Luís	  da	   Silva.	  After	   a	  brief	   argument	  between	   the	  Guinean	  officials,	   Cabral	  was	  invited	  in,	  while	  his	  rivals	  were	  ordered	  to	  leave.	  Sékou	  Touré	  gave	  the	  floor	  to	  Cabral	  after	  his	  opening	  speech.	  “That	  was	  one	  of	  our	  major	  victories.	  My	  statement	  showed	  everybody	  that	  the	  Republic	  of	  Guinea	  supported	  our	  party,”	  argued	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  in	  conversation	   with	   Oleg	   Ignatyev.220	  Shortly	   afterwards,	   the	   PAIGC	   received	   official	  permission	   to	   receive	  weapons	   in	  Conakry,	   and	   the	  Guinean	  authorities	   released	   the	  weapons	  from	  Czechoslovakia.	  	  
The	  Origins	  and	  Foundation	  of	  FRELIMO,	  1961-­‐1962	  When	   the	   Angolan	   Uprising	   took	   place	   in	   1961,	   the	   Mozambican	   liberation	  movement	  did	  not	  have	  a	  united	  nationalist	  organization,	  but	  consisted	  of	  three	  main	  organizations,	   which	   acquired	   an	   independence	   agenda	   after	   the	   1960	   “Mueda	  Massacre.”	   These	   were	   the	   National	   Democratic	   Union	   of	   Mozambique	   (UDENAMO;	  
União	  Democrática	  Nacional	  de	  Moçambique),	   the	  Mozambique	  Africa	  National	  Union	  (MANU),	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  for	  Independent	  Mozambique	  (UNAMI;	  União	  Africana	  
de	  Moçambique	  Independente).	  Both	  MANU	  and	  UNAMI	  were	  regionally	  based	  groups,	  rooted	  in	  communities	  of	  Mozambicans	  who	  had	  traditionally	  crossed	  borders	  looking	  for	  economic	  opportunities	  or	  political	  freedom	  elsewhere.	  MANU	  was	  originally	  based	  in	   the	   British-­‐held	   territory	   of	   Tanganyika	   in	   East	   Africa,	   where	   it	   found	   support	  among	  Mozambicans,	  mainly	  those	  of	  Makonde	  ethnic	  origin,	  and	  was	  modelled	  on	  the	  Tanganyika	   African	   National	   Union	   (TANU),	   the	   main	   political	   party	   in	   Tanganyika,	  which	  was	   led	  by	  Julius	  Kambarage	  Nyerere.	   In	  1961,	  MANU	  moved	  its	  headquarters	  to	   Mombasa	   in	   the	   newly	   independent	   Kenya,	   where	   Matthew	   Mmole,	   a	   Makonde	  Mozambican	   born	   in	   Tanganyika,	   undertook	   to	   develop	   the	   organization.	   UNAMI	  represented	  Mozambican	  workers	  from	  the	  Tete	  district	  in	  Mozambique	  who	  lived	  in	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  British	   Nyasaland	   (Malawi).	   It	   was	   first	   established	   by	   Baltazar	   Chagonga,	   a	   former	  nurse	   and	   a	   political	   organizer	   at	   the	   Moatize	   Coal	   Mining	   Company	   in	   the	   Tete	  province,	  who	  had	  had	  fled	  to	  Malawi	  in	  1961,	  fearing	  for	  his	  life.221	  	  UDENAMO	  was	  perhaps	   the	  only	  organization	   that	   appealed	   to	  Mozambicans	  across	  regional	  divides.	  The	  organization	  was	  first	  established	  in	  Bulawayo,	  the	  center	  of	   the	   labor	   movement	   in	   South	   Rhodesia.	   Its	   leader	   was	   the	   22-­‐year-­‐old	   Adelino	  Gwambe,	   a	   former	   employee	   of	   the	   South	   Rhodesian	   railways,	   from	   Inhambane,	  southern	   Mozambique.	   South	   Rhodesia	   offered	   employment	   and	   a	   freer	   political	  climate;	  thus,	  many	  Mozambicans	  who	  wanted	  to	  escape	  the	  forced	  construction	  work	  imposed	   by	   Salazar	   in	   central	   Mozambique	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   fled	   there,	  finding	  employment	  as	  railway	  and	  agricultural	  workers,	  as	  well	  as	  establishing	  self-­‐help	   organizations	   that	   would	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   UDENAMO.	   One	   of	   the	   people	   who	  joined	  UDENAMO	  in	  the	   late	  1950s	  was	  Reverend	  Uria	  Simango.	  Born	   in	  Maropanhe,	  Sofala	  province,	  Uria	  Simango’s	  father	  Kamba	  Simango	  had	  been	  among	  the	  first	  black	  Mozambicans	   to	   receive	   higher	   education	   in	   the	   US.	   On	   his	   return	   to	   Mozambique,	  Kamba	   Simango	   founded	   a	  missionary	   church	   that	   aimed	   to	   promote	   education	   and	  religion	   for	   black	   Africans.	   In	   the	   1950s,	   its	   followers	   were	   persecuted	   and	   fled	   to	  South	   Rhodesia,	   where	   Kamba’s	   son,	   Uria	   Simango,	   a	   Presbyterian	   minister,	   joined	  UDENAMO.222	  	  In	  April	  1961,	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  invited	  Adelino	  Gwambe	  to	  represent	  the	  Mozambican	   liberation	   front	  at	   the	   foundational	  conference	   for	  CONCP,	   the	  umbrella	  organization	   uniting	   the	   liberation	   movements	   fighting	   against	   Portuguese	  colonialism,	   in	  Casablanca,	  Morocco,	  where	   the	  delegates	  urged	  unification	  of	   all	   the	  Mozambican	   liberation	   movements.	   In	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   Gwambe	   made	   a	   rhetorical	  announcement	   that	   UDENAMO	   was	   preparing	   to	   liberate	   Mozambique	   with	   some	  7,000	   soldiers.	  Given	   that	  Tanganyika	  was	  not	   an	   independent	   country	  at	   that	  point,	  Nyerere	   was	   not	   prepared	   to	   tolerate	   such	   explosive	   statements,	   and	   Gwambe	   was	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   97	  expelled	  from	  the	  country.223	  He	  then	  moved	  to	  Ghana,	  where	  he	  found	  support	   from	  President	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  and	  began	   to	   seek	   international	   support.	  This	  was	  when	  Gwambe	  first	  visited	  Moscow	  and	  Prague.	  	  Gwambe	   did	   not	  make	   a	   good	   impression	   in	  Moscow.	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	  wrote	  that	   Gwambe	   surprised	   his	   hosts	   when	   he	   told	   them	   that	   the	   ancient	   swords	   and	  maces,	   on	   display	   at	   the	   Moscow’s	   armory	   museum	   would	   suit	   the	   fighters	   in	  Mozambique	   or	   when	   he	   refused	   to	   anything	   but	   the	   Russian	   type	   of	   sour	   yoghurt,	  
kefir,	   in	  memory	  of	  his	  “hungry	  comrades,”	  only	  to	  devour	  a	  huge	  dinner	  a	  few	  hours	  later.	  Yevsyukov	  also	  did	  not	  like	  the	  fact	  that	  Gwambe	  had	  also	  travelled	  to	  the	  United	  States,	   describing	   him	   as	   a	   “petty	   political	   adventurer,	   whose	   main	   goal	   was	   to	  misinform	   us	   and	   receive	   more	   money.”224	  The	   CC	   CPSU	   International	   Department	  nonetheless	  allocated	  a	  token	  $3,000	  for	  UDENAMO	  in	  1961.225	  	  Gwambe	   made	   a	   better	   impression	   in	   Prague	   in	   April	   1962,	   when	   he	   and	  another	   UDENAMO	  member,	   David	   Mabunda,	   arrived	   in	   search	   of	   financial	   support	  and	   scholarships.	   Gwambe	   struck	   Czechoslovakian	   officials	   as	   a	   young	   politician,	   an	  “inspired	  champion	  of	  independence,”	  but	  one	  who	  was	  still	  quite	  undecided	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  political	  beliefs.	  Meanwhile,	  Mabunda	  was	  much	  more	  self-­‐confident,	  made	  good	  arguments,	  and	  adhered	  to	  left-­‐wing	  views.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  direct	  consequences	  of	  this	  trip	  were,	  but	  the	  unsigned	  Czechoslovakian	  report	  noted	  with	  satisfaction	  that,	  by	   receiving	   Gwambe	   and	  Mabunda,	   they	   had	   created	   direct	   links	  with	   a	  movement	  that	   would	   probably	   take	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   attainment	   of	   Mozambican	  independence.226	  While	  Gwambe	  was	   touring	   the	   socialist	   countries	   looking	   for	   support,	  many	  other	   Mozambican	   nationalists	   converged	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   in	   expectation	   of	  Tanganyika’s	   independence.	   When	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   heard	   about	   Gwambe’s	  expulsion	   from	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  he	  moved	   from	  Rabat,	  Morocco,	   to	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	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   98	  joined	   UDENAMO,	   as	   did	   Paulo	   Gumane.	   Originally	   a	   teacher	   from	   Inhambane,	  southern	  Mozambique,	  Gumane	  began	  his	  political	  career	  as	  a	  branch	  secretary	  of	  the	  Laundry	   and	   Dry	   Cleaner	  Workers’	   Union	   in	   Cape	   Town,	   where	   he	   became	   familiar	  with	   members	   of	   the	   African	   National	   Congress	   and	   the	   South	   African	   Communist	  Party.227	  These	  activists,	  who	  had	  converged	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  realized	  that	  they	  had	  to	  establish	  a	  unified	  movement	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  credibility	  with	  Tanzania’s	  President	  Julius	   Nyerere	   and	   foreign	   donors.	   At	   that	   moment,	   however,	   they	   seemed	   to	   be	  lacking	  a	  person	  of	  significant	  stature	  who	  could	  lead	  such	  a	  movement.	  The	  one	  man	  who	  seemed	  suitable	  for	  the	  role	  was	  the	  41-­‐year-­‐old	  Eduardo	  Chivambo	  Mondlane.	  Mondlane	  definitely	  had	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  background	  and	  connections	  to	  lead	  a	  united	  Mozambican	  liberation	  front.	  Born	  on	  20	  June	  1920,	  Mondlane	  was	  the	  son	  of	  a	  Tsonga	   chief	   from	   the	   Gaza	   province	   in	   southern	  Mozambique.	   He	  was	   educated	   by	  Swiss	   missionaries,	   after	   which	   he	   moved	   to	   study	   at	   the	   University	   of	   the	  Witwatersrand	   in	   Johannesburg,	   South	   Africa,	   right	   when	   the	   African	   National	  Congress	   was	   rapidly	   expanding	   its	   campaign	   against	   apartheid.	   Mondlane	   became	  involved	   in	   political	   campaigning,	   for	   which	   he	   was	   expelled	   from	   the	   country,	   and	  spent	  some	  time	  in	  Lourenco	  Marques	  (later	  renamed	  Maputo),	  where	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	   founding	  members	  of	   an	   association	   for	  black	   students	   in	  Mozambique	   (NESAM;	  
Núcleo	   dos	  Estudantes	  Africanos	   Secundários	   de	  Moçambique).	   After	   a	   brief	   period	   of	  study	  in	  Portugal,	  Mondlane	  took	  up	  a	  scholarship	  to	  study	  sociology	  and	  anthropology	  at	  Oberlin,	  Northwestern,	  and	  Harvard	  universities,	  and	  married	  a	  white	  woman	  from	  Indiana,	  Janet	  Rae	  Johnson.	  In	  1957,	  Mondlane	  started	  work	  as	  a	  research	  officer	  at	  the	  Trusteeship	  Department	   of	   the	  United	  Nations,	  where	   he	   encountered	  many	  African	  leaders,	   such	   as	   the	   leader	   of	   TANU	   and	   the	   first	   President	   of	   Tanganyika,	   Julius	  Nyerere.	  	  In	   the	   first	   half	   of	   1961,	   Mondlane	   embarked	   on	   a	   tour	   of	   Mozambique,	  campaigning	  for	  reform	  and	  attracting	  large	  crowds.	  On	  his	  return	  to	  the	  United	  States,	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   99	  Mondlane	  gave	  a	  full	  account	  of	  his	  trip	  to	  officials	  of	  the	  US	  State	  Department,	  urging	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  Salazar	  to	  accept	  reform	  in	  the	  colonies	  and	  move	   towards	  self-­‐determination	  within	  a	  realistic	   timetable.	  Mondlane	  struck	  a	  favorable	   chord	  at	   the	  State	  Department,	  with	  Undersecretary	  of	   State	  Chester	  Boles	  describing	  him	  as	  a	  “moderate	  with	  the	  potential	   for	  top	   leadership	  in	  Mozambique.”	  Mondlane	  still	  believed	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  independence	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  negotiation,	  and	  that	  he	  could	  facilitate	  this	  process.	  When	  Mondlane	  received	  several	  letters	  from	  Mozambican	  politicians	  requesting	  that	  he	  take	  part	  in	  a	  unity	  conference	  organized	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  he	  set	  off	   for	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  with	  this	  goal	  in	  mind.228	  On	  25	  June	  1962,	  UDENAMO,	  MANU,	  and	  MANI	  finally	  merged	  to	  create	  a	  new	  umbrella	   organization,	   the	   Mozambique	   Liberation	   Front	   (FRELIMO;	   Frente	   de	  
Libertação	   de	   Moçambique).	   Mondlane,	   who	   had	   apparently	   campaigned	   on	   the	  promise	   that	   he	   would	   provide	   scholarships	   for	   Mozambican	   students,	   was	   elected	  president	  because	  he	  had	  the	  support	  of	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  and	  Uria	  Simango,	  who	  believed	  that	  Mondlane’s	  international	  connections	  and	  prestige	  would	  earn	  FRELIMO	  many	   recruits.	   Uria	   Simango	   became	   vice-­‐president,	   and	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   the	  secretary	   for	   foreign	  relations.	  MANU’s	  Matthew	  Mmole	  was	  elected	  treasurer,	  David	  Mabunda	   general	   secretary,	   and	   Paulo	   Gumane	   deputy	   general	   secretary.	  While	   the	  previous	   organizations	   were	   supposed	   to	   dissolve,	   there	   was	   not	   much	   discussion	  about	  the	  long-­‐term	  goals	  of	  the	  movement.	  Later	  in	  life,	  Mondlane	  admitted	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  united	  those	  who	  had	  founded	  FRELIMO	  was	  hatred	  of	  colonialism	  and	  the	   desire	   to	   destroy	   the	   old	   social	   structure,	   but	   nobody	   knew	  what	   type	   of	   social	  structure	  would	   actually	   replace	   the	   previous	   one.229	  FRELIMO	  was	   the	   product	   of	   a	  “marriage	  of	  convenience,”	  which	  started	  to	  unravel	  very	  shortly	  afterwards.230	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Crisis	  and	  Consolidation	  of	  FRELIMO,	  1962-­‐1963	  The	   focus	   of	   many	   frustrations	   was	   the	   election	   of	   Eduardo	   Mondlane	   as	  FRELIMO’s	   President,	   as	   became	   immediately	   apparent	   to	   the	   Soviet	   cadres.	   When	  David	   Mabunda,	   Fanuel	   Mahluza,	   and	   Matthew	   Mmole	   visited	   Moscow	   for	   the	  International	   Congress	   for	   Peace	   and	   Disarmament	   shortly	   after	   the	   foundation	   of	  FRELIMO	   in	   July,	   they	   expressed	   concern	   regarding	   Mondlane.	   On	   16	   July	   1962,	  speaking	   with	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee,	   Dmitry	  Dolidze,	  David	  Mabunda	   said	   that	  Mondlane’s	   election	  had	   alarmed	   them	  because	  of	  his	  questionable	  political	  affiliation.	  He	  also	  asked	  for	   financial,	  material	  and	  political	  support	  from	  the	  USSR,	  and	  declared	  that	  UDENAMO	  could	  withdraw	  from	  the	  front	  at	  any	   time.231	  Former	   MANU	   leader	   Matthew	   Mmole	   also	   asked	   for	   military	   training,	  scholarships	   and	   financial	   assistance	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   “cars	   and	   propaganda	  materials,”	   but	   he	   would	   not	   answer	   which	   organization	   (FRELIMO	   or	   MANU)	   he	  actually	   represented.232	  In	   August,	   Adelino	   Gwambe	   accused	   Mondlane	   of	   being	   an	  American	  agent	  and	  officially	  withdrew	  UDENAMO	  from	  the	  front.	  	  Gwambe’s	   withdrawal	   from	   the	   front	   did	   not	   signal	   the	   end	   to	   FRELIMO’s	  leadership	   struggles.	   Eduardo	   Mondlane’s	   election	   as	   President	   remained	   a	  contentious	   issues	   among	   FRELIMO’s	   leadership,	  with	   a	   few	  members	   critical	   of	   his	  relationship	  with	   the	  Kennedy	  administration.	  August	   saw	   the	   expulsion	  of	  Matthew	  Mmole,	   the	   former	   president	   of	   the	   MANU	   and	   Lawrence	   M.	   Millinga,	   its	   secretary-­‐general,	   for	   lashing	   out	   at	   Washington’s	   dubious	   anti-­‐colonial	   stance.	   Many	   were	  apparently	   critical	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   Mozambicans	   from	   the	   south,	   including	   Eduardo	  Mondlane	  and	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos,	  dominated	  all	  the	  leadership	  positions,	  while	  the	  majority	   of	   the	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   members	   were	   from	   the	   north,	   did	   not	   get	   as	   much	  representation	   in	  high-­‐ranking	  posts.	  The	   influx	  of	  young	   recruits	   from	   the	   southern	  Gaza	   province	   strengthened	   Mondlane’s	   presidency	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   September	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Dolidze	  (Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  General	  Secretary)	   to	  CC	  CPSU,	  9	  August	  1962,	  "Zapis	  besedy	  s	  chlenami	  ZK	  Nazionalnogo	  Demokraticheskogo	  soyuza	  Mozambika	  Mabundoi,	  Mlhuza	  i	  Mohlayeye,"	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  53.	  232	  Gafurov	  (Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  deputy	  chairman)	  to	  CC	  CPSU,	  7	  August	  1962,	  "Zapis	  besedy	  s	  Presidentom	  Afrikanskogo	  natsionalnogo	  soyuza	  Mozambika	  Matthew	  Mmole,"	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  53.	  
	   101	  Congress	   and	   further	   alienated	   many	   original	   members,	   who	   felt	   they	   were	   being	  sidelined	   from	   effective	   leadership	   of	   the	  movement.	   Mondlane	  was	   again	   criticized	  when	   he	   appointed	   a	   black	   American	   by	   the	   name	   of	   Leo	   Milas	   to	   the	   post	   of	   the	  Secretary	  of	  Information.	  While	  Milas	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  born	  in	  Mozambique,	  many	  doubted	  that	  was	  the	  fact	  and	  in	  fact	  believed	  that	  Milas	  was	  an	  agent,	  recruited	  by	  the	  CIA	  to	  keep	  tabs	  on	  FRELIMO.233	  	  Opposition	   leaders	   thus	   started	   to	   approach	   the	   cadres	   from	   the	   socialist	  countries	   looking	   for	   support.	  On	  2	  October,	  David	  Mabunda	   explained	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Ambassador	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Andrey	  Timoshchenko,	  that	  Mondlane	  had	  been	  making	  slanderous	  comments	  about	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  socialist	  countries,	  and	  that	  the	  “progressive	  elements”	  were	  being	  eradicated	   from	  FRELIMO’s	  Executive	  Committee,	  being	  replaced	  by	  certain	  individuals	  (implying	  Leo	  Milas)	  who	  were	  being	  bribed	  by	  the	  Americans.	  Mabunda	   told	  Timoshchenko	   that	  he	  was	   already	  being	   called	   a	   “red	  agent	  and	  a	  traitor”	  and	  that	  he	  would	  probably	  be	  expelled	  soon.234	  Two	  months	  later,	  Mabunda	   approached	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   embassy	   in	   Cairo,	   asking	   for	   arms	   in	   the	  name	  of	   FRELIMO;	  however,	   it	  was	   soon	  apparent	   that	  he	  was	   already	  acting	  on	  his	  own	   accord,	   and	   his	   request	   was	   rejected.235 	  Gwambe	   and	   his	   associate,	   Fanuel	  Mahlayeye,	  also	  approached	  the	  Czechoslovakian	  representatives	  in	  Cairo,	  arguing	  that	  Mondlane	  was	  a	  “pro-­‐American	  agent,	  who	  had	  been	  tasked	  by	  the	  US	  to	  destroy	  the	  Mozambican	   liberation	  movement.”	  The	  Czechoslovakian	  cadres	  were	  not	   impressed,	  as	   “[both]	   appeared	   to	   be	   immature	   politicians,	   who	   did	   not	   see	   a	   way	   out	   of	   the	  situation,”	  according	  to	  a	  follow-­‐up	  report.236	  The	   crisis	   reached	   a	   crescendo	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1962,	   when	   a	   group	   of	   people	  critical	  of	  Mondlane	  became	  embroiled	  in	  a	  fight,	  allegedly	  beating	  up	  Leo	  Milas	  in	  the	  process.	   Subsequently,	   David	   Mabunda,	   Paulo	   Gumane,	   and	   Fanuel	   Mahluza	   were	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   Soviet	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   102	  kicked	  out	  of	  FRELIMO	  and	  denied	  residence	  visas	  in	  Tanganyika.	  Shortly	  afterwards,	  the	   authorities	   expelled	   them	   from	  Tanganyika.	   From	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   they	  moved	   to	  Cairo,	  resuscitating	  UDENAMO	  under	  the	  new	  name	  UDENAMO-­‐Moçambique	  on	  1	  May	  1963.237	  Meanwhile,	   Gwambe	   proclaimed	   the	   creation	   of	   FUNIPAMO	   (Frente	   Unida	  
Anti-­‐Imperialista	  Popular	  Africana	  de	  Moçambique).	  	  Moscow	  disliked	   the	   expulsion	  of	   those	   supposedly	   radical	  members,	   but	  did	  not	   quite	   know	   what	   to	   make	   of	   it.	   Writing	   to	   Dmitry	   Dolidze	   in	   March	   1963,	   the	  Deputy	  Permanent	  Representative	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  to	  Cairo,	  Aleksei	  Tepliashin,	  predicted:	  “If	  the	  Cairo-­‐based	  opposition	  resuscitated	  UDENAMO,	  FRELIMO	  would	   probably	   fall	   apart	   because	   former	   MANU	   members	   would	   also	   leave.”	  Therefore,	   he	   advised	   strengthening	   contact	   with	   the	   former	   UDENAMO’s	   leaders,	  Mabunda	  and	  Mahluza,	  even	  though	  these	  leaders	  were	  weak.238	  The	  Czechoslovakian	  ambassador	  in	  Cairo,	  František	  Zachystal,	  wrote	  in	  a	  report	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  in	  Prague:	  "The	  national	  liberation	  movement	  in	  Mozambique	  is	  in	  crisis,	  so	  that	  it	  would	  take	  no	  less	  than	  one	  or	  two	  years	  until	  it	  becomes	  consolidated.	  The	  situation	  within	  FRELIMO	  is	  confused	  and	  not	  particularly	  clear,	  and	  it	  would	  take	  a	  long	  time	  until	  we	  understand	  who	  represents	  the	  real	  force	  with	  solid	  popular	  support."239	  The	  Soviets	  were	  suspicious	  of	  Mondlane,	  but	  they	  could	  rely	  on	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos,	   whom	   they	   had	   known	   well	   since	   the	   late	   1950s.	   On	   22	   May	   1963,	   Latip	  Maksudov,	  the	  chief	  Soviet	  representative	  at	  the	  AAPSO	  Secretariat	  in	  Cairo,	  spoke	  to	  dos	  Santos	  at	  the	  foundational	  conference	  for	  the	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	  (OAU)	  in	   Addis	   Ababa,	   Ethiopia.	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   confirmed	   that	   Mondlane	   was	   pro-­‐American,	  but	  underlined	   that	  he	  had	   the	   right	  education	  and	  connections.	  From	  the	  very	  beginning,	  he	  and	  the	  opposition	  leaders	  had	  agreed	  to	  allow	  Mondlane	  to	  be	  the	  figurehead,	  while	  they	  would	  navigate	  the	  movement	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  He	  added:	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  Manchkha	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  International	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   103	  “Later,	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  replace	  Mondlane.”240	  Dos	  Santos	   tried	  to	  convince	  Maksudov	  that	   the	   leadership	  crisis	  had	  nothing	  to	   do	   with	   ideological	   differences.	   The	   real	   reason	   that	   David	  Mabunda	   had	   left	   for	  Cairo,	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  argued,	  was	  because	  he	  could	  not	  handle	  the	  hardships	  of	  life	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  Maksudov	  reported	  his	  conversation	  with	  dos	  Santos	  as	  follows:	  “'Comrade	  Maksudov,	  you	  may	  not	  believe	  me,	  but	  talk	  to	  [Mário]	  de	  Andrade,	  talk	  to	  [Amílcar]	  Cabral.'	  ‘No’,	  I	  responded	  to	  him,	  ‘We	  know	  how	  to	  differentiate	  between	  our	  interlocutors.	  One	  thing	  is	  when	  we	  speak	  to	  somebody	  else	  and	  another	  is	  when	  we	  want	   to	   know	   your	   opinion,	   the	   opinion	   of	   our	   old	   friend,	   whom	   we	   trust.	   We	   are	  worried	  about	  the	  split	   in	  the	  Mozambican	  liberation	  movement.	  Yet,	   the	  accusations	  against	  Mondlane	  of	  his	  pro-­‐American	  orientation	  are	  quite	  reasonable.’”241	  Given	  that	  Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   refused	   to	   join	   the	   opposition	   and	   that	   FRELIMO	   still	   enjoyed	  support	  from	  the	  Tanganyikan	  authorities,	  representatives	  from	  the	  socialist	  countries	  soon	  realized	  that	  the	  best	  solution	  would	  be	  for	  “progressives”	  like	  Gumane	  to	  work	  from	  inside	  FRELIMO.242	  Having	   dealt	   with	   the	   worst	   of	   the	   crisis,	   FRELIMO’s	   leadership	   began	   a	  campaign	   for	   international	   sponsors.	   As	   with	   the	   MPLA,	   Algeria	   came	   first,	   offering	  arms	   and	  military	   training	   for	   FRELIMO.	  Mondlane	   continued	   to	   lobby	   the	   Kennedy	  administration	   for	   cash.	   He	   wanted	   to	   use	   the	   money	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   what	  would	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Mozambican	  Institute,”	  a	  hostel	  and	  school	  for	  young	  recruits.	  In	   mid-­‐April	   1963,	   Mondlane	   met	   the	   deputy	   assistant	   secretary	   for	   African	   affairs,	  Wayne	  Fredericks,	  and	  Attorney-­‐General	  Robert	  Kennedy	  in	  Washington,	  asking	  them	  for	   financial	   assistance,	   emphasizing	   that	   others	   in	   FRELIMO	  were	   seeking	   aid	   from	  Ghana,	   the	   USSR,	   and	   other	   places	   not	   attuned	   to	   Western	   interests.	   Mondlane	  managed	   to	   source	   $96,000	   from	   the	   Ford	   Foundation	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  “Mozambique	   Institute”	   in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	  which	  was	   supposed	   to	  provide	   education	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  and	  healthcare	  for	  recruits.243	  Mondlane	   and	  Santos	   also	   continued	   lobbying	   socialist	   countries	   for	   support.	  Dos	   Santos	   visited	   China,	   where	   he	   was	   received	   by	   Mao	   Zedong,	   and	   apparently	  received	  an	  offer	  of	  financial	  assistance.	  On	  his	  return,	  he	  urged	  Mondlane	  to	  also	  go	  to	  Beijing	  to	  seal	  the	  deal.	  The	  trip	  went	  ahead,	  but	  Mondlane	  came	  back	  disappointed,	  as	  the	   Chinese	   had	   apparently	   asked	   that	   FRELIMO	   cease	   any	   contact	   with	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   and	   the	   United	   States.244	  In	   November,	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   saw	   the	   Soviet	  Ambassador	   to	   Tanzania	   (as	   Tanganyika	   had	   become),	   Andrey	   Timoshchenko,	   and	  submitted	  a	  list	  of	  requirements	  for	  the	  training	  of	  thirty	  cadres	  in	  subversive	  warfare,	  humanitarian	   assistance	   for	   Mozambican	   refugees,	   technical	   aid	   for	   propaganda	  purposes,	   financial	   assistance,	   and	   medical	   treatment	   in	   the	   USSR.	   Timoshchenko	  reiterated	  his	  skepticism	  of	  FRELIMO,	  but	  nevertheless	  recommended	  that	  the	  Soviets	  invite	  Mondlane	  and	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  to	  Moscow	  and	  allocate	  10	  to	  15	  placements	  for	   FRELIMO	   cadres	   in	   Soviet	  military	   establishments,	   because	   the	  movement	   had	   a	  “healthy	  progressive	  force”	  in	  the	  leadership.245	  In	  December	  1963,	  Uria	  Simango	  and	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  went	  on	  their	  first	  visit	   to	   East	   Berlin,	   looking	   for	   funding,	   scholarships	   and	  material	   support	   (textiles,	  clothing,	  and	  printing	  presses)	  from	  the	  GDR.	  The	  two	  made	  a	  good	  impression.	  “The	  subjective	   impression	   from	   both	   was	   very	   positive.	   They	   demonstrated	   genuinely	  progressive	  and	  consistent	  attitudes	  which	  seem	  genuine,	  especially	  Simango,”	  read	  a	  report	  prepared	  by	  the	  GDR	  Solidarity	  Committee.246	  	  This	  trip	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  very	   close	   relationship	   between	   the	   GDR	   and	   FRELIMO.	   In	   1963,	   the	   Solidarity	  Committee	  earmarked	  20,000	  marks	  for	  FRELIMO,	  and	  would	  soon	  provide	  them	  with	  humanitarian	   aid,	   scholarships	   and,	   from	   1967	   onwards,	   arms.247 	  This	   emerging	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   105	  relationship	   with	   FRELIMO	   reflected	   East	   Germany’s	   interest	   in	   establishing	   its	  presence	  in	  East	  Africa,	   in	  view	  of	  long-­‐standing	  historical	  ties	  with	  the	  region	  dating	  back	  to	  Germany’s	  colonial	  past.248	  Soviet	   attitudes	   towards	   FRELIMO	   were	   colored	   from	   their	   inception	   by	  Eduardo	  Mondlane’s	  connection	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  general,	  and	  with	  Kennedy’s	  administration	  in	  particular.	  Soviet	  cadres	  believed	  that	  Eduardo	  Mondlane	  was	  “pro-­‐American,”	   which	   hindered	   any	   assistance	   to	   FRELIMO	   before	   1964.	   Moreover,	   the	  Soviets	  suspected	  that	  FRELIMO	  might	  not	  even	  survive	  as	  a	  united	  front,	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  members	  elected	  to	  the	  Steering	  Committee	  had	  either	  quit	  or	  had	  been	  expelled	   from	   the	  movement	   by	   1963.	   Seeking	   support	   from	   the	   socialist	   countries,	  these	   members	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Mondlane	   opposition	   reinforced	   Soviet	   conceptions	   of	  Mondlane	   as	   staunchly	   pro-­‐American.	   What	   ultimately	   made	   the	   difference	   to	   the	  Soviet	   evaluation	   of	   FRELIMO	   was	   that	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos,	   a	   dedicated	   Marxist,	  stayed	  on	  in	  the	  top	  leadership	  and	  that	  FRELIMO,	  despite	  the	  grim	  predictions	  of	  the	  opposition,	  managed	   to	   survive	   thanks	   to	   the	   support	   provided	   by	   the	   Tanganyikan	  government.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  1961	  Angolan	  Uprising	  plunged	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  into	  the	  Cold	  War.	  When	   Nikita	   Khrushchev	   emerged	   as	   the	   undisputed	   trendsetter	   of	   Soviet	   foreign	  policy	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  his	  opponents	  in	  1957,	  he	  believed	  that	  	  competition	  between	  the	   two	   rival	   systems	   could	   be	   peaceful.	   However,	   he	   became	   increasingly	  disillusioned	   regarding	   this	   possibility,	   and	   his	   response	   shifted	   to	   a	   progressively	  aggressive	   strategy	   in	   the	   Third	   World.	   The	   1960	   Congo	   Crisis	   was	   an	   extremely	  important	  event	  that,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  U-­‐2	  Incident,	  revealed	  to	  Khrushchev	  the	  limits	   of	   peaceful	   competition	   with	   the	   West	   in	   the	   Third	   World.	   Only	   in	   1960	   did	  Soviet	  and	  Czechoslovakian	  intelligence	  adopt	  a	  joint	  plan	  to	  actively	  develop	  relations	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   106	  with	   leaders	   of	   the	   African	   liberation	   movements.	   This	   signified	   a	   move	   towards	   a	  more	  aggressive	  strategy,	  designed	  to	  undercut	  the	  influence	  of	  Western	  powers	  in	  the	  region.	   It	   was	   not	   until	   the	   Angolan	   Uprising,	   however,	   that	   Portuguese	   colonialism	  became	   a	   matter	   of	   particular	   importance	   for	   Moscow	   and	   Washington.	   For	  Khrushchev,	  support	  for	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  uprisings	  was	  his	  way	  of	  striking	  at	  the	  West	  for	   frustrating	   his	   outreach	   initiatives.	  While	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	   ideology	   provided	   the	  foundation	   for	   a	   Soviet	   alliance	   with	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   movements,	   superpower	  competition	   rendered	   the	   incentive	   necessary	   to	   convince	   Moscow	   and	   Prague	   to	  allocate	  the	  first	  assistance	  packages	  to	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  1961.	  This	  would	  not	  have	  happened	  without	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  who	  regularly	  invoked	  Cold	  War	  stereotypes	  to	  brand	  their	  rivals	  as	  “pro-­‐American”	  or	  “pro-­‐Soviet,”	   reinforcing	   dogmatic	   views	   held	   by	   policy-­‐makers	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	  Cold	  War	  divide.	  	  One	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  the	  liberation	  movements	  were	  not	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  agenda	  for	  the	  CC	  CPSU,	  and	  that	  Soviet	  assistance	  between	  1961	  and	  1964	  was	  fairly	  limited.	   In	   comparison	   to	   the	   money	   that	   the	   Soviets	   were	   spending	   on	   annual	  assistance	  for	  the	  Italian	  or	  the	  US	  communist	  parties,	  for	  example,	  financial	  assistance	  for	   the	   MPLA	   and	   the	   PAIGC	   was	   negligible,	   and	   the	   number	   of	   scholarships	   for	  military	  training	  was	  quite	  low.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  hard	  evidence	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  provided	  any	  arms	  to	  the	   liberation	  movements	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  Czechoslovakian	  commitment	  to	  the	  movements	  was	  actually	  much	  greater	  than	  that	  of	   the	   Soviets,	   especially	   given	   the	   size	   of	   and	   financial	  means	   available	   to	   the	   CPC.	  Czechoslovakian	   assistance	   –	   arms,	   training,	   financial	   and	   humanitarian	   assistance	   –	  was	  especially	  important	  for	  the	  PAIGC's	  ability	  to	  launch	  an	  anti-­‐colonial	  campaign	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  in	  early	  1963.	  	  While	   the	   liberation	   movements	   were	   not	   particularly	   important	   to	   the	   top	  Soviet	   leadership,	   the	   “middle-­‐ranking	   officials”	   who	   actually	   dealt	   with	   the	  movements	  became	  invested	  in	  the	  cause	  and	  would	  become	  its	  main	  advocates.	  This	  
	   107	  is	   why	   human	   relations	   became	   highly	   pertinent	   in	   this	   story.	   Initially,	   the	   MPLA	  emerged	   as	   the	   key	   ally	   for	  Moscow.	   This	  was	   due	   to	   two	   factors:	   Angola	   became	   a	  subject	  of	  superpower	  competition	  in	  1961,	  and	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz	  and	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  had	   been	   well	   known	   to	   Soviet	   officials	   since	   the	   late	   1950s.	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin	   also	  developed	  a	  strong	  personal	  connection	  with	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  a	  connection	  that	  would	  work	   in	   Neto’s	   favor	   in	   the	   following	   years.	   In	   contrast,	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   was	   not	  particularly	   fond	  of	  Neto,	  but	  did	  not	  hide	  his	   friendly	  affection	  and	  even	  admiration	  for	  Cabral,	  writing	  that	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  for	  example,	  often	  complained	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  had	  received	  much	  larger	  assistance	  than	  the	  MPLA,	  in	  terms	  proportional	  to	  the	  sizes	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  Angola.249	  Cabral	  also	  managed	  to	  develop	  a	  very	  good	  personal	  relationship	   with	   the	   StB’s	   deputy	   rezident	   in	   Conakry,	   Miroslav	   Alter,	   who	   was	  instrumental	   in	   advocating	  on	  Cabral’s	  behalf	  before	  his	   first	   visit	   to	  Prague	   in	   early	  1961	   and	  who	   proposed	   that	   Cabral	   could	   be	   a	   valuable	   asset.	   Alter	   and	   his	   senior	  colleagues	  in	  Prague	  were	  clearly	  not	  idealist	  romantics;	  they	  understood	  that	  Cabral	  needed	  Czechoslovak	  money,	  weapons,	  and	  training	  to	  launch	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  The	  reason	  why	   they	   decided	   to	   recruit	   Cabral	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1961,	  when	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   and	   Czechoslovakia	   increasingly	   looked	   for	  ways	   to	   extend	   their	   reach	   in	   the	  Third	   World,	   was	   that	   they	   believed	   that	   Cabral	   shared	   their	   optimism	   about	   the	  prospects	  of	  scientific	  socialism	  in	  Africa	  and	  that	  he	  could	  be	  a	   long-­‐term	  ally	   in	  the	  region	  as	  it	  was	  inevitably	  drawn	  into	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Cabral’s	  impressive	  interpersonal	  and	   diplomatic	   skills	   meant	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   was	   the	   first	   resistance	   movement	   to	  launch	  the	  violent	  phase	  of	   its	  program	  in	  early	  1963,	  and	  that	   it	  managed	  to	  sustain	  its	  momentum	  after	  opening	  battle.	  One	  can	  already	  see	  why	  the	  PAIGC	  would	  become	  a	  major	  recipient	  of	  Czechoslovak	  and	  Soviet	  assistance	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  why	  Cabral’s	  importance	  for	  Prague	  and	  Moscow	  would	  grow	  over	  the	  following	  years.	  	  The	   political	   consequences	   of	   superpower	   engagement	   with	   the	   liberation	  movements	  during	  this	  period	  were	  of	  long-­‐lasting	  importance,	  even	  if	  assistance	  was	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
	  
Transitions:	  The	  Military	  Campaigns	  Unfold,	  1963–65	  
	  In	   August	   1963,	   António	   de	   Oliveira	   Salazar	   made	   one	   of	   his	   rare	   television	  appearances.	  The	  aging	  dictator	  gave	  an	  hour-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half-­‐long	  speech,	  raging	  against	  a	  wave	  of	  “black	  racism,”	  which	  was	  putting	  the	  Portuguese	  “civilizing	  mission”	  in	  Africa	  in	   jeopardy.	   He	   wondered:	   “Is	   the	   language	   that	   we	   teach	   those	   people	   superior	   to	  their	  dialects	  or	  not?	  Does	  the	  religion	  preached	  by	  the	  missionaries	  surpass	  fetishism	  or	  not?	  Is	  belonging	  to	  a	  nation	  of	  civilized	  expression	  and	  world	  projection	  not	  better	  than	   narrow	   regionalism	  without	  means	   for	   defense	   or	   progress?”	   Salazar	   never	   set	  foot	   in	   the	   colonies,	   but	   he	  was	   committed	   to	   defending	   them,	   despite	   international	  and	  domestic	  pressures.	  Salazar	  had	  already	  communicated	  to	  Washington	  that	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Western	  alliance	  by	  denying	  NATO’s	  access	  to	   the	   Azores	   if	   this	  was	   the	   cost	   of	  maintaining	   the	   empire.	   Addressing	   his	   African	  subjects,	   Salazar	   offered	   “the	   closest	   and	   most	   friendly	   cooperation,	   if	   they	   find	   it	  useful,”	   but	   pledged	   that	   Portugal	   would	   defend	   its	   colonies	   “to	   the	   limit	   of	   our	  resources,	  if	  they	  think	  fit	  to	  turn	  their	  threats	  into	  acts	  of	  war.”251	  By	   1963,	   nobody	   questioned	   the	   fact	   that	   Salazar	   would	   not	   relinquish	   the	  colonies	  without	  a	  fight.	  The	  Portuguese	  army	  had	  already	  crushed	  a	  popular	  uprising	  in	  Angola,	  which	   ended	   all	   hope	   of	   a	   quick	  withdrawal.	   In	   fact,	   the	   scale	   of	   guerrilla	  activity	  in	  the	  North	  –	  the	  site	  of	  the	  1961	  Angolan	  Uprising	  –	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  low-­‐scale	  policing.	  Neither	  the	  MPLA	  nor	  the	  FNLA	  were	  equipped	  for	  a	  protracted	  war,	  but	  this	   is	   exactly	  what	  was	   required	   for	   them	   to	   achieve	   independence.	   The	  PAIGC	  had	  already	   launched	  a	  military	   campaign	   in	   early	  1963	  with	   some	   success,	   but	   by	   early	  1964,	  Lisbon	  had	  responded	  with	  a	  vigorous	  assault	  launched	  by	  the	  newly	  appointed	  Governor	   General,	   Arnaldo	   Schultz.	   	   FRELIMO’s	   President,	   Eduardo	   Mondlane,	   was	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   110	  also	   under	   increasing	   pressure	   to	   launch	   an	   anti-­‐colonial	   uprising	   in	   Mozambique,	  which	   ultimately	   took	   place	   on	   25	   September	   1964.	   Therefore,	   all	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  engaged	  in	  vigorous	  diplomacy	  to	  obtain	  support	  for	  their	  war	  efforts	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Czechoslovakia,	  the	  GDR,	  Bulgaria,	  China,	  and	  Cuba.	  Soviet	  assistance	  to	   the	   liberation	   movements	   in	   1965	   increased	   in	   accord	   with	   requirements	   of	   the	  military	  campaigns,	  even	   though	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  was	  dismissed	   from	  the	  position	  of	   First	   Secretary	   and	   replaced	   by	   Leonid	   Brezhnev	   in	   October	   1964.	   By	   the	   end	   of	  1965,	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  had	   started	   supplying	  weapons	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements,	  and	  had	  constructed	  a	  specialized	  training	  center	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Perevalnoye,	  on	  the	  Crimean	   peninsula.	   Bolstered	   by	   more	   sophisticated	   weapons,	   the	   MPLA,	   FRELIMO	  and	   the	   PAIGC	  managed	   to	   continue	   their	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns.	   Lisbon	   was	   now	  facing	   a	   significant	   security	   problem	   in	   the	   colonies,	   which	   was	   no	   longer	   easy	   to	  dismiss.	  	  
The	  War	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  Unfolds,	  1963–1964	  Of	   the	   three	   colonies,	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   represented	   the	   most	   difficult	   military	  challenge	  for	  the	  Portuguese	  army.	  The	  dry	  season,	  from	  November	  to	  May,	  is	  known	  for	  hot	  winds	  that	  come	  from	  the	  Sahara	  desert.	  The	  rainy	  season,	  during	  which	  there	  are	   frequent	   monsoons,	   lasts	   from	   June	   to	   October.	   The	   country	   is	   swampy	   and	  crisscrossed	  by	  many	  rivers,	  which	  means	  that	  80%	  of	  all	  cargo	  is	  transported	  via	  the	  river	   system.	  The	   country’s	  habitable	  mass	   shrinks	   to	   the	   size	  of	   Switzerland	  during	  the	  rainy	  season,	  which	  makes	  the	  whole	  country	  “a	  frontier	  and	  a	  battle	  zone”	  difficult	  to	  defend.252	  Just	  how	  difficult	  it	  would	  be	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  PAIGC	  became	  apparent	  soon	  after	  the	  movement	   launched	  its	   first	  assault,	   in	  the	  south	  of	  the	  country,	  on	  23	  January	  1963.	  The	  PAIGC	  found	  overwhelming	  support	  among	  the	  Balante,	  the	  largest	  ethnic	  group,	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  the	  guerrillas	  were	  entrenched	  in	  the	  southern	  Tombali	  province	  and	  in	  the	  Oio	  region,	  north	  of	  the	  capital,	  Bissau.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Cann,	  Brown	  Waters,	  Chapter	  5.	  
	   111	  year,	  the	  Portuguese	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	  General	  Manuel	  Gomes	  de	  Araújo,	  confessed	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  had	  gained	  control	  over	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  colony.253	  	  On	  8	  October	  1963,	  Cabral	  arrived	  in	  Prague,	  accompanied	  by	  his	  half-­‐brother	  Luís	   and	   a	   shopping	   list.	   First,	   Cabral	   wanted	   Czechoslovakia	   to	   send	   humanitarian	  assistance,	  such	  as	  medicine,	  stationery	  supplies	  for	  children,	  clothing,	  and	  household	  items,	   to	   normalize	   civilian	   life	   in	   the	   “liberated	   areas.”	   Second,	   Cabral	   asked	   for	  expansion	  of	  military	  assistance.	  The	  PAIGC	  had	  already	  liberated	  30%	  of	  the	  country,	  argued	   Cabral,	   but	   the	   Portuguese	   still	   controlled	   the	   major	   administrative	   centers,	  which	   they	  resupplied	  with	  a	   large	   fleet	  of	  vessels,	   covered	  by	  air	   support.	  Thus,	   the	  rebels	  required	  large	  quantities	  of	  heavy	  weapons,	  especially	  machine	  guns.254	  Cabral	  also	  explained	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  streamline	  military	  operations	  by	  creating	  a	  regular	  armed	  force	  and	  organizing	  a	  headquarters	  for	  the	  General	  Staff,	  and	  for	  that	  he	  would	  need	  a	  military	  professional	  who	  would	  advise	  the	  leadership	  on	  such	  matters.255	  The	  Czechoslovak	  leadership	  was	  responsive	  to	  Cabral’s	  request,	  approving	  the	  allocation	  of	  20	  heavy	  machine	  guns	  and	  10,000	   items	  of	   clothing	  and	  caps	   for	   the	  PAIGC	  on	  7	  January	   1964.256	  While	   Cabral	   was	   contemplating	   the	   reorganization	   of	   the	   armed	  forces,	  the	  movement	  was	  facing	  a	  major	  Portuguese	  offensive	  on	  the	  island	  of	  Como.	  A	  small	  and	  marshy	  island	  just	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  the	  southern	  Tombali	  province,	  Como	  was	   not	   particularly	   important,	   in	   either	   economic	   or	   strategic	   terms,	   for	   the	  Portuguese.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   1963,	   several	   hundred	   guerrillas	   infiltrated	   the	   island,	  mostly	  inhabited	  by	  the	  Balante,	  and	  proclaimed	  it	  a	  “liberated	  area.”	  The	  Portuguese	  decided	   they	   could	   not	   allow	   the	   PAIGC	   to	   achieve	   this	   symbolic	   victory,	   and	   on	   15	  January	  1964	  they	  launched	  a	  massive	  campaign	  to	  retake	  the	  island,	  involving	  3,000	  ground	   troops	   backed	   by	   aerial	   support.	   The	  militants	  managed	   to	   resist,	   thanks	   to	  local	   supporters	   who	   were	   much	   more	   familiar	   with	   the	   terrain	   than	   the	   colonial	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   112	  troops,	   and	   after	   seventy-­‐five	   days	   of	   fierce	   fighting,	   Lisbon	   decided	   to	   abort	   the	  operation.257	  Como	  was	  a	  heavy	  blow	  to	  the	  prestige	  and	  morale	  of	  the	  colonial	  army,	  as	  it	  revealed	  that	  even	  a	  professional	  force	  could	  not	  always	  withstand	  a	  determined	  resistance.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   PAIGC	   was	   also	   undergoing	   a	   process	   of	   internal	  reorganization.	  	  When	  the	  war	  first	  began,	  the	  militants	  were	  given	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  autonomy	  to	  mobilize	  the	  local	  population.	  Many	  guerrillas	  were	  dispatched	  to	  rural	  areas	  without	  proper	  training	  because	  of	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  the	  military	  campaign.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  reports	  of	  local	  people	  complaining	  about	  the	  militants	  abusing	  their	  powers	  started	  to	  emerge.	  This	  had	  a	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  on	  the	  image	  of	  the	  movement.	  Aristides	  Pereira	   remembered:	   “The	  population	   started	   to	  demobilize	   and	   turn	  hostile	   against	  the	   party.”	   Many	   guerrillas	   also	   refused	   Cabral’s	   orders	   to	   spread	   the	   military	  campaign	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  they	  believed	  their	  mission	  had	  already	  been	  accomplished:	   “We	   have	   liberated	   our	   own	   country…now	   let	   those	   others	   liberate	  theirs!	  Why	  should	  a	  Balante	  go	  to	  help	  liberate	  the	  Fulas?	  Let	  the	  Fulas	  do	  their	  own	  work.”258	  Given	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   threat	   to	   the	  movement,	   Cabral	   convened	   the	  first	  party	  congress	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  at	  Cassaca,	  on	  13	  February	  1964.	  The	   Cassaca	   Congress	   was	   an	   important	   moment	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	  movement.	  The	  rebellious	  guerrilla	  commanders	  were	  made	  to	  examine	  their	  actions	  and	  lay	  down	  their	  arms.	  The	  Congress	  also	  approved	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  regular	  armed	  force,	   the	   Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   the	   People	   (FARP;	   Forças	   Armadas	  
Revolucionarias	   do	   Povo).259	  The	   Congress	   also	   adopted	   a	   comprehensive	   program,	  pledging	   to	   establish	   basic	   social	   services	   for	   the	   civilian	   population,	   to	   set	   up	   a	  network	  of	  “people’s	  stores”	  to	  regulate	  internal	  trade,	  and	  to	  adopt	  a	  set	  of	  measures	  to	   increase	   and	   diversify	   agricultural	   production.	   Aristides	   Pereira	   observed:	   “Those	  decisions	  were	  extraordinary.	  One	  can	  say	  that	  in	  Cassaca	  we	  defined	  the	  entire	  course	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   113	  of	   the	   struggle.”260	  Cabral	   needed	   modern	   arms	   and	   training	   to	   organize	   a	   more	  centralized	  military	  force,	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  stepped	  up	  its	  assistance.	  	  On	   30	   June,	   the	   Politburo	   of	   the	   CC	   CPC	   approved	   a	   generous	   arms	   package,	  fulfilling	   Cabral’s	   requests	   from	   April,	   and	   by	   October	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Solidarity	  Committee	  allocated	  45,000	  Czech	  crowns	  worth	  of	  medicines,	  stationery	  supplies,	  and	  medical	  equipment.261	  In	  September	  1964,	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Interior	  Ministry	  honored	  their	   promise	   to	   Cabral	   and	   dispatched	   the	   intelligence	   officer	   František	   Polda	   to	  Conakry.	   He	   was	   to	   support	   the	   building	   up	   of	   the	   regular	   armed	   force	   and	   the	  centralized	   military	   command	   structure	   in	   Conakry.	   In	   the	   first	   year,	   Polda	   was	  apparently	   involved	   in	  organizing	  and	  training	  cadres	   for	  the	  FARP	  General	  Staff	  and	  the	  Information	  Service,	  as	  well	  as	  advising	  on	  military	  strategy,	  in	  particular	  planning	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  fortified	  posts.262	  His	  other	  task	  was	  to	  teach	  military	  intelligence	  and	  counter-­‐intelligence	  tactics	  to	  the	  guerrilla	  commanders,	  and	  to	  inform	  Prague	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  PAIGC.263	  Thus,	  Czechoslovakia	  remained	  the	  PAIGC’s	  key	  foreign	  donor	  during	  the	  first	  two	   years	   of	   the	   war.	   The	   Soviet	   contribution	   is	   less	   clear.	   In	   1963,	   the	   CC	   CPSU	  International	  Department	  allocated	  $50,000	  to	  the	  PAIGC;	  this	   figure	  rose	  to	  $70,000	  in	  1965.264	  Cadres	   from	  the	  PAIGC	  were	  enrolled	   in	   special,	   six-­‐month	  courses	  at	   the	  Higher	  Party	  School,	  the	  Komsomol	  School,	  in	  Moscow,	  and	  they	  received	  scholarships	  to	   universities	   across	   the	   Soviet	  Union.265	  There	   is	   no	   evidence,	   however,	   to	   confirm	  that	  the	  Soviets	  shipped	  arms	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  before	  1965.	  If	  they	  did	  not,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  they	  relied	  on	  Czechoslovakia	  to	  do	  so.	  While	  the	  situation	   in	  Guinea-­‐
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   114	  Bissau	  had	  become	  a	   formidable	  challenge	   to	   the	  Portuguese	  by	  1964,	   the	  same	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Angola.	  	  	  
Jonas	  Savimbi’s	  Courting	  of	  the	  Soviets	  	  As	  1963	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  the	  political	  fortunes	  of	  the	  MPLA	  were	  in	  dire	  straits.	  Eleven	   governments	   had	   recognized	   its	   main	   rival,	   Holden	   Roberto’s	   Revolutionary	  Government	  in	  Exile	  (GRAE),	  as	  the	  only	  representative	  of	  the	  Angolan	  liberation	  front.	  In	  1963,	   the	  Congolese	  authorities	  expelled	  the	  MPLA	  from	  the	  Congo	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  the	   Simba	   Rebellion,	   which	   had	   been	   led	   by	   former	   associates	   of	   the	  martyred	   first	  Prime	   Minister,	   Patrice	   Lumumba.	   This	   deprived	   the	   MPLA	   of	   access	   to	   northern	  Angola,	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  1961	  uprising.	  Thus,	  the	  Bakongo-­‐based	  FNLA	  (the	  liberation	  movement	   behind	   the	   GRAE)	   remained	   the	   only	   guerrilla	   movement	   engaging	   the	  Portuguese	   army,	   in	   increasingly	   infrequent	   raids	   across	   the	   Congo-­‐Angola	   border.	  Regardless,	  Holden	  Roberto	  grew	  increasingly	  bitter	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  According	   to	  a	  US	  State	  Department	  memorandum	  of	  November	  1963,	  “Heretofore	   strongly	  western-­‐oriented,	   the	  GRAE	   is	   rapidly	  assuming	  a	  more	  neutral	  position	   and	  may	   seek	   some	   Eastern	   European	   assistance	   during	   the	   coming	   year	   –	  probably	  for	  tactical,	  rather	  than	  ideological	  reasons.”266	  Holden	   Roberto	   was	   indeed	   looking	   for	   ways	   to	   diversify	   the	   sources	   of	  support	   for	   the	   FNLA/GRAE.	   This	   had	   to	   do	   with	   his	   growing	   frustration	   with	  American	  officials,	  who	  had	  limited	  all	  contacts	  with	  leaders	  of	  the	  radical	  nationalist	  movements	   so	   as	   to	   not	   alienate	   Salazar.	   Kennedy’s	   assassination	   on	   22	   November	  1963	  only	  reinforced	  this	  trend,	  as	  his	  successor	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  was	  not	  particularly	  interested	   in	   engaging	   with	   African	   leaders.	   Roberto	   publicly	   criticized	   American	  policy	  towards	  Portugal,	  and	  on	  4	  December	  1963,	  GRAE	  representatives	  at	  the	  United	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   115	  Nations	   approached	   the	   Soviet	   delegation,	   asking	   them	   to	   provide	   financial	   and	  material	  assistance	  to	  the	  FNLA.267	  	  The	  Soviets	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  develop	  contacts	  with	  the	  FNLA	  for	  many	  years,	  and	   therefore	  Moscow	   responded	   positively	   to	   Roberto’s	   opening.	   On	   17	   December,	  Dmitriy	  Dolidze,	  the	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  met	  Holden	  Roberto	  in	  Nairobi,	  where	  the	  two	  had	  arrived	  to	  participate	  in	  Kenya’s	  independence	  celebrations.	  Roberto	  seemed	  willing	  to	  establish	  contacts	  with	  the	  socialist	  countries,	  but	   he	   was	   not	   open	   to	   an	   idea	   of	   a	   common	   front	   alliance	   with	   the	  MPLA,	   a	   topic	  which	  was	  of	  utmost	   importance	   to	   the	  Soviets,	   as	  became	  clear	   in	   the	  course	  of	   the	  meeting.	  When	  asked	  whether	  he	  had	  considered	  the	  prospect	  of	  unification	  with	  the	  MPLA,	  Roberto	  responded	  that	  he	  was	  not	  against	  a	  union	  in	  principle,	  but	  this	  could	  only	  be	  possible	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  FNLA,	  wrote	  Dolidze	  in	  his	  report	  to	  the	  CC	  CPSU.	   This	   was	   fair,	   Roberto	   argued,	   because	   the	  MPLA	   did	   not	   have	   any	   presence,	  military	  or	  otherwise,	  inside	  Angola,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  waging	  armed	  struggle.	  Moreover,	  Holden	   accused	   Neto	   of	   collaboration	   with	   the	   Portuguese	   secret	   police,	   and	  postulated	  that	  the	  MPLA	  was	  seeking	  a	  compromise	  with	  the	  colonial	  administration.	  Dolidze	  mentioned	   that	   Roberto	  was	   visibly	   nervous	   and	   distrustful	   throughout	   the	  conversation.	  Nevertheless,	  Dolidze	  invited	  him	  to	  visit	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  a	  guest	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee.268	  It	  was	  fairly	  clear	  that	  Roberto	  was	  not	  particularly	  willing	  to	  compromise,	  and	  thus	  the	  Soviets	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  GRAE’s	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Relations,	  the	  increasingly	  influential	  30-­‐year-­‐old	  Jonas	  Malheiro	  Savimbi.	  Savimbi’s	  background	  and	  political	   views	  were	  at	  odds	  with	  Roberto’s.	  While	  Roberto	  derived	  support	  from	  the	  Bakongo,	  a	  community	  in	  northern	  Angola,	  Savimbi	  was	  born	   in	  Munhango,	   in	   the	  eastern	  Moxico	  province,	   the	  home	  of	  Angola’s	   largest	  ethnic	  group,	  the	  Ovimbundu.	  Savimbi	  had	  studied	  in	  Portugal	  and	  then	  in	  Switzerland	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  V.	   Shitarev	   (First	  African	  Department,	   Foreign	  Ministry),	  24	  December	  1963,	   "Kharakteristika	  na	  Al'varo	  Holdena	  Roberto/Khose	  Gil'more/	  lidera	  partii	  'Soyuz	  natsional'nogo	  osvobozhdeniya	  Angoly/FNLA,	  glavu	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  Arkhiv	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  Politiki	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  (hereafter	  d.)	  1,	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  74.	  268	  Bazanov	   (Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee)	   to	   CC	   CPSU,	   "Zapis	   besedy	   s	   prezidentom	   partii	   Soyuz	  narodov	  Angoly,	  prem'er-­‐ministrom	  tak	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   'Nakhodyashchimsya	  v	   izgnanii	   revolyutsionnogo	  pravitel'stva	  Angoly'	  Kholdenom	  Roberto,"	  27	  January	  1964,	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  64,	  pp.	  282-­‐284.	  
	   116	  where,	   as	   he	   would	   later	   claim	   in	   conversations	   with	   officials	   from	   the	   socialist	  countries,	   he	   was	   inspired	   by	   leftist	   ideas	   and	   became	   well	   acquainted	   with	  Portuguese	   and	   Swiss	   communists.	   Savimbi	   initially	   wanted	   to	   join	   the	   MPLA,	   but	  ultimately	   decided	   against	   it	   because	   only	   the	   FNLA/GRAE,	   he	   believed,	   had	   a	   real	  chance	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  military	  struggle	  against	  the	  colonialists.	  His	  expectations	  did	  not	  materialize	  because	  the	  FNLA	  required	  proper	  training	  and	  arms	  to	  engage	  in	  military	  action,	  and	  thus	  Savimbi	  started	  to	  criticize	  Roberto	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  accept	  aid	  from	  the	  socialist	  countries.	  He	  also	  became	  critical	  of	  Roberto’s	  dictatorial	  leadership	  style	  and	  for	  favoring	  his	  own	  Bakongo	  ethnic	  group.269	  Charismatic	  and	  ambitious,	  Savimbi	  acquired	   a	   following	   inside	   the	   FNLA,	   and	   he	   proceeded	   to	   establish	   contacts	   with	  representatives	  of	   the	   socialist	   countries	   to	   strengthen	  his	   claim	   to	   the	   leadership	  of	  the	   movement.	   In	   early	   1964	   in	   Cairo,	   where	   he	   was	   in	   touch	   with	   the	   Soviet	  representative	   to	   the	   AAPSO,	   Latip	   Maksudov,	   and	   the	   Czechoslovak	   and	   GDR	  Ambassadors	   to	   Egypt,	   František	   Zachystal	   and	   Ernst	   Scholtz	   respectively,	   Savimbi	  launched	   a	   campaign	   to	   gain	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   socialist	   countries.	   Speaking	   to	  Maksudov,	   Savimbi	   argued	   that	   there	   was	   a	   group	   inside	   the	   FNLA	   that	   was	  sympathetic	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   clearly	   separating	  himself	   from	   the	   “pro-­‐American”	  Holden	   Roberto.	   Savimbi	   also	   said	   that	   Neto	   was	   an	   effective	   political	   leader	   who	  enjoyed	  substantial	  support	  among	  the	  Angolan	  masses.270	  He	  also	  played	  up	  left-­‐wing	  ideas,	  which	  particularly	   impressed	  Ambassador	  Scholtz,	  who	  recommended	  that	   the	  GDR	  extend	  formal	  recognition	  to	  the	  FNLA/GRAE,	  without	  asking	  for	  permission	  from	  other	   socialist	   countries.	   Both	   Scholtz	   and	   Zachystal	   recommended	   that	   Savimbi	   be	  invited	   for	   talks	   in	   East	   Berlin	   and	   Prague.271The	   KGB	   was	   also	   very	   interested	   in	  Savimbi’s	  outreach	  initiative,	  as	  they	  hoped	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  long-­‐sought	  alliance	  between	   the	  MPLA	   and	   the	   FNLA.	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin	   recalled:	   “When	   Savimbi	   started	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  Bridgland,	  Jonas	  Savimbi:	  a	  Key	  to	  Africa	  	  (Edinburgh:	  Mainstream,	  1986),	  p.	  58.	  270	  CSSR	   embassy	   in	  Moscow	   to	  Prague,	   "Angola-­‐snaha	   exilove	   vlady	   o	   ziskani	   pomoci	   ZST,"	  AMFA,	  TO-­‐T,	   IV/4,	   sign.	  274,	  p.	  125.	  271	  Scholz	   (GDR	   ambassador,	   Cairo)	   to	   Schwab	   (Deputy	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Berlin),	   25	   February	   1964,	   PAAA-­‐MfAA,	  A15964;	   Lessing	   to	   Schwab,	   25	   February	  1964,	   PAAA-­‐MfAA,	  A1596;	   Schwab	   (Berlin)	   to	   Scholz	   (Cairo),	   25	   February	  1964,	   PAAA-­‐MfAA,	   A15964;	   Cairo	   to	   Berlin,	   Record	   of	   conversation	   between	   ambassadors	   Scholz	   and	   Zachystal	   in	  Cairo,	  6	  April	  1964,	  PAAA-­‐MfAA,	  A17416.	  
	   117	  criticizing	  Roberto	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  take	  over	  the	  FNLA,	  our	  staff	  [i.e.,	  the	  KGB]	  stepped	  up	   their	  efforts	   to	   tear	  him	  away	   from	  Roberto.”272	  Therefore,	   in	  April	  1964,	  Savimbi	  travelled	   to	   East	   Berlin,	   Moscow,	   and	   Prague	   to	   obtain	   support	   from	   the	   socialist	  countries.	  	  Savimbi’s	  main	  selling	  point	  on	  the	  trip	  was	  that	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  establish	  a	  common	   front	   with	   the	   MPLA.	   Speaking	   to	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   Czechoslovak	  Solidarity	   Committee	   in	   Prague,	   Savimbi	   said	   that	   Holden	   Roberto	   had	   recently	  met	  the	  US	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	   for	  Political	  Affairs,	  Averell	  Harriman,	   in	  Léopoldville,	  under	   the	   auspices	   of	   Congolese	   Prime	  Minister	   Cyrille	   Adoula.	   Savimbi	   argued	   that	  Adoula	  was	  apparently	  concerned	  about	  a	  “communist	  takeover”	  of	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  that	  Harriman	  had	  promised	  to	  provide	  assistance	  for	  Roberto.	  Meanwhile,	  Savimbi	  argued	  that	  he	  had	  been	  talking	  to	  Neto	  to	  establish	  a	  common	  front	  with	  the	  MPLA.273	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Harriman	  discussed	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  FNLA	  with	  Roberto	  and	  Adoula	  during	  his	  trip	  to	  Léopoldville,	  he	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  any	  promises.274	  Moving	  on	  to	  East	  Berlin,	  Savimbi	  argued,	  in	  conversations	  with	  GDR	  officials,	  that	   he	   had	   already	   established	   a	   group	   (the	   Revolutionary	   Committee	   of	   Angola)	  inside	  the	  GRAE,	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  convince	  Roberto	  to	  unite	  in	  a	  common	  front	  with	   the	  MPLA.	  Yet	   again,	  he	  argued	   that	  Agostinho	  Neto	  was	   in	   favor	  of	   striking	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  FNLA,	  but	  he	  also	  said	  that	  they	  had	  to	  nominally	  retain	  Roberto	  as	  a	  figurehead	  because	  of	  his	  international	  contacts	  and	  the	  assistance	  he	  was	  receiving	  from	   the	   Congo,	   Tunisia,	   and	   the	   United	   States.275	  GDR	   officials	   treated	   Savimbi’s	  claims	   cautiously,	   arguing	   that	   one	   had	   to	   wonder	   whether	   his	   claims	   about	   the	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  had	  a	  real	  foundation.276	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  Nazhestkin,	  "Superderzhavy,"	  31.	  273	  Prague,	  "Záznam	  o	  prijeti	  delegace	  FNLA	  (Narodni	  fronta	  osvobozeni	  Angoly)	  na	  Cs.vyboru	  solidarity	  dne	  14	  dubna	  1964,"	  AMZV,	  TO-­‐tajné,	  IV/4,	  sign.	  274.	  274	  Nina	  Howland,	  et	  al.,	  eds.,	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (FRUS),	  1960-­‐1968	  -­‐	  Congo.	  Vol.	  XXIII	  (Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  2013),	   	  Document	  162.	  In	  1964,	  the	  issue	  to	  raise	  the	  CIA	  allocation	  to	  Roberto’s	  GRAE	  was	  raised	  many	   times,	  although	   this	  was	  opposed	  every	   time	  by	   the	  Bureau	  of	  African	  Affairs.	  See:	  Nina	  Davis	  Howland,	  ed.	  Foreign	  Relations	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  States	  (FRUS),	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  Africa.	  Vol.	  XXIV	  (Washington,	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  United	  States	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1995),	  	  Document	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  275	  Berlin,	  22	  April	  1964,	  "Information	  über	  den	  Besuch	  des	  Aussenministers	  der	  angolesischen	  Exilregierung,	  Dr.	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  und	  seines	  Begleiters	  Florentino	  Duarte	  in	  der	  DDR	  vom	  19.-­‐21.4.1964,"	  BA-­‐SAPMO,	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  30/IV,	  A	  2/20/948,	  pp.	  163-­‐166.	  276	  Ibid.,	  p.	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   118	  Savimbi’s	  message	   to	   the	   Soviets	  was	   very	   similar.	  When	   Savimbi	  met	   Soviet	  representatives	  on	  17	  April,	  he	  sharply	  criticized	  Roberto,	  asking	  that	  he	  not	  be	  invited	  to	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	  He	   also	   briefed	   his	   interlocutors	   about	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   special	  group	  inside	  the	  GRAE	  in	  favor	  of	  uniting	  in	  a	  common	  front	  with	  the	  MPLA.	  Savimbi	  also	   asked	   for	   financial	   aid,	   three	   scholarships	   for	   political	   education	   and	   two	   for	  military	   training	   in	   the	   USSR,	   as	   per	   the	   report	   drafted	   by	   Petr	   Yevsyukov’s	   boss	  Veniamin	   Midtsev.	   This	   shows	   that	   he	   was	   clearly	   looking	   to	   increase	   his	   prestige	  within	   the	   movement,	   in	   direct	   competition	   with	   Roberto.277	  The	   Soviet	   objectives	  remain	  obscure.	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin	  recalled	  that	  Savimbi	  was	  too	  ambitious	  and	  refused	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  unification	  with	  the	  MPLA,	  implying	  that	  this	  is	  what	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	  suggested	   to	   him.278	  Conversely,	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   wrote	   that	   it	   was	   not	   within	   the	  capabilities	   of	   the	   International	   Department	   to	   engineer	   reconciliation	   between	  Savimbi	   and	   Neto.279	  Savimbi	   himself	   recalled	   much	   later	   that	   the	   officials	   in	   the	  socialist	  countries	  were	  only	  interested	  in	  recruiting	  new	  members	  for	  the	  MPLA.280	  While	  Yevsyukov	  denied	  that	  Savimbi	  was	  in	  any	  way	  considered	  an	  alternative	  to	  Neto,	   in	   reality,	   the	   Soviets	   adopted	   a	  more	   cautious,	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	   approach.	   The	  support	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements	  was	  one	  of	  the	  topics	  of	  a	  consultative	  meeting	  of	   representatives	   of	   the	   International	   Departments	   (or	   their	   equivalents)	   from	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  GDR,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Hungary,	  Bulgaria,	  Czechoslovakia,	  and	  Mongolia	  in	  late	  April	  1964.	  Vitaliy	  Korionov,	  one	  of	  Boris	  Ponomarev’s	  deputies	  at	  the	  CC	  CPSU,	  admitted	   that	   the	   complicated	   situation	   in	   the	   Angolan	   liberation	   movement	  demanded	   that	   the	   socialist	   countries	   maintain	   contacts	   with	   both	   the	   MPLA	   and	  FNLA/GRAE,	  given	  that	  the	  latter	  had	  already	  been	  recognized	  by	  many	  African	  states.	  These	   difficulties	   notwithstanding,	   Korionov	   informed	   his	   colleagues	   that	   the	   USSR	  had	  already	  established	  six-­‐month	  courses	  for	  cadres	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  on	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  Shubin,	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  "kholodnaya"	  Voyna:	  Yug	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  Ed.	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  Kindle	  (Moscow:	  2014),	  Chapter	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   119	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Higher	  Party	  School	  in	  Moscow	  and	  called	  for	  continuous	  provision	  of	  assistance,	  especially	  in	  the	  form	  of	  training.281	  Overall,	   Moscow,	   Prague,	   and	   Sofia	   became	   increasingly	   skeptical	   about	   the	  prospects	  of	   the	  MPLA,	  given	   the	  on-­‐going	   internal	  divisions	  and	   lack	  of	  unity	   in	   the	  Angolan	   liberation	  movements.	  This	   is	  why	   the	  Soviets	  and	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	  socialist	   countries	   hedged	   their	   bets	   on	   ideologically	   acceptable	   individuals,	   like	  Savimbi,	  who	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  play	  up	  his	  left-­‐wing	  ideas.	  Nevertheless,	  unification	  of	   all	   the	   Angolan	   forces	   into	   a	   single	   front	   had	   been	   pursued	   by	   the	   International	  Department	   since	   1961,	   and	   Roberto’s	   opening	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   to	   advance	  that	  goal.	  Moreover,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  continued	  to	  provide	  support	   to	   the	  MPLA.	  For	  the	   MPLA,	   the	   Soviet	   flirtation	   with	   Holden	   Roberto	   and	   Savimbi	   was	   a	   formidable	  challenge	  that	  had	  to	  be	  addressed	  if	  the	  movement	  was	  to	  revive	  its	  fortunes	  after	  its	  expulsion	  from	  the	  Congo.	  	  	  
The	  MPLA’s	  Diplomatic	  Offensive	  In	  August	  1963,	  Alphonse	  Massamba-­‐Débat	  was	  appointed	   the	  new	  president	  of	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  after	  his	  predecessor,	  defrocked	  priest	  Abbé	  Fulbert	  Youlou,	  was	  overthrown	  in	  a	  coup	  d'état	  of	  15	  August	  1963,	  that	  followed	  three	  days	  of	  street	  riots.	  Massamba-­‐Débat	   promised	   to	   fight	   corruption,	   proclaimed	   adherence	   to	   scientific	  socialism,	  and	  established	  relations	  with	   the	  socialist	  countries.	  When	  the	  MPLA	  was	  expelled	   from	   Léopoldville	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Simba	   Rebellion,	   Massamba-­‐Débat	  offered	  Agostinho	  Neto	  and	  his	  followers	  a	  safe	  haven	  in	  Brazzaville	  and	  allowed	  them	  to	  establish	  a	  training	  camp	  at	  Dolisie.	  Massamba-­‐Débat	  offered	  refuge	  not	  only	  to	  the	  Angolans,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   Congolese	   opposition	   leaders;	   thus,	   he	   was	   extremely	  insecure,	  fearing	  retaliation	  from	  the	  Léopoldville	  authorities.	  Having	  lost	  direct	  access	  to	  northern	  Angola,	   the	  MPLA	  hoped	   to	   rekindle	  guerrilla	  operations	   in	  Cabinda,	   the	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   120	  only	  stretch	  of	  Angolan	  territory	  bordering	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville.	  First,	  though,	  Neto	  had	  to	  inject	  vitality	  into	  the	  MPLA.	  Neto’s	   strategy	   for	   overcoming	   the	   political	   crisis	  was	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   members	   to	   strengthen	   his	   authority.	   Therefore,	   in	   January	   1964,	   Neto	  convened	   a	   “Cadres	   Conference”	   in	   Brazzaville,	   which	   was	   supposed	   to	   outline	   the	  future	   direction	   of	   the	   MPLA.	   While	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	   had	   departed	   with	   a	   group	   of	  supporters,	   many	   of	   the	   younger	   cadres,	   who	   had	   come	   to	   respect	   Neto	   as	   an	  unwavering	  critic	  of	  the	  Salazar	  regime,	  remained	  loyal.	  One	  of	  them	  was	  a	  charismatic	  youth	   leader,	   the	  33-­‐year-­‐old	  Daniel	   Julio	  Chipenda,	   the	   son	  of	  prominent	  Protestant	  clergyman	   and	   political	   activist	   Jesse	   Chipenda	   of	   the	   Ovimbundu	   tribe	   of	   southeast	  Angola.	   Chipenda	   became	   a	   popular	   student	   athlete	   while	   studying	   at	   Coimbra	  University	   (1958–1962)	   before	   he	   was	   summoned	   by	   the	   MPLA	   to	   join	   their	   new	  headquarters	  in	  Léopoldville.	  Because	  of	  his	  charisma,	  he	  was	  elected	  the	  MPLA	  youth	  leader	   in	   May	   1963. 282 	  The	   MPLA	   wanted	   to	   reverse	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   OAU	  recognizing	   the	   FNLA/GRAE	   as	   the	   only	   representative	   of	   the	   Angolan	   liberation	  movement	  and	  to	  restore	  the	  “exclusive”	  support	  of	  the	  socialist	  countries.	  The	  MPLA	  leadership	   also	   wanted	   to	   revive	   their	   military	   operations	   in	   Cabinda.	   Chipenda	  recalled:	   “We	   decided	   to	   launch	   an	   offensive	   to	   revive	   the	   fortunes	   of	   the	  MPLA.”283	  With	  those	  objectives	  in	  mind,	  Neto	  travelled	  to	  Moscow	  in	  April.	  	  Neto	   was	   in	   for	   a	   major,	   unpleasant	   surprise	   in	   Moscow.	   Shortly	   before	   his	  arrival,	   Nikita	   Khrushchev,	  who	  was	   on	   vacation	   at	   his	   summerhouse	   in	   Pitsunda,	   a	  resort	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  in	  modern-­‐day	  Abkhazia,	  had	  apparently	  discovered	  that	  many	  African	   countries	   had	   already	   recognized	   the	   GRAE	   and	   decided,	  without	   consulting	  the	   International	  Department,	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union	   should	  do	   the	   same.	  The	   task	  of	  breaking	   the	   news	   to	   Neto	   fell	   to	   Dmitriy	   Shevlyagin,	   one	   of	   the	   deputies	   of	   the	  International	   Department.	   Yevsyukov	   recalled	   that	   Neto’s	   conversation	   with	  Shevlyagin	  had	  been	  going	  very	  well	  right	  up	  until	  the	  very	  end,	  when	  Neto	  found	  out	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   121	  that	  the	  CPSU	  had	  decided	  to	  extend	  formal	  recognition	  to	  the	  GRAE	  the	  following	  day.	  Yevsyukov,	   who	   was	   also	   present	   at	   the	   meeting,	   recalled	   that	   this	   sounded	   like	   a	  “death	  sentence”	  for	  Neto.284	  Yevsyukov	  was	  not	  one	  of	  Neto’s	  greatest	  fans,	  but	  he	  had	  grown	  committed	  to	  the	  MPLA	  as	  an	  organization	  and	  decided	  to	  help.	  He	  explained:	  “I	  knew	  well	  who	  Holden	  Roberto	  was	  and	  understood	  even	  better	  that	  we	  had	  made	  a	  mistake,	  betraying	  our	  friends.”	  He	  advised	  Neto	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Communist	  Party,	  Alvaro	  Cunhal,	  who	  was	  well	  known	  and	  respected	  in	  Moscow.	  Neto	  did	  as	  Yevsyukov	  suggested,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  recognize	  the	  GRAE	  was	  reversed.285	  Yet	   another	   source	   of	   support	   for	   Neto	   came	   from	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin,	   who	  continued	   to	   monitor	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   Angolan	   liberation	   movements	   after	   the	  forced	  departure	  of	  the	  KGB’s	  rezidentura	  from	  Léopoldville	  in	  November	  1963.	  In	  late	  April	   1964,	   Holden	   Roberto	   formally	   admitted	   the	   MPLA’s	   splinter	   faction,	   led	   by	  Viriato	   da	   Cruz,	   to	   the	   FNLA,	   without	   any	   consultations	   with	   Savimbi.	   In	   one	   of	   his	  analytical	  briefs	   from	  June	  1964,	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin	  argued	  that	  Roberto’s	  decision	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  polarization	  of	   the	  Angolan	   liberation	  movement	  and	  had	  reduced	  the	  chances	  of	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  FNLA.	  Nazhestkin	  also	  argued	  that	   the	   alliance	   revealed	   that	   Viriato	   da	   Cruz	  was	  motivated	   by	   nothing	  more	   than	  personal	   ambitions.286	  Nazhestkin	   was	   proved	   right	   when	   Jonas	   Savimbi	   publicly	  resigned	  from	  the	  GRAE	  during	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  OAU	  heads	  of	  state	  in	  Cairo	  in	  July	  1964.	  	   The	   MPLA	   leadership	   also	   tried	   to	   convince	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   socialist	  countries	  that	  both	  Roberto	  and	  Savimbi	  were	  disingenuous.	  On	  27	  May,	  Miguel	  Baya,	  the	  MPLA’s	  representative	  in	  Cairo,	  spoke	  to	  Henry	  Eggebrecht,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  figures	  in	   the	   GDR	   Solidarity	   Committee	   responsible	   for	   maintaining	   contacts	   with	   the	  liberation	   movements	   in	   Cairo.	   Baya	   told	   Eggebrecht	   that	   his	   task	   was	   to	   clarify	   to	  everyone	  that	  Savimbi’s	  real	  mission	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  was	  to	  ensure	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  GRAE	  by	  the	  socialist	  countries,	  and	  that	  he	  had	  no	  intention	  of	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  establishing	  a	  common	  front	  with	  the	  MPLA.287	  The	  MPLA’s	  representative	  in	  Algeria,	  Luís	  de	  Almeida,	  argued	  that	  Roberto’s	  attempted	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  MPLA	  was	  merely	  a	  tactical	  tool,	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  FNLA	  from	  Simbas	  harassing	  the	  FNLA’s	  arms	  depots	  and	  supply	  bases	   in	   the	  Congo,	  as	  he	   told	   the	  Soviet	  chargé	  d'affaires	   in	  Algeria,	  Yuriy	  Belskiy.288	  Yet	   another	   twist	   in	   the	   Congolese	   Crisis	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   Soviet	  rapprochement	  with	  Holden	  Roberto	  by	  end	  of	  1964.	  This	  twist	  was	  the	  appointment	  of	  Moïse	  Tshombe	  as	  the	  new	  prime	  minister	  of	  the	  Congo	  in	  July.	  The	  former	  leader	  of	  the	   Katanga	   secessionists	   and	   one	   of	   the	   masterminds	   behind	   the	   assassination	   of	  Patrice	  Lumumba,	  Tshombe	  was	  a	  Soviet	  nemesis.	  On	  16	  December,	  Pravda	  published	  an	   article	   by	   Yevsyukov’s	   immediate	   superior,	   Veniamin	  Midtsev,	  who	   lashed	   out	   at	  Roberto	  for	  colluding	  with	  Tshombe	  in	  a	  military	  campaign	  against	  the	  Simbas,	  among	  other	  sins:	   “Rejection	  of	  armed	  struggle	  against	  Portuguese	  colonizers,	  unwillingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  genuine	  patriots	  united	  under	  the	  MPLA,	  attempts	  to	  please	  the	  opportunist	  Tshombe,	  who	   is	   intimately	   connected	  with	   the	   imperialists	   –	   all	   of	   this	  has	   undermined	   the	   prestige	   of	   Holden	   Roberto’s	   government-­‐in	   exile.”	   However,	  Midtsev	  expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  would	  cooperate	  with	  the	  MPLA.289	  Savimbi	   would	   not	   join	   the	   MPLA.	   Shortly	   after	   his	   resignation,	   Savimbi	  travelled	  to	  Brazzaville	  for	  talks	  with	  Neto,	  but	  left	  after	  a	  short	  stay.	  Two	  years	  later,	  Savimbi	  would	   establish	   the	   third	   rival	   liberation	  movement,	   the	  National	  Union	   for	  the	  Total	  Independence	  of	  Angola	  (UNITA).	  Savimbi	  argued	  that	  the	  reason	  he	  had	  not	  joined	   the	   MPLA	   in	   1964	   had	   been	   because	   he	   did	   not	   like	   what	   he	   had	   seen	   at	   a	  training	   camp	   in	  Dolisie:	   “There	  was	   no	   real	   fighting	   going	   on,	   and	  Daniel	   Chipenda	  was	   drinking	   too	  much	   and	   so	  were	   all	   his	  men.”290	  Lúcio	   Lara	   argued	   that	   the	   real	  reason	   Savimbi	   did	   not	   join	  was	   because	   he	   had	   not	   been	   satisfied	  with	   the	   post	   of	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  Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Relations,	  which	  Neto	  had	  offered	  him.291	  Whichever	  reason	  was	  true,	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  negotiations	  with	  Savimbi	  led	  to	  further	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  Angolan	  liberation	  movement.	  	  One	   of	   the	   senior	   advisers	   at	   the	   International	   Department,	   Karen	   Brutents,	  invoked	   the	   incident	   of	   Soviet	   near-­‐recognition	   of	   the	   GRAE	   as	   proof	   that	   Soviet	  attitudes	   towards	   the	   MPLA	   were	   defined	   mainly	   by	   practical	   considerations.292	  Of	  course,	   prospects	   for	  military	   struggle	  mattered,	   and	   so	   did	   the	   attitudes	   of	   African	  heads	   of	   state,	   especially	   those	  whom	   the	   Soviets	   considered	  potential	   or	   real	   allies.	  Still,	  ideology	  mattered	  greatly	  in	  the	  Soviet	  calculations,	  in	  ways	  that	  Brunets	  was	  not	  necessarily	   aware	   of	   because	   he	   did	   not	   actually	   engage	   with	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	  movements	   from	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies	   in	   the	   1960s.	   If	   Neto’s	   faction	   had	   not	  survived,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Soviets	  would	  have	  switched	  their	  support	  to	  Viriato	  da	  Cruz,	  who	  was	  well	  known	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Prague.	  Savimbi	  perhaps	  seemed	  to	  be	  an	  acceptable	   alternative	   to	   Roberto,	   as	   he	   flaunted	   his	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   credentials,	  connections	   with	   Portuguese	   communists,	   and	   willingness	   to	   compromise	   with	   the	  MPLA.	  What	  seems	  particularly	  important	  is	  how	  certain	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials,	  who	  had	   already	   become	   personally	   invested	   in	   the	   MPLA	   –	   Petr	   Yevsyukov	   and	   Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	   in	   this	   case	   –	   defended	   Neto	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   opportunistic	  decision	  to	  extend	  recognition	  to	  the	  GRAE,	  showing	  how	  personal	  relations	  translated	  into	   real	   policy	   outcomes.	   Although	   the	   MPLA	   was	   still	   just	   an	   annoyance	   for	   the	  Portuguese	   in	  Cabinda	   in	  1965,	   another	   theatre	  of	   operations	  had	   just	   opened	  up	   in	  Portugal’s	  second-­‐largest	  colony,	  Mozambique.	  	  	  
FRELIMO	  Launches	  Armed	  Struggle	  FRELIMO	   started	   preparations	   for	  military	   action	   in	   January	   1963,	  when	   the	  first	  group	  of	  young	  recruits	  left	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  for	  military	  training	  in	  Algeria.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  graduates	  of	  the	  training	  course	  was	  a	  27-­‐year-­‐old	  native	  of	  Zambezia	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   124	  province,	  Filipe	  Samuel	  Magaia.	  Having	  gone	   through	  military	   training	   in	  Algeria	  and	  then	  China,	  Magaia	  rose	  quickly	  to	  become	  the	  first	  chief	  of	  defense	  and	  security.	  The	  second	   group	  of	   graduates	  would	   include	   Samora	  Machel,	   the	   son	  of	   a	  Tsonga	   tribal	  chief	  from	  the	  southern	  Gaza	  province.	  Machel	  first	  saw	  Eduardo	  Mondlane	  during	  his	  1961	  tour	  of	  Mozambique,	  while	  Machel	  was	  working	  as	  a	  nurse	  in	  Lourenço	  Marques,	  after	  which	  he	  fled	  the	  capital	  to	  join	  FRELIMO.	  Once	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Machel	  decided	  to	   go	   into	  military	   training	   because,	   as	   he	   put	   it,	   “I	  was	   certain	   that	   the	   Portuguese	  would	   not	   give	   us	   independence	   and	   that	   without	   armed	   struggle	   the	   Portuguese	  would	  never	  agree	  to	  establish	  a	  dialogue	  with	  us.”293	  	  Tanganyika	   became	   increasingly	   important	   for	   FRELIMO	   as	   the	   leadership	  decided	   to	   prepare	   for	   armed	   struggle.	   Tanganyika’s	   first	   president,	   Julius	   Nyerere,	  was	  one	  of	   the	  key	  supporters	  of	  African	   liberation.	  Given	   the	  artificial	  nature	  of	   the	  border	   between	   northern	   Mozambique	   and	   Tanganyika,	   there	   were	   many	   cultural,	  ethnic,	   and	   linguistic	   connections	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   Many	   Tanganyikan	  politicians	   traced	   their	   ethnic	   origins	   to	   Mozambique	   or	   had	   even	   been	   born	   there.	  Nyerere	  was	  initially	  cautious	  about	  sheltering	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  as	  he	  openly	  expressed	  concern	  about	  retaliation	  from	  the	  Portuguese,	  yet	  he	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  One	  journalist	  who	  lived	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  wrote	  that	  once	  Nyerere	  had	  shown	  him	  a	  secret	  document,	  revealing	  the	  country’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  liberation	   struggle:	   “I	  was	   astounded;	   the	   amount	   ran	   into	  millions	   of	  US	  dollars.”294	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   also	   hosted	   the	   so-­‐called	   Liberation	   Committee,	   established	   by	   the	  Organization	   of	   African	   Union	   as	   a	   fund	   to	   provide	   assistance	   for	   African	   liberation	  movements.	   Its	   first	   chairman	   was	   Oskar	   Kambona,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   influential	  politicians	   in	  Tanganyika	  at	   that	   time.	  However,	   in	  1964,	  Nyerere’s	   regime	  was	   itself	  threatened	  by	  a	  series	  of	  events	  spurred	  by	  revolution	  in	  Zanzibar.	  	  The	  unrest	  in	  Zanzibar	  began	  on	  12	  January	  1964,	  when	  John	  Okello,	  a	  radical	  revolutionary	  originally	  from	  Uganda,	  overthrew	  the	  sultan	  of	  Zanzibar	  with	  the	  aim	  of	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   125	  breaking	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Arab	   minority	   on	   the	   island.	   Okello	   established	   a	  revolutionary	   council,	   naming	   the	   leader	  of	   the	  Afro-­‐Shirazi	  Party,	  Abeid	  Karume,	   as	  President.	   Abdallah	   Kassim	   Hanga,	   a	   graduate	   of	   Lumumba	   University	   in	   Moscow,	  became	   the	  vice	  president;	   Sheikh	  Abdurrahman	  Babu,	   the	   leader	  of	   the	   rival	  Umma	  Party,	   was	   appointed	   the	   foreign	   minister.	   Among	   the	   reasons	   for	   revolution	   was	  dissatisfaction	  of	  the	  African	  majority	  with	  domination	  by	  the	  Arab	  minority,	  leading	  to	  brutal	   reprisals	   against	   the	   Arabs	   and	   South	   Asians	   living	   on	   the	   island.	   The	   Soviet	  Union	   and	  China	   applauded	   revolution	   in	  Zanzibar,	   extended	  diplomatic	   recognition,	  and	   offered	   economic	   assistance.	   Zanzibar	   quickly	   became	   a	   Cold	  War	   playing	   field,	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  offering	  support	  for	  Hanga,	  the	  Chinese	  courting	  Babu,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  hoping	  to	  strengthen	  Nyerere,	  whom	  they	  considered	  a	  moderate.295	  The	   revolution	   in	   Zanzibar	   spurred	   anti-­‐government	   protests	   in	   Kenya,	  Uganda,	   and	   Tanganyika.	   On	   19	   January,	   soldiers	   in	   the	   Colito	   barracks	   of	   Dar	   es	  Salaam	  mutinied	   because	   they	  were	   angry	   about	   their	   low	   pay	   and	   the	   retention	   of	  European	  officers	   in	   top	  positions.	  Eventually,	   on	  24	   January,	  Nyerere	   sent	  a	  note	   to	  the	  British	  government	  asking	  for	  military	  assistance.	  A	  British	  force	  arrived	  the	  next	  day	   and	   bombed	   the	   barracks,	   successfully	   crushing	   the	   mutiny.296	  Convinced	   that	  events	  in	  Zanzibar	  and	  East	  Africa	  were	  linked,	  Nyerere	  exploited	  the	  power	  struggle	  that	  had	  emerged	  in	  Zanzibar’s	  Revolutionary	  Council	  to	  push	  for	  his	  long	  sought-­‐after	  project:	   unification	   of	   Tanganyika	   and	   Zanzibar.	   On	   24	   April,	   the	   agreement	   was	  signed,	   and	   the	   new	   state	   was	   christened	   the	   United	   Republic	   of	   Tanzania.	   While	  Karume	   remained	   president,	   with	   wide-­‐ranging	   powers,	   Nyerere	   invited	   Kassim	  Hanga	  and	  Babu	  to	  join	  the	  government	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  act	  of	  union	   strengthened	  Nyerere’s	   personal	   power	   as	   the	  main	  power	  broker	   behind	   the	  agreement.	  	  The	   instability	   facing	   Nyerere	   in	   early	   1964	   forced	   him	   to	   curb	   FRELIMO’s	  military	   preparations.	   For	   example,	   the	   authorities	   confiscated	   a	   consignment	   of	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   126	  Algerian	   weapons	   for	   FRELIMO	   and	   only	   released	   them	   in	   May.	   Eduardo	  Mondlane	  complained	  that	  this	  delay	  was	  damaging	  because	  he	  was	  increasingly	  under	  pressure	  from	  both	  his	   followers	  and	  critics	   to	  begin	   the	  armed	  struggle.297	  One	  of	  FRELIMO’s	  leading	  functionaries,	  Sérgio	  Vieira,	  recalled	  that	  attitudes	  towards	  FRELIMO	  differed	  among	   the	   Tanzanian	   ruling	   elite.	   “Some	   were	   dreaming	   about	   annexation	   of	   Cabo	  Delgado,	  dominated	  by	   the	  Makonde.	  Others,	   like	   the	   first	  vice-­‐president	  of	  Tanzania	  and	  president	  of	  Zanzibar,	  Sheikh	  Karume,	  condemned	  our	  non-­‐racist	  policy	  and	  our	  insistence	   that	   everybody	   could	   be	   integrated	   within	   our	   ranks.”	   Regardless,	   it	   was	  firm	   support	   from	   Nyerere	   that	   ultimately	   guaranteed	   FRELIMO	   a	   safe	   haven	   in	  Tanzania.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Karume,	  Nyerere	  always	  opposed	  the	  so-­‐called	  “black	  racism,”	  which	  manifested	  itself	  in	  different	  forms,	  from	  anti-­‐Arab	  riots	  in	  Zanzibar	  to	  calls	  for	  the	   “Africanization”	   of	   the	   army	   of	   Tanganyika	   during	   the	   1964	   uprising	   in	   Dar	   es	  Salaam.	  	  Vieira	  observed:	  “The	  dominant	  current	  was	  embodied	  by	  Nyerere,	  who	  gave	  us	  his	  support	  and	  never	  wanted	  a	  millimeter	  of	  Mozambican	  land.”298	  	  It	  was	   under	   these	   circumstances	   that	   Eduardo	  Mondlane	   and	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  travelled	  to	  Moscow	  in	  May	  1964.	  The	  content	  of	  their	  talks	  with	  Soviet	  cadres	  in	   Moscow	   is	   not	   available,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   they	   even	   wanted	   to	   obtain	  Soviet	   arms,	   given	   the	   complicated	   situation	   in	   Tanzania.	   The	   Soviets	   agreed	   to	  provide	   some	   humanitarian	   assistance	   and	   allocated	   forty	   placements	   for	   FRELIMO	  military	   cadres.299 	  When	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos	   travelled	   to	   Prague	   after	   visiting	  Moscow,	   he	   asked	   for	   scholarships	   and	   humanitarian,	   material,	   and	   financial	  assistance,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   ask	   for	   arms	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   FRELIMO	   had	   not	   yet	  decided	  on	   their	   specific	   requirements	  and	  had	  not	  yet	   figured	  out	  how	   to	   transport	  weaponry	  to	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.300	  While	  FRELIMO’s	  submitted	  by	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  in	  May	   were	   quite	   modest,	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Interior	   Ministry	   denied	   them,	   citing	   the	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  Vieira,	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  p.	  209.	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  is	  clear	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  Mondlane’s	  aid	  request,	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  p.	  1,	  d.	  1.	  300	  Vaclavic,	  Prague,	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   127	  internal	  divisions	  and	  general	  inactivity	  of	  FRELIMO.301	  While	  FRELIMO	  had	  very	  little	  means	  to	  wage	  war	  and	  only	  a	  few	  recruits,	  Mondlane	  was	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  to	  launch	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  	  There	  were	  several	   reasons	   for	   this.	   In	   July,	  Portuguese	  president	  Americo	  R.	  Tomas	  made	  a	  two-­‐week	  tour	  of	  Mozambique,	  greeted	  by	  large	  crowds	  of	  Africans	  and	  Europeans,	  who	  often	  tried	  to	  break	  police	  cordons	  to	  kiss	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  figure	  in	  full	  military	  uniform.	  Official	  sources	  reported	  that	  the	  trip	  revealed	  that	  peace,	  progress,	  and	  racial	  harmony	  existed	  in	  Mozambique.302	  Any	  further	  delay	  in	  the	  armed	  struggle	  threatened	   a	   decline	   in	   FRELIMO’s	   credibility	   and	   gave	   credence	   to	   its	   rivals.	   This	  threat	  materialized	   in	  August	  1964,	  when	  armed	  dissidents	   linked	   to	   the	   rival	  group	  MANU	   moved	   into	   Cabo	   Delgado	   and	   killed	   a	   Dutch	   missionary,	   Father	   Daniel	  Boormans,	   who	   was	   a	   popular	   figure	   in	   the	   area.	   One	   of	   those	   who	   reported	   these	  incidents	  in	  the	  area	  was	  Alberto	  Chipande.	  “Armed	  bandits”	  would	  apparently	  pillage	  Indian	   shops,	   and	   the	  Portuguese	  would	   tell	   the	  population	   it	  was	  FRELIMO’s	  doing.	  “This	  held	  us	  back,”	  recalled	  Chipande.303	  With	  FRELIMO’s	  credibility	  under	  threat,	  the	  leadership	  decided	  to	  act.	  On	   25	   September	   1964,	   FRELIMO	   launched	   its	   liberation	   struggle,	   when	   a	  dozen	  men	   led	  by	  Alberto	  Chipande	  attacked	  a	  Portuguese	  post	   in	   the	   small	   town	  of	  Chai,	  Cabo	  Delgado	  province.	  This	  was	  not	  actually	   the	   first	  assault,	  but	   it	   is	   the	  only	  one	  of	  which	  a	  written	  record,	  by	  Chipande	  himself,	  has	  survived.	  Chipande	  wrote:	  The	  guard	   came	  and	   stationed	  himself	   at	   the	  door	  of	   the	  house	  of	   the	   chefe	  do	  posto,	  seated	  on	  a	  chair.	  He	  was	  white.	  I	  approached	  the	  guard	  to	  attack	  him.	  My	  gunshot	   would	   be	   the	   signal	   to	   the	   other	   comrades	   to	   attack.	   The	   attack	   took	  place	  at	  21	  hours.	  When	  he	  heard	  the	  shots,	  the	  chefe	  do	  posto	  opened	  the	  door	  and	  came	  out	  –	  he	  was	  shot	  and	  killed.	  Apart	  from	  him,	  six	  other	  Portuguese	  were	  killed	  in	  the	  first	  attack.	  The	  explanation	  given	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  authorities	  was	  ‘death	  by	  misadventure.’	  We	  withdrew.	  On	  the	  following	  day	  we	  were	  pursued	  by	  some	  troops	  –	  but	  that	  time	  we	  were	  far	  away,	  and	  they	  failed	  to	  find	  us.304	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   H.	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   Revolution	   and	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   128	  Why	  did	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Czechoslovakia,	  the	  GDR,	  and	  Bulgaria	  provide	  assistance	  to	  FRELIMO	  in	  1964?	  As	  Eduardo	  Mondlane	  told	  the	  American	  Embassy	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  the	   Soviets	   were	   prepared	   to	   accept	   his	   relationship	   with	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	  deterrent	   to	  China’s	  presence	   in	  Mozambique.305	  It	   is	   true	   that	   the	  Soviets	  had,	   since	  the	  early	  1960s,	  become	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  the	  Chinese	  challenge	  to	  Soviet	  leadership	   of	   the	   international	   communist	  movement.306	  Soviet	   competition	  with	   the	  Chinese	   was	   particularly	   active	   in	   Zanzibar,	   where	   the	   Soviets	   established	   close	  contacts	  with	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Umma	  Party,	  Abdurrahman	  Babu,	  after	  Julius	  Nyerere	  established	   a	   close	   economic	   relationship	   with	   the	   Chinese	   leadership	   in	   1965.307	  Moscow	  was	  also	  concerned	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  West	  in	  East	  Africa.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	  British	  intervention	  in	  early	  1964	  that	  ultimately	  put	  down	  a	  revolutionary	  uprising	  in	  East	  Africa,	  spurred	  by	  revolution	  in	  Zanzibar.	  The	  establishment	  of	  Tanzania	  in	  April	  was	  a	  highly	  negative	  development	  from	  the	  Soviet	  point	  of	  view,	  because	  it	  meant	  that	  revolution	  in	  Zanzibar	  would	  be	  subsumed	  into	  the	  more	  conservative	  regime	  of	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  as	  Petr	  Manchkha,	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  Africa	  section	  at	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department,	  told	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  on	  13	  October	  1964.308	  Moreover,	  the	  Soviets	  trusted	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  as	  a	  guarantor	  that	   FRELIMO	   would	   follow	   a	   “progressive	   path,”	   as	   Ambassador	   Timoshchenko	  implied	  when,	  in	  November	  1963,	  he	  advised	  Dmitri	  Dolidze	  to	  support	  the	  movement	  because	  there	  were	  “healthy	  progressive	  forces”	  in	  the	  leadership.309	  	  
Soviet	  Policy	  in	  Transition,	  1964-­‐65	  By	   the	   end	   of	   1964,	   the	   Soviets	   were	   increasingly	   under	   pressure	   to	   deliver	  arms	   to	   the	   liberation	   movements.	   Nikita	   Khrushchev	   personally	   pledged	   that	   the	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  Policy	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  in	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  Cold	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  (2009).	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  In	   1965,	   Tanzania	   and	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China	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   a	   Treaty	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   Friendship.	   China	   agreed	   to	   build	   the	  “Tanzam”	   railway,	   connecting	   Zambia	   and	  Tanzania	   and	   allocated	   generous	   loans	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   training	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  Tanzanian	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  Transcript	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  the	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  13	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  op.1,	  d.155.	  309	  Timoshchenko	  (USSR	  ambassador	  in	  Tanganyika)	  to	  Dolidze	  (Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Secretary),	  15	  November	  1963,	  GARF,	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  op.2,	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   129	  Soviet	   Union	   would	   supply	   arms	   to	   the	   liberation	   movements	   during	   a	   special	  reception	  of	  delegates	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  Moscow	  for	  the	  World	  Forum	  for	  Solidarity	  of	   Youth	   and	   Students	   in	   the	   Struggle	   for	   National	   Independence	   and	   Peace	   in	  September.310	  On	  13	  October	  1964,	  speaking	  at	   the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	   Deputy	   Chairman	   Vladimir	   Tereshkin	   informed	   his	   colleagues	   that	   the	  cadres	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  Committee	  had	  had	  many	  conversations	  with	  the	  delegates	  at	  the	  Congress,	   and	   that	  many	  had	  demanded	  material	   assistance	   in	  addition	   to	  moral	  support.	   Therefore,	   the	   Solidarity	   Committee	   submitted	   several	   proposals	   to	   the	   CC	  CPSU	  that	  would	  meet	  some	  of	  those	  demands,	  according	  to	  Tereshkin.311	  	  That	  same	  day,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  landed	  at	  the	  Vnukovo-­‐2	  airport	  in	  Moscow	  with	  one	  of	  his	  closest	  associates,	  Anastas	  Mikoyan.	  Khrushchev	  came	  to	  Moscow	  from	  his	   summerhouse	   at	   Pitsunda,	   to	   which	   he	   had	   travelled	   for	   a	   short	   break	   in	  anticipation	   of	   the	   forthcoming	   plenum	   of	   the	   Politburo.	   The	   previous	   evening,	  Khrushchev	  had	   received	   a	   call	   from	  Leonid	   Ilyich	  Brezhnev,	   one	   of	   the	  most	   senior	  party	  members.	  Brezhnev	  had	   told	  him	   that	   the	  members	  of	   the	  CC	  CPSU	  Presidium	  had	   decided	   to	   hold	   a	   special	   meeting	   on	   agricultural	   policy	   the	   following	   day,	   and	  Khrushchev	   grudgingly	   agreed	   to	   attend.	   As	   soon	   as	   Khrushchev	   entered	   the	  Presidium	   meeting	   room	   in	   the	   Kremlin,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   the	   topic	   of	   the	  meeting	   was	   not	   agricultural	   policy,	   but	   Khrushchev	   himself.	   Brezhnev	   spoke	   first,	  accusing	   Khrushchev	   of	   treating	   his	   colleagues	   rudely	   and	   of	   making	   high-­‐risk	  decisions	   without	   consulting	   them.	   Then	   each	   of	   the	   senior	   party	   members	   spoke,	  pointing	  out	  Khrushchev’s	  mistakes	  in	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  criticizing	  him	  for	  ignoring	   the	   Presidium	   and	   instituting	   his	   own	   cult	   of	   personality,	   and	   calling	   on	  Khrushchev	  to	  retire.	  A	  palace	  coup,	  which	  had	  been	  in	  the	  making	  for	  a	  few	  months,	  concluded	   later	   that	  evening	  when	  Khrushchev	  called	  Mikoyan,	  saying	   that	  he	  would	  not	  put	  up	  a	  fight	  and	  would	  peacefully	  retire.312	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   130	  Khrushchev’s	   removal	   indicated	   a	   conservative	   turn	   in	   the	   Kremlin,	   which	   a	  recently	  declassified	  document	  known	  as	   “Polyanskiy’s	   report”	  confirms.	   It	  describes	  in	   some	   detail	   all	   Khrushchev’s	   mistakes.313	  One	   of	   Khrushchev’s	   protégés,	   Vladimir	  Semichastnyi,	  who	  had	  replaced	  his	  close	  friend	  Alexander	  Shelepin	  as	  KGB	  Chairman	  in	   1961,	   admitted	   much	   later	   that	   the	   report	   was	   actually	   prepared	   by	   economists	  working	   for	   his	   department,	   just	   in	   case	   Khrushchev	   tried	   to	   resist	   involuntary	  retirement.	  Given	   that	   this	  did	  not	  happen,	   the	  report	  was	  actually	  never	  read	  at	   the	  Presidium.314	  Nevertheless,	  the	  unpublished	  report	   indicates	  the	  mood	  that	  took	  over	  the	  Presidium	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  resignation.	  	  Polyanskiy’s	  report	  criticized	  Khrushchev	  for	  singling	  out	  the	  US	  as	  a	  guarantor	  of	  world	  peace	  and	  for	  strained	  relations	  with	  Chairman	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Fidel	  Castro,	  and	  the	  Romanian	  leader	  Georgiy	  Dej.	  It	  pointed	  out	  that	  Khrushchev’s	  policy	  in	  Africa	  was	  not	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  report	  stated	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	  countries	  reaped	  the	  benefits	  of	  aid	  but	  then	  turned	  away	  from	  Moscow,	  as	  when	  the	  “so-­‐called	  socialist	  Sékou	  Touré”	  did	  not	  even	  allow	  Soviet	  planes	  to	  land	  at	  Conakry	  on	   their	  way	   to	  Cuba.	  The	  solution	   therefore	  was	   for	  Soviet	   leaders	   to	  be	  more	   careful	   when	   selecting	   regional	   allies.	   “This	   happens	   because	   we	   do	   not	  differentiate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   class	   or	   political	   affiliation,	   we	   give	   aid	   and	   credit	   to	  countries	   whose	   leaders	   can	   easily	   distinguish	   a	   ruble	   from	   a	   fig	   but	   who	   do	   not	  discern	  a	  communist	   from	  a	   traitor,	  who	   follow	  the	   line	  of	   the	   imperialist	  countries,”	  the	   report	   contended.315	  While	   the	   report	   did	   not	   offer	   any	   clear	   guidelines	   for	  remedying	   the	  situation,	   it	   reflected	   that	   the	  people	  who	  took	  over	   from	  Khrushchev	  were	  not	  as	  immediately	  concerned	  with	  détente	  with	  the	  US	  and	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  stick	  to	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  dogma,	  if	  that	  meant	  preserving	  the	  status	  and	  prestige	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  313	  This	   refers	   to	   the	   member	   of	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Presidium	   Dmitriy	   Stepanovich	   Polyanskiy,	   who	   was	   responsible	   for	  agricultural	  policy.	  	  314	  Rudolf	  Pikhoya,	  Moskva,	  Kreml',	  Vlast:	  40	  Let	  posle	  Voyny,	  1945-­‐1985.	  Noveyshaya	  Istoriya.	  Osobyi	  Vzglyad	  (Moscow:	  Rus'-­‐Olimp,	  AST,	  2007),	  p.	  469.	  315	  "Doklad	  Prezidiuma	  TsK	  KPSS	  na	  Oktyabr'skom	  Plenume	  TsK	  KPSS	  (Variant),"	  undated,	  retrieved	   from	  http://on-­‐island.net/History/1964.htm.	   Originally	   published	   in	   Vestnik	   Arkhiva	   Presidenta	   Rossiyskoi	   Federatsii	   2	   (1995):	  102-­‐125.	  
	   131	  The	  newly	  elected	  CC	  CPSU	  First	  Secretary,	  Leonid	  Brezhnev,	  and	  the	  collective	  leadership	  could	  agree	  about	  the	  need	  to	  restore	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  and	  above	  all	   to	  mend	   the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  alliance.	  One	  of	   the	   first	   initiatives	  of	   the	  new	   leadership	  was	   to	   invite	   Chinese	   premier	   Zhou	   Enlai	   for	   talks	   in	   the	   Kremlin.	   However,	  negotiations	   failed	   rather	   marvelously	   when	   Soviet	   Minister	   of	   Defense	   Rodion	  Malinovsky	   advised	   Zhou	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   Mao.	   In	   early	   1965,	   Soviet	   premier	   Aleksey	  Kosygin	  travelled	  to	  Beijing,	  where	  he	  tried	  to	  convince	  Mao	  to	  forge	  a	  joint	  strategy	  of	  assistance	   to	   North	   Vietnam.	   As	   the	   United	   States	   intensified	   its	   offensive	   against	  North	  Vietnam	  in	  support	  of	  the	  south,	  the	  Soviets	  also	  stepped	  up	  their	  support,	  but	  Mao	  was	  not	  responsive.	  Kosygin	  failed	  to	  strike	  a	  deal	  on	  Vietnam,	  and	  Chinese	  anti-­‐Soviet	  propaganda	  intensified	  in	  1965.316	  	  The	   Chinese	   challenge	   to	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   role	   in	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	   People’s	  Solidarity	   Organization	   (AAPSO)	   dominated	   the	   proceedings	   of	   the	   Presidium	   of	   the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  on	  5	  February	  1965.	  The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Mirzo	  Tursun-­‐Zade,	  shared	  his	  thoughts	  about	  the	  message	  that	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	   would	   have	   to	   convey	   to	   third-­‐world	   revolutionaries	   at	   the	   forthcoming	  conference	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  People’s	  Solidarity	  Organization	  (AAPSO),	  scheduled	  to	  be	  held	   in	   Winneba,	   Ghana:	   “These	   people	   want	   to	   fight	   against	   imperialism,	   neo-­‐colonialism,	  and	  we	  thus	  have	  to	  start	  from	  the	  will	  of	  those	  people,	  of	  course	  bearing	  in	  mind	   the	  need	   to	   fight	   for	  peace,	  disarmament,	   and	  all	   other	   issues	   related	   to	   the	  peace	  campaign.”317	  The	  deputy	  chairman,	  Vladimir	  Tereshkin,	  agreed	  that	   the	  Soviet	  delegation	  should	  not	  raise	  questions	  that	  contradicted	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  countries.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  challenges,	  stated	  Tereshkin,	  was	  the	  Chinese,	  who	  claimed	  that	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   did	   not	   have	   the	   will	   to	   lead	   the	   struggle	   against	  colonialism.318	  The	  AAPSO	  Conference	  in	  Winneba	  in	  May	  1965	  turned	  out	  quite	  sour	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   132	  for	  the	  Soviets:	  the	  delegates	  rejected	  the	  idea	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence	  as	  meaningless	  and	  decided	  to	  hold	  the	  next	  meeting	  in	  Beijing.319	  	  The	   Chinese	   were	   not	   the	   only	   ones	   to	   challenge	   Soviet	   supremacy	   of	   the	  international	   communist	   movement.	   Cuba’s	   famous	   revolutionary	   leader	   Ernesto	  “Che”	  Guevara	  also	  publicly	  challenged	  Soviet	  policy	   in	  Africa	  when	  he	  arrived	  at	   the	  Economic	   Seminar	   organized	   by	   AAPSO	   in	   Algiers	   in	   February	   1965.	   Che	   publicly	  condemned	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   exploitative	   trade	   agreements	   with	   the	   African	  countries,	   warning,	   “The	   socialist	   countries	   have	   the	  moral	   duty	   of	   liquidating	   their	  tacit	  complicity	  with	  the	  exploiting	  countries	  of	  the	  West.”320	  Che	  merely	  repeated	  the	  charges	   leveled	   against	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   by	   those	  African	   leaders	  who,	   like	  Guinea’s	  Sékou	  Touré,	  were	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  Soviet	  aid.	  This,	  of	  course,	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  new	  leadership’s	  criticism	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  policy	  in	  Africa,	  as	  outlined	  in	  Polyanskiy’s	   report.	  Not	   only	  was	   Soviet	   trade	  with	  Africa	  not	  particularly	  beneficial	  for	  the	  Soviet	  economy,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  outright	  damaging	  to	  Soviet	  prestige.	  	  On	  21	  April	  1965,	  Edmund	  Pszczolkowski,	  the	  Polish	  ambassador	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  Vasiliy	  Solodovnikov,	  the	  newly	  appointed	  director	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Institute	  of	  African	   Studies,	   met	   to	   discuss	   this	   problem.	   Solodovnikov	   had	   studied	   at	   the	  Mechanics	  Department	  of	  the	  Samara	  Industrial	  Institute	  and	  the	  prestigious	  Academy	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  in	  Moscow,	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  US	  as	  an	  employee	  of	  the	  Soviet	  “Amtorg”	  Trading	   Corporation	   from	   1947	   and	   1949,	   and	   had	   served	   as	   deputy	   to	   Nikolai	  Fedorenko,	  the	  Soviet	  representative	  at	  the	  UN,	  before	  replacing	  the	  terminally	  ill	  Ivan	  Potekhin	   as	   director	   of	   the	   Institute	   of	   African	   Studies.321	  Unlike	   his	   predecessor,	  Solodovnikov	  was	  not	   an	  Africanist	   by	   training,	   but	   he	  was	   attuned	   to	   the	   economic	  problems	  of	  developing	  countries	  and	  had	  good	  contacts	  at	  various	  research	  institutes	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry.	  He	  was	  thus	  put	  in	  charge	  of	  imagining	  a	  new	  Soviet	  policy	  approach	  to	  Africa.	  “Countries	  of	  our	  camp	  should	  seek	  new	  ways	  of	  developing	  trade	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   133	  relations,	   new	   ways	   of	   economic	   and	   technical	   assistance	   for	   Africa,”	   argued	  Solodovnikov,	   “because	   our	   work	   in	   this	   area	   has	   been	   sharply	   criticized	   by	   our	  African	   partners.”	   Thus	   he	   advised	   that	   the	   socialist	   countries	   reconsider	   their	  recommendation	  to	  the	  African	  countries	  to	  nationalize	  their	  industries,	  because	  they	  were	  not	  ready.	  He	  recommended	  that	  socialist	  countries	  come	  up	  with	  new	  terms	  of	  trade	  that	  could	  benefit	  both	  sides.322	  What	  emerges	  from	  these	  rather	  vague	  discussions	  of	  Soviet	  policy	  in	  Africa	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  socialist	  countries	  should	  be	  more	  selective	  in	  choosing	  their	  partners,	  in	   direct	   reaction	   to	  Khrushchev’s	   policy	   of	   unilaterally	   allocating	   funds	   for	   building	  socialism	  in	  countries	  that	  were	  not	  predisposed	  towards	  it.	  However,	  support	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements	  was	  a	  whole	  different	  matter.	  In	  fact,	   it	  went	  to	  the	  core	  of	  the	  new	  leadership’s	  attempt	  to	  reinforce	  the	   image	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  the	   leaders	  of	  the	  international	  communist	  movement.	  It	  was	  a	  response	  to	  accusations	  from	  the	  left	  –	   specifically,	   the	   Cubans	   and	   the	   Chinese	   –	   but	   it	   was	   even	  more	   so	   a	   response	   to	  increasing	   pressure	   from	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements	   themselves,	   who	  desperately	   needed	   military	   means	   to	   wage	   the	   armed	   struggle.	   That	   is	   why	   this	  emphasis	  on	  liberation	  movements	  was	  immediately	  put	  into	  practice	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  MPLA	   and	   the	   PAIGC,	   but	   not	   FRELIMO,	   which	   was	   still	   considered	   to	   be	   ‘pro-­‐American’	   because	   of	   Eduardo	   Mondlane’s	   background	   and	   his	   connections	   in	  Washington.	  	  
The	  Resurgence	  of	  the	  MPLA	  In	  September	  1964,	  Neto	  toured	  the	  socialist	  countries	   to	  obtain	  resources	  to	  launch	   military	   operations	   in	   the	   exclave	   of	   Cabinda,	   the	   only	   portion	   of	   Angola’s	  territory	   bordering	   on	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	   which	   had	   become	   the	   new	   base	   for	   the	  MPLA.	  Most	  probably,	  Neto’s	  visit	   in	  September	  coincided	  with	   the	  World	  Forum	   for	  Solidarity	  of	  Youth	  and	  Students	  in	  the	  Struggle	  for	  National	  Independence	  and	  Peace	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  Moscow,	   21	   April	   1965,	   "Notatka	   z	   rozmowy	  Tow.	   Ambasadora	   E.	   Pszczolkowskiego	   i	   Radcy	  W.Paszkowskiego	   z	  dyrektorem	   Instytutu	   Afryki	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   Nauk	   ZSRR	   tow.	   W.G.	   Solodownikowem,"	   Archiwum	   Ministerstwa	   Spraw	  Zagranicznych	  (hereafter	  AMSZ),	  58.70.W1.	  
	   134	  held	  in	  Moscow,	  at	  which	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  affirmed	  the	  Soviet	  commitment	  to	  supply	  arms	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements.323	  In	   1965,	   the	   Soviets	   provided	   heavy	  weaponry	  and	   $100,000	   to	   the	   MPLA,	   doubling	   the	   money	   allocated	   in	   1963.324	  Neto’s	   trip	   to	  Sofia	  was	   also	   successful:	   the	   Politburo	   of	   the	  Bulgarian	  Communist	   Party	   agreed	   to	  provide	  a	  shipment	  of	  heavy	  weapons	  worth	  10,000	  leva	  and	  allocated	  10	  placements	  for	  military	  training	  and	  three	  scholarships	  for	  a	  three-­‐year	  course	  at	  the	  Higher	  Party	  School	  in	  Sofia.325	  A	  sizable	  aid	  package	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Bulgaria	  indicated	  a	  positive	  reversal	  of	  fortunes	  for	  the	  MPLA.	  	  Czechoslovakia	  was	   the	  only	   exception.	  On	  13	  November	  1964,	  Czechoslovak	  Foreign	   Minister	   Václav	   David	   wrote	   to	   Antonín	   Novotný,	   outlining	   Czechoslovak	  policy	   towards	   the	  Angolan	   liberation	  movement.	  David	  admitted	   that	   the	  MPLA	  had	  rekindled	   its	   activism	   in	   the	   previous	   year,	   while	   Holden	   Roberto’s	   power	   was	   in	  decline.	   David	   wrote	   that	   Tshombe’s	   appointment	   had	   weakened	   Roberto	   and	   that	  many	  African	   leaders	  had	  been	  switching	   their	   support	   to	  Neto	  because	  of	  Roberto’s	  connection	   with	   Tshombe.	   The	   foreign	   minister	   argued	   against	   renewing	   regular	  financial	  aid.	  Instead,	  he	  recommended	  that	  Prague	  dispatch	  humanitarian	  aid	  via	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Solidarity	  Committee	  and	  hand	  over	  a	  one-­‐time	  cash	  amount	  of	  $3,000	  as	  compensation	  for	  the	  gap	  in	  payments.326	  On	  7	  February,	  Luiz	  de	  Azevedo	  arrived	  in	  Prague	  to	  convince	  the	  Czechoslovak	  leadership	   that	   supporting	   the	  MPLA	  would	  be	  worthwhile.	  Azevedo	  argued	   that	   the	  MPLA	  had	  made	   substantial	   progress	   in	  Cabinda,	  where	   they	   controlled	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	   territory.	   Although	   they	  were	   already	   expecting	   to	   receive	   the	   first	   shipment	   of	  heavy	  weaponry	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  “force	  the	  Portuguese	  out	  of	  the	  barracks,”	  they	   were	   still	   short	   on	   funds	   for	   “700	   combatants	   operating	   in	   Cabinda”	   and	   on	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  Friedman,	  "Soviet	  Policy	  in	  the	  Developing	  World	  "	  p.	  266.	  324	  RGANI,	  f.	  89,	  inv.	  38,	  d.	  8	  325	  Report	  on	  Agostinho	  Neto's	  visit	  to	  Sofia,	  18	  September	  1964,	  TsDA,	  f.1b,	  op.51,	  a.e.23;	  Dimo	  Dichev	  to	  Ivan	  Bashev,	  TsDa,	  31	  December	  1964,	  f.	  1b	  op.	  51,	  a.e.	  23.	  The	  shipment	  left	  for	  Ghana	  on	  26	  December.	   	  It	  contained	  six	  cases	  of	  200	  “Mannlicher”	  rifles	  and	  200	  ‘Suomi”	  submachine	  guns	  with	  ammunition.	  	  326	  David	   (Foreign	   Minister,	   Czechoslovakia)	   to	   	   Novotny	   (General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   CC	   CPC),	   13	   November	   1964,	  Národní	  Archiv,	  KSČ-­‐ÚV-­‐ANII,	  č.	  f.	  1261/0/44,	  inv.	  č.	  75,	  ka.	  71.	  
	   135	  weapons,	   food,	   and	   military	   equipment.	   Azevedo	   thus	   asked	   for	   30,000	   convertible	  Czech	  crowns.327	  	  In	  June,	  the	  MPLA’s	  Secretary	  for	  Security	  Teles	  “Iko”	  Carreira	  again	  asked	  for	  Czechoslovak	  aid	  when	  he	  came	  to	  Prague	  for	  medical	  treatment.328	  Carreira	  had	  been	  close	  to	  the	  Czechoslovak	  intelligence	  agency	  since	  1963,	  when	  he	  had	  first	  travelled	  to	  Prague	  for	  three	  weeks	  of	  training	  in	  security	  matters,	  including	  learning	  how	  to	  write	  cryptography	  and	  ensure	  personal	   security.	  At	   the	  end	  of	  his	   stay	   in	  Czechoslovakia,	  Carreira	  had	  suggested	  working	  together	  with	  Czechoslovak	  intelligence.	  Carreira,	  or,	  as	   the	  StB	  had	  nicknamed	  him,	   agent	   “KONIK,”	  would	  pass	   along	   information	   “about	  the	   Angolan	   national	   liberation	   movement,	   disagreements	   within	   the	   MPLA	   and	  particular	  personalities,”	  according	  to	  the	  StB	  report	  of	  1967.	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  MPLA	  had	   been	   forced	   to	   relocate	   its	   headquarters	   from	  Léopoldville	   to	  Brazzaville,	  where	  Czechoslovakia	  did	  not	  have	  a	  rezidentura,	  Carreira’s	  usefulness	  was	  somewhat	  limited. 329 	  While	   Czechoslovakia	   was	   increasingly	   selective	   about	   its	   foreign	  engagements,	   the	   Soviets	   became	   increasingly	   involved	  with	   the	  MPLA,	   not	   only	   by	  shipping	  arms	  but	  also	  by	  organizing	  a	  press	  campaign	   to	  showcase	   the	  successes	  of	  the	  liberation	  struggle	  in	  Cabinda.	  	  The	   MPLA	   first	   launched	   its	   military	   campaign	   in	   Cabinda	   in	   1964,	   but	   the	  campaign	  did	  not	  take	  off	  until	  1965.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  campaign's	  advancement	  was	  a	  rather	  significant	   influx	  of	  Cuban	   instructors	  resulting	   from	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  and	  Che	  Guevara,	  who	  had	  stopped	  in	  Brazzaville	  during	  his	  tour	  of	   Africa	   in	   January	   1965.330	  In	   May	   1965,	   the	   first	   nine	   Cuban	   advisers	   arrived	   in	  Brazzaville,	  led	  by	  Rafael	  Moracén	  Limonta.	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  months,	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  Cubans	  crossed	  the	  Mayombe	  jungle	   into	  Cabinda,	  engaging	  in	  small	  clashes	  with	  the	  Portuguese	  patrols.331	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  Algiers	  to	  Prague,	  21	  January	  1965,	  AMZV,	  TO-­‐tajné,	  IV/6,	  sign.	  274/111.	  328	  Meeting	  between	  Luiz	  Azavedo	  and	  the	  Czechoslovak	  solidarity	  committee,	  8th	  February	  1965,	  AMFA,	  TO-­‐T,	   IV/6,	  Sign.	  274.	  329	  Prague	  (first	  directorate,	  4th	  department),	  7	  January	  1966,	  "Vyhodnoceni:	  DS	  Konik,"	  ABS,	  11611/114.	  330	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  83.	  331	  George	   Edward	   George,	  The	   Cuban	   Intervention	   in	   Angola,	   1965-­‐1991:	   from	  Che	  Guevara	   to	   Cuito	   Cuanavale.	   Cass	  Military	  Studies	  (London:	  Frank	  Cass,	  2005),	  p.	  29.	  
	   136	  During	  this	  time,	  Soviet	  journalists	  started	  venturing	  into	  Angola,	  accompanied	  by	   the	  MPLA.	   The	   first	  was	  Pravda	   journalist	  Mikhail	   Domogatskikh,	  who	  wrote	   the	  first	   series	   of	   articles	   published	   in	   the	   Soviet	   press	   by	   a	   journalist	   reporting	   from	   a	  ‘real’	   theatre	   of	   anti-­‐colonial	   war.	   The	   long	   series,	   titled	   “Flame	   over	   Angola,”	   was	  published	  in	  Pravda	  between	  May	  and	  June	  1965	  and	  was	  broadcast	  in	  Portuguese	  for	  African	   consumption.	  Domogatskikh	  described	   journeying	   to	   the	   liberated	   areas	   and	  meeting	   the	   combatants,	   and	   reported	   their	   motivations	   for	   joining	   the	   guerrilla	  struggle,	   first	   battlefield	   experiences,	   and	   hopes	   for	   the	   future.	   In	   one	   emotional	  passage,	  Domogatskikh	  described	  speaking	  at	  a	  rally	  of	  guerrilla	  commanders	  who	  had	  just	  finished	  a	  course	  of	  political	  instruction	  at	  one	  of	  the	  Centers.	  He	  writes:	  I	   started	   talking	   about	   how	   much	   our	   people	   are	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	  national	  liberation	  struggle,	  how	  much	  they	  are	  following	  the	  wars	  in	  Angola,	  Mozambique,	  and	  ‘Portuguese’	  Guinea:	  ‘The	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  always	  been	  and	  will	   remain	  with	   you,	   dear	   comrades.’	   Everybody	   jumped	   from	   seats.	  Hands	  clutching	  machine	  guns	  went	  up:	  ‘Vive	  Union	  Soviétique!	  Vive	  Moscou!’332	  	  Tomas	   Kolesnichenko	   became	   the	   second	   Soviet	   journalist	   to	   travel	   to	   Angola.	  Kolesnichenko,	   who	   travelled	   to	   Cabinda	   with	   the	   MPLA,	   would	   become	   one	   of	  
Pravda’s	  main	   foreign	  correspondents,	  known	  for	  his	   lively	  writing	  style	  and	  flair	   for	  adventure.	   The	   account	   of	   his	   trip,	   published	   in	   a	   series	   of	   articles	   in	   Pravda	   titled	  “Letters	   from	  Angola”	   in	   early	   1966,	  was	   in	  many	  ways	   similar	   to	   his	   predecessor’s.	  This	  time,	  Neto	  and	  Hoji	  Ya	  Henda,	  the	  MPLA’s	  commander	  in	  Cabinda,	  served	  as	  the	  guides.	  Ya	  Henda	  told	  Kolesnichenko	  that	  the	  MPLA	  forces	  were	  regularly	  engaged	  in	  fighting	   the	  Portuguese,	  who	  rarely	  ventured	  out	  of	   their	  posts	   for	   fear	  of	  ambushes.	  Neto	   apparently	   told	  Kolesnichenko	   that	   the	  MPLA	  had	   formed	  many	   committees	   in	  the	  liberated	  areas	  and	  that	  membership	  continued	  to	  grow	  every	  day.	  333	  The	  MPLA	  thus	  emerged	  as	  an	  efficient	  guerrilla	  movement	  with	  wide	  popular	  support.	  In	  the	  last	  article	  of	  the	  series,	  Kolesnichenko	  placed	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  MPLA	  within	   the	   international	   context.	   In	   Angola,	   the	   MPLA	   was	   up	   against	   not	   only	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  Mikhail	  Domogatskikh,	   "Plamya	  Nad	  Angoloy,"	  16	   June,	  1965;	   ibid;	  Mikhail	  Domogatskikh,	   "Plamya	  Nad	  Angoloy,"	  
Pravda,	  31	  May,	  1965;	  Mikhail	  Domogatskikh,	  "Plamya	  Nad	  Angoloy,"	  Pravda,	  7	  June,	  1965.	  333	  Tomas	  Kolesnichenko,	  "Pis'ma	  iz	  Angoly:	  Chistaya	  Voda,"	  ibid.8	  March	  1966.	  
	   137	  Portuguese	  colonialism,	  but	  also	  Western	  imperialism	  in	  general:	  “The	  struggle	  of	  the	  Angolan	   partisans	   proves	   that	   the	   liberation	   movement	   against	   colonialism	   and	  imperialism	   can’t	   exist	   in	   isolation	   from	   the	   international	  workers'	  movement,	   from	  the	  international	  socialist	  system.”334	  Journalistic	   forays	   into	   the	   liberated	   areas	   served	  many	   purposes.	   First,	   they	  were	  obviously	  intended	  to	  educate	  Soviet	  citizens	  about	  foreign	  policy.	  These	  reports	  –	  transmitted	  in	  Portuguese	  over	  the	  radio	  –	  also	  helped	  popularize	  the	  struggle	  in	  the	  Portuguese	   colonies	   and	   the	   MPLA	   itself.	   For	   Soviet	   purposes,	   it	   was	   important	   to	  portray	   the	   liberation	   movement	   in	   the	   colonies	   as	   being	   connected	   to	   the	  international	   communist	   movements,	   with	   the	   USSR	   at	   the	   helm.	   Even	   deep	   in	   the	  jungle,	  as	  Domogatskikh	  tried	  to	  show,	  guerrillas	  were	  reading	  Lenin	  and	  related	  their	  struggle	   to	   the	   Soviet	   experiences	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   These	   trips	   also	  served	   as	   a	   way	   to	   gather	   first-­‐hand	   intelligence	   about	   the	   liberation	   struggle.	   The	  actual	  military	  campaign	  in	  Cabinda	  stalled	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1965	  because	  the	  terrain	  and	  tough	   Portuguese	   response	   made	   it	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   mount	   any	   effective	  challenge	   to	   the	   colonial	   authorities.335	  The	   important	   development	   from	   the	   Soviet	  perspective	   was	   that	   things	   were	   moving,	   that	   the	   MPLA	   was	   engaged	   in	   active	  military	   struggle.	   One	   proof	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   action	   to	   the	   Soviets	   is	   that	   Petr	  Yevsyukov	   himself	   visited	   Brazzaville	   in	   1965,	   perhaps	   to	   discuss	   further	   assistance	  for	  the	  MPLA.336	  While	  the	  MPLA	  was	  making	  advances	  in	  Cabinda,	  FRELIMO	  was	  also	  expanding	  its	  operations	  in	  Mozambique.	  	  
Mondlane’s	  Diplomacy	  of	  Liberation	  	  FRELIMO	   began	   its	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaign	   on	   25	   September,	   with	   only	   250	  men	  armed	  with	  a	  few	  automatic	  rifles.	  Samora	  Machel,	  who	  was	  appointed	  the	  head	  of	  the	  movement’s	  training	  camp	  at	  Kongwa,	  central	  Tanganyika,	  recalled	  that	  he	  had	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   138	  to	   use	   sticks	   to	   train	   his	   men.337	  The	   attacks	   mounted	   rapidly,	   spreading	   to	   the	  Mozambican	  provinces	  of	  Niassa,	  Zambezia,	  and	  Tete	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1965.	  In	  a	  January	  1965	  interview	  to	  a	  Tanzanian	  newspaper,	  The	  Nationalist,	  Mondlane	  announced	  that	  Soviet	   Union	   and	   Czechoslovakia	   had	   already	   offered	   aid	   to	   FRELIMO	   and	   that	  Mozambique	  would	  be	  liberated	  in	  two	  years.	  Mondlane’s	   preference	   was	   to	   negotiate	   for	   a	   peaceful	   transition	   to	  independence,	   with	   assistance	   from	   the	   United	   States.	   This	   did	   not	   work,	   and	   the	  relationship	  between	  Mondlane	  and	  Washington	  soured	  after	  Kennedy’s	  assassination.	  In	  1964,	   the	  Ford	  Foundation	  withdrew	   funding	   for	   the	  Mozambique	   Institute	  under	  pressure	   from	  Lyndon	   Johnson’s	   administration.	  Mondlane’s	  wife	   Janet,	  who	   ran	   the	  Institute,	   had	   secured	  bridging	   funds	   from	   the	  World	  Council	   of	  Churches,	   and,	   after	  Eduardo	   and	   Janet	   Mondlane	   visited	   Stockholm	   in	   September	   1964,	   the	   Swedish	  government	  allocated	  the	  first	  150,000	  Swedish	  crowns	  for	  the	   institute	   in	  May.338	  In	  1965,	   the	  US	  State	  Department	  refused	  to	  host	  a	  FRELIMO	  delegation	  at	   their	  official	  headquarters,	   giving	   a	   clear	   sign	   that	   Washington’s	   previously	   positive	   attitude	   to	  Mondlane	   and	   FRELIMO	   had	   changed	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   Kennedy	   years.	   Quite	  incensed	  over	  the	  incident,	  Mondlane	  pushed	  even	  harder	  for	  support	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Czechoslovakia.	  In	  April,	  he	  visited	  Bulgaria,	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  Hungary	  with	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  to	  obtain	  further	  assistance.	  	  Mondlane	   thus	   had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   turn	   increasingly	   to	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  China,	  argued	  Jaime	  Sigauke,	  FRELIMO’s	  head	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  International	  Organization,	  in	  conversation	  with	  Peter	  Fullerton,	  a	  British	  diplomat	  in	  Tanzania.	   “Sigauke	   said	   that	   the	  Americans	  were	  dishonest	   in	   their	   relations	  with	  FRELIMO;	  they	  kept	  saying	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  support	  FRELIMO,	  but	  had	  done	  little	  for	   them	   and	   said	   nothing	   in	   public	   to	   indicate	   that	   they	   were	   backing	   them.”339	  Writing	   of	   Mondlane’s	   attempts	   to	   obtain	   assistance	   from	   Eastern	   Europe,	   Stephen	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   139	  Miles,	   the	   British	  Deputy	  High	   Commissioner	   in	   Tanzania,	   noted	   that	  Mondlane	  was	  “staunchly	   anti-­‐communist	   by	   conviction,”	   but	   that	   he	   had	   to	   take	   whatever	   was	  available	  from	  the	  communist	  countries	  and	  Algeria.340	  	  FRELIMO’s	  requirements	  for	  external	  support	  multiplied	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	   war	   effort.	   When	   Mondlane	   visited	   Czechoslovakia	   in	   October	   1964,	   his	   main	  request	   for	   the	   deputy	   foreign	  minister,	   Jan	   Pudlák,	  was	   for	   Czechoslovakia	   to	   train	  recruits	  for	  underground	  work.	  In	  November,	  Mondlane	  approached	  the	  Czechoslovak	  embassy	   again,	   this	   time	   asking	   for	  material	   assistance	   and	  weapons,	   saying	   that	   he	  wanted	   to	   obtain	   the	   support	   of	   Czechoslovakia	   in	   particular	   because	   it	  was	   a	   small	  country	  without	  the	  ambitions	  of	  a	  superpower.341	  In	  March	  1965,	  Mondlane	  appealed	  to	   the	   Soviet	   government,	   asking	   for	   further	  material	   assistance	   and	   placements	   for	  training	  cadres	  who	  could	  assume	  administrative	  tasks	  in	  the	  liberated	  areas:	   	  When	   I	   was	   in	   the	   USSR	   in	   May	   [1964],	   I	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   tell	   the	  Solidarity	   Committee	   about	   the	  most	   pressing	   needs	   of	   our	   struggle,	   which	   I	  suppose	  had	  been	  relayed	  to	  the	  Soviet	  government.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  visit,	  our	  movement	   has	   received	   substantial	   aid	   in	   war	   material	   and	   other	  supplementary	   equipment.	   However,	   now,	   our	   struggle	   has	   entered	   a	   new	  stage:	   now	   our	  men	   and	   women	   lead	   the	   armed	   struggle	   against	   Portuguese	  colonialism	   inside	   Mozambique.	   The	   requirements	   of	   our	   movement	   have	  significantly	  increased	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  last	  year.	  Thus,	  I	  am	  asking	  your	  Excellences	  to	  increase	  material	  aid	  for	  our	  movement.342	  	  Mondlane	   also	   believed	   that	   to	   prepare	   for	   independence,	   FRELIMO	   had	   to	   educate	  young	   Mozambicans	   so	   they	   could	   take	   over	   the	   government	   when	   independence	  came.	   This	   vision	   was	   embodied	   in	   the	   Mozambique	   Institute,	   which	   opened	   in	  September	  1964	  as	   a	  hostel	   and	   school	   for	  Mozambican	   refugees	   in	  Tanzania.	  When	  the	   war	   began,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   a	   protracted	   guerrilla	   campaign	   would	   require	  mobilization	   and	   politicization	   of	   the	   peasantry.	   Thus,	   FRELIMO	   did	   not	   just	   need	  young	   recruits	  who	   could	   count,	   read,	   and	   understand	   basic	   science,	   but	  who	   could	  also	   explain	   what	   the	   war	   was	   all	   about.	   Mondlane	   thus	   appealed	   to	   the	   socialist	  countries	  to	  dispatch	  instructors	  who	  could	  teach	  regular	  subjects	  at	  the	  Mozambique	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   140	  Institute	  and	  could	  also	  give	   lectures	   in	  political	   theory	  and	  clandestine	  organization	  and	   action.	   In	   his	   February	   appeal	   to	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Solidarity	   Committee,	   he	  explained:	  “The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  teachers	  is	  to	  help	  prepare	  and	  direct	  a	  program	  for	   the	   training	   of	   political	   cadres	   in	   order	   to	   send	   them	   into	   the	   interior	   of	  Mozambique.	  Most	  of	  the	  work	  we	  did	  before	  the	  September	  insurrection	  was	  rather	  improvised.	  It	  is	  now	  necessary	  that	  we	  should	  work	  on	  a	  more	  scientific	  basis.”343	  Then	  in	  April,	  Mondlane	  toured	  Southeast	  Europe,	  stopping	  in	  Sofia,	  Budapest,	  and	  Belgrade.	  From	  Bulgaria,	  Mondlane	  obtained	  170,000	  leva	  worth	  of	  weapons	  and	  war	  material	  and	  another	  100,000	  leva	  of	  humanitarian	  aid.	  FRELIMO	  also	  received	  10	  annual	   placements	   for	   enrolment	   at	   Bulgarian	   universities	   and	   technical	   lyceums.344	  Prague	  eventually	  provided	  assistance	  to	  FRELIMO	  in	  June,	  when	  the	  Politburo	  of	  the	  CC	  CPC	  approved	  the	  provision	  of	  second-­‐hand	  weapons	  and	  war	  material	  worth	  one	  million	  crowns.	  Czechoslovakia	  also	  agreed	  to	  dispatch	  one	  expert	  to	  provide	  military	  and	  political	  training	  at	  the	  Mozambican	  Institute.345	  While	   Czechoslovakia	   and	   Bulgaria	   extended	   aid	   to	   FRELIMO,	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   Moscow	   offered	   any	   further	   aid	   in	   1965	   beyond	  what	   had	  already	  been	  granted	  in	  1964.	  According	  to	  a	  Czechoslovak	  report	   justifying	  Prague’s	  assistance	   package	   to	   FRELIMO,	   representatives	   of	   the	   Soviet	   International	  Department	   “welcomed”	   the	   initiative,	   but	   nevertheless	   warned	   the	   Czechoslovaks	  about	   Mondlane’s	   past,	   when	   he	   was	   closely	   associated	   with	   the	   Americans.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  the	  Czechoslovakian	  officials	   learned	  that	  Ambassador	  Timoshchenko	  had	  met	  with	  Tanzanian	  Minister	  of	  Defense	  Oscar	  Kambona	  to	  discuss	  the	  Soviet	  military	  contribution	  to	  the	  Mozambican	  liberation	  movement.346	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   141	  In	   1964,	   Salazar	   dispatched	   Brigadier	   Arnaldo	   Schultz	   as	   the	   new	   governor	  general	   and	   commander-­‐in-­‐chief	   in	   the	   province,	   following	   the	   Portuguese's	  humiliating	   defeat	   at	   Como.	   Having	   served	   in	   the	   pacification	   campaign	   in	   Angola,	  Schultz	   was	   confident	   that	   he	   could	   end	   the	   war	   in	   six	   months.	   His	   plan	   involved	  constructing	  a	  network	  of	  control	  points	  and	  garrisons	  along	  the	  Guinean	  border	  to	  cut	  lines	  of	  communication	  with	  Conakry.	  Schultz	  also	  oversaw	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  ground	  troops,	   from	   8,000	   in	   1964	   to	   16,000	   the	   following	   year.	   He	   also	   relied	   on	  massive	  bombing	  raids	  to	  dislodge	  the	  PAIGC	  forces	  from	  their	  strongholds.347	  	  The	  PAIGC	  thus	  faced	  a	  massive	  challenge,	  and	  the	  key	  to	   its	  survival	  was	  the	  availability	   of	   weapons.	   In	   1964,	   Czechoslovakia	   had	   already	   stepped	   up	   its	   arms	  shipments	  to	  the	  PAIGC,	  and	  in	  early	  1965,	  a	  large	  shipment	  of	  Soviet	  arms,	  including	  one	   hundred	   pistols,	   five	   hundred	   small	   arms,	   five	   hundred	   carbines,	   fifty	   light	   and	  twenty	   heavy	   machine	   guns,	   twenty	   grenade	   launchers,	   binoculars,	   compasses,	   and	  anti-­‐tank	   and	   anti-­‐personnel	   mines,	   reached	   Conakry.	   This	   is	   the	   first	   time	   that	   we	  know	  for	  certain	  that	  Soviet	  arms	  shipments	  reached	  the	  PAIGC,	  something	  that	  Cabral	  had	  probably	  negotiated	  with	  Soviet	  officials	  around	  October	  1964.348	  Cabral	  of	  course	  knew	   that	   the	  militants	   required	   special	   military	   training,	   especially	   as	   increasingly	  sophisticated	  weapons	   poured	   in,	   if	   his	   aim	   of	   creating	   a	   regular	   armed	   force	   –	   the	  FARP	  –	  was	  to	  be	  achieved.	  Sometime	   in	  October	   1964,	   shortly	   after	  Khrushchev’s	   forced	   retirement,	   the	  CC	  CPSU	  approved	  construction	  of	  a	  secret	   training	  center	   in	  Crimea,	  Soviet	  Ukraine,	  upon	  Cabral’s	  request	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  training	  program	  in	  the	  USSR.	  The	  165	  Training	  Center	  for	  the	  Instruction	  of	  Foreign	  Servicemen	  was	  located	  at	  the	  village	  of	  Perevalnoye,	   off	   the	   highway	   that	   connected	   the	   capital	   of	   Crimea,	   Simferopol,	   and	  Alushta,	   a	   famous	   vacation	   destination	   on	   the	   Black	   Sea.	   The	   training	   center	   at	  Perevalnoye	  was	  under	  the	  command	  of	  the	  Tenth (Main)	  Directorate,	  a	  department	  of	  the	   Soviet	   Ministry	   of	   Defense,	   which	   was	   responsible	   for	   providing	   aid	   to	   foreign	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  countries,	  among	  other	  things.	  The	  Tenth	  Directorate	  was	  under	  direct	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Soviet	  General	  Staff,	   led	  by	  the	  newly	  reappointed	  Marshall	  Matvey	  Vasilyevich	  Zakharov.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  was	   in	  a	  rush,	  and	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  1965,	  all	   the	  main	  facilities	  of	  a	  military	  school,	  including	  a	  two-­‐storied	  school	  building,	  the	  officers’	  quarters,	   the	   soldiers’	   barracks,	   a	   canteen,	   an	   obstacle	   course,	   and	   a	   shooting	   range	  was	   complete.	   The	   first	   commander	   of	   the	   school	  was	  Colonel	   Ivan	  Boyko,	   a	   heavily	  decorated	   war	   veteran.	   His	   deputy	   was	   colonel	   Mikhail	   Strekozov.	   Thus	   Captain	  Vladilen	   Kinchevskiy	   recalled	   meeting	   the	   first	   seventy-­‐five	   PAIGC	   militants	   at	   the	  Simferopol	  airport	  in	  June	  1965:	  It	  was	  already	  dark;	  we	  could	  not	  make	  out	  who	  was	  going	  down	  the	  ramp…	  Some	  sort	  of	   invisible	  men.	  When	  we	  approached	  very	  close,	   it	  became	  clear	  why:	  all	  of	  them	  were	  black…	  Fine,	  we	  tried	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  language	  they	  spoke.	  No	  more	  than	  10	  spoke	  Portuguese	  and	  the	  rest	  spoke	  various	  African	  dialects	  and	  gesticulated	  a	  lot.	  All	  of	  them	  were	  skinny,	  looked	  alike,	  and	  were	  of	  uncertain	  age	  –	  from	  sixteen	  to	  thirty-­‐five.349	  	  	  Perevalnoye	  functioned	  like	  a	  regular	  military	  school.	  Mikhail	  Strekozov,	  who	  drafted	  the	  first	  curriculum,	  recalled	  that	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  sapper	  training.	  Instructors	  taught	  their	  students	  how	  to	  blow	  up	  railway	  tracks,	  bridges,	  and	  buildings,	  so	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	   the	   course,	   each	   recruit	  would	   know	  how	   to	   handle	   explosives.	   Strekozov	   argued	  that	  this	  kind	  of	   training	  was	  commonplace	  for	  any	  regular	  military	  school,	  recalling:	  “We	   never	   prepared	   terrorists.	  We	   taught	   everything	   that	  was	   commonplace	   in	   any	  military	   school.”	   Military	   training	   was	   supplemented	   with	   the	   basics	   of	   Marxism-­‐Leninism.	   Course	   Convener	  Aleksey	  Antipov	   justified	   the	   need	   for	   his	   subject	  with	   a	  joke	   he	   would	   repeat	   very	   often	   to	   his	   colleagues:	   “First	   we	   should	   teach	   whom	   to	  shoot,	   and	   then	   how	   to	   shoot.”	   The	   teachers	   became	   quite	   invested	   in	   and	   proud	   of	  their	   students.	   Vladilen	  Kinchevskiy,	   one	   of	   the	   teachers,	   recalls:	   “We	  would	   read	   in	  overviews	  of	   international	  press	   that	   a	   certain	  number	  of	  planes	  had	  been	  hit	   in	   the	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  Portuguese	  colonies.	  Then,	  our	  boss,	  Colonel	  Boyko,	  would	  proudly	  say,	  ‘This	  was	  our	  job.’”350	  	  Meanwhile,	  Cabral	  continued	  campaigning	  for	  greater	  resources	  for	  the	  PAIGC.	  In	  May	  1966,	  Cabral	  had	  very	  fruitful	  discussions	  with	  the	  new	  Czechoslovak	  Minister	  of	   the	   Interior,	   Josef	   Kudrna.	   Cabral	   briefed	   Kudrna	   on	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   country,	  saying	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   been	   trying	   to	   expand	   internal	   trade	   and	   correcting	   the	  massive	  shortages	  in	  the	  health-­‐care	  system,	  which	  was	  severely	  lacking	  in	  medicines	  and	  basic	  equipment.	  He	  also	  told	  Kudrna	  that	   the	  PAIGC	  was	  planning	  to	  expand	   its	  operations	   into	   every	   region	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   finally	   liquidate	   the	   military	  garrisons.	  This	   is	  why,	  Cabral	   explained,	  he	   required	  anti-­‐aircraft	   and	  anti-­‐boat	  guns	  from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Czechoslovakia.	   Moreover,	   he	   informed	   Kudrna	   that	   the	  PAIGC	  forces	  were	  planning	  to	  launch	  guerrilla	  warfare	  in	  Cape	  Verde.	  Cabral	  also	  said	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  had	  been	  successfully	  expanding	  contacts	  with	  socialist	  countries,	  but	  he	  warned	  that	  one	  had	  to	  be	  careful	  to	  avoid	  charges	  of	  being	  pro-­‐communist.351	  Kudrna	  was	  very	  impressed	  by	  Cabral.	  He	  approved	  of	  Cabral’s	  plan	  of	  action	  in	  Cape	   Verde.	   He	   also	   praised	   Cabral’s	   tactic	   of	   not	   speaking	   openly	   about	   friendship	  with	  the	  USSR,	  but	  doing	  everything	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  socialist	  movement.	  “He	  [Kudrna]	   expressed	   his	   confidence	   that	   the	   liberation	   movement	   would	   become	   an	  example	   for	   the	   whole	   of	   Africa.	   It	   is	   rooted	   in	   realism	   and	   is	   well	   organized,”	  according	   to	   a	   report	   of	   the	   meeting	   signed	   by	   Houska.352	  Therefore,	   in	   June,	   the	  Czechoslovak	  Communist	  Party	  allocated	  1.85	  million	  crowns	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  arms	  and	   war	   materiel	   and	   150	   thousand	   crowns	   for	   humanitarian	   assistance.	   “Current	  military	  situation	   is	   favorable;	   the	  victory	  of	   the	  national	   liberation	  movement	   in	   the	  foreseeable	  future	  is	  evident,”	  according	  to	  the	  attached	  report.353	  The	   StB	   also	   needed	   Cabral	   to	   better	   understand	   developments	   in	   the	   other	  liberation	  movements.	  On	  18	   September	  1965,	   Cabral	  met	   his	   new	   case	   officer,	  who	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  was	   known	  by	  his	   last	   name,	   Peták,	  whom	  he	  briefed	   about	   the	   forthcoming	  CONCP	  conference	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  The	  CONCP	  had	  been	  established	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1961	  Angolan	  Uprising	  and	  united	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  under	  one	  umbrella	  organization.	  The	  main	  motivations	  for	  the	  conference,	  said	  Cabral,	  were	  to	  assert	  the	  unity	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements,	   to	   establish	   common	   foreign	   policy	   lines,	   and	   to	  coordinate	  military	  action.	  Peták	   in	  turn	  proposed	  to	  Cabral	   that	  he	  provide	  material	  aid,	   assist	   with	   personnel	   training,	   and,	   overall,	   and	   share	   his	   experiences	   with	   the	  other	  liberation	  movements	  at	  the	  conference.	  He	  also	  inquired	  whether	  Cabral	  could	  serve	  as	  mediator	  between	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  the	  liberation	  movement	  regarding	  the	  provision	   of	   special	   aid	   (i.e.,	   arms).	   Cabral	   responded	   that	   he	   had	   already	   thought	  about	   it,	   saying	   that	   the	   conference	  would	  provide	   an	   important	  occasion	   for	  him	   to	  speak	   to	  his	   comrades	  on	   that	   issue.354	  It	   is	  not	   clear	  whether	  Cabral	  discussed	  what	  Peták	   had	   asked	   him	   at	   the	   CONCP	   conference	   in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   but	   he	   did	  make	   a	  strong	   statement	   in	   acknowledging	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	   socialist	   countries	   to	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.355	  What	   is	   particularly	   important	   is	   that	   by	   1966,	   both	   Moscow	   and	   Prague	  considered	  Cabral	  one	  of	  their	  most	  trusted	  allies	  in	  the	  region	  because	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  influence	  they	  believed	  he	  had.	  That	  is	  why	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  were	  therefore	  very	  willing	  to	  expand	  their	  assistance	  to	  the	  PAIGC.	  Aristides	  Pereira	  attributed	  this	  to	  Cabral,	  who	  became	  so	  close	  with	  the	  Soviets	  that	  assistance	  for	  the	  movement	  was	  gradually	  regularized	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  was	  integrated	  into	  early	  plans	  of	  the	   various	   agencies.	   “This	   demonstrated	   the	   trust	   Soviets	   had	   in	   Amílcar.	   They	  practically	  started	   to	  believe	  he	  was	  one	  of	   them,”	  Pereira	  observed.	  356	  On	  5	   January	  1966,	   Josef	  Otáhal,	  who	  was	  one	  of	  the	  cadres	  of	  the	  fourth	  (Afro-­‐Asian)	  department,	  evaluated	   the	   relationship	  with	   Cabral	   very	   positively,	  writing	   that	   Cabral	   fulfilled	   a	  key	  function	  as	  far	  as	  Czechoslovak	  Intelligence	  was	  concerned	  and	  that	  in	  1966,	  they	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  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  19	  September	  1965,	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  ABS,	  43197/020,	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  84.	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  Amilcar	  Cabral,	  "The	  Nationalist	  Movements	  of	  the	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  address	  at	  the	  CONCP	  Conference	  held	  in	  Dar	  Es-­‐Salaam,	  1965,	  retrieved	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  https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/cabral/1965/tnmpc.htm.	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   145	  would	   rely	   on	   Cabral	   to	   provide	   an	   insight	   into	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.357	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  Soviet	  assistance	  to	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  uprisings	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  expanded	  in	  1965	  despite	  Nikita	  Khrushchev’s	  departure	  from	  the	  Kremlin	  in	  October	  1964.	   While	   Khrushchev’s	   close	   associates	   criticized	   his	   policy	   in	   the	   Third	   World,	  most	   notoriously	   in	   the	   unpublished	   “Polyanskiy	   report”,	   in	   1965,	   the	   CC	   CPSU	  Politburo	  approved	  shipments	  of	  heavy	  arms	  to	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  and	  oversaw	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  clandestine	  military	  training	  center	  at	  Perevalnoye	  in	  the	  Crimea.	  1965	   also	   saw	   Soviet	   international	   journalists	   –	   Tomas	   Kolesnichenko	   and	   Mikhail	  Domogatskikh	  –	   starting	   to	   report	   from	   the	   frontlines	  of	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	   struggle	   in	  Angola.	   This	   amounted	   to	   a	   qualitative	   shift	   in	   the	   USSR’s	   engagement	   with	   the	  liberation	   movements.	   Soviet	   aid	   before	   1965	   was	   mainly	   limited	   to	   providing	  scholarships,	   some	  humanitarian	   assistance,	   and	   cash,	   allocated	  by	   the	   cadres	   of	   the	  International	  Department;	   it	  was	   only	   in	   1965	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   really	   began	   to	  provide	   substantial	   material	   assistance,	   including	   some	   heavy	   weapons,	   to	   the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  	  The	   reason	   for	   this	   shift	   had	   to	   do	   with	   the	   increased	   importance	   of	   the	  conservative	   interpretation	   of	   Marxism-­‐Leninism	   followed	   by	   Brezhnev	   and	   other	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo,	  such	  as	  Aleksey	  Kosygin,	  Alexander	  Shelepin,	  and	  Vladimir	  Semichastnyi.	  If	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  thought	  he	  could	  both	  ensure	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence	  with	  the	  West	  and	  maintain	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  international	  communist	  movement,	  the	   conservatives	   believed	   that	   this	   policy	   had	   led	   to	   a	   dangerous	  weakening	   of	   the	  Soviet	   Union.	   Thus,	   they	   further	   reinforced	   the	   importance	   of	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	  doctrine	   as	   the	   key	   principle	   guiding	   foreign	   policy.	   Their	   ideological	   conservatism	  implied	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   would	   no	   longer	   waste	   resources	   on	   funding	   the	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  development	   of	   Third	   World	   countries	   where	   prospects	   for	   socialism	   were	   slim.	  Instead,	   it	   would	   support	   genuine	   revolutionary	  movements	   in	   the	   colonies.	   This	   is	  why	   the	   Soviets	   were	   increasingly	   willing	   to	   provide	   arms	   and	   training	   to	   the	  ideologically	  reliable	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC,	  but	  remained	  quite	  skeptical	  of	  FRELIMO,	  as	   they	  still	  had	  doubts	  about	   the	  allegiance	  of	  President	  Mondlane.	  The	  cadres	   from	  the	  socialist	  countries	  would	  continue	  to	  carefully	  follow	  the	  transformations	  of	  these	  anti-­‐colonial	   movements,	   which	   they	   believed	   represented	   the	   most	   vibrant	  progressive	  force	  on	  the	  continent.	  	  While	  ideational	  changes	  were	  important,	  individual	  people	  also	  advocated	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Petr	  Yevsyukov	  and	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin	  defending	  Neto	  during	  the	  MPLA’s	  internal	  crisis	  and	  in	  the	  members	  of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   and	   the	   International	   Department	   arguing	   for	   an	  expansion	   of	   assistance.	   The	   same	  was	   true	   in	   the	   other	   socialist	   countries,	   and	  we	  have	   seen	   just	   how	   important	   Cabral	  was,	   since	   he	   provided	   a	   gateway	   into	   African	  politics	   for	   Czechoslovak	   Intelligence.	   This	  was	   of	   course	   an	   interactive	   relationship,	  driven	   by	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   who	   engaged	   in	   very	   active	  diplomacy	  to	  obtain	  resources	  for	  the	  unfolding	  anti-­‐colonial	  campaigns.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  Czechoslovakia	  and,	  gradually,	  Bulgaria,	  became	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  providing	  military	  aid	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  The	   most	   important	   consequence	   of	   this	   period	   was	   therefore	   the	  militarization	  of	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  The	  military	  became	  responsible	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  weapons	  and	  for	  the	  training	  of	  the	  military	  cadres	  of	   the	   liberation	   movements	   on	   an	   increasingly	   large	   scale,	   all	   very	   important	  developments	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Moscow’s	   ever-­‐deeper	   involvement	   in	   the	   Vietnam	  War.	  While	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  address	  the	   importance	  of	  particular	   individuals	  (because	  the	  military	  archives	  are	  still	  sealed	  and	  there	  are	  no	  memoirs)	  those	  men	  who	  served	  as	   instructors	  at	  Perevalnoye	   felt	  pride	   in	   their	  students,	   even	   if	   it	  was	   tinged	  with	  a	  sense	  of	   paternalistic	   superiority.	   The	  middle-­‐ranking	   cadres	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   the	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Zenith:	  Mobilization,	  Governance,	  and	  Conflict	  in	  the	  
Liberated	  Areas,	  1966-­‐69	  	  On	  24	  February	  1966,	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  had	  only	   just	   landed	   in	  Beijing	  when	  he	  was	   informed	   of	   the	   coup	   d'état	   in	   Ghana’s	   capital,	   Accra,	  which	   had	   taken	   place	  earlier	   that	  morning.	  Nkrumah,	  who	  was	   on	   his	  way	   to	  North	  Vietnam	  with	   a	   peace	  mission,	   learnt	   that	   he	   had	   been	   dismissed	   as	   president	   of	   Ghana,	   and	   that	   that	   his	  Convention	   People’s	   Party	   (CPP)	   had	   been	   banned	   and	   replaced	   by	   a	   group	   calling	  themselves	   the	  National	  Liberation	  Council	   (NLC).	  Nkrumah	  would	   spend	   the	   rest	  of	  his	  life	  in	  Conakry,	  after	  receiving	  an	  invitation	  from	  Guinea’s	  President	  Sékou	  Touré.	  Nkrumah	  believed	  that	  the	  coup	  was	  a	  product	  of	  collusion	  between	  hostile	   forces	   in	  the	  Ghanaian	  army	  and	  police	   force	  and	  the	   imperialists,	  as	  he	  explained	   in	  his	  1968	  book,	  Dark	  Days	  in	  Ghana.	  While	   the	   role	  of	   the	  US	   in	   the	  coup	  has	  been	  a	   subject	  of	  much	  speculation,	  we	  know	  now	  that	  Nkrumah	  was	  partly	  correct	  about	   the	  reasons	  for	  it.	  Nkrumah	  looked	  increasingly	  anti-­‐American,	  especially	  after	  he	  accused	  the	  CIA	  of	  being	  directly	  responsible	   for	   instigating	  crises	  around	  the	  world	   in	  his	  book	  Neo-­‐
Colonialism:	  The	  Last	  Stage	  of	  Imperialism.	  Washington	  did	  know	  about	  the	  impending	  coup	   and	   denied	   Nkrumah’s	   repeated	   requests	   for	   economic	   assistance,	   which	  contributed	   to	   the	   increasingly	   desperate	   economic	   situation	   in	   Ghana;	   however,	  Nkrumah	  overlooked	  his	  personal	  mistakes.358	  	  Constantly	  fearful	  for	  his	  life,	  Nkrumah	  had	  introduced	  legislation	  that	  had	  given	  him	  sole	  authority	  to	  dismiss	  staff	   from	  the	  police	  force	  and	  had	  established	  his	  own	  presidential	  guard,	  alienating	  the	  traditional	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  military	  and	  police	   forces.	  His	  economic	  policies	  were	  generally	  unpopular,	  while	  his	  slide	   into	  an	   increasingly	  authoritarian	  one-­‐man	  rule	  was	  resented	  by	   the	  elites.	  One	  could	   not	   deny	   that	   there	  was	   generally	   very	   little	   resistance	   to	   the	   coup,	   reflecting	  general	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Nkrumah’s	  regime.	  359	  Nkrumah’s	   overthrow	   was	   in	   many	   ways	   a	   key	   moment	   in	   Africa’s	   post-­‐colonial	   history.	   Not	   only	   did	   it	   drastically	   undermine	  African	   unity	   as	   an	   ambitious	  political	   project,	   but	   it	   also	   testified	   to	   the	   failures	   of	   the	   nativist-­‐inspired	  developmental	  models,	  such	  as	  “African	  socialism,”	  championed	  by	  the	  first	  leaders	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	  African	  states,	   including	  Nkrumah	  himself.	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  African	   leaders	  continued	  to	  speak	  about	  non-­‐alignment	  and	  sought	  economic	  and	  developmental	   assistance	   from	   all	   factions	   in	   the	   Cold	   War,	   others,	   such	   as	   Julius	  Nyerere	  in	  Tanzania,	  pushed	  for	  a	  more	  radical	  transformation	  of	  society,	  following	  the	  1967	  Arusha	  Declaration,	  which	  borrowed	  its	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  not	  only	  from	  “African	  socialism”	  but	  also	  from	  China’s	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  Nkrumah’s	  fall	  was	  also	  of	  major	  significance	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies,	  not	  only	  because	   they	   no	   longer	   received	   Ghanaian	   support,	   but	   also	   because	   this	   confirmed	  some	  of	   the	   ideas	  advocated	  by	  Amílcar	  Cabral,	  an	   increasingly	   influential	   theorist	   in	  his	   own	   right.	   During	   the	   January	   1966	   Tricontinental	   Conference,	   held	   in	   Cuba’s	  capital	   Havana,	   Cabral	   had	   made	   a	   major	   speech,	   asserting	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  ideologically	   driven	   revolutionary	   vanguard	   or	   so-­‐called	   “vanguard	   party”	   was	  essential	  during	  the	  struggle	  for	  national	  liberation	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  neo-­‐colonial	  situation	  after	  independence.	  	  Cabral	  was	  seemingly	  proved	  right	  just	  one	  month	  later,	  because	  the	  coup	  was	  widely	   attributed	   to	   the	  meddling	   of	   the	   colonial	   powers	   and	  Nkrumah’s	   inability	   to	  create	  a	  revolutionary	  vanguard.	  Cabral’s	  philosophy	  had	  been	  increasingly	  adopted	  by	  the	  MPLA	  and	  FRELIMO,	  which	  started	  organizing	  life	  in	  the	  liberated	  areas	  in	  view	  of	  future	  independence,	  abolishing	  what	  they	  called	  “traditional”	  authority	  and	  replacing	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  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2011),	  p.	  156.	  
	   150	  it	  with	  new	  socialist-­‐inspired	  practices	  to	  govern	  community	  relations.	  Out	  of	  all	  three	  major	   liberation	  movements,	   FRELIMO’s	   transformation	  was	   the	  most	   significant,	   as	  the	  organization	  progressed	  from	  a	  collection	  of	  individuals	  who	  relied	  on	  traditional	  authorities	  to	  a	  much	  more	  centralized,	  top-­‐down	  organization	  whose	  leadership	  was	  increasingly	  adopting	  Marxism	  as	  the	  key	  ideology	  for	  the	  movement.	  	  Moscow	  looked	  upon	  Nkrumah’s	   fall	  as	  a	  serious	  defeat,	  not	  only	  because	  the	  coup	  d'état	  led	  to	  a	  total	  reversal	  of	  Ghana’s	  allegiance,	  but	  also	  because	  this	  revealed	  a	  lack	  of	  popular	  support	  for	  socialist	  transformation	  in	  the	  continent,	  which	  the	  Soviets	  had	  hoped	   in	   the	  early	  1960s	   to	  achieve.	  Although	  Moscow	  regarded	  the	  situation	   in	  Africa	   with	   great	   pessimism,	   this	   did	   not	   mean	   they	   gave	   up	   on	   the	   prospect	   of	  revolutionary	   change	   that	   would	   eventually	   lead	   to	   socialism.	   Czechoslovakian	  intelligence	   and	   the	   KGB	   actually	   tried	   to	   stage	   a	   counter-­‐coup	   in	   Ghana	   with	   the	  support	  of	  Nkrumah’s	  former	  advocates,	  and	  provided	  military	  assistance	  and	  training	  to	   the	   liberation	   movements.	   Cabral	   played	   a	   special	   role,	   both	   because	   he	   was	   an	  important	   source	   of	   information	   regarding	   Nkrumah’s	   plans	   and	   because	   the	   PAIGC	  was	  perceived	  as	  the	  likeliest	  of	  the	  three	  liberation	  movements	  to	  achieve	  a	  military	  breakthrough.	   The	   Soviets	   also	   increasingly	   looked	   upon	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	  MPLA	   and	   FRELIMO	   as	   proof	   of	   revolutionary	   potential	   in	   the	   Third	   World,	   a	  conclusion	   that	  was	   strengthened	   by	  Washington’s	   inability	   to	  make	   any	   substantial	  progress	   in	   North	   Vietnam.	   Optimism	   regarding	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  surged,	  culminating	  in	  the	  1969	  Khartoum	  Conference,	  which	  was	  the	  key	  symbolic	  moment	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  appeared	  as	  the	  key	  supporter	  of	   liberation	  in	  southern	  Africa.	  	  	  
Rescuing	  Ghana’s	  Revolution:	  Nkrumah,	  Sékou	  Touré,	  and	  Cabral	  	  	  Nkrumah’s	   fall	  was	   a	  major	  defeat	   for	   Soviet	   interests	   in	  Africa.	  Not	   only	  did	  the	   coup	   mean	   the	   loss	   of	   an	   influential	   political	   ally,	   but	   it	   also	   signified	   a	   major	  setback	  for	  revolution	  in	  Africa	  as	  a	  whole.	  Additionally,	   in	  the	  first	   few	  months	  after	  
	   151	  the	   coup,	   the	   NLC	   reversed	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   economic	   policies	   of	   its	   predecessor.	  “Nkrumah	  was	  doing	  more	  to	  undermine	  our	   interests	  than	  any	  other	  black	  African,”	  wrote	  Robert	  Komer,	  the	  special	  assistant	  on	  national	  security	  affairs	  to	  US	  president	  Lyndon	   Johnson,	   on	   12	   March	   1966.	   “In	   reaction	   to	   his	   strongly	   pro-­‐Communist	  leanings,	   the	   new	  military	   regime	   is	   almost	   pathetically	   pro-­‐Western.”	  360	  	   Long-­‐time	  Soviet	  diplomat	  Leonid	  Musatov	  wrote	  that	  Nkrumah’s	  fall	  was	  particularly	  painful	  for	  the	   Soviet	   leadership,	   given	   the	   country’s	   subsequent	   complete	   realignment	   of	  domestic	   and	   foreign	   policy.	   Nkrumah’s	   defeat	   meant	   the	   loss	   of	   Ghana	   as	   a	   major	  financial	  contributor	  as	  well	  as	  a	  training	  ground	  and	  logistical	  hub	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  weapons	   and	   money	   for	   other	   liberation	   movements,	   especially	   for	   the	   MPLA	   and	  PAIGC.361	  The	   MPLA’s	   President	   Agostinho	   Neto,	   speaking	   to	   two	   members	   of	   the	  Politburo	   of	   the	   Polish	   United	   Workers’	   Party	   (PUPW),	   Zenon	   Kliszko	   and	   Edward	  Gierek,	  during	   the	  Twenty-­‐Third	  Congress	  of	   the	  CPSU	   in	  March	  1966,	  expressed	  his	  deep	   concerns	   about	   the	   situation	   in	   Africa,	   saying	   that	   the	   events	   in	   Ghana	   had	  reduced	  the	  possibility	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Angolan	  people.362	  One	  lesson	  from	  the	  coup,	  some	  Soviet	  cadres	  would	  later	  come	  to	  believe,	  was	  that	   radical	   transitional	   “people’s	   democracies,”	   the	   term	   that	  was	   used	   for	   regimes	  whose	   leaders	   subscribed	   to	   a	   form	   of	   socialist	   organization	   of	   society,	   were	  unsustainable	  if	  they	  relied	  upon	  the	  traditional	  social	  classes.	  On	  21	  December	  1966,	  speaking	   to	  a	  group	  of	  diplomats	   from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Yugoslavia,	   and	  Cuba,	  Vasiliy	  Solodovnikov,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Africa	  Institute,	  also	  argued	  that	  Ghana	  had	  become	  the	   target	   for	   “imperialists	   and	   neo-­‐colonialists”	   because	   Nkrumah	   was	   the	   main	  proponent	  of	  African	  unity,	  even	  though	  he	  did	  acknowledge	  that	  Nkrumah	  was	  partly	  to	   blame	   for	   the	   coup	   because	   he	   had	   isolated	   himself	   from	   the	   masses	   and	   had	  instituted	  a	  cult	  of	  personality.	  Solodovnikov	  argued	  that	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  coup	  ran	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  Paul	   Lee,	   "Documents	   Expose	   U.S.	   Role	   in	   Nkrumah	   Overthrow,"	   June	   2002,	  	  http://www.seeingblack.com/x060702/nkrumah.shtml.	  Musatov	  argues,	   for	  example,	  that	  the	  1968	  coup	  in	  Mali	  was	  not	  taken	  badly	  by	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  because	  it	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  major	  realignment	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  361	  Leonid	  Musatov,	  "Afrikanskie	  Marshruty."	  Afrika	  v	  Vospominaniiakh	  Veteranov	  Diplomaticheskoi	  Sluzhby.	  Ed.	  Aleksey	  Vasilyev	  (Moscow:	  Institut	  Afriki	  RAN,	  2000),	  p.	  120.	  362	  Warsaw,	  "Spotkanie	  z	  delegacja	  partii	  'Ruch	  Ludowy	  o	  Wyzwolenie	  Angoli,"	  Archiwum	  Akt	  Nowych	  (hereafter	  AAN),	  PZPR,	  237/XXII-­‐1354,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	  
	   152	  even	  deeper	  than	  Nkrumah’s	  miscalculations.	  Young	  African	  states	  could	  not	  withstand	  many	  post-­‐independence	  pressures	  because	  they	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  pre-­‐colonial	  social	  structures	  and	  align	  with	  the	  non-­‐proletarian	  social	  classes,	  given	  their	  origins	  as	  mass	  movements	  during	   the	  struggle	   for	   independence.	  Under	   those	  circumstances,	   it	  was	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  army	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  powerful	  force	  that	  could	  be	  manipulated	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  foreign	  actors.	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  problem,	  according	  to	  Solodovnikov,	  was	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  creating	  ideological	  vanguard	  parties.363	  Beneath	  this	  swirl	  of	  ideologically	  inspired	  theorizing	  lay	  a	  tangle	  of	  questions	  about	  the	  Soviets'	  practical	  response	  to	  events	  in	  Ghana.	  The	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Andrey	  Gromyko,	  argued	  that	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam,	  non-­‐interference,	  and	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	   could	   serve	   as	   common	   points	   for	   a	   dialogue	   between	   the	   non-­‐aligned	  nations	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  during	  a	  discussion	  with	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Collegium	  of	   the	   Soviet	   Foreign	  Ministry	   in	  March.	   The	   coup	   in	   Ghana	  was	   an	   obvious	   case	   of	  interference	  by	  the	  British,	  stated	  Gromyko,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  African	  countries	  could	  not	  present	   a	  united	   resistance.	  Gromyko	   said	   that	   the	  USSR	  has	   already	  been	  successful	   in	  pushing	  through	  yet	  another	  resolution	  on	  non-­‐interference	  at	   the	  UN’s	  General	  Assembly,	  but	  the	  time	  had	  come	  to	  influence	  the	  non-­‐aligned	  countries	  with	  practical	   advice	   on	   how	   to	   transform	   abstract	   ideas	   into	   practical	   steps.	   “Clearly,	  African	  unity	  is	  falling	  apart.	  The	  coup	  in	  Ghana	  throws	  the	  country	  back.	  We	  have	  to	  contain	   this	   process	   to	   eliminate	   the	   consequences	   of	   imperialist	   intervention,”	  Gromyko	  concluded.	  364	  	  Nkrumah’s	  defeat	  also	  colored	  discussions	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Africa	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact.	  On	  22	  April	  1966,	  the	  Soviet	  deputy	  foreign	  ministers,	  Yakov	  Malik	  and	   Leonid	   Ilyichev,	   convened	   a	   joint	   plenary	   session	   with	   their	   Czechoslovakian	  counterparts,	   Jan	   Pudlák	   and	   Jan	   Ledl,	   in	   Moscow.	   Malik	   spoke	   at	   length	   about	   the	  situation	   in	  Africa,	  arguing	   that	   the	   imperialists	  were	   increasingly	  exploiting	   internal	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  Seiferth	  (GDR	  embassy,	  Moscow)	  to	  Berlin,	  9	  January	  1967,	  PAAA-­‐MfAA,	  C465/72,	  p.	  69.	  	  364	  Gromyko	   as	   quoted	   in	   Rostislav	   Sergeev,	   V	  MID	   SSSR.	   Na	   Kuznetskom	  Mostu	   i	   Smolenskoy	   Ploshchadi,	   1948-­‐1991	  	  (Moscow:	  Rosspen,	  2007),	  171.	  Gromyko	  refers	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  2131	  (XX)	  of	  21	  December	  1965	  titled	   “Declaration	  of	   the	   Inadmissibility	  of	   Intervention	   in	   the	  Domestic	  Affairs	  of	   States	   and	   the	  Protection	  of	   their	  Independence	  and	  Sovereignty”	  which	  was	  first	  launched	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  24	  September	  1965.	  
	   153	  problems	   within	   the	   newly	   independent	   states	   to	   provoke	   distrust	   of	   the	   people’s	  regimes	  and	   the	  non-­‐capitalist	  path	  of	  development.	  Nevertheless,	  Malik	   argued	   that	  one	   could	   not	   be	   overly	   pessimistic,	   proposing	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  Czechoslovakia	  should	  continue	  developing	  various	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  with	  African	  countries,	  especially	  in	  the	  military	  sphere.	  Pudlák	  agreed	  with	  Malik’s	  conclusions	  and	  explained	   Czechoslovakia’s	   experiences	   providing	   economic	   aid	   and	   the	   training	   of	  military	   cadres.365	  Responding	   to	   Ilyichev’s	   criticism	   that	   the	   socialist	   countries	   had	  misjudged	  the	  reality	  of	  class	  relations	  in	  Africa	  by	  supporting	  hasty	  industrialization	  and	  misunderstanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  military,	  Malik	  said	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  no	  longer	  support	  the	  megalomania	  of	  some	  African	  leaders	  and	  would	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  staffs	  of	  the	  Soviet	  embassies	  in	  African	  countries	  would	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  was	  happening	  with	  the	  army	  and	  police.366	  What	  this	  meant	  in	  reality	  was	  that	  the	  socialist	  countries	   would	   continue	   their	   policies	   in	   Africa	   as	   before,	   but	   without	   the	   rabid	  intensity	  and	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  early	  1960’s.	  	  Not	   everybody	   agreed.	   The	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Polish	   Solidarity	   Committee,	  Lucjan	  Wolniewicz,	  roused	  his	  colleagues	  as	  he	  spoke	  about	  his	  impressions	  of	  a	  recent	  trip	  to	  East	  Africa	  at	   the	   first	  consultative	  meeting	  of	   the	  Solidarity	  Committees	   from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Czechoslovakia,	  Hungary,	  Bulgaria,	   and	  Poland,	  held	  on	  28-­‐29	   June	  1966	   in	   East	   Berlin.	   Wolniewicz	   gave	   a	   strong	   critique	   of	   the	   nationalist	   liberation	  movement,	   questioning	   the	   very	   idea	   that	   African	   countries	   would	   ever	   join	   the	  socialist	   camp.	   While	   some	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements	   were	   simply	  opportunists	   who	  were	  milking	   the	   socialist	   countries	   for	  money	   and	   goods,	   others	  were	   living	   in	  exile	   “like	   the	  bourgeoisie,”	   completely	  detached	   from	  their	  people.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  two	  camps	  existed,	  Africans	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  both	  sides,	  and	  thus	  it	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  (CSSR	  Foreign	  Minister)	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  Antonin	  Novotny	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  Secretary),	  7	  May	  1966,	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  Archiv,	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  inv.	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  pp.	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   154	  would	  be	  impractical	  for	  them	  to	  choose	  one	  over	  the	  other,	  Wolniewicz	  concluded.367	  Given	  this	  logic,	  continuing	  support	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements	  seemed	  pointless.	  	  Others	   could	   not	   accept	   such	   a	   view.	   The	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Dmitriy	  Dolidze,	  admitted	  that	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  slowdown	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  process	  in	  Africa,	  but	  disagreed	  that	  one	  could	  generalize,	  saying	  that	   all	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements	   only	   represented	   a	   small	   group	   of	   people.	   He	  defended	  the	  MPLA,	  saying	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  organization	  did	  not	  have	  any	  popular	   following	   in	  Angola.	  The	  MPLA	  could	  not	  organize	  an	  effective	  armed	  struggle	  because	   the	  movement	  was	  based	   in	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  and	  had	  very	  limited	  access	  to	  Angola’s	  interior,	  as	  passage	  via	  the	  Congo	  was	  problematic,	  but	  the	  MPLA	   was	   a	   “progressive	   and	   a	   good”	   organization	   with	   a	   “big	   future,”	   Dolidze	  argued.368	  	   Dolidze	  was	  much	  more	   critical	   of	   the	  Mozambican	   liberation	  movement	  because	   it	  was	   fragmented	  by	  disagreements	  between	  warring	   factions.	  Even	   though	  FRELIMO	  was	  “weak”	  and	  contained	  “unreliable	  people”	   in	   the	   leadership,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  extended	  “exclusive	  support”	  to	  that	  organization	  because	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  other	   alternative,	   concluded	   Dolidze.369	  The	   final	   resolution	   reflected	   the	   majority	  view;	   the	   Solidarity	   Committees	   agreed	   to	   continue	   to	   develop	   contacts	   with	   the	  liberation	  movements	  and	  coordinate	  policies	  to	  minimize	  future	  mistakes.	  370	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Soviet	   and	   Czechoslovakian	   intelligence	   services	   were	   also	  contemplating	   their	   responses	   to	   events	   in	   Ghana.	   On	   15	   March	   1966,	   Prague	  instructed	   Peták,	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   intelligence	   officer	   in	   Conakry	  most	   closely	   in	  touch	  with	   Cabral,	   to	   talk	   to	   Cabral	   and	   learn	   his	   view	   of	   events	   in	   the	   region.	   This	  intelligence	  was	  sought	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  a	  full	  picture	  of	  events	  in	  the	  region	  and	  develop	  a	  plan	  to	  prop	  up	  Guinea’s	  president	  Sékou	  Touré	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  similar	  coup	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   "Konsultationstreffen	   zwischen	   den	   Vertretern	   Afro-­‐asiatischer	   Solidaritätskomitees	   (AASK)	   europäischer	  sozialistischer	   Länder	   am	   28./29.06.1966,"	   BA-­‐SAPMO,	   DZ8/32,	   p.	   54.	   Lucjan	   Wolniewicz	   would	   serve	   as	   Poland’s	  Ambassador	   to	   the	   Congo	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	  would	   act	   as	   an	   observer	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   Luanda	   in	   early	   1975.	   See	  Chapter	  5.	  368	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  67-­‐68.	  369	  Ibid.,	  p.	  70.	  370 	  "Vorschläge	   für	   weitere	   Tagungen	   der	   Solidaritätskomitees	   der	   sozialistischen	   	   Länder,	   unterbreitet	   auf	   der	  internationalen	  Konsultation	  am	  28.	  und	  29.6.1966	  in	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  BA-­‐SAPMO,	  DZ8/32	  	  
	   155	  attempt.371	  	   Cabral	   was	   not	   surprised	   by	   the	   coup	   in	   Ghana,	   which	   he	   believed	   was	  reactionary	   and	   harmful	   for	   African	   unity,	   and	   was	   also	   worried	   about	   Touré's	  stability,	  as	  Peták	  learnt	  from	  conversations	  with	  Cabral	  on	  1	  and	  24	  March.372	  During	  another	  meeting	  with	  Peták	  and	  StB’s	  resident	  in	  Conakry,	  Pecháček,	  on	  13	  May,	  Cabral	  again	   spoke	   about	   the	   situation	   in	   Guinea	   and	   Ghana.	   One	   of	   Nkrumah’s	   mistakes,	  Cabral	   mused,	   was	   that	   Nkrumah	   had	   not	   eliminated	   the	   power	   of	   the	   tribal	   chiefs	  whilst	   in	   office.	   Another	   misstep	   was	   that	   he	   had	   not	   established	   an	   underground	  resistance	   movement	   shortly	   after	   the	   coup.	  373	  When	   Cabral	   visited	   Prague	   in	   late	  November,	  he	  discussed	  Nkrumah	  with	  Czechoslovakian	  intelligence	  agents,	  including	  Josef	   Janouš,	   the	   chief	   of	   the	   fourth	   (Afro-­‐Asian)	   department	   of	   the	   StB’s	   first	  (intelligence)	   directorate.	   Cabral	   again	   repeated	   that	   Nkrumah	   had	   to	   organize	   a	  resistance	  movement	   in	  Ghana,	   saying	   that	  Nkrumah	  still	   enjoyed	   the	   support	  of	   the	  masses	  and	  that	  his	  prospects	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  country	  were	  therefore	  quite	  good.	  “Upon	  returning	  to	  Conakry,	  Cabral	  will	  visit	  NK	  [Kwame	  Nkrumah]	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  on	  his	  impressions	  of	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  Bulgarian	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Sofia,	  talk	  about	  his	  plans,	  and	  promise	  the	  PAIGC’s	  help.”374	  One	   reason	   why	   Czechoslovakian	   intelligence	   was	   so	   interested	   in	   Nkrumah	  was	  because	   they	  were	  secretly	  putting	   together	  a	  plan	   for	  a	  counter-­‐coup	   in	  Ghana.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  personalities	   in	  that	  process	  would	  be	  Kofi	  Batsa,	  who	  had	  worked	  as	  the	  co-­‐editor	  of	  an	  influential	  newspaper	  –	  The	  Spark	  –	  and	  was	  a	  long-­‐time	  contact	  for	  Czechoslovakian	  Intelligence.	  Having	  spent	  one	  year	  in	  prison	  following	  the	  February	  coup,	  Batsa	  approached	  the	  Czechoslovakian	  resident	  intelligence	  officer	  in	  Accra	  and	  asked	  for	  help	  with	  his	  plan	  to	  overthrow	  the	  military	  regime	  in	  Ghana.	  The	  full	  details	  of	   that	   conspiracy	   are	   not	   clear,	   but	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   suggests	   that	   the	   KGB	  believed	  the	  operation	  was	  vital	  and	  that	  they	  offered	  their	  full	  cooperation.375	  It	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  what	  role	  Nkrumah	  was	  to	  play	  in	  this	  plot	  or	  whether	  he	  even	  knew	  about	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  Prague,	  "Organizační	  dopis	  pro	  s	  Petáka,"	  15	  March	  1966,	  ABS,	  11853/000,	  p.	  262.	  372	  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  24	  March	  1966,	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  p.	  94.	  373	  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  14	  May	  1966,	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  pp.	  95-­‐96.	  374Otakar	  Mařík	  (Fourth	  department	  of	  the	  StB	  First	  Directorate),	  Prague,	  7	  December	  1966,	  "Pobyt	  Sekretáře	  v	  ČSSR,"	  ABS,	  43197/020.	  375	  For	  a	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  incident,	  see:	  Zídek	  and	  Sieber,	  Československo,	  pp.	  73-­‐74.	  
	   156	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  it,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  StB	  placed	  their	  trust	  in	  Cabral	  to	  act	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  mediator	  between	  them	  and	  Nkrumah.	  376	  Over	  the	   following	  years,	  Cabral	  grew	  increasingly	  skeptical	  about	  Nkrumah’s	  political	  future.	  On	  6	  February	  1967,	  speaking	  to	  Josef	  Janouš	  in	  Prague,	  Cabral	  spelled	  out	   his	   frustration	  with	   Nkrumah,	   whom	   he	   had	   finally	  met	   in	   Conakry.	   First	   of	   all,	  Cabral	   objected	   to	   Nkrumah’s	   plan	   to	   publish	   a	   book,	   Handbook	   on	   Revolutionary	  
Warfare,	   in	  which	  he	  proposed	   the	  creation	  of	  an	  all-­‐African	  working	  class	  vanguard	  party,	   the	  All-­‐African	  People's	  Army	  and	  Militia,	   to	   counter	   the	   future	  military	   coups	  because,	  as	  Cabral	  told	  Janouš,	  it	  would	  expose	  his	  whole	  strategy	  to	  the	  imperialists.	  Cabral	   also	   complained	   to	   Janouš	   that	   Nkrumah	   had	   not	   been	   responsive	   to	   this	  criticism	  and	  had	  actually	  proposed	   that	  Cabral	   should	   give	  him	  a	   group	  of	   guerrilla	  fighters	   who	   could	   organize	   resistance	   in	   Ghana.	   Janos	   responded	   by	   saying	   that	  Czechoslovakia	  would	  do	  everything	  to	  protect	  Nkrumah’s	  interests,	  but	  that	  he	  would	  have	  to	  put	  aside	  his	  Pan-­‐Africanist	  theories	  and	  concentrate	  on	  organizing	  resistance	  inside	  the	  country.	  Janouš	  thus	  asked	  Cabral	  to	  use	  his	  influence	  with	  Nkrumah	  for	  this	  purpose,	  but	  without	  him	  knowing	  about	  Czechoslovakia’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  plan.377	  Cabral	   continued	   feeding	   information	   about	   the	   situation	   inside	   Ghana	   to	   Nkrumah,	  but	   it	   soon	   became	   quite	   clear	   that	   the	   former	   president	   was	   no	   longer	   actively	  interested	   in	   returning	   to	   power.	   On	   25	   February	   1968,	   meeting	   Peták	   in	   Conakry,	  Cabral	  said	   that	  Nkrumah	  knew	  very	   little	  about	   the	   internal	  situation	   in	  Ghana,	   that	  he	  had	  become	  more	  of	  a	  philosopher	  than	  a	  politician,	  and	  that	  his	  plan	  to	  liberate	  the	  African	  continent	  was	  not	  realistic.378	  Nothing	  came	  out	  of	   the	  plans	   to	  generate	  a	   left-­‐wing	  revolution	   in	  Ghana.	   In	  August	  1968,	  the	  Ghanaian	  police	  arrested	  Kofi	  Batsa,	  who	  ultimately	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  379	  Cabral	   was	   a	   very	   willing	   participant	   in	   these	   plans,	   especially	   initially,	  when	   he	   believed	   that	   Nkrumah	   still	   had	   a	   chance	   to	   return	   to	   Ghana.	   Cabral	   thus	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  Josef	  Janouš	  (Fourth	  department	  of	  the	  StB	  First	  Directorate,	  chief),	  18	  May	  1967,	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  pp.	  154-­‐155.	  377	  Josef	  Janouš	  (Fourth	  department	  of	  the	  StB	  First	  Directorate,	  chief),	  Prague,	  13	  February	  1967,	  "Zpráva	  o	  jednání	  s	  Amilcarem	  Cabralem,"	  ABS,	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  167-­‐169.	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  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  26	  February	  1968,	  "Sekretář	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  schůzka	  s	  Nkrumahem,"	  ABS,	  43197/020,	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  Sieber,	  Československo,	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   157	  pledged	   support	   for	   Sékou	   Touré	   and	   acted	   as	   a	   go-­‐between	   Czechoslovakian	  Intelligence	  and	  Nkrumah,	  trying	  to	  convince	  the	  latter	  to	  construct	  a	  realistic	  plan	  for	  the	  liberation	  of	  Ghana.	  While	  this	  did	  not	  work	  out,	  Czechoslovakian	  Intelligence	  was	  still	  very	  pleased	  with	  Cabral’s	  contribution.	  On	  4	  April	  1969,	  looking	  back	  at	  relations	  with	  Cabral	  over	   the	  previous	  nine	  years,	  Czechoslovakian	  Intelligence	  observed	  that	  their	   focus	   had	   been	   to	   use	   Cabral	   as	   a	   “progressive	   influence”	   on	   African	   public	  opinion	  and	  on	  regional	   forums	  such	  as	  the	  OAU	  and	  the	  CONCP.	  “Equally	  useful	  and	  influential	  was	  the	  role	  he	  played	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  Czechoslovakian	  intelligence	  when	  in	  contact	  with	  President	  Nkrumah,	  both	  when	  the	  latter	  lived	  in	  Accra	  and	  after	  he	  left	  for	  Conakry.”380	  Cabral	  was	  willing	  to	  help	  Nkrumah,	  but	  this	  was	  definitely	  not	  his	  key	  concern,	  for	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  war	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  intensified	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1960s.	  	  
	  
The	  PAIGC	  Goes	  on	  the	  Offensive,	  1966-­‐1967	  In	  January	  1966,	  Cabral	  made	  a	  major	  speech	  called	  the	  “Weapon	  of	  Theory”	  at	  the	   Tricontinental	   Conference	   in	   Havana,	   where	   he	   outlined	   his	   views	   on	   African	  liberation	   efforts.	   Cabral	   postulated	   that	   only	   “two	   paths”	   were	   available	   to	   an	  independent	   nation:	   to	   “return	   to	   imperialist	   domination”	   or	   to	   “take	   the	   way	   of	  socialism.”	   Construction	   of	   a	   socialist	   society	  was	   dependent	   upon	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  “revolutionary	  vanguard”	   firmly	  conscious	  of	   the	  ultimate	  objectives	  of	   the	   liberation	  struggle.	  Given	  the	  generally	  “embryonic”	  nature	  of	  the	  working	  class	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  political	  conservatism	  of	   the	  peasantry,	   the	  nationalist	  petit	  bourgeoisie	  becomes	  the	  leading	   force	   in	   the	   national	   liberation	   struggle.	   It	   is	   this	   sector	   that	   becomes	  most	  rapidly	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  free	  itself	  from	  foreign	  domination	  and	  is	  most	  capable	  of	  maintaining	   control	   of	   the	   state	   after	   the	   achievement	  of	   political	   independence.	   If	   a	  wide	  national	  liberation	  front	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  political	  independence,	  then	   the	   role	   of	   the	   “revolutionary	   vanguard”	   is	   to	   prevent	   a	   neo-­‐colonial	   situation	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  (StB),	  Prague,	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   158	  whereby	  the	  nationalist	  petit	  bourgeoisie	  allies	  itself	  with	  Western	  capitalism	  and	  thus	  betrays	   the	   revolution.	   To	   fulfill	   the	   role	   of	   this	   vanguard,	   the	   nationalist	   petit	  bourgeoisie	  had	  to	  commit	  what	  Cabral	  termed	  “class	  suicide,”	  which	  entailed	  rejecting	  the	  temptations	  of	  the	  natural	  concerns	  of	  its	  class	  mentality	  and	  identifying	  itself	  with	  the	   working	   classes,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   “reborn	   as	   revolutionary	   workers,	   completely	  identified	  with	  the	  deepest	  aspirations	  of	  the	  people	  to	  which	  they	  belong.”	  381	  Cabral’s	  speech	  impressed	  Fidel	  Castro.	  “His	  address	  to	  the	  Tricontinental	  was	  brilliant.	  Everyone	  was	  struck	  by	  his	  great	  intelligence	  and	  personality,”	  recalled	  Jorge	  Risquet,	   who	  was	   then	   in	   charge	   of	   Cuba’s	  military	  mission	   to	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville.382	  Castro	   already	   knew	   of	   Cabral	   from	   one	   of	   his	   closest	   associates	   and	   friends,	   Che	  Guevara,	   who	   had	   visited	   Conakry	   in	   December	   1964	   during	   his	   tour	   of	   Africa.	  Convinced	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   good	   prospects,	   especially	   regarding	   the	   liberation	  struggle	   in	  Cape	  Verde,	  Che	  had	  offered	  Cabral	   some	   support.	   In	  May	  1965,	   a	  Cuban	  ship,	  the	  Uvero,	  had	  brought	  food,	  arms,	  and	  weapons	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  Conakry,	  while	  in	  July,	  a	  handful	  of	   recruits	   from	  the	  Cape	  Verde	   islands	  had	  gone	   to	  Cuba	   for	  military	  training.	  “When	  Cabral	  visited	  Cuba	  [in	  1966],	  Fidel	  already	  had	  information	  about	  us	  from	   a	   source	   he	   kept	   in	   high	   regard,	   Che	   [Guevara],”	   observed	   Aristides	   Pereira.383	  Castro	   and	   Cabral	   spoke	   at	   length	   in	   Havana;	   Amílcar	   explained	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  liberation	  struggle,	  and	  Castro	  promised	   to	  expand	  Cuba’s	  support.	  By	   July	  1966,	   the	  Cuban	  military	  mission	   in	  Conakry	  counted	  11	  artillery	  specialists,	  eight	  drivers,	  one	  mechanic,	   and	   10	   doctors,	   led	   by	   an	   intelligence	   officer,	   Lieutenant	   Aurelio	   Ricard	  Hernandez,	   known	   as	   Artemio.	   The	   Cubans	   also	   delivered	   cigars,	   brown	   sugar,	  distinctive	  olive	  green	  uniforms,	  equipment	  for	  the	  armed	  forces,	  and	  trucks.	  384	  Meanwhile,	   the	   PAIGC	   leadership	   began	   preparations	   for	   a	   major	   military	  offensive	   in	   the	   east	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   By	   1966,	   it	   had	   become	   apparent	   that	   the	  offensive	  launched	  by	  Arnaldo	  Schultz,	  the	  Governor	  General	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  in	  1964	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  Cabral,	  "The	  Weapon	  of	  Theory,"	  retrieved	  from	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  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  187.	  383	  Lopes,	  Aristides	  Pereira,	  p.	  121.	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  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	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   159	  had	   failed	   to	  bring	   any	   substantial	   advances.385	  Having	   successfully	  defended	  against	  army	   attacks	   on	   their	   stronghold	   in	   the	   southern	   Tombali	   province,	   the	   PAIGC	  launched	   a	   counter-­‐offensive	   designed	   to	   dislodge	   the	   army	   from	   its	   well-­‐fortified	  posts.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  strategic	  forts	  in	  the	  east	  was	  located	  at	  Madina	  do	  Boé.	  Close	  to	  the	  border	  with	  Guinea,	   the	   fort	  at	  Madina	  do	  Boé	  blocked	   the	  PAIGC’s	  access	   to	   the	  eastern	   hinterland	   and	   protected	   another	   strategic	   army	   post	   at	   Guiledge.	   Passing	  through	  Moscow	  on	  his	  way	   to	   the	  Tricontinental	  Conference	   in	  Havana,	  Cabral	  gave	  an	   interview	   with	   Pravda’s	   correspondent	   Mikhail	   Zenovich	   and	   said,	   “I	   cannot	  promise	  we	  will	  achieve	  independence	  next	  year,	  but	  we	  will	  not	  spare	  our	  strength	  to	  achieve	   this	   goal.”	  386	  Heavy	   artillery	  was	   required	   for	   the	   assault	   on	  Madina	  do	  Boé,	  and	   this	   was	   exactly	   why	   Cabral	   asked	   Castro	   to	   urgently	   dispatch	   Cuban	   weapons	  specialists	   to	   Conakry.387	  In	   July,	   a	   Cuban	   commander,	   Raul	  Menéndez	   Tomassevich,	  toured	   the	   liberated	   areas	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   accompanied	   by	   Cabral,	   João	   Bernardo	  “Nino”	   Vieira,	   and	   Francisco	   “Chico”	   Mendes,	   advising	   the	   rebels	   about	   the	  organization	  of	  the	  military	  bases	  and	  planning	  for	  the	  attack	  on	  Madina	  do	  Boé.388	  The	  eastern	  offensive	  soon	  ran	  into	  major	  difficulties.	  While	  support	  from	  the	  Balante	   had	   been	   key	   to	   the	   PAIGC’s	   victory	   at	   Como,	   the	   eastern	   front	   was	  predominantly	   inhabited	  by	  the	  Fula	  (or	  Fulani),	  a	  Muslim	  ethnic	  group	  whose	  tribal	  chiefs	  had	   long	  cooperated	  with	   the	  Portuguese	  and	  who	  were	  generally	   resistant	   to	  the	   nationalists’	  mobilization	   drive.	   According	   to	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   adviser	   to	   the	  PAIGC	   in	   Conakry,	   František	   Polda,	  writing	   to	   Prague	   in	  November	   1966,	   the	   PAIGC	  had	  made	  substantive	  military	  progress	  in	  the	  south	  and	  in	  the	  north,	  but	  the	  situation	  with	   the	   civilian	   population	   was	   impeding	   progress	   in	   the	   east.	   He	   explained,	   “This	  region	  is	  inhabited	  by	  the	  Fula,	  who	  do	  not	  identify	  with	  the	  PAIGC.	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year,	  when	  armed	  clashes	  began	  in	  this	  area,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  fled	  to	  neighboring	   Guinea	   while	   the	   rest	   flocked	   to	   the	   ‘protected	   villages’	   near	   two	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  Pravda,	  December	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  1965,	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  Conflicting	  Missions,	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  Portuguese	   posts	   in	   Madina	   and	   Beli.”389	  When	   the	   PAIGC	   –	   armed	   with	   82mm	  mortars,	   three	   75mm	   cannons,	   15	   rocket	   launchers,	   and	   six	   12.7mm	   anti-­‐aircraft	  machine	  guns,	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  Cuban	  artillery	  specialists	  and	  doctors	  –	   launched	  a	  major	   attack	   against	   Madina	   do	   Boé	   on	   11	   November,	   the	   operation	   failed	  spectacularly,	   resulting	   in	   multiple	   casualties	   including	   the	   military	   commander,	  Domingos	   Ramos,	   who	   died	   at	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   the	   attack.390	  	   Ramos	   was	   a	  charismatic	  military	   leader	  who	   had	  worked	   as	   an	   effective	  mobilizer	   for	   the	   PAIGC	  before	   being	   appointed	   the	   commander	   of	   the	   eastern	   front	   after	   the	   1964	   Cassaca	  Congress.391	  Cabral	   was	   particularly	   upset	   by	   his	   death	   because	   the	   two	   men	   were	  close	  friends.	  Visiting	  Prague	  in	  November	  1966,	  Cabral	  told	  his	   interlocutors	  that	  he	  would	   make	   a	   detailed	   evaluation	   of	   the	   operation	   that	   had	   resulted	   in	   Ramos’s	  death.392	  The	   Czechoslovakian	   and	   Soviet	   Intelligence	   services	   were	   concerned	   about	  the	   military	   situation	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   “The	   struggle	   led	   by	   the	   PAIGC	   has	   a	   large	  importance	   for	   the	   whole	   of	   Africa	   and	   especially	   for	   other	   Portuguese	   colonies,”	  stated	   a	   report	   briefly	   summarizing	   a	   joint	   consultation	   session	   between	  Czechoslovakian	  and	  Soviet	   intelligence	  staff	  and	  countersigned	  by	   Josef	   Janouš,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  department	  at	  the	  StB’s	  intelligence	  directorate.	  While	  both	  agreed	  that	  the	  liberation	  struggle	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  was	  important	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  required	   assistance	   on	  multiple	   fronts,	   their	   evaluation	   of	   the	  military	   situation	  was	  quite	  pessimistic,	  citing	  a	  slowdown	  of	  progress	  and	  lack	  of	  morale.	  The	  solution,	  the	  report	   continued,	  was	   to	   “work	   out	   a	   strategic	   and	   tactical	   plan”	   for	   the	   PAIGC	   and	  then	   “choose	   and	   teach	   a	   few	  qualified	  men”	  who	   could	   enact	   this	   plan.	   The	  Cubans	  were	   also	   to	   be	   consulted	   and	   asked	   for	   aid	   in	   enacting	   the	   strategy	   and	   tactics	   of	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   Josef	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  StB	  First	  Directorate),	  Prague,	  7	  December	  1966,	  "Pobyt	  Sekretáře	  v	  ČSSR,"	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  p.	  122.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  when	  exactly	  this	  meeting	  took	  place	  and	  who	  participated	  in	  it	  on	  either	  side.	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  war.393	  	   The	   Czechoslovakian	   and	   Soviet	   Intelligence	   services	   were	   clearly	   worried	  about	  the	  PAIGC's	  military	  situation	  and	  wanted	  to	  enlist	  Cuban	  support	   for	  a	  rescue	  operation.	  	  	  
The	  PAIGC:	  On	  the	  Brink	  of	  Victory,	  1967-­‐1969	  On	   6	   February	   1967,	   Amílcar	   Cabral	   had	   a	   long	   conversation	   about	   the	  situation	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	  with	   Josef	   Janouš	   in	   Prague.	   Cabral	   briefed	   Janouš	   on	   the	  most	  recent	  meeting	  of	  the	  party	  leadership,	  saying	  that	  the	  offensive	  would	  continue,	  but	  that	  future	  operations	  would	  have	  to	  be	  very	  carefully	  planned.	  Cabral	  also	  briefed	  Janouš	  on	  his	  most	  recent	  negotiations	  with	  his	  Cuban	  comrades	   in	  Havana,	  pointing	  out	  that	  he	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  Cubans’	  advice	  that	  the	  movement	  should	  prepare	  for	  an	  attack	  on	  Bissau.	   	  Cabral	  believed	  that	  such	  a	  high-­‐risk	  operation	  could	  lead	  to	  high	   casualties,	   which	   would	   be	   demoralizing	   and	   harmful	   for	   the	   party’s	   prestige.	  Janouš	   criticized	   Cabral	   for	   his	   gap	   in	  military	   intelligence	   and	   for	   not	   organizing	   a	  well-­‐functioning	   general	   staff,	   two	   topics	   that	   they	   discussed	   at	   length.	   Cabral	   again	  referenced	   his	   negotiations	   in	   Havana,	   saying	   that	   he	   had	   warned	   their	   Cuban	  comrades	  that	  if	  the	  Chinese	  managed	  to	  undermine	  the	  Soviet	  influence	  in	  Guinea	  and	  overall	  in	  Africa,	  this	  would	  mean	  success	  for	  the	  imperialists,	  and	  for	  the	  Cubans,	  the	  end	  of	  their	  influence	  in	  Africa.	  “Cuba	  has	  influence	  and	  weight	  in	  Africa	  only	  with	  the	  presence	   of	   the	   USSR	   and	   Czechoslovakia,”	   Cabral	   told	   Janouš.394	  Given	   that	   Cuba’s	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  at	  a	  low	  point	  in	  1967,	  it	  was	  smart	  for	  Cabral	  to	  shore	  up	  his	  interlocutor’s	  confidence	  by	  praising	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  While	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	   relations	   remained	   sour	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   1967,	   it	  appears	   that	   Czechoslovakian	   spies	   discussed	   the	   PAIGC	   at	   Conakry.	   The	   initiative	  came	   from	   the	  Cuban	   rezident	  and	  First	   Secretary	  of	   the	  Cuban	  embassy	  at	  Conakry,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  393	  Josef	  Houska	  to	  Josef	  Kudrna,	  15	  November	  1966,	  "PAIGC	  –	  stručné	  shrnutí	  konsultací,"	  ABS,	  11853/011,	  pp.	  61-­‐62.	  During	  this	  meeting,	  Janouš	  told	  Cabral	  that	  Prague	  had	  approved	  to	  supply	  additional	  1,000	  pistols,	  2,000	  knives,	  50	  heavy	  machine	  guns,	  and	  50	  bazookas	  with	  ammunition.	  394	  Josef	  Janouš	  (Fourth	  department	  of	  the	  StB	  First	  Directorate,	  chief),	  Prague,	  13	  February	  1967,	  "Zpráva	  o	  jednání	  s	  Amilcarem	  Cabralem,"	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  pp.	  165.	  “Piedro”	  was	  perhaps	  Pedro	  Rodriques	  Peralta,	  a	  Cuban	  adviser	  who	  would	   be	   captured	   and	   imprisoned	   by	   the	   Portuguese	   in	   1969.	   Like	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   documents	   of	   the	   StB’s	   First	  Directorate,	  Peták	  refers	  to	  Cabral	  as	  “SEKRETAR,”	  to	  Luís	  Cabral	  as	  “KOTAS”	  and	  to	  Aristides	  Pereira	  as	  “ACHILLES.”	  
	   162	  Luís	   Delgado	   Perez,	   who	   approached	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   rezident	   Pecháček	  requesting	  a	  meeting.	  Pecháček	   told	  him	   to	   talk	   to	  Peták.	  On	  both	   the	  8th	  and	  15th	  of	  May	   1967,	   Perez	   visited	   Peták	   at	   home,	   accompanied	   by	   another	   Cuban	   who	  introduced	   himself	   as	   “Piedro.”	   Military	   strategy	   was	   the	   principal	   focus	   of	   their	  conversation.	  Peták,	  Luís,	  and	  “Piedro”	  agreed	  that	  military	  operations	  had	  stalled	  and	  that	   morale	   was	   low.	   Peták	   said	   that	   the	   armed	   forces	   should	   be	   reorganized	   into	  larger	   units	   capable	   of	   engaging	   in	   pre-­‐planned	   military	   operations.	   Piedro	   initially	  responded	   that	   large	   detachments	   were	   vulnerable	   to	   attacks	   and	   required	   very	  effective	  leadership,	  but	  later	  agreed	  with	  Peták.	  They	  also	  agreed	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  lacking	  in	  military	  intelligence,	  which	  was	  harmful	  for	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  military	  operations.395	  The	  Cubans	  and	  Peták	  also	  shared	  opinions	  about	  the	  movement’s	  leadership.	  Perez	  and	  “Piedro”	  told	  Peták	  that	  Cabral	  had	  fully	  centralized	  decision	  making	  into	  his	  hands,	  and	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  associates	  would	  not	  dare	  disagree	  with	  him,	  except	  for	   the	   late	  Domingos	  Ramos.	   In	   response,	   Peták	  praised	  Cabral,	   saying	   that	   his	   loss	  would	   be	   very	   dangerous	   for	   the	   movement	   and	   that	   they	   had	   to	   do	   everything	   to	  ensure	  his	  security.	  Cabral,	  of	  course,	  made	  mistakes	   like	  other	  politicians,	  continued	  Peták,	   but	   his	   popularity	   both	   within	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   worldwide	   was	   unrivalled	  when	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  anyone	  else	  in	  the	  movement.	  The	  Cubans	  agreed	  that	  while	  Aristides	   Pereira	   was	   a	   good	   organizer,	   he	   was	   not	   a	   politician,	   and	   that	   only	   Luís	  Cabral	   could	   perhaps	   succeed	   his	   brother.	   “The	   two	   Cubans	   were	   very	   frank	   and	  informed	  us	  willingly	  about	  everything	  they	  know.	  I	  propose	  to	  collaborate	  with	  them	  closely,”	  Peták	  concluded.396	  Piero	  Gleijeses	  writes	  that	  the	  Cubans	  never	  tried	  to	  impose	  their	  opinions	  on	  Cabral,	  who	  was	  ultimately	  the	  final	  authority	  on	  all	  matters	  of	  military	  strategy	  in	  the	  conflict.	   For	   example,	   Cabral	   preferred	   a	   war	   of	   attrition	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   high	  casualties,	   while	   the	   Cubans	   argued	   in	   favor	   of	   larger	   operations.	   “We	   would	   have	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  Ibid.	  396	  Quoted	   in	  Peták	  (Conakry)	   to	  Prague,	  17	  May	  1967,	  "Konsultace	  problémů	  PAIGC	  s	  kubánskými	  přáteli	  8.	  a	  17.5,"	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  pp.	  151-­‐153.	  
	   163	  preferred	  a	  more	  aggressive	  strategy,	  but	  we	  adapted,”	  recalled	  Victor	  Dreke,	  the	  new	  head	   of	   mission. 397 	  Evidence	   is	   lacking	   as	   to	   how	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   advisers	  evaluated	   these	  Cuban	   tactics.	  Meeting	  Francisco	   “Chico”	  Mendes	  and	  Osvaldo	  Vieira	  on	   14	   December	   1966,	   Peták	   discovered	   that	   Cabral	   had	   requested	   that	   the	   two	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  “several	  destructive	  propaganda	  operations”	   in	  Bissau.	  “From	  their	   information,	   they	   do	   not	   have	   a	   single	   plan	   of	   action,”	   wrote	   Peták	   to	   Prague,	  saying	   that	  he	  had	  advised	   the	   two	   to	   focus	  on	  propaganda,	  while	   remembering	   that	  any	  “destructive	  operations”	  required	  forward	  planning	  and	  accurate	  intelligence.398	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  that	  the	  Czechoslovak	  advisers	  had	  any	  major	  disagreements	  with	   the	  Cubans,	   as	  per	   the	  documented	   conversations.	   Czechoslovakian	   Intelligence	  was	  still	  fairly	  skeptical	  about	  prospects	  for	  an	  easy	  win.	  In	  May	  1967,	  evaluating	  the	  PAIGC’s	   prospects	   on	   a	   request	   from	   GDR’s	   intelligence,	   Peták	   stated	   that	   the	  Portuguese	  would	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  colony	  as	  long	  as	  fighting	  was	  concentrated	  in	   remote	  areas	  of	   little	  economic	  or	   strategic	   importance,	   and	   if	   fighting	  was	  not	   so	  concentrated,	   Western	   countries	   might	   come	   to	   Lisbon’s	   rescue. 399 	  Nevertheless,	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  their	  best	  to	  help	  the	  PAIGC	  achieve	  a	  victory	  in	  the	  east.	  	  Peták	   remained	   in	   Conakry	   in	   an	   advisory	   capacity	   until	   1968.	   In	   1967,	   he	  participated	  in	  discussions	  about	  a	  plan	  for	  a	  renewed	  offensive	  on	  the	  “eastern	  front.”	  Peták	   also	   advised	   the	   military	   commanders	   about	   the	   best	   use	   for	   the	   advanced	  weapons	   arriving	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Czechoslovakia.	   One	   of	   the	   discussions	  was	   how	   best	   to	   use	   the	   120mm	   mortars	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   received	   from	   the	   Soviet	  Union.400	  During	  one	  meeting	  with	  Osvaldo	  Vieira	  –	  the	  new	  commander	  of	  the	  eastern	  front	   –	   Peták	   explained	   how	   sniper	   rifles,	   which	   had	   been	   recently	   delivered	   to	   the	  PAIGC,	   could	   be	   used	   to	   dislodge	   the	   Portuguese	   troops	   from	   their	   fortified	   posts,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  397	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  198.	  398	  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  15	  December	  1966,	  "OSWALDO	  VIEIRA	  a	  ŠIKO	  -­‐	  schůzka,"	  ABS,	  11853/011,	  p.	  63.	  399	  Peták	  (Conakry)	  30	  May	  1967,	  "PAIGC	  –	  podklady	  pro	  jednání	  s	  rozvědkou	  NDR,"	  ABS,	  11853/011,	  pp.	  136-­‐139.	  400	  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  28	  December	  1966,	  "Schuze	  PB	  PAIGC	  v	  Boke	  	  -­‐	  konec	  prosince	  1966,"	  ABS,	  11853/011,	  p.	   67;	   Peták	   (Conakry)	   to	   Prague,	   19	   June	   1967,	   "SEKRETÁŘ	   –	   projednání	   operačního	   plánu	   pro	   oblast	   Východní	  fronty,"	  ABS,	  43197/020,	  p.	  184.	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  including	  Madina	  do	  Boé.	  401	  	  However,	  as	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  war	  quickened,	  resident	  spies	  complained	   that	   they	   could	  hardly	  ever	   see	  Cabral,	  who	  was	  almost	   always	  away	  on	  foreign	  trips.402	  1968	  was	  of	  course	  a	  turbulent	  year	  in	  Czechoslovakia.	  After	  a	  group	  of	  reform-­‐minded	   party	   leaders	   led	   by	   the	   new	   CPC	   First	   Secretary	   Alexander	   Dubček	  took	  power	  in	  January	  1968,	  the	  Minister	  of	  the	  Interior,	  Josef	  Kudrna,	  and	  the	  Chief	  of	  Intelligence,	   Josef	   Houska,	   were	   dismissed	   from	   office.	   While	   Pecháček	   remained	   in	  Conakry,	   Peták	   and	   František	   Polda	   were	   recalled	   around	   this	   time,	   for	   unknown	  reasons.	   With	   these	   two	   gone,	   the	   volume	   of	   communications	   between	  Czechoslovakian	   Intelligence	   and	   Cabral	   declined	   steadily,	   even	   though	   Prague	  remained	  committed	  to	  supporting	  the	  PAIGC.	  	  With	   the	   acquisition	   of	   advanced	   weapons	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  Czechoslovakia,	   and	   with	   military	   training	   and	   medical	   instruction	   provided	   by	   the	  Cubans,	   the	   PAIGC	   launched	   several	   successful	   operations.	   On	   28	   February	   1968,	   a	  FARP	  antiaircraft	  unit	  led	  by	  Andre	  Gomes	  attacked	  the	  Bissablanca	  airport,	  destroying	  three	  aircraft	  hangars,	  a	  control	  tower,	  and	  two	  jets.403	  One	  year	  later,	  the	  FARP	  finally	  managed	   to	   take	   over	   Madina	   do	   Boé.	   Snipers	   would	   prevent	   the	   Portuguese	   from	  leaving	   their	   bunkers	   during	   the	   day,	  while	   artillery	   continuously	   shelled	   the	   fort	   at	  night.	   “The	   Portuguese	   held	   beyond	   human	   endurance,”	   recalled	   one	   military	  commander,	   but	   eventually	   had	   to	   abandon	   the	   fort.404	  With	   the	   military	   situation	  rapidly	  deteriorating	  in	  1968,	  Arnaldo	  Schultz	  was	  recalled	  to	  Lisbon	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  another	  veteran	  of	  the	  Angolan	  counterinsurgency	  campaign,	  General	  António	  Ribeiro	  de	  Spínola.	  When	  Spínola	  arrived	  at	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  he	  found	  the	  Portuguese	  army	  on	  the	  defensive,	  and	  warned	  Washington	  that	  reinforcements	  of	  men	  and	  materiel	  were	  urgently	   required	   to	   rescue	   the	   colonial	   authority	   from	   total	   collapse.405	  While	   the	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  PAIGC	  was	   increasing	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   Portuguese	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau,	   the	  MPLA’s	  campaign	  in	  Angola	  was	  also	  strengthening.	  	  	  
The	  MPLA’s	  War	  and	  State-­‐Building	  in	  the	  Southeast,	  1966-­‐1969	  The	   MPLA’s	   fortunes	   looked	   promising	   in	   early	   1966.	   One	   reason	   was	   the	  situation	   in	   Zambia,	   a	   former	   British	   colony,	   which	   had	   acquired	   independence	   in	  1964.	   Zambia	  had	  a	   long	  border	  with	   eastern	   and	   southeast	  Angola,	  which	  provided	  ample	   opportunities	   for	   penetration	   of	   that	   vast	   and	   sparsely	   populated	   hinterland.	  Zambia’s	   first	   president,	   Kenneth	   Kaunda,	   was	   initially	   reluctant	   to	   allow	   liberation	  movements	   to	   operate	   from	   Zambia,	   but	   Ian	   Smith’s	   Unilateral	   Declaration	   of	  Independence	  in	  South	  Rhodesia	  made	  Kaunda	  more	  inclined	  to	  support	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  The	  MPLA	  had	  already	  established	  an	  office	   in	  Zambia’s	   capital,	   Lusaka,	  and	   in	   early	   1966,	   Agostinho	   Neto	   wanted	   to	   open	   a	   new	   “front”	   in	   the	   southeast.	  Beyond	   that,	   Neto	   was	   receiving	   a	   warm	   welcome	   in	   Moscow.	   Neto	   attended	   the	  Twenty-­‐Third	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU	  in	  March	  1966,	  where	  he	  held	  discussions	  with	  the	  Soviets,	   Bulgarians,	   and	   even	   the	   Polish,	   asking	   for	   cash,	   humanitarian	   assistance	  (including	   stationery	   and	   medicines),	   arms,	   and	   supplies	   for	   combatants	   in	   the	  southeast.406	  On	  2	  April	  1966,	  speaking	  to	  Bogumil	  Rychlowski,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Polish	  delegation,	   Petr	  Manchkha,	   the	   chief	   of	   the	   Africa	   Section	   at	   the	   CPSU	   International	  Department,	  said	  the	  MPLA	  was	  active	  in	  Cabinda	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  ship	  more	  arms	  for	  the	  organization	  via	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  He	  also	  praised	  Neto	  as	  a	  man	  who	  commanded	  authority	  among	  the	  “progressive	  forces	  in	  Africa.”	  Manchkha	  concluded:	  “CPSU’s	   attitude	   towards	   the	   MPLA,	   towards	   its	   leadership,	   and	   towards	   Agostinho	  Neto	  is	  very	  positive.”407	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  also	  dispatched	  a	  surgeon,	  Oleg	  Poremskiy,	  to	  run	  a	  hospital	  near	  the	  MPLA’s	  training	  camp	  at	  Dolisie,	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville.	  	  Within	   the	   first	   eight	   months	   of	   his	   arrival,	   Poremskiy	   started	   providing	  medical	   services	   to	   address	   the	  MPLA’s	  medical	   needs.	   He	   reported	   to	  Moscow	   that	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  while	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  delivered	  medicines	  and	  equipment	  for	  the	  hospital,	  these	  could	   not	   be	   adequately	   used	   because	   there	   were	   no	   qualified	   doctors.	   With	  Poremskiy’s	   arrival,	   it	   was	   now	   possible	   for	   the	   hospital	   to	   operate	   at	   full	   capacity,	  offering	  surgical	  and	  general	  medical	  treatment,	  mostly	  to	  injured	  militants.	  Poremskiy	  also	   trained	   a	   group	   of	   10	   nurses	   who	  would	   be	   dispatched	   as	   first-­‐aid	   responders	  wherever	   required.	   The	   surgeon	  wrote	   that	   his	   relations	  with	   Neto	   and	   the	  MPLA’s	  leadership	   in	   general	  were	   good,	  which	   allowed	   for	   the	   resolution	   of	   any	  difficulties	  that	   arose.408	  Poremskiy	  actually	  arrived	   just	   in	   time	   to	  witness	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  MPLA’s	  military	  operations	  the	  north.	  The	  MPLA	  was	   still	   active	   in	  Cabinda,	   but	  Neto	  had	  not	   given	  up	   the	  hope	  of	  reinvigorating	   military	   operations	   in	   the	   north,	   the	   scene	   of	   the	   1961	   Angolan	  Uprising.	   Jorge	  Risquet,	   the	  head	  of	   the	  Cuban	  military	  mission	   in	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	  recalled,	  “This	  was	  Neto’s	  great	  obsession.”	  409	  Travelling	  to	  the	  north	  of	  Angola	  –	  in	  the	  MPLA’s	  terminology,	  the	  “First	  Military	  Region”	  –	  from	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  was	  a	  highly	  risky	   business,	   involving	   trekking	   through	   Zairian	   territory	   controlled	   by	   Holden	  Roberto’s	  FNLA,	  which	  was	  hostile	  to	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  first	  such	  expedition,	  undertaken	  in	   July	   1966,	   was	   a	   success;	   a	   column	   of	   about	   100	   men	   led	   by	   Jacobo	   “Monstro	  Imortal”	  Caetano	  safely	  reached	  Ngalama	  in	  the	  First	  Military	  region	  on	  23	  September	  1966,	   and	   immediately	   asked	   for	   reinforcements	   and	   supplies. 410 	  The	   second	  expedition,	  of	  January	  1967,	  proved	  disastrous,	  as	  the	  150	  guerrilla	  fighters,	  including	  four	  women,	   lost	   their	  way,	   starved,	  were	  ambushed,	  and	   then	  were	   finally	  captured	  by	   FNLA	   troops.	   Many	   of	   them,	   including	   Deolinda	   Rodriques	   de	   Almeida,	   the	   only	  woman	   in	   the	  MPLA’s	   steering	   committee,	  would	  never	   be	   seen	   again.411	  On	  12	   July,	  Zairian	   foreign	   minister	   Justin	   Bomboko	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   his	   counterpart	   in	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	  Charles	  David	  Ganao,	  saying	  that	  the	  MPLA	  should	  seek	  a	  settlement	  with	  the	  FNLA	  and	  warning	   that	  any	   further	  covert	  penetration	  of	  Zairian	   territory	  would	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  be	   “considered	   a	   breach	   of	   national	   sovereignty.”412	  After	   yet	   another	   disastrous	  attempt	   the	   following	   year,	   the	   MPLA	   stopped	   sending	   columns	   to	   the	   north.	   Lúcio	  Lara	  recalled,	  “We	  would	  have	  tried	  again,	  but	  we	  did	  not	  have	  any	  more	  weapons,	  and	  it	   had	   become	   too	   difficult	   –	   there	   were	   spies	   everywhere	   and	   too	   many	  checkpoints.”413	  Vadim	  Kirpichenko,	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  one	  of	  KGB’s	  Africa	  departments	  in	  the	  1960s,	  wrote	  that	  solid	  intelligence	  on	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  campaigns	  was	  lacking.	  That	  was	  why,	   in	  early	  1967,	  an	   intra-­‐departmental	  mission	  was	  assembled	  with	   the	  purpose	   of	   traveling	   to	   all	   the	   frontline	   states	   –	   Zambia,	   Tanzania,	   and	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  –	  in	  order	  to	  find	  out	  what	  was	  happening	  “on	  the	  ground.”	  Angola	  was	  the	  key	   target	   of	   this	  mission:	   “Out	   of	   all	   the	   problems	   facing	   us,	   Angola	  warranted	   our	  special	  attention.”	  Apart	  from	  Kirpichenko,	  other	  members	  of	  the	  delegation	  included	  Petr	   Yevsyukov,	   Petr	   Manchkha,	   and	   Genadiy	   Fomin,	   Chief	   of	   the	   Third	   African	  Department	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  Kirpichenko	  wrote	  that	  they	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  find	  somebody	  who	  had	  actually	  witnessed	  part	  of	  the	  military	  campaign	  in	  Angola,	   and	   eventually	   they	   found	   a	   “Soviet	   doctor”	   working	   for	   a	   military	   hospital	  near	  Dolisie,	  who	  confirmed	  that	  wounded	  guerrillas	  were	  arriving	  at	  the	  hospital	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  	  This	   “doctor”	   to	   whom	   Kirpichenko	   refers	   was	   most	   probably	   the	   surgeon	  Poremskiy,	  who	  had	   arrived	   at	  Dolisie	   a	   few	  months	  beforehand.	  Kirpichenko	  wrote	  that	  when	  they	  finally	  reached	  Neto,	  though	  he	  did	  not	  look	  like	  a	  military	  leader,	  given	  his	  bespectacled,	  round	  face	  bearing	  a	  tinge	  of	  “tiredness	  and	  sadness,”	  he	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  “decisive	  and	  courageous	  man.”	  Neto	  did	  not	  want	  to	  discuss	  internal	  dynamics	  in	  the	  movement,	   concrete	   military	   operations,	   or	   the	   prospects	   for	   unification	   of	   the	  Angolan	  national	  liberation	  movement,	  recalled	  Kirpichenko,	  but	  neither	  did	  he	  try	  to	  “exaggerate	   the	  achievements	  of	   the	  MPLA”	  and	  his	  expectations	  of	  Soviet	  assistance	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  were	  modest.414	  Overall,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  trip	  made	  a	  good	  impression	  on	  the	  four	  men	  who	   participated,	   because	   shortly	   afterwards	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Politburo	   decided	   to	  provide	  “all-­‐round	  support	  to	  the	  militant	  nationalists	   in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies,”	  as	  Petr	   Yevsyukov	  wrote.	   He	   did	   not	   go	   into	   any	   detail,	   but	   this	   probably	  meant	  more	  weapons,	  cash,	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance	  for	  the	  MPLA.415	  While	   the	   Soviet	   delegation	   found	   some	   proof	   that	   the	   MPLA	   was	   active	   in	  Cabinda,	  the	  bulk	  of	  operations	  had	  actually	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  southeast.	  Cabinda	  was	  a	  very	  difficult	  front:	  increasingly	  so	  in	  1967,	  when	  the	  US-­‐based	  company	  Gulf	  Oil	  discovered	  vast	  reserves	  of	  offshore	  oil	   in	   the	  region.	  As	  the	  economic	   importance	  of	  the	   enclave	   skyrocketed,	   the	   Portuguese	   government	   tightened	   security,	   making	   it	  more	  difficult	   to	  engage	   in	  any	  kind	  of	  operations	   in	   the	   territory.	  Writing	   in	  August	  1967,	   Poremskiy	   confirmed	   that	   there	   were	   no	   longer	   any	   injured	   guerrillas	   at	   the	  hospital	  because	  there	  were	  “no	  active	  military	  operations	  in	  Cabinda.”416	  Meanwhile,	  the	   MPLA’s	   campaign	   in	   the	   southeast,	   launched	   in	   May	   1966,	   was	   making	   some	  progress.	  Writing	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  in	  September	  1966,	  Cosmo	  Stewart,	  the	  British	  Consul	  General	  at	  Luanda,	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  security	  situation	  was	  not	  good	  and	  that	   the	   Portuguese	   army	   in	   the	   southeast	  was	   overextended,	  while	   the	  MPLA	  were	  efficiently	  led	  and	  well	  equipped.417	  In	  early	  October,	  Silvino	  Silvério	  Marques,	  Angola’s	  governor	   general,	   was	   recalled	   to	   Lisbon	   amidst	   the	   deteriorating	   security	   situation	  and	   allegations	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	   colonial	   administration,	  while	   Luanda	  was	   filled	  with	  alarmist	  rumors	  about	  mounting	  casualties.	  418	  Southeast	   Angola	   thus	   became	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   the	   MPLA's	   anti-­‐colonial	  campaign	  and	  the	  main	  trial	  ground	  for	  an	  exercise	  in	  state	  building.	  Popularly	  known	  as	   the	   “End	   of	   the	   World,”	   this	   vast	   territory	   on	   the	   border	   with	   Zambia	   was	   very	  scarcely	  populated	  and	  was	  of	  very	  little	  strategic	  or	  economic	  consequence,	  except	  for	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   In	   fact,	   the	   International	  Department	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  $145,000	   for	   the	  MPLA	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  1966,	  an	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  38,	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  Shubin,	  Hot	  Cold	  War,	  p.	  16.	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  Simonov	  (Soviet	  embassy,	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  to	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  the	  Benguela	  railway,	  which	  carried	  minerals	  from	  the	  Congolese	  province	  of	  Katanga	  to	   the	  Angolan	  port	  of	  Lobito	  via	  Zambia	  and	  southeast	  Angola.	  Given	  the	  absence	  of	  any	   major	   economic	   or	   economic	   interests	   in	   the	   region,	   the	   main	   competition	  between	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  would	  be	  over	  people:	  the	  MPLA	  would	  move	  the	  people	   from	  the	  riverbanks	   to	   territories	  under	   their	  control	   in	   the	  “bush,”	  while	   the	  Portuguese	  would	   try	   to	  concentrate	   the	  population	   in	  aldeamentos	  known	  as	   “protected	   villages.”	   Large-­‐scale	   displacement	   of	   the	   rural	   population	   led	   to	   the	  disruption	  of	  farming	  and	  rural	  networks	  of	  exchange.	  Like	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  FRELIMO	  in	  Mozambique,	  the	  MPLA	  would	  have	  to	  provide	  basic	  services	  for	  the	  civilian	   population:	   “people’s	   stores”	   for	   distribution	   of	   basic	   goods,	   a	   network	   of	  rudimentary	   clinics	   and	   schools,	   and	   “people’s	   fields”	   to	   sustain	   agricultural	  production.419	  The	  MPLA’s	   activity	   in	   the	   southeast	  would	  not	  be	   limited	   to	  providing	  basic	  services,	   because	   the	   leadership	   also	   wanted	   the	   people	   to	   adopt	   a	   new	   version	   of	  modernity	  that	  they	  believed	  was	  essential	  for	  a	  free	  and	  prosperous	  Angola.	  “We	  are	  trying	  to	  free	  and	  modernize	  our	  people	  by	  a	  dual	  revolution	  –	  against	  their	  traditional	  structures,	   which	   can	   no	   longer	   serve	   them,	   and	   against	   colonial	   rule,”	   Neto	   told	  visiting	  British	   journalist	  and	  political	  activist	  Basil	  Davidson.420	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  tools	  for	   revolutionizing	   the	   population	   was	   education.	   The	   MPLA	   established	   special	  training	   courses	   for	   guerrillas	   known	   as	   the	   “Centers	   for	   Revolutionary	   Instruction”	  (CIR;	   Centro	   de	   Instrução	   Revolucionário)	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   training	   guerrillas	   to	  become	  the	  party’s	  revolutionary	  vanguard.	  Civilians,	  in	  the	  meantime,	  were	  expected	  to	  attend	  regular	  political	  meetings,	  at	  which	  the	  MPLA	  would	  explain	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  nationalist	   movement,	   often	   presented	   in	   the	   form	   of	   parables	   and	   songs,	   meant	   to	  help	   the	   people	   to	   connect	   with	   the	   MPLA.421	  The	   MPLA’s	   leadership	   of	   course	  communicated	  their	  goals	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  On	  2	  November,	  speaking	  to	  representatives	  of	   the	   Soviet	   Committee	   of	   Youth	   Organizations,	   the	   foreign	   relations	   branch	   of	   the	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  Komsomol,	  Neto	  argued	  that	   the	  disunity	  of	   the	  African	  countries	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  “vanguard	  parties”	  and	  by	  the	  policy	  of	  “balancing”	  pursued	  by	  the	  ruling	   African	   elite.	   He	   complained	   that	   Angolans	   studying	   in	   the	   USSR	   were	   not	  introduced	   to	   these	   issues	   and	   insisted	   that	   all	   Angolans	   studying	   at	   the	   Higher	  Komsomol	  School	  study	  “all	  the	  main	  tenets	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,”	  which	  was	  crucial	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  politically	  conscious	  revolutionary	  vanguard.422	  The	   MPLA’s	   leadership	   increasingly	   identified	   with	   scientific	   socialism	   as	   a	  model	   for	   a	   future	   Angola.	   “Our	   ideology	   is	   scientific	   socialism,”	   stated	   Spartacus	  Monimambu,	  the	  chief	  of	  operations	   in	  the	  eastern	  front,	   in	  a	  1968	  interview,	  saying,	  “We	   are	   going	   to	   be	   a	   socialist	   country	   tomorrow.”	   Monimambu	   confirmed	   that	  ideological	   education	   of	   the	  militants	  was	   necessary	   to	   create	   a	   vanguard	   party	   that	  would	   rule	   post-­‐independent	   Angola.423	  Although	   official	   rhetoric	   stressed	   that	   the	  modernizing	  mission	  would	   be	   achieved	   through	   education,	   new	   studies	   reveal	   that	  the	  MPLA	  used	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  coercion	  and	  violence	  to	  compel	  participation,	  including	  the	  forced	  removal	  of	  people	  from	  their	  villages	  and	  executions	  based	  on	  accusations	  of	  treason.424	  In	  August	  1968,	  the	  MPLA	  held	  its	  First	  Eastern	  Regional	  Conference.	  Attended	  by	   85	   delegates	   from	   all	   five	   military	   zones	   and	   friendly	   foreign	   journalists,	   the	  conference	   publicized	   the	  MPLA	   campaign.	   Among	   the	   topics	   under	   discussion	  were	  the	   creation	   of	   a	   regular	   army	   and	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   MPLA	   from	   a	   broad	  movement	  into	  a	  political	  party.	  The	  major	  decision	  approved	  by	  the	  conference	  was	  to	  generalize	  the	  armed	  struggle	  to	  all	  regions	  of	  Angola.	  The	  conference	  was	  publicized	  as	   a	   major	   success.	   As	   Roy	   Harvey,	   a	   documentary	   filmmaker,	   author	   and	   political	  activist,	  described	  it	  in	  his	  eyewitness	  account	  of	  the	  event,	  the	  conference	  was	  a	  “quiet	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  illustration	   of	   the	   MPLA’s	   success	   in	   winning	   the	   support	   of	   the	   peasantry.”	  425	  The	  delegates	   did	   not	   know	   that	   the	   conference	   would	   mark	   the	   apex	   of	   the	   MPLA's	  military	  fortunes	  during	  the	  entire	  campaign	  in	  the	  southeast.	  	  
The	  Transformation	  of	  FRELIMO,	  1966–1968	  In	  1965-­‐1966,	  FRELIMO’s	  campaign	  in	  northern	  Mozambique	  ran	  into	  serious	  problems.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  serious	  reverses	  was	  in	  eastern	  Niassa,	  a	  sparsely	  populated	  province	  bordering	  Malawi.	  While	   the	   first	  attacks	   in	  1964	  and	  1965	   in	   the	  province	  took	   the	   colonial	   authorities	   by	   surprise,	   by	   1966,	   they	   had	   begun	   to	   respond	  with	  overwhelming	  force.	  “The	  censorship	  imposed	  in	  Mozambique	  is	  so	  complete	  that	  little	  is	   known	   to	   the	   outside	   world…	   whole	   villages	   have	   been	   bombed,	   strafed	   with	  machine-­‐gun	   bullets	   and	   burned	   to	   the	   ground,”	   reported	   the	   London-­‐based	   Church	  
Times	  on	  17	  September	  1965.	  Faced	  with	  massive	  retaliation,	  the	  Nyanja	  people	  living	  around	  Lake	  Malawi	  fled,	  while	  many	  FRELIMO	  sympathizers	  were	  arrested	  in	  Malawi	  on	   orders	   from	   President	   Hastings	   Banda.	   Lord	   Kilbracken,	   who	   visited	   Niassa	   in	  September,	   reported	   on	   the	   state	   of	   the	   war	   in	   a	   series	   of	   articles	   for	   the	   British	  
Evening	  Standard:	  	  Not	  one	  white	  settler	  dares	  stay	   in	  all	   the	  area.	  Their	  once-­‐neat	  holdings	  are	  today	  silent	  and	  abandoned.	  And	  most	  of	  the	  Africans	  –	  they	  belonged	  to	  the	  Nyanja	   tribe	   –	   have	   fled	   to	   the	   mountains	   or	   islands	   or	   to	   Tanzania	   and	  Malawi.	  In	  80	  miles	  of	  lakeshore	  from	  Metangula	  to	  the	  Tanzanian	  border	  only	  two	  African	  villages	  are	  still	  inhabited.426	  	  Military	  setbacks	   fuelled	   internal	  disagreements.	  Competition	  developed	  partly	  along	  ethnic	  lines,	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  FRELIMO’s	  rank	  and	  file	  members	  came	  from	  the	  Makonde	   people	   of	   northern	   Mozambique,	   while	   the	   political	   leadership,	   including	  Eduardo	  Mondlane,	   came	   from	   the	   south.	  Many	  military	   commanders	   thus	   resented	  their	   dominance,	   arguing	   that	   the	  military	   should	   be	   given	  more	   power.	   One	   theory	  was	  that	  this	  resentment	  was	  fuelled	  by	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  including	  Filipe	  Magaia,	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  Reprinted	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   172	  the	   defense	   and	   security	   chief,	   vice	   president	   Uria	   Simango,	   and	   the	   provisional	  secretary	   for	   the	   Cabo	  Delgado	  province,	   Lazaro	  Kavandame.427	  Magaia,	   for	   example,	  was	  known	  to	  criticize	  the	  overrepresentation	  of	  the	  Makonde	  in	  the	  guerrilla	  forces.	  In	   October	   1966,	   FRELIMO	   leadership	   denounced	   “the	   emergence	   of	   a	   certain	   spirit	  among	  several	  militants	  who	  believe	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  FRELIMO	  members	  –	  the	  military	  and	  the	  civilians,	  the	  first	  being	  the	  superior	  ones”	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee.428	  On	  10	  or	  11	  October,	  Magaia	  was	  shot	  dead	  by	  fellow	  FRELIMO	  guerrilla	  Lourenço	  Matola	  allegedly	  while	  on	  a	  march,	  crossing	  a	  river	  after	  nightfall.	  An	  official	  FRELIMO	   investigation	  concluded	   that	  Magaia’s	  death	  was	  an	  accident,	   caused	  by	  an	  accidental	  shooting	  of	  the	  gun.	  A	  few	  theories	  as	  to	  the	  real	  reason	  behind	  the	  shooting	  immediately	  emerged:	  some	  suggested	  that	  Matola	  had	  conspired	  with	  the	  Portuguese,	  while	   others	   argued	   that	  Matola	   acted	   on	   orders	   from	   FRELIMO’s	   leadership	   and	   in	  particular	   from	   Samora	   Machel,	   who	   replaced	   Magaia	   as	   chief	   of	   defense	   after	   his	  death.429	  Another	   debate,	   over	   ideology,	   was	   also	   being	   waged	   within	   the	   movement.	  While	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  and	  Samora	  Machel	  were	  strongly	   influenced	  by	  Marxist	  ideas,,	   others,	   like	   the	  Makonde	   chief	   Lazaro	  Kavandame,	  who	  had	   been	   operating	   a	  lucrative	   trade	   in	   goods	   in	   the	   Cabo	   Delgado	   province,	   objected.	   Eduardo	  Mondlane	  was	   of	   course	   a	   key	   decisive	   figure,	   and	   some	   argue	   that	   he	   too	   was	   increasingly	  attached	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  socialist	  Mozambique.	  For	  Mondlane,	  a	  devout	  Protestant,	  socialism	   was	   a	   necessary	   means	   to	   overcome	   colonialism,	   allowing	   the	   land	   and	  natural	   resources,	   which	   had	   rightfully	   belonged	   to	   the	   people,	   to	   be	   recovered	  through	   nationalization.	   In	   a	   1967	   interview,	   Mondlane	   declared	   that	   Mozambique	  would	   become	   a	   “democratic,	   modern,	   unitary,	   single-­‐party	   state”	   modeled	   after	  Tanzania,	   “neither	   capitalist	   nor	   communist,	   but	   rather	   a	   socialist	   state.”430	  	   In	   yet	  another	  political	   statement	  made	  shortly	  before	  his	  assassination	   in	  1969,	  Mondlane	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  (New	  Brunswick:	  Transaction	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  p.	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  Cabrita,	  Mozambique,	  p.	  47.	  429	  Opello,	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  Conflict,"	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   173	  stressed	   that	   FRELIMO’s	   thinking	   was	   much	   more	   “socialist,	   progressive,	   and	  revolutionary	   than	   ever”	   and	   that	   the	   “the	   tendency	   was	   more	   and	   more	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  socialism	  of	  the	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  variety.	  431	  	  The	   diplomatic	   community	   living	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   did	   not	   overlook	   this	  transformation.	  Among	  these	  diplomats	  were	  Dr.	  Zdanek	  Kirschner,	  a	  Czechoslovakian	  national	   dispatched	   on	   FRELIMO’s	   request	   to	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   in	   1966	   to	   teach	   at	   the	  “Mozambique	   Institute”	   alongside	   other	   white	   teachers;	   Helder	   Martins,	   the	   future	  Minister	   of	   Health	   for	   Mozambique,	   and	   his	   wife	   Helena;	   Jacinto	   Veloso,	   a	   white	  Mozambican	  pilot	  who	  had	  joined	  FRELIMO	  in	  1963;	  the	  historian	  Fernando	  Ganhão;	  and	  Joaquim	  Kindler	  from	  the	  GDR.	  Kirschner	  stayed	  at	  the	  institute	  for	  several	  years,	  teaching	   mathematics	   and	   politics.	   By	   October	   1966,	   Kirschner	   had	   come	   to	   the	  conclusion	   that	   FRELIMO	   leaders	   were	   “serious	   people”	   who	   were	   perhaps	   not	   as	  progressive	  as	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC,	  but	  who	  had	  good	  potential,	  as	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  report	   to	   Prague.	   Kirschner	   described	   President	  Mondlane	   as	   a	   “progressive	   liberal”	  who	   tried	   to	   balance	   between	   the	   two	   camps,	   but	   who	   could	   not	   ignore	   a	   “leftist	  tendency.”	  This	  was	  represented	  by	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  on	  the	  Steering	  Committee	  and	   was	   widespread	   among	   the	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   soldiers	   in	   the	   military	   camps	   and	  guerrilla	   detachments.	   Concluding	   this	   evaluation,	   Kirschner	   suggested	   that	   the	  attitudes	   of	   the	   other	   socialist	   countries	   toward	   FRELIMO	  were	   the	   same:	   “Bulgaria	  has	  dispatched	  a	   large	  quantity	  of	   food,	  Yugoslavia	  –	  medicines,	   the	  USSR	  has	   invited	  Mondlane	  for	  a	  meeting	  to	  discuss	  further	  assistance.”432	  Mondlane	   confirmed	   his	   leftist	   credentials	   when	   he	   visited	   Moscow,	   Prague,	  and	  East	  Berlin	  in	  November	  1966.	  On	  14	  November,	  speaking	  to	  the	  GDR’s	  attaché	  in	  Moscow,	  Manfred	  Seiferth,	  Nikolay	  Bazanov	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  stated	  that	   he	   believed	   Mondlane’s	   positive	   attitude	   towards	   socialist	   countries	   had	  developed	   because	   he	   had	   been	   constantly	   pushed	   to	   the	   left	   by	   the	   progressive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  431	  Saul,	  "Eduardo	  Mondlane,"	  p.	  310.	  432	  Kirschner	  (Dar	  es	  Salaam)	  to	  Prague,	  20	  October	  1966,	  "Zpráva	  o	  činnosti	  s.	  Kirschnera	  v	  Mozambickém	  institutu,"	  AMZV,	  1965-­‐1969,	  TO-­‐tajné,	  IV/7,	  sign.	  273,	  	  inv.	  č.	  67,	  pp.	  1-­‐8.	  
	   174	  forces.”433	  Officials	   from	   the	   GDR	   echoed	   their	   Soviet	   colleagues.	   “Influenced	   by	   the	  progressive	   forces	   in	  his	  circle,	  Mondlane	  has	  moved	   to	   the	   left	   in	  his	  beliefs,”	   said	  a	  report	  prepared	  by	  GDR’s	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  following	  Mondlane’s	  trip.	  Since	  Mondlane	   was	   moving	   in	   the	   right	   direction,	   FRELIMO	   received	   more	   aid:	  humanitarian	   assistance	   from	   the	   GDR,	   weapons	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   and	  medication	  from	  Czechoslovakia.	  434	  Mondlane	  was	  to	  face	  a	  new	  challenge	  to	  the	  development	  of	  internal	  cohesion	  among	  the	  organization.	  Trouble	  began	  in	  1967,	  when	  FRELIMO	  mandated	  that	  all	  of	  its	   foreign	   students	   attend	   compulsory	   military	   training	   during	   holidays.	   Many	  students	   refused	   to	   comply,	   and	   they	   found	   an	   advocate	   for	   their	   refusal	   in	   a	   black	  Catholic	   priest	   named	   Mateus	   Gwenjere,	   a	   teacher	   at	   the	   Mozambique	   Institute.	   He	  criticized	   this	  policy	  and	  accused	   the	  white	   teachers,	   including	  Mondlane’s	  American	  wife	  Janet,	  of	  being	  agents	  of	  the	  imperialists.	  He	  was	  relieved	  of	  his	  teaching	  position,	  but	  continued	  his	  campaign,	  which	  sparked	  a	  fight	  between	  students	  on	  5	  March	  1968.	  This	   incident	   required	   the	   intervention	   of	   FRELIMO’s	   leadership,	   including	   chief	   of	  security	  Joaquim	  Chissano,	  who	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  authorities	  had	  the	  students	   arrested	   and	   later	   dispatched	   to	   the	   Rutamba	   refugee	   camp,	   from	   where	  many	   fled	   to	  Kenya.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   school	  was	   closed	   for	   two	   years	   to	   prevent	   any	  further	  trouble.435	  This	  did	  not	  end	  the	  turbulence	  within	  the	  organization.	  On	  9	  May	  1968,	  rank-­‐and	   file	   Makonde	   members	   stormed	   FRELIMO	   offices	   in	   Nkrumah	   Street,	   Dar	   es	  Salaam,	   striking	  Mateus	   Sansao	  Muthemba,	   the	   telecommunications	   chief,	   who	   later	  died	  of	  head	  injuries.	  Mondlane	  and	  others	  blamed	  the	  incident	  on	  a	  Makonde	  leader	  named	   Lazaro	   Kavandame,	   whom	  Mondlane	   had	   accused	   of	   profiteering	   due	   to	   his	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  whether	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  and	  Aurelio	  Manave,	  who	  entered	   the	   school,	   fired	   shots	   to	   pacify	   the	   students	   and	  whether	  Manave,	   having	   been	   arrested	   by	   the	   Tanzanian	  police,	  was	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  the	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  1962–1970,"	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  control	  of	   trade	   in	   the	  province	  of	  Cabo	  Delgado.	  As	  Eduardo	  Mondlane	  explained	   to	  the	  delegation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  visiting	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  in	  early	  June,	  unrest	  at	  the	  school	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  and	  Gwenjere’s	  incitement	  of	  the	  students.	   Mondlane	   also	   informed	   the	   Soviet	   delegation	   that	   FRELIMO	   was	   in	  preparation	   of	   its	   Second	   Congress,	   which	   would	   focus	   on	   the	   crucial	   relationship	  between	  the	  army,	  the	  police,	  and	  the	  masses.	  “All	  of	  FRELIMO’s	  former	  mistakes,”	  in	  Mondlane’s	   opinion,	   “came	   out	   because	   there	   was	   no	   understanding	   between	   these	  three	  forces.”436	  FRELIMO’s	   Second	   Congress,	   which	   opened	   on	   22	   July	   1968	   near	   the	   tiny	  hamlet	  of	  Matchedje,	   in	  Niassa	  province,	   strengthened	  Mondlane	  and	  his	   supporters.	  Held	  inside	  Mozambique	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  FRELIMO	  managed	  to	  ensure	  a	  high	  level	  of	  secrecy	  so	  that	  the	  Portuguese	  planes	  arrived	  dropping	  bombs	  after	  the	  Congress	  had	  already	   ended.	   Neither	   Gwenjere	   nor	   Kavandame	   attended	   the	   Congress,	   and	   thus	  more	  than	  170	  delegates	  confirmed	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  military	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  the	   liberation	  struggle,	  and	  ratified	  equality	  of	   the	  races	  and	  the	  sexes	  as	  the	  guiding	  principles	  of	   the	  Mozambican	  Revolution.	  The	  Congress	  also	  approved	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	   Central	   Committee	   from	   22	   to	   42	   members,	   to	   include	   all	   the	   frontline	  commanders,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  eight-­‐person	  Executive	  Committee,	  which	  was	  to	  initially	   include	   Eduardo	   Mondlane,	   Samora	   Machel,	   Joaquim	   Chissano,	   Armando	  Guebuza,	   Uria	   Simango,	   Marcelino	   dos	   Santos,	   Jorge	   Rebelo,	   and	   Mariano	   Matsinhe.	  Thus,	   the	   guiding	   principles	   of	   the	   liberation	   struggle,	   such	   as	   the	   merger	   of	   the	  political	   and	   military	   aspects	   of	   the	   liberation	   effort	   and	   race	   and	   gender	   equality,	  were	  confirmed.	  The	  1968	  crisis	  and	  the	  July	  Congress	  thus	  became	  crucial	  parts	  of	  the	  foundational	   ethic,	   which	   has	   been	   presented	   as	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   campaign	   against	  traditions	  that	  strove	  to	  undermine	  efforts	  at	  social	  transformation.437	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   176	  FRELIMO	  proceeded	   to	   centralize	   control	  over	  all	   aspects	  of	   the	  Mozambican	  revolution.	  In	  August,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  convened	  to	  draft	  a	  “program	  of	  action”	  for	  the	  various	  departments	  based	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Congress.	  The	  Department	  of	  Organization	   was	   instructed	   to	   organize	   refugees	   and	   promote	   their	   resettlement	  inside	   Mozambique.	   The	   Department	   of	   Social	   Affairs	   was	   instructed	   to	   create	  assistance	   centers	   for	   those	  disabled	   in	   the	  war	  and	   to	   set	   up	   judicial	   committees	   to	  resolve	   local	   issues;	   the	   Department	   of	   Education	   was	   charged	   with	   expanding	  opportunities	   for	   primary	   and	   secondary	   education,	   including	   ways	   to	   “re-­‐integrate	  foreign	   students	   into	   the	   struggle,”	   and	   ensuring	   that	   all	   non-­‐Mozambican	   teachers	  “agree	   to	   work	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   political	   principles	   of	   FRELIMO.”	   The	  Department	   of	   Defense	   was	   strengthened	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   military	   High	  Command,	  a	  Disciplinary	  Committee,	  and	  a	  Military	  Court.	  The	  Central	  Committee	  also	  determined	  that	  all	  FRELIMO	  officers	  must	  undergo	  both	  political	  and	  military	  training	  and	   recommended	   that	   “only	   active	   militants”	   should	   receive	   scholarships	   to	   study	  abroad.	   The	   Political	   Department	   was	   to	   engage	   with	   “theoretical	   and	   ideological	  aspects	   of	   the	   struggle,”	   and	   the	   Department	   of	   Production,	   Commerce	   and	  Cooperatives	  was	  to	  “extend	  commercial	  activities	  to	  new	  zones,	  establish	  exchange	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  interior,	  [and]	  study	  possibility	  of	  trade	  with	  other	  countries”;	  both	  were	  to	   develop	   a	   plan	   as	   to	   how	   “cooperatives	   could	   operate	   in	   Mozambique.”438	  The	  “program	   of	   action”	   amounted	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   FRELIMO	   from	   an	  amalgamation	   of	   regional	   groups	   and	   interests	   into	   a	   “vanguard	   party”	   that	   would	  become	  the	  single	  voice	  of	  the	  Mozambican	  revolution.	  	  The	   Congress	   strengthened	   confidence	   in	   FRELIMO	   among	   the	   communist	  states.	  On	  27	  July,	  Gottfried	  Lessing,	  the	  GDR	  Consul	  General	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  wrote	  to	  the	   Deputy	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Wolfgang	   Kiesewetter,	   with	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	  Congress,	   based	   on	   his	   conversations	   with	   Soviet	   colleagues,	   perhaps	   with	   Bahadyr	  Abdurazakov,	   who	   had	   attended	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   AAPSO	   delegation.	   The	   Consul	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   177	  reported	   that	   the	   delegates	   had	   “reached	   unanimity	   with	   regards	   to	   political	   and	  administrative	  work	  in	  the	  liberated	  areas	  and	  accepted	  the	  principle	  that	  all	  freedom	  fighters	  are	  full	  members	  of	  FRELIMO	  regardless	  of	  their	  race.”	  Lessing	  believed	  non-­‐racism	   represented	   a	   “rebuff	   of	   Chinese	   attempts	   at	   subversion”	   and	   thus	  recommended	  that	   the	  GDR	  Solidarity	  committee	  should	  “maintain	  or	  even	   increase”	  material	  assistance	  to	  the	  movement.439	  FRELIMO’s	   tendency	   towards	   Marxism-­‐Leninism	   continued	   after	   Mondlane	  was	  assassinated	  on	  3	  February	  1969	  by	  means	  of	  a	  parcel	  bomb.	  Although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Portuguese	   intelligence	  services	  stood	  behind	  the	  assassination,	   it	   is	  still	  not	  clear	  whether	  anyone	   inside	  FRELIMO	  actually	  conspired	  with	  the	  Portuguese.	  While	  rumor	   and	   speculation	   spread	   as	   to	  who	  was	   responsible	   for	  Mondlane’s	   death,	   his	  post	  was	  taken	  over	  by	  a	  triumvirate	  consisting	  of	  Uria	  Simango,	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos,	  and	   Samora	   Machel.	   On	   27	   February,	   the	   Czechoslovak	   Ambassador	   to	   Tanzania,	  Mikulas	   Surina,	   argued	   that	   Mondlane’s	   death	   signaled	   a	   militant	   tendency	   in	  FRELIMO.440	  The	   triumvirate	  did	  not	   last,	   however.	   In	  November	  1969	  Uria	   Simango	  published	  a	  document	  titled	  “Gloomy	  Situation	  in	  Mozambique”	  that	  accused	  southern	  Mozambicans	   within	   the	   leadership	   of	   ethnic	   nepotism	   and	   of	   plans	   to	   assassinate	  rivals.	   He	   called	   for	   Samora	  Machel,	  Marcelino	   dos	   Santos,	   and	   Joaquim	   Chissano	   to	  stand	  trial	  for	  their	  criminal	  activity	  and	  threatened	  to	  resign	  if	  his	  demands	  were	  not	  met.	  Uria	  Simango	  was	  expelled	   from	  FRELIMO	  shortly	  afterwards	  and	   in	  April	  1970	  he	   left	   for	   Egypt,	   where	   he	   joined	   the	   Revolutionary	   Committee	   of	   Mozambique	  (COREMO;	  Comité	  Revolucionário	  de	  Moçambique),	  a	  small	  splinter	  rival	  group,	  which	  been	  established	  by	  Mondlane’s	  critics	  in	  1965.	  Samora	  Machel	  thus	  assumed	  the	  role	  of	  FRELIMO’s	  President	  in	  May	  1970.	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   178	  to	   analyze	   the	   proceedings	   of	   the	   Eighth	   Session	   of	   the	   Presidium	   of	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	  People’s	   Solidarity	  Organization	   (AAPSO)	   in	  Nicosia,	   Cyprus,	  which	   officially	  marked	  China’s	   de	   facto	  withdrawal	   from	   the	   organization,	   the	   expulsion	   of	   the	   pro-­‐Chinese	  liberation	  movements,	  and	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  previous	  decision	  to	  convene	  the	  following	  the	   fifth	   Congress	   of	   the	   AAPSO	   in	   Beijing.	  While	   all	   believed	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   the	  Chinese	  was	  positive	   for	  Soviet	   influence	  within	   the	  AAPSO,	  Soviet	   cadres	  knew	   that	  the	  organization	  was	   in	  crisis.	  Dmitriy	  Dolidze,	   for	  example,	  argued	  that	  many	  newly	  independent	   African	   states	   like	   Zambia,	   Tanzania,	   Guinea,	   and	   Mali	   were	   no	   longer	  interested	  in	  AAPSO	  because	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  organization,	  national	  liberation,	  had	  become	  obsolete	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  should	  help	  the	  Permanent	  Secretariat	   Cairo	   adapt	   to	   the	   new	   agenda,	   namely	   to	   help	   in	   working	   out	   a	  “constructive	  program	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  development.”	  441	  His	   colleagues	   agreed,	   but	   the	   Cubans	   remained	   a	   problem.	   Osmany	  Cienfuegos,	  who	  led	  the	  Cuban	  delegation	  to	  Nicosia,	  hoped	  to	  “witness	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  organization,”	  as	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  committee	  Mirso	  Tursun-­‐Zade	  saw	   the	   situation.442	  Only	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   argued	  Bahadyr	   Abdurazakov,	   the	   permanent	   Soviet	   representative	   at	   the	   AAPSO	  headquarters	   in	  Cairo,	  proved	   to	  be	  very	  actively	   involved.443	  The	  national	   liberation	  movements	   provided	   support	   and	   legitimacy	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   international	  forums	  such	  as	  the	  AAPSO.	  The	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  was	  to	  expand	  its	  activities	  by	  organizing	  public	  events	  and	  seminars	  for	  foreign	  students.444	  	  One	  man	  who	  personified	   this	  activism	  was	   the	  new	  General	  Secretary	  of	   the	  Soviet	   Solidarity	  Committee,	  Alexander	  Dzasokhov.	  He	  belonged	   to	   the	  generation	  of	  young	  Soviets	  who	  had	  benefited	   from	  the	  dynamism	  of	  Khrushchev’s	   foreign	  policy.	  He	  was	  born	  on	  3	  April	  1934	  in	  Vladikavkaz,	  the	  capital	  of	  North	  Ossetia	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Caucasus.	   Dzasokhov’s	   father	   worked	   as	   the	   head	   of	   a	   railway	   station,	   while	   his	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  mother,	   educated	   as	   a	   financier,	  was	   a	   housewife.	   Dzasokhov	   studied	   geology	   at	   the	  Mining	   Metallurgical	   Institute,	   where	   he	   was	   elected	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Komsomol	  organization.	   After	   graduation	   in	   1957,	   Dzasokhov	   became	   the	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Komsomol	   organization	   for	   Vladikavkaz	   and	   started	   teaching	   at	   his	   university.	   That	  same	   year,	   a	   high-­‐level	   Komsomol	   functionary,	   visiting	   Vladikavkaz	   from	   Moscow,	  noticed	  Dzasokhov	  and	  offered	  him	  a	  job	  in	  the	  capital.	  Soon	  enough,	  Dzasokhov	  found	  himself	   working	   for	   the	   Committee	   of	   Youth	   Organizations,	   a	   department	   of	   the	  Komsomol	   responsible	   for	   contacts	   with	   foreign	   youth	   organizations.	   In	   1963,	  Dzasokhov	   led	  a	  group	  of	  Soviet	  agricultural	  specialists	   to	  Cuba.	  After	  a	  brief	  spell	  at	  the	   Komsomol	   after	   his	   return,	   he	   took	   over	   from	   Dmitriy	   Dolidze	   as	   the	   General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  committee	  in	  1967.445	  One	  of	  Dzasokhov’s	  first	  tasks	  was	   to	   travel	   to	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   coordinate	   policy	   with	   other	   Solidarity	  Committees.	  Back	   in	  Moscow,	  Dzasokhov	  reported	   that	  all	   the	  Solidarity	  Committees	  were	   expanding	   their	   contacts	   with	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   even	   though	   more	  information	  was	  required	  to	  coordinate	  policy.446	  The	   Solidarity	   Committee	   also	   aimed	   to	   revive	   the	   AAPSO	   by	   sponsoring	  conferences	   on	   issues	   of	  major	   concern	   to	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	   states:	   Vietnam,	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict,	  and	  African	  liberation.	  In	  April	  1968,	  the	  Solidarity	  Committee	  decided	  that	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Africa	  Institute,	  Vasilii	  Solodovnikov,	  and	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Law	  Institute,	  Viktor	  Chikhvadze,	  would	  begin	  preparing	  materials	  for	  a	  conference	  of	  solidarity	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  of	  Portuguese	  Africa,	  South	  Rhodesia,	  and	  South	   Africa.447	  In	   May-­‐June,	   one	   delegation	   went	   to	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville	   and	   Guinea,	  while	   another	   travelled	   to	   Tanzania	   and	   Burundi.	   The	   Soviets	   of	   course	  wanted	   the	  conference	  to	  raise	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  AAPSO,	  tarnished	  after	  China’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	   organization;	   however,	   as	   both	   delegations	  would	   discover,	   there	  was	   not	  much	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  Politika.	  446	  Report	  of	  SCSCAA's	  	  visit	  to	  the	  socialist	  countries,	  1967,	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  239a.	  447	  Report	  about	  	  SCSCAA	  activities	  in	  1968,	  [undated],	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  244,	  p.	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  interest	   in	   the	  AAPSO.448	  Nevertheless,	  preparations	  went	  ahead	  after	  Khartoum	  was	  chosen	  as	  a	  venue.	  Then,	  on	   the	  night	  of	  20-­‐21	  August	  1968,	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  along	  with	  Bulgaria,	  Hungary,	  the	  GDR,	  and	  Poland,	  invaded	  Czechoslovakia	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  a	  program	  of	  political	  liberalization	  known	  as	  the	  “Prague	  Spring.”	  	  The	  invasion	  of	  Czechoslovakia	  was	  a	  public	  relations	  disaster	  for	  Moscow.	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  African	  countries,	  only	  Mali’s	  Modibo	  Keita	  publicly	  supported	  the	  invasion.	  Many	  African	  leaders,	  such	  as	  Zambia’s	  Kenneth	  Kaunda	  and	  Tanzania’s	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  publicly	   condemned	   the	   invasion.	   Others,	   like	   the	   President	   of	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	  Alphonse	  Massamba-­‐Débat,	  maintained	  a	  calculated	  silence.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  to	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	   Ivan	  Spitskiy,	  wrote	  about	  a	  conversation	  he	  had	  with	  Massamba-­‐Débat	  shortly	  after	  the	  invasion:	  “Having	  listened	  to	  my	  explanation,	  he	  declared	  that	  a	  small	   country	   like	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville	   could	   not	   agree	   that	   a	   great	   power,	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	  had	  occupied	  a	   small	   country,	  Czechoslovakia.	  Nevertheless,	  Massamba-­‐Débat	  stated	   that	   they	   would	   refrain	   from	   making	   a	   public	   statement	   condemning	   the	  invasion,	   in	  consideration	  of	  the	  friendly	  relationship	  between	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,"	  Spitskiy	  recalled.449	  	  The	   Khartoum	   conference	   was	   thus	   quite	   convenient	   for	   helping	   mend	  Moscow’s	   tarnished	  reputation.	  On	  1	  October	  1968,	  speaking	  at	   the	  Presidium	  of	   the	  Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee,	   Vasiliy	   Solodovnikov	   argued	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   southern	  Africa	  was	  of	  particular	  importance	  in	  an	  “ideological,	  political,	  economic,	  and	  strategic	  sense.”450	  Solodovnikov	   told	   his	   colleagues	   that	   he	  was	   convinced	   that	   a	  major	   crisis	  was	   to	  be	  expected	   in	   the	  region	  and	   that	  one	  should	   therefore	  prepare	  properly	   for	  the	   conference	   and	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   articles	   covering	   issues	   of	   racism	   and	  colonialism	   in	   the	   Soviet	   press. 451 	  Most	   importantly,	   argued	   Solodovnikov,	   the	  Khartoum	   conference	   would	   improve	   Soviet	   public	   relations	   after	   the	   invasion	   of	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  Committee,	  Moscow,	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  Report	  on	  the	  SCSCAA's	  trip	  to	  Congo-­‐Brazzavile	  and	  Guinea,	  	  28	  May	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  1968,	  GARF,	  f.	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  d.	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  Ivan	  Spitskiy,	  "Obrazovanie	  Afrikanskikh	  Otdelov	  v	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  Raboty	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  Respublike	  Kongo	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  1964-­‐1969."	   Afrika	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   Ed.	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   Vasilyev	   (Moscow:	   Institut	   Afriki	  RAN,	  2001),	  p.	  35.	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  Transcript	  of	  the	  SCSCAA	  Presidum	  Meeting,	  1	  October	  1968,	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  240,	  p.	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  451	  Ibid.,	  p.	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  Czechoslovakia:	   “I	   believe	   that	   this	   will	   be	   the	   second	   conference	   (like	   with	   the	  Vietnam	   conference)	   that	  will	   allow	  us	   to	   reduce	   residual	   tensions	   connected	   to	   the	  measures	  adopted	  in	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  reduce	  implications	  of	  the	  reaction	  to	  events	  in	  Czechoslovakia.”452	  The	  Khartoum	  Conference	  was	  held	  between	  18	  and	  21	  January	  1969	  and	  was	  generally	  considered	  a	  success.	  Although	  countries	   like	  Zambia	  and	  Tanzania	  refused	  to	   participate	   in	   what	   was	   clearly	   a	   Soviet-­‐sponsored	   event,	   the	   conference	   hosted	  representatives	   from	   fifty-­‐six	   countries	   and	   twelve	   international	   organizations.	   The	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  PAIGC,	  ANC,	  ZAPU,	  and	  SWAPO	  –	  were	  declared	  the	  only	  “authentic”	  representatives	   of	   the	   liberation	   struggle.	   The	   conference	   also	   established	   a	   Cairo-­‐based	  Mobilization	  Committee	   to	   coordinate	   assistance	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements.	  The	  “Khartoum	  alliance”	  strengthened	  the	  links	  that	  had	  previously	  existed	  among	  the	  members,	  which	  allowed	   the	  six	   so-­‐called	   “authentic”	   liberation	  movements	   to	   lobby	  as	  a	  bloc.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  conference	  allowed	  for	  international	  publicity.	  It	  was	  a	  turning	  point	  after	  which	  those	  six	  movements,	  called	  “authentic”	  to	  separate	  them	   from	   rival	   organizations,	   started	   receiving	   humanitarian	   aid	   from	   the	   Nordic	  countries.453	  	  The	  Khartoum	  Conference	  also	  marked	  an	  important	  watershed	  for	  the	  Soviets,	  as	   became	   evident	   from	   a	   brief	   presentation	   by	   Rostislav	   Ulyanovskiy,	   one	   of	   Boris	  Ponomarev’s	  deputies	  at	   the	  CC	  CPSU,	  responsible	   for	  Afro-­‐Asian	  affairs.	  A	  sixty-­‐five-­‐year-­‐old	  man	   in	   1969,	   Ulyanovskiy’s	   life	   story	  was	   representative	   of	   his	   generation,	  but	   fairly	   uncommon	   for	   an	   official	   of	   his	   rank.	   Born	   in	   Vitebsk,	   now	   in	   northeast	  Belarus,	  Ulyanovskiy	   lost	   both	  parents	   at	   a	   young	   age,	   joined	   the	  Red	  Army	   in	  1920	  and	  moved	   to	   Tashkent,	   currently	   the	   capital	   of	   independent	   Uzbekistan	   but	   then	   a	  Russian	  city,	  where	  he	   joined	   the	  Komsomol.	   In	  1922	  he	  was	  dispatched	   to	  Moscow,	  then	   enrolled	   at	   the	  Moscow	   Institute	   of	   the	   Far	   East,	   briefly	   interning	   at	   the	   Soviet	  embassy	  in	  Afghanistan.	  In	  the	  1930s,	  he	  headed	  the	  section	  for	  the	  “Far	  East	  and	  the	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  April	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  ed.,	  Liberation,	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  of	  Liberation:	  the	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	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  1960	   	   (London:	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  Academic,	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   182	  Colonies”	   at	   the	  Comintern’s	   International	  Agrarian	   Institute	   and	  published	   research	  on	   India.	   His	   life	   took	   a	   sharp	   turn	   on	   the	   night	   of	   1	   January	   1935,	   when	   he	   was	  arrested,	   charged	  with	  belonging	   to	   a	  Trotskyist	   organization,	   and	  dispatched	   to	   the	  labor	   camps.	  Rehabilitated	   in	   1955,	  Ulyanovskiy	   returned	   to	  Moscow,	  where	  he	  was	  invited	  in	  1961	  to	  join	  the	  International	  Department	  to	  supervise	  Afro-­‐Asian	  affairs.454	  On	   19	   February	   1969,	   delegates	   of	   the	   Presidium	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	  Committee	   listened	   to	   Ulyanovskiy	   report	   on	   the	   Khartoum	   conference	   he	   had	  attended	   along	   with	   Alexander	   Dzasokhov.	   Ulyanovskiy	   started	   his	   speech	   by	  predicting	  a	  “historic	  turning	  point”	  in	  Africa.	  “One	  can	  say	  that	  we	  stand	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  a	  major	  intensification	  of	  our	  activities	  and	  the	  people’s	  war	  in	  Africa	  and	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  decisions	  and	  the	  mood	  of	  the	  conferences.”	  455	  	  “Only	  a	  few	  years	  ago,	  when	  we	  faced	  the	  splinter	  group	  of	  Mao	  Zedong,”	  argued	  Ulyanovskiy,	  “many	  representatives	  of	  the	  liberation	  movement	  in	  Africa	  and	  Asia”	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  “imperialists”	  had	  been	  prevailing	  against	  the	  socialist	  countries	  and	  the	  liberation	  movement.	  However,	   this	   thesis	  had	  been	  called	   into	  question	  by	   the	   inability	  of	   the	  United	   States	   to	   defeat	   North	   Vietnam	   by	   military	   means,	   Ulyanovskiy	   argued.	   The	  reason	   lay	   in	   the	   linkage	   of	   “people’s	   resistance”	   in	   North	   Vietnam	   with	   Soviet	  weapons,	  a	  linkage	  that	  “could	  not	  be	  crushed	  even	  by	  the	  militarily	  strongest	  country	  in	   the	   world.”456	  Having	   witnessed	   this,	   continued	   Ulyanovskiy,	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	  liberation	   movements	   realized	   that	   it	   was	   “impossible	   to	   defeat	   imperialist	   racism”	  without	  Soviet	  assistance.457	  Ulyanovskiy	   also	   explained	   the	   positive	   developments	   in	   the	   liberation	  movement.	  Of	  utmost	  importance	  to	  him	  was	  the	  progression	  from	  political	  to	  armed	  struggle,	  and	  he	  especially	  pointed	  out	  the	  success	  of	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  “A.	   Cabral	   showed	   us,	   and	   we	   also	   had	   other	   ways	   to	   make	   sure	   of	   this,”	   argued	  Ulyanovskiy,	  “that	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  has	  been	  liberated,	  with	  the	  exception	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  of	   a	   few	   Portuguese	   garrisons,	   besieged	   by	   insurgents,	   with	   their	   prospects	   being	  hardly	   auspicious,	   given	   that	   the	   guerrillas	   are	   increasingly	   able	   to	   fight	   the	  Portuguese	   colonialists	   with	   weapons	   and	   guerrilla	   tactics	   employed	   by	   the	  Vietnamese	   patriots.”	   If	   Cabral	   had	   always	   been	   quite	   close	   to	   Moscow,	   both	  FRELIMO’s	  Eduardo	  Mondlane	  and	   the	  MPLA’s	  Agostinho	  Neto	  had	  become	  closer	   to	  the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Mondlane	   told	   Ulyanovskiy	   that	   the	   Soviet	   cadres	   had	   gained	   his	  trust	   because	   they	   had	   always	   delivered	   on	   their	   promises	   and	   had	   never	   been	  patronizing.458	  According	   to	   Ulyanovskiy,	   Mondlane	   had	   evolved	   in	   a	   way	   similar	   to	  other	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements,	   like	   Agostinho	   Neto,	   who	   used	   to	   be	   far	  removed	  from	  scientific	  socialism.	  At	  Khartoum,	  Neto	  approached	  Ulyanovskiy,	  asking	  him	   for	   advice	   on	   the	   politics	   of	   race:	   “We	   need	   you	   to	   arm	   us,	   anti-­‐racists,	   with	  theoretical	   theses	  –	  a	  political	   textbook	  –	   that	  could	  counter	   the	  whole	   racist	   system	  not	   in	  general	  methodological	   terms,	  but	   that	   could	   specify	  what	  a	   state	   should	   look	  like,	  how	  to	  pacify	  two	  communities,	  how	  to	  ensure	  co-­‐existence	  of	  the	  white	  and	  black	  man.”459	  Neto	   also	   praised	   the	   Soviet	   experience	   of	   partisan	  warfare,	   saying	   that	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   had	   great	   experience	   of	   armed	   struggle	   during	   their	   Revolution,	   their	  Civil	  War,	   and	  World	  War	   II,	   but,	  Neto	   complained,	   they	   did	   not	   have	   ‘a	   single	   book	  about	   your	   armed	   struggle.”	   Ulyanovskiy	   concluded,	   “We	   have	   defeated	   the	   Chinese	  accusation	  that	  we	  are	  pacifists	  incapable	  of	  armed	  struggle,	  but	  now	  we	  should	  think	  about	  how	   to	  make	   the	   great	   experience	  of	   our	  peoples	   accessible	   for	   the	  public.”460	  Judging	  by	  Ulyanovskiy’s	  account,	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  were	  destined	  for	  a	  bright	  future.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  What	  emerges	   from	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	  1960s	   is	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	  liberation	   movements	   –	   the	   MPLA,	   FRELIMO,	   and	   the	   PAIGC	   –	   from	   groups	   of	  individuals	   united	   by	   little	  more	   than	   commitment	   to	   independence	   into	   collectives	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  defined	   by	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   beliefs,	   such	   as	   non-­‐racialism,	   rejection	   of	   tradition,	   and	  early	   attempts	   to	   build	   revolutionary	   “vanguard	   parties”	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   mass	  movements.	   In	   the	   later	  1960s,	   the	   radical	  African	  nationalists	   seemed	   to	  be	   turning	  away	  from	  the	  nativists’	  projects,	  such	  as	  “African	  socialism,”	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  model	  that	  included	   high	   levels	   of	   planning	   and	   state	   involvement	   in	   the	   economy,	   which	  borrowed	  heavily	   from	  Soviet	  example.	  The	   leaderships	  of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  were	   attracted	   to	   Soviet	   socialism	   for	   several	   reasons.	   One	   key	   attraction	   was	   the	  application	   of	   socialist	   universalism	   in	   mixed-­‐race	   contexts,	   which	   was	   particularly	  suitable	  for	  the	  predominately	  mestiço	  leadership	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	   colonies,	   especially	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   MPLA	   and	   the	   PAIGC.	   Kwame	  Nkrumah’s	   fall	   from	   power	   was	   yet	   another	   reason	   why	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  liberation	   movements	   chose	   a	   model	   that	   rejected	   indigenous	   tradition	   in	   favor	   of	  social	   revolution,	   to	   be	   led	   by	   strong	   parties.	  Many	   of	   these	   categories	  were	  merely	  imaginary	   constructions,	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   guerrilla	   campaigns	   meant	   that	   the	  liberation	  movements	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  whichever	  forces	  –	  indigenous	  or	  not	  –	  provided	  support.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   transformation	   of	   the	   late	   1960s	  would	   to	   a	   great	   extent	  determine	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Soviet	   developmental	   model	   in	   independent	   Angola,	  Mozambique,	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  	  Cadres	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Czechoslovakia,	  Bulgaria,	  and	  the	  GDR	  followed	  these	  transformations	  with	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  optimism.	  They	  observed	  the	  liberation	  movements	   adopting	   practices	   resembling	   embryonic	   socialist	   structures	   in	   the	  liberated	  areas.	  In	  addition,	  their	  leaders	  pledged	  adherence	  to	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  was	  close	   to	   their	   own.	   Moreover,	   they	   thought	   that	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  had	  finally	  come	  to	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  part	  due	   to	   their	   observation	   of	   Vietnam,	   they	   saw	   what	   was	   possible	   with	   Soviet	  assistance.	   Additionally,	   China	   no	   longer	   posed	   a	   formidable	   threat	   as	   far	   as	   the	  liberation	   movements	   were	   concerned.	   This	   represented	   a	   shift	   in	   perspective	   by	  those	   functionaries	  who	  were	  regularly	   in	   touch	  with	   the	   liberation	  movements.	  The	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  1969	  Khartoum	  Conference	  symbolized	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  this	  optimism,	  as	  Ulyanovskiy’s	  speech	   reveals.	   Ulyanovskiy	   saw	   Mondlane	   and	   Neto	   evolve	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  “scientific	   socialism”	   and	   become	   eager	   to	   learn	   from	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   socialist	  countries.	  	  Cabral	   played	   a	   very	   important	   part	   in	   this	   story.	   Cabral’s	   analysis	   of	   the	  situation	  in	  Africa	  contributed	  to	  the	  MPLA	  and	  FRELIMO	  adopting	  the	  establishment	  of	  strong	  “vanguard	  parties,”	  led	  by	  revolutionary	  elites,	  as	  their	  desired	  objective.	  The	  Czechoslovak	   intelligence	   services	   ascribed	   very	   high	   importance	   to	   Cabral	   because,	  out	   of	   the	   three	   liberation	   movements,	   the	   PAIGC	   exhibited	   the	   greatest	   military	  potential.	  The	   few	  sources	  we	  have	  show	   that	   the	  Soviet	   intelligence	  also	  very	  much	  valued	   Cabral	   for	   the	   same	   reason.	   The	   Czechoslovak	   intelligence	   also	   believed	   that	  Cabral	   was	   exerting	   a	   “progressive”	   influence	   on	   African	   public	   opinion,	   regional	  forums	  such	  as	  the	  OAU,	  and	  even	  Kwame	  Nkrumah.	  While	  Nkrumah	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  saved,	  the	  liberation	  movements	  provided	  new	  hope	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  revolution	  in	  Africa.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
	  
Setbacks:	  Portuguese	  Offensives	  and	  Détente,	  1969-­‐1974	  
	  On	  27	  September	  1968,	  Portugal’s	  president,	  Américo	  Tomás,	  invited	  a	  62-­‐year	  old	   Lisbon	   law	   professor,	   Marcello	   Caetano,	   to	   take	   over	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   after	  António	  de	  Oliveira	  Salazar	   suffered	  a	  debilitating	  stroke.	  Caetano	  presented	  a	   sharp	  contrast	  to	  Salazar	  in	  many	  ways.	  Unlike	  his	  ascetic	  predecessor,	  Caetano	  was	  married	  with	   four	   children.	  While	   Salazar	   almost	   never	   ventured	   beyond	   Portugal’s	   borders,	  Caetano	  travelled	  widely,	  spoke	  French,	  and	  was	  interested	  in	  cultural	  developments.	  Upon	  assuming	   the	  premiership,	  Caetano	   fashioned	  himself	   as	   a	  moderate.	  He	  eased	  press	   censorship,	   loosened	   government	   control	   over	   the	   trade	   unions,	   and	   allowed	  some	   outspoken	   critics	   of	   the	   regime,	   such	   as	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   Socialist	  Party,	  Mário	   Soares,	   to	   return	   from	  exile.	   In	  many	  other	   aspects,	   however,	  Caetano’s	  regime	  differed	  little	  from	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  Having	  served	  as	  a	  legal	  adviser	  to	  Salazar	   in	  1929,	  Marcello	  Caetano	  had	  been	  one	  of	   the	  architects	  of	   the	  Estado	  Novo.	  Caetano	  had	  held	  a	  number	  of	  key	  government	  posts,	  serving	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  state	  youth	  movement,	  Mocidade;	  Minister	  of	  the	  Colonies;	  and	  President	  of	  the	  Corporative	  Chamber	   before	   becoming	   Minister	   to	   the	   Presidency	   in	   1955,	   a	   post	   that	   can	   be	  compared	   to	   that	   of	   the	  deputy	  prime	  minister.	   The	   relationship	   between	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  his	  protégé	  deteriorated	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  yet	  in	  power,	  Caetano	  retained	  all	  the	  major	  features	  of	  the	  Salazarist	  dictatorship:	  political	  opposition	  was	  ruthlessly	  suppressed,	   the	   press	   was	   censored,	   and	   all	   the	   seats	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   National	  Assembly	  remained	  occupied	  by	  the	  ruling	  party,	  the	  National	  Union.461	  	  Above	  all,	  Caetano	  shared	  Salazar’s	  resolve	  to	  retain	  the	  Empire	  at	  any	  cost.	  In	  1970,	   Caetano	   authorized	   a	   major	   offensive	   designed	   to	   crush	   the	   liberation	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  movements,	   despite	   mounting	   international	   pressure,	   escalating	   costs,	   and	   war	  weariness.	  By	  1974,	  many	  of	   the	  army’s	   top	  generals	  believed	   that	   the	  colonial	  wars	  were	  unwinnable	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  but	  Caetano	  was	  unmoved,	  refusing	  to	  give	  in	  until	  his	  own	  fall	  from	  power	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  military	  coup	  d’état	  on	  25	  April	  1974.	  Caetano’s	  colonial	  policy	  received	  tacit	  support	  from	  US	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  sworn	  in	  on	  20	  January	   1969,	   and	   Nixon’s	   omnipotent	   national	   security	   adviser,	   Henry	   Kissinger.	  Convinced	   that	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   campaigns	   would	   not	   lead	   to	   independence	   and	  generally	  uninterested	   in	  Africa,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  provided	   increasing	   support	   to	  Lisbon,	  but	  stopped	  short	  of	  reversing	  the	  ban	  on	  weapons	  sales	  to	  Portugal	  just	  before	  the	   coup.462	  On	   30	   May	   1970,	   speaking	   to	   US	   Secretary	   of	   State	   William	   Rogers,	  Caetano	  declared	  that	  the	  decolonization	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  in	  Africa	  could	  not	  follow	   the	   Brazilian	   model	   of	   1822	   because	   the	   transfer	   of	   power	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements	  would	  represent	  a	  “danger	  to	  civilization”	  and	  would	  lead	  to	  “implantation	  of	   communism,”	   presenting	   a	   great	   risk	   to	   South	   Rhodesia	   and	   South	   Africa.	   Rogers	  responded	   by	   saying	   that	   the	   danger	   of	   “communist	   penetration”	   had	   lessened	   in	  comparison	   to	   the	   level	   during	   other	   periods	   but	   emphasized	   that	   the	   Nixon	  administration	   understood	   Caetano’s	   point	   of	   view	   and	   valued	   the	   relationship	  with	  Lisbon.463	  	  Contrary	   to	  Washington’s	   assumption,	   Moscow	  was	   very	  much	   interested	   in	  Africa.	   Having	   experienced	   war	   first-­‐hand,	   CC	   CPSU	   General	   Secretary	   Leonid	  Brezhnev	   wanted	   desperately	   to	   avoid	   another	   horrific	   scenario,	   which	   motivated	  Brezhnev	  to	  push	  for	  détente	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  After	  Nixon’s	  inauguration	  on	  20	  January	  1969,	  Washington	  and	  Moscow	  started	  talks	  concerning	  controlling	  the	  arms	  race,	  and	  on	  26	  May	  1972,	  Nixon	  and	  Brezhnev	  signed	  a	  historical	  agreement	  limiting	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	   anti-­‐ballistic	  missiles,	   known	  as	   the	  Strategic	  Arms	  Limitation	  Treaty	  (SALT	   I)	   at	   the	   Moscow	   Summit.	   However,	   Brezhnev	   never	   gave	   up	   the	   idea	   that	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  socialism	  would	  ultimately	   triumph	  all	   around	   the	  world.	  Relaxation	  of	   tensions	  was	  necessary	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  by	  peaceful	  means,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  the	  end	  of	  class	  struggle.	  On	  16	  April	  1970,	  while	  opening	  a	  memorial	  complex	  dedicated	   to	  Lenin	   in	  Ulyanov	  (Simbirsk),	  Brezhnev	  declared	  that	  only	  a	  little	  effort	  was	  required	  to	  achieve	  total	  victory	   for	  socialism.464	  What	   is	  more,	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  did	  not	  believe	   that	  détente	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  American	  behavior	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  Even	  though	  Washington	  was	  disillusioned	  with	  trying	  to	  stifle	  left-­‐leaning	  regimes	  by	  orchestrating	   coups	   d’état,	   they	   wanted	   to	   undercut	   revolutionary	   processes	   by	  bribing	   people	   in	   the	   Third	   World	   with	   economic	   assistance.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   by	  1970,	   the	   cadres	   of	   the	   International	   Department	   had	   come	   to	   believe	   that	   the	  prospects	  of	   the	   liberation	  movements	  were	  quite	  promising.	  The	  Central	  Committee	  thus	  decided	  to	  seize	  the	  initiative	  by	  offering	  qualitatively	  more	  sophisticated	  kinds	  of	  assistance,	   including	   new	   weapons	   systems	   with	   the	   capability	   to	   shoot	   down	   low-­‐flying	  aircraft;	  however,	  optimistic	  Soviet	  expectations	  did	  not	  pan	  out.	  The	  MPLA	  was	  heavily	   hit	   by	   a	   renewed	   Portuguese	   offensive,	   which	   exacerbated	   pre-­‐existing	  divisions	   within	   the	   movement.	   By	   1974,	   Agostinho	   Neto’s	   leadership	   was	   heavily	  criticized	   by	   Moscow,	   with	   the	   Soviets	   demanding	   that	   Neto	   reconcile	   with	   the	  opposition	  or	  face	  termination	  of	  Soviet	  assistance.	  FRELIMO’s	  relations	  with	  the	  CPSU	  were	  also	  difficult,	  with	  President	  Samora	  Machel	  unsatisfied	  with	  his	  treatment	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Soviets.	  Only	  the	  PAIGC-­‐CPSU	  relationship	  was	  an	  unqualified	  success:	  by	  1974,	   the	  PAIGC	  was	  on	   the	  verge	  of	  a	  military	  victory	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  Overall,	   the	  early	  1970s	  was	  a	  period	  of	  disillusionment	  for	  the	  Soviets	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  	  
Soviet	  Designs	  for	  Africa,	  1970	  On	   6	   May	   1970,	   KGB	   Chairman	   Yuriy	   Andropov	   wrote	   to	   the	   CPSU	  International	   Department	   proposing	   to	   increase	   Soviet	   involvement	   in	   Africa.	  Justification	  for	  this	  proposal	  by	  Andropov	  and	  the	  KGB	  was	  two-­‐fold.	  Andropov	  wrote	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  464	  Dmitriy	  Volkogonov,	  Lenin:	  A	  New	  Biography	  	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1994),	  p.	  456.	  
	   189	  that	  Western	   experts	   did	   not	   think	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  was	   planning	   for	   a	   “broad	  offensive”	   in	  Africa.	   This	   assumption,	   according	   to	  Andropov,	  was	   a	   good	   reason	   for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  step	  up	  operations	  in	  Africa.	  Having	  been	  appointed	  the	  head	  of	  the	  KGB	   in	  May	  1967,	  Andropov	  had	  become	   increasingly	   influential	   by	   the	   early	   1970s	  and	  had	  become	  capable	  of	  manipulating	  the	  ailing	  Brezhnev.	  Of	  all	  the	  Soviet	  leaders,	  Andropov	  was	   probably	   the	   least	   understood	   character,	   perhaps	   because	   he	   did	   not	  like	   to	   share	   his	   inner	   thoughts,	   a	   survival	   technique	   acquired	   during	   the	   Stalinist	  purges.	  Known	  to	  be	  intelligent,	  well-­‐read,	  and	  eager	  to	  surround	  himself	  with	  people	  of	   unorthodox	   persuasions,	   Andropov	   was	   also	   an	   orthodox	   Marxist	   who	   saw	   the	  world	   in	   terms	   of	   class	   struggle.	   The	   Third	   World	   was	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	  Andropov	  because	  he	  saw	  that	  there	  was	  where	  the	  struggle	  between	  capitalism	  and	  socialism	   would	   play	   out.	   On	   26	   November	   1970,	   KGB	   Deputy	   Chairman	   Viktor	  Chebrikov	  wrote	  to	  the	  International	  Department,	  explaining	  that	  Angola	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   in	   particular	   had	   strategic	   importance	   for	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   and	   that	   both	   the	  United	   States	   and	   China	   wanted	   to	   increase	   their	   influence	   with	   the	   liberation	  movements.465	  The	  Chief	   Intelligence	  Directorate	   (GRU;	  Glavnoe	  Razvedyvatelnoe	  Upravlenie)	  was	  also	  concerned	  about	  the	  US	  and	  China	  in	  Africa.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  reports	  from	  1970,	  the	   GRU	   argued	   that	   the	   capitalist	   states	  were	   putting	   pressure	   on	   African	   states	   to	  enter	   into	   base	   agreements	   and	   assistance	   plans,	   while	   China	   was	   also	   targeting	  countries	   that	   had	   already	   been	   receiving	   aid	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union.466	  The	   GRU’s	  evaluation	   most	   probably	   reflected	   the	   views	   of	   Petr	   Ivashutin,	   the	   chief	   of	   Soviet	  Military	   Intelligence	   since	   1963.	   Trained	   as	   a	  military	   pilot,	   Ivashutin	   had	   served	   in	  military	  counter-­‐intelligence	  beginning	  in	  1939,	  before	  being	  promoted	  to	  the	  post	  of	  KGB	   Deputy	   Chairman	   in	   1954.	   Very	   little	   is	   known	   about	   his	   personal	   views	   on	  foreign	   policy,	   but	   there	   is	   some	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   he	   was	   interested	   in	   the	  Third	  World,	  not	   least	  because	  of	   the	  opportunities	   that	  part	  of	   the	  world	  presented	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   190	  for	   military	   reconnaissance.	   One	   of	   Ivashutin’s	   first	   proposals	   as	   GRU	   chief	   was	   to	  negotiate	   an	   arrangement	   with	   the	   Cubans	   to	   install	   a	   radio-­‐electronic	   monitoring	  system	  to	  gather	  information	  on	  the	  US's	  nuclear	  capabilities.467	  The	  GRU	  was	  the	  key	  agency	  that	  approved	  what	  military	  assistance	  the	  liberation	  movements	  would	  obtain	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Not	  much	  is	  known	  about	  Ivashutin’s	  personal	  opinions	  on	  any	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  but	  on	  at	  least	  one	  occasion,	  he	  advocated	  on	  their	  behalf	  in	  front	  of	  his	  direct	  boss,	  Andrey	  Grechko,	  the	  Soviet	  Minister	  of	  Defense	  from	  1967	  to	  1976,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  KGB’s	  and	  the	  GRU’s	  evaluation	  must	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  information	  coming	   from	   Soviet	   diplomatic	   representatives	   and	   intelligence	   contacts	   based	   in	  Africa.	   On	   27	   October	   1970,	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Soviet	   Ambassador,	   Anatoliy	  Ratanov,	  wrote	   to	   the	  CC	  CPSU	  arguing	   that	   the	  western	   countries	  had	  become	  very	  interested	   in	   Guinea.	   Having	   served	   in	   a	   number	   of	   high-­‐ranking	   posts,	   including	  secretary	  of	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Democratic	  Youth	  and	  ambassador	  to	  Cambodia,	  Ratanov	  was	  already	  an	  experienced	  diplomat	  and	  a	  man	  who	  would	  prove	  decisive	  in	  crisis	   situations.	   “The	  USA	  and	   the	  FRG	   [Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany]	  have	  recently	  increased	   their	   infiltration	   of	   Guinea,	   offering	   considerable	   economic	   aid,”	   argued	  Ratanov,	  adding	  that	  Guinea	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	   in	  China’s	  policy	   in	  Africa.	  Ratanov	   warned	   that	   the	   socialist	   countries	   were	   to	   expect	   a	   “long	   and	   difficult	  struggle”	   to	   safeguard	   their	   positions	   in	   Guinea,	   which	   was	   important	   to	   the	  maintenance	  of	  Soviet	  positions	  in	  Africa	  overall:	  “Defeat	  of	  the	  progressive	  regime	  in	  Guinea,	  especially	  after	  the	  reactionary	  coup	  in	  Ghana,	  would	  have	  delivered	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  liberation	  struggle	  in	  West	  Africa	  and	  would	  have,	  in	  many	  ways,	  complicated	  the	  overall	   situation	   for	   the	   socialist	   countries	   in	   Africa.”468	  Given	   the	   importance	   of	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  Guinea,	  Ratanov	  proposed	   involving	  other	  socialist	  countries	   in	  developing	  economic	  and	  political	  relations	  with	  the	  country	  to	  counter	  interest	  from	  the	  capitalist	  states.469	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   liberation	  movements	  were	  gaining	  popular	  support	   from	  the	  social	  democratic	  governments	  in	  the	  Nordic	  countries.	  The	  PAIGC	  became	  the	  largest	  recipient	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	   from	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  after	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  went	  to	  Sweden	   in	   1968	   and	   met	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Swedish	   Social	   Democratic	   Party,	   Olof	  Palme.	   The	   governments	   of	   Sweden	   and	   other	  Nordic	   countries,	   including	  Denmark,	  Finland,	   and	   Norway,	   also	   supplied	   humanitarian	   assistance	   to	   FRELIMO	   and,	   to	   a	  lesser	   extent,	   to	   the	   MPLA.	   Lúcio	   Lara	   recalled	   that	   the	   MPLA	   were	   even	   “a	   little	  jealous”	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   PAIGC	   received	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   aid	   from	   the	   Nordic	  governments	   in	  proportional	   terms.	   “The	  reason	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  Amílcar	  Cabral.	  He	  was	  very	  dynamic	  and	  always	  on	  top	  of	  events,”	  Lara	  argued.470	  For	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  relations	  with	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  were	  important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  the	   humanitarian	   aid	   –	   everything	   from	   cans	   of	   food	   to	   trucks	   –	   allowed	   for	   the	  provision	  of	  basic	  goods	  and	  services	   to	   the	  civilian	  population,	  which	  was	  crucial	   in	  order	   to	   counter	   what	   the	   Portuguese	   were	   offering	   to	   the	   civilian	   population.	  “Weapons	   alone	   do	   not	   change	   life,	   but	   the	   clothes,	   for	   example,	   helped	   us	   to	   give	  something	   to	   the	   peasants	   in	   the	   liberated	   areas,”	   recalled	   Sérgio	   Vieira	   in	   a	   1996	  interview. 471 	  Second,	   assistance	   from	   the	   Nordic	   states	   decreased	   the	   fronts'	  dependency	   on	   aid	   from	   the	   socialist	   countries,	   allowing	   for	   a	   more	   independent	  stance.	  Joaquim	  Chissano,	  FRELIMO’s	  Secretary	  for	  Security	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  recalls	  that	  independence	  from	  any	  bloc	  and	  any	  outside	  influence	  was	  their	  basic	  policy	  and	  that	  support	  from	  Sweden	  and	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  helped	  them	  achieve	  that	  goal.472	  In	   Europe,	   public	   opinion	   was	   also	   turning	   against	   Portuguese	   colonialism.	  Much	  criticism	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  Cabora	  Bassa	  project.	  The	  project,	  envisioned	  by	  the	  Portuguese	   government,	   involved	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   hydroelectric	   dam	   on	   the	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  Interview	  with	  Lúcio	  Lara	  in	  Sellström,	  ed.,	  Liberation,	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  Sérgio	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  Zambezi	  River	  in	  the	  Tete	  province	  of	  Northern	  Mozambique;	  this	  dam	  was	  supposed	  to	  produce	  power	  for	  industry	  in	  South	  Rhodesia	  and	  South	  Africa.	  Lisbon	  also	  hoped	  that	   the	   electricity	   generated	   would	   promote	   local	   agriculture	   and	   attract	   up	   to	   a	  million	   white	   settlers	   to	   northern	   Mozambique.	   FRELIMO	   vigorously	   opposed	   the	  project	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  a	  colonialist	  project	  that	  perpetuated	  minority	  rule	  in	   South	   Rhodesia	   and	   apartheid	   South	   Africa.	   Just	   before	   the	   final	   signoff	   in	  September	  1969,	  a	  Swedish	  firm,	  ASEA,	  withdrew	  from	  the	  Cabora	  Bassa	  project	  due	  to	  popular	  opposition.473	  Popular	  concern	  for	  the	   liberation	  movements	   in	  the	  Nordic	  countries	   was	   developed	   through	   other	   initiatives.	   In	   1969,	   the	   Swedish	   Union	   of	  Secondary	  School	  Students	  decided	  to	  funnel	  the	  proceeds	  raised	  through	  their	  annual	  charity	  event,	  “Operation	  Day’s	  Work”,	  to	  health	  and	  education	  projects	  carried	  out	  by	  FRELIMO’s	  Mozambique	  Institute,	  raising	  public	  awareness	  of	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  wars	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies.474	  One	   clear	   manifestation	   of	   the	   change	   in	   public	   opinion	   was	   the	   1970	  International	   Conference	   of	   Solidarity	   with	   the	   Peoples	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   Colonies,	  held	   in	   Rome.	   That	   conference	   was	   attended	   by	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   sympathizers,	  including	  Christian	  Democrats,	  Socialists,	  and	  Communists,	   reflecting	  a	  broad	  shift	   in	  public	  opinion.	  Most	  significantly,	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos,	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  and	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  held	  a	  brief	  audience	  with	  Pope	  Paul	   IV	  at	   the	  Vatican.475	  The	  papal	   reception	  indicated	  the	  Vatican’s	  disapproval	  of	  Marcello	  Caetano’s	  colonial	  policy,	  which	  was	  a	  public	  relations	  debacle	  for	  the	  conservative	  Catholic	  regime	  in	  Portugal	  and	  a	  victory	  for	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   including	   over	   their	   internal	   rivals,	   who	   were	   not	  present	  at	  the	  conference	  in	  Rome.	  Speaking	  to	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Rogers	  in	  August	  1970,	  Congolese	  president	  Joseph	  Mobutu	  complained	  that	  the	  papal	  reception	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   Bassa:	   Power	   and	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   details	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   the	   debate	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   Sweden,	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   Sellström,	   Sweden	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   National	  
Liberation	  in	  Southern	  Africa:	  Formation	  of	  a	  Popular	  Opinion,	  1950-­‐1970,	  pp.	  483-­‐485.	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  Tor	  Sellström,	  Sweden	  and	  National	  Liberation	  in	  Southern	  Africa:	  Solidarity	  and	  Assistance.	  Vol.	  II	  (Uppsala:	  Nordiska	  Afrikainstitutet,	  2002),	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  Lopes,	  Aristides	  Pereira,	  p.	  149.	  Aristides	  Pereira	  recalls	  that	  the	  initiative	  belonged	  to	  Marcella	  Glisenti,	  a	  Christian	  Democrat	  activist	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Italian	  branch	  of	  the	  „Europe-­‐Latin	  America”	  solidarity	  group.	  It	  was	  her	  who	  apparently	  negotiated	  with	  Vatican	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  	  
	   193	  gave	  a	  “psychological	  advantage”	  to	  the	  MPLA	  over	  the	  FNLA.476	  Yet	  another	  surprise	  came	  after	  the	  conference	  when	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  and	  the	  director	  of	  the	   Institute	   of	   African	   studies,	   Vasiliy	   Solodovnikov,	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  was	  supplying	  arms	  to	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  an	  interview	  for	  Pravda.477	  	  It	  is	  not	  exactly	  known	  how	  Moscow	  viewed	  support	  from	  the	  Nordic	  countries.	  Generally	   speaking,	   the	   Soviet	   cadres	   recommended	   that	   the	   liberation	   movements	  should	   seek	   sources	   of	   support	   in	   the	  West.478	  The	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   also	  maintained	   relations	  with	   a	   variety	   of	   individuals	   involved	  with	   European	   solidarity	  groups	  and	  organizations,	   such	  as	  Lars-­‐Gunnar	  Eriksson,	  director	  of	   the	   International	  University	  Exchange	  Fund.	  Vladimir	  Shubin,	  who	  was	  involved	  in	  developing	  contacts	  with	  European	  solidarity	  groups	  at	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  argued	   that	   there	   was	   no	   negative	   attitude	   in	   Moscow	   toward	   involvement	   of	   the	  Nordic	   countries,	   but	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   the	   Soviet	   attitude	   towards	   the	   Social	  Democratic	   parties	   was	   positive. 479 	  When	   a	   delegation	   of	   the	   Polish	   Solidarity	  Committee,	  led	  by	  Kwyrin	  Grela,	  visited	  Moscow	  in	  November	  1971,	  their	  counterparts	  at	  the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee	  informed	  them	  that	  they	  had	  witnessed	  a	  significant	  increase	   in	   assistance	   from	   Social	   Democrats	   to	   the	  movements,	   urging	   the	   Poles	   to	  neither	  interfere	  with	  those	  contacts	  nor	  allow	  the	  socially	  democratic	  parties	  to	  seize	  all	  the	  initiative.	  Whatever	  reservations	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	  had	  regarding	  support	  from	  the	   Nordic	   countries,	   they	   definitely	   did	   not	   voice	   them. 480 	  Joaquim	   Chissano	  remembered	  that	  the	  Soviets	  did	  not	  have	  a	  single	  question	  about	  Sweden	  involvement	  with	  FRELIMO.481	  	  China	  re-­‐emerged	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  around	  1970,	  the	  year	  the	  country	  emerged	  from	  the	  self-­‐imposed	  diplomatic	  isolation	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  CCP	  re-­‐kindle	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	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  Shubin	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  Sellström,	  ed.,	  Liberation,	  	  p.	  247.	  480	  Polish	  Solidarity	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  majority	  of	  African	  countries,	  but	  it	  also	  pursued	  an	  increasingly	  activist	  diplomacy	  to	  win	   over	   allies	   at	  Moscow’s	   expense.	  Many	   of	   these	   African	   states	   voted	   for	   China’s	  admission	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  October	  1971.	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1971,	  both	  the	  MPLA’s	  President	  Agostinho	  Neto	  and	  FRELIMO’s	  Samora	  Machel	  stayed	  in	  Beijing	  for	  quite	   a	   long	  period	  of	   time,	  during	  which	   they	  were	   showered	  with	   attention	  by	   the	  CCP’s	   top	   leadership,	   including	   Premier	   Zhou	   Enlai. 482On	   10	   August	   1971,	   the	  presidium	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   held	   a	   special	   meeting	   dedicated	   to	  China’s	   resurgence.	   The	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Solidarity	   Committee,	   Alexandr	  Dzasokhov,	   warned	   his	   colleagues	   that	   China	  might	   return	   to	   undermine	   the	   Soviet	  influence	   in	   the	   AAPSO	   and	   urged	   them	   to	   find	   other	   ways	   of	   countering	   Beijing’s	  influence.483	  Others	  agreed,	  arguing	   that	   the	  Soviets	  needed	   to	  activate	   their	  contacts	  in	   the	  AAPSO	  to	  convince	  their	   friends	  of	   the	  true	   intentions	  of	   the	  Chinese,	  and	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  avoid	  blunt	  anti-­‐Chinese	  propaganda.484	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  did	  not	  make	  the	  socialist	  countries	  back	  off	  from	  supporting	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  In	  November	  1971,	  after	  a	  trip	  to	  Moscow,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Polish	  Solidarity	  Committee,	  Kwyrin	  Grela,	  proposed	  increasing	  Polish	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA,	   FRELIMO,	   and	   the	   PAIGC	   by	   allocating	   one	  million	   zloty	   for	   shipments	   of	  medicine,	   equipment	   for	   a	   military	   hospital,	   and	   “three	   to	   five	   hundred	   automatic	  pistols”	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  movements.485	  While	  Warsaw	  had	  already	  supplied	  some	  goods,	   including	   medicine,	   food,	   clothes,	   and	   household	   utensils,	   to	   the	   three	  movements	   from	   1969	   to	   1971,	   the	   Polish	   commitment	   was	   insignificant	   in	  comparison	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  GDR,	  and	  Bulgaria,	  Grela	  argued.	   	  Moreover,	  Poland	  had	  sold	  ships	   to	  Portugal,	  which	  was	  a	   lucrative	  deal	   for	  Warsaw,	  but	  which	  predictably	   provoked	   a	   storm	   of	   criticism	   from	   the	   liberation	   movements.486	  Grela	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  further	   justified	   his	   proposal	   to	   increase	   support	   for	   the	   liberation	   movements	   by	  saying	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  military	  aid	  would	  shield	  Poland	  from	  criticism	  for	  selling	  its	  ships	  to	  Portugal.	  More	  generally,	  argued	  Grela,	  decolonization	  in	  Portuguese	  Africa	  had	  entered	  the	  final	  stage,	  and	  it	  was	  thus	  necessary	  to	  “intensify	  our	  involvement.”487	  Richard	   Frelek,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Polish	  United	   Workers’	   Party	   (PUWP),	   supported	   Grela’s	   proposal.488	  Poland	   was	   finally	  catching	   up	   to	   the	   commitment	   other	   socialist	   countries	   had	   shown	   the	   liberation	  movements.	  	  	  
The	  MPLA	  on	  the	  Defensive,	  1970-­‐1971	   	  In	  July	  1970,	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  to	  Zambia,	  Dmitriy	  Belokolos,	  proposed	  a	  set	  of	  measures	  to	  provide	  military	  aid,	  logistical	  support,	  and	  political	  training	  to	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  Soviets	  were	  also	  prepared	  to	  send	  advisers	  and	  offer	  political	  support	  to	  Zambia,	   the	   Congo,	   and	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville.	   Neto	   received	   the	   news	   of	   the	   Soviet	   aid	  very	  positively;	  he	  reiterated	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  the	  MPLA’s	  main	  international	  ally	  and	  stressed	  that	  he	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  China.489	  The	   first	  signs	  that	  Moscow	  was	  serious	  appeared	  in	  July,	  when	  a	  team	  of	  Soviet	  journalists,	  including	  Oleg	  Ignatyev,	  Pavel	  Mikhalev,	  and	  Anatoliy	  Nikanorov,	  together	  with	  two	  cameramen,	  Vladimir	  Komarov	  and	  Yuriy	  Yegorov,	  crossed	  the	  Zambia/Angola	  border	  for	  a	  month-­‐long	   trip	   to	   the	  so-­‐called	   liberated	  areas	  of	  southeast	  Angola.	  Their	  main	  goal	  was	   to	  shoot	  a	  film	  and	  write	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  about	  the	  MPLA’s	  armed	  struggle.	  The	  crew	  spent	  their	  time	  observing	  life	  in	  the	  liberated	  areas,	  talking	  to	  the	  MPLA	  cadres,	  and	  even	  participating	  in	  an	  attack	  on	  a	  Portuguese	  fort	  on	  26	  July,	  the	  very	  same	  day	  that	  António	  Oliveira	  Salazar	  died,	  two	  years	  after	  his	  debilitating	  stroke.490	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  Kwytin	   Grela	   to	   Ludwikowski	   (CC	   PUWP	   International	   Department),	   15	   November	   1971,	   "Notatka	   w	   sprawie	  pomocy	  ruchom	  narodowo-­‐wyzwolenczym	  Afriki,"	  AAN,	  PZPR,	  LXXVI/503.	  488	  Rychard	  Frelek	  to	  Stanislaw	  Kania	  (CC	  PUWP	  Secretary),	  9	  November	  1971,	  AAN,	  	  PZPR,	  LXXVI/503.	  489	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	   "Moscow	  and	   the	  Angolan	  Crisis,	  1974-­‐1976:	  A	  New	  Pattern	  of	   Intervention,"	  The	  Cold	  War	   in	  Southern	  Africa	  and	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Bulletin	  No.	  8/9	  -­‐-­‐	  Winter	  1996,	  p.	  22.	  490	  Oleg	   Ignatyev	   (Pravda)	   to	   the	   Foreign	   Ministry,	   18	   June	   1970,	   AVPRF,	   f.658,	   op.	   40,	   p.	   1,	   d.1;	   Oleg	   Ignatyev,	   "A	  Victoria	  e	  Serta:	  Reportazh	  iz	  Partizanskogo	  Otryada	  Angoly,"	  Pravda,	  23	  August,	  1970,	  	  p.	  4;	  Tvoi	  Syn,	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   196	  US	  intelligence	  quickly	  picked	  up	  signs	  that	  Moscow	  might	  be	  expanding	  aid	  to	  the	   liberation	   movements.	   On	   11	   August,	   Wayne	   Smith	   at	   the	   State	   Department’s	  Bureau	   of	   Intelligence	   and	   Research	   drafted	   a	   note	   stating	   they	   had	   unconfirmed	  information	  that	  a	  “team	  of	   four	  to	  six	  Soviets”	  had	  entered	  Angola	   from	  Zambia	  and	  that	  the	  MPLA	  had	  received	  an	  “extraordinarily	  large”	  arms	  shipment	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  release	  of	   this	   information	  also	  meant	   that	   the	  MPLA’s	  military	  campaign	  was	  preparing	  to	  enter	  a	  more	  active	  phase.491	  It	  is	  not	  known	  exactly	  what	  kind	  of	  aid	  the	  Soviets	  envisioned	   for	   the	  MPLA	  nor	  what	   they	  actually	  delivered,	  but	   the	  Soviet	  willingness	  to	  expand	  assistance	  indicates	  there	  was	  optimism	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  movement	  in	  the	  southeast.	  	  This	   expectation	   did	   not	   materialize,	   because	   in	   1970,	   the	   MPLA	   faced	   a	  renewed	  army	  offensive	  directed	  by	  the	  newly	  appointed	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief,	  General	  Francisco	  da	  Costa	  Gomes.	  Known	  to	  be	  a	  talented	  commander,	  Gomes	  began	  to	  use	  a	  combination	   of	   the	   “guadrillage”	   garrisoning	   system,	   which	   had	   been	   used	   by	   the	  French	   in	  Algeria	   to	  divide	   the	   country	   into	   sectors,	   each	  permanently	   controlled	  by	  troops	  to	  isolate	  the	  insurgents,	  and	  mobile	  reaction	  groups	  for	  dry-­‐season	  sweeps	  in	  the	  southeast.	  Costa	  Gomes	  also	  increasingly	  used	  helicopters,	  most	  notably	  the	  French	  model	   “Alouette	   III,”	   for	   reconnaissance,	   liaison,	   and	   support	   work.	   The	   Portuguese	  also	  strengthened	  their	  vehicles	  against	  mine	  attacks	  and	  greatly	  improved	  their	  land	  communications	   by	   building	   a	   network	   of	   roads	   that	   connected	  major	   towns	   in	   the	  east.492	  Most	  notably,	   the	  army	  started	  using	   industrial	   chemicals	   to	  destroy	  crops	   in	  order	  to	  deprive	  the	  insurgents	  of	  any	  means	  of	  sustenance.	  Daniel	  Chipenda,	  a	  former	  head	   of	   the	  MPLA’s	   youth	  wing	  who	   became	   responsible	   for	   expanding	   the	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  southeast	  thus	  recounts	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  offensive:	  “This	  was	  really	  hell:	  during	  this	  time,	  they	  unleashed	  herbicides,	  burning	  all	  the	  leaves,	  all	  of	  the	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  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  92.	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  Anthony	  Clayton,	  Frontiersmen:	  Warfare	  In	  Africa	  Since	  1950	  	  (London:	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  Press,	  1999),	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   197	  cassava,	  and	  then	  the	  fields	  became	  empty,	  which	  made	  life	  very	  difficult	  both	  for	  the	  guerrillas	  and	  for	  the	  population	  who	  supported	  us.”493	  The	   Portuguese	   offensive	   put	   a	   major	   strain	   on	   the	   internal	   cohesion	   of	   the	  MPLA.	  The	  first	  signs	  of	  internal	  discontent	  appeared	  shortly	  following	  the	  1968	  army	  offensive,	  during	  which	  the	  head	  of	  the	  MPLA	  medical	  program,	  Dr.	  Americo	  Boavida,	  and	  a	   charismatic	   commander,	  Hoji	  Ya	  Henda,	  had	  been	  both	  killed.	  The	  head	  of	   the	  MPLA’s	  youth	  wing,	  Daniel	  Chipenda,	  recalls	  that	  the	  hardship	  brought	  by	  the	  offensive	  forced	  many	  guerrillas	   to	   reflect	  upon	   the	  war,	   and	   that	   they	   then	   started	   criticizing	  the	   leadership	   for	   discriminatory	   practices.	   In	   1969,	   a	   group	   of	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	  Ovimbundu	   guerrillas	   deserted	   Angolan	   camps	   and	   went	   to	   the	   Zambian	   bases,	  protesting	  against	  arbitrary	  executions	  of	  civilians	  and	  other	  abuses	  committed	  by	  the	  MPLA	   field	   commanders.	   Chipenda	   remembered	   that	   the	   mutineers	   demanded	   to	  speak	  to	  Neto,	  but	  he	  was	  away	  and,	  thus,	  it	  was	  he	  who	  was	  required	  to	  negotiate	  with	  them.	   “I	   talked	   to	   them,	   they	   told	   me	   what	   they	   wanted,	   I	   transmitted	   this	   to	   the	  Directorate,	   but	   they	  were	   already	   individuals	  who	   said	   that	  Chipenda	  wanted	   to	  be	  President	   and	   I	   don’t	   know	   what	   else,	   and	   thereafter	   started	   perpetrating	   that	  belief.”494	  	  This	   incident	   testified	   to	   the	  MPLA’s	   inability	   to	  obtain	   grassroots	   support	   in	  Ovimbundu-­‐dominated	   southeast	   Angola.	   Of	   the	   top-­‐level	   commanders,	   only	   Daniel	  Chipenda	  was	  of	  Ovimbundu	  origin.	  Others	  were	  of	  Mbundu	  or	  mixed-­‐race	  origin,	  and	  they	   came	   from	   Luanda	   and	   northwest	   Angola.	   By	   the	   time	   military	   operations	   in	  Cabinda	  and	  the	  northwest	  stalled	  around	  1967,	   the	  MPLA	  had	  flown	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  experienced	  commanders	  from	  Brazzaville	  to	  Lusaka	  to	  lead	  the	  campaign	  in	  the	  southeast.	   Although	   they	   had	   the	   necessary	   education,	   military	   training,	   and	  experience,	  they	  shared	  very	  little	  with	  the	  people	  whom	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  lead	  into	  battle.	  They	  could	  not	  speak	  the	   local	   languages	  and	  knew	  very	   little	  about	   local	  customs	   and	   traditions.	   They	   used	   translators	   to	   communicate	   with	   their	   soldiers.	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  Interview	  with	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  in	  Jaime	  and	  Barber,	  eds.,	  Angola,	  	  p.	  145.	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  Interview	  with	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  in	  ibid.,	  p.	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   198	  Quite	   naturally,	   the	   MPLA	   were	   often	   seen	   as	   intruders	   rather	   than	   liberators.	   In	   a	  1998	   interview,	   Lúcio	   Lara	   admitted	   that	   the	   MPLA	   commanders	   abused	   their	  privileged	   status	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   combatants:	   “In	   Cabinda,	   the	  commanders,	  including	  myself,	  always	  used	  to	  carry	  our	  own	  loads,	  while	  in	  the	  East,	  the	  commanders	  walked	  freely,	  while	  the	  guerrillas	  would	  carry	  their	  loads.”	  The	  same	  discriminatory	   practices	   often	   applied	   to	   food	   allocation,	   recounted	   Lúcio	   Lara,	   thus	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  “Eastern	  Revolt.”495	  	  In	  1970,	  a	  renewed	  army	  offensive	  put	  a	  major	  strain	  on	  the	  MPLA.	  Persistent	  bombing	  raids	  caused	  widespread	  deprivation	  and	  starvation	  in	  the	  MPLA-­‐controlled	  zones,	   while	   transportation	   problems	   hindered	   the	   re-­‐supply	   of	   the	   hinterland.	   The	  war	  was	  hugely	  disruptive	  to	  the	  population	  of	  the	  southeast,	  where	  the	  people	  were	  forced	   to	   abandon	   their	   villages	   and	   move	   to	   the	   bush	   or	   to	   the	   Portuguese-­‐run	  protected	   villages.	   Ingre	   Brinkman,	   one	   of	   the	   few	   historians	   to	   have	   conducted	  extensive	  research	  into	  the	  popular	  response	  to	  the	  military	  campaign	  in	  the	  southeast,	  shows	   that	   the	   number	   of	   people	   accused	   of	   betrayal	   and	   executed	   as	   traitors	  increased	  dramatically	   after	  1970,	   as	  people	   fled	   to	  Portuguese-­‐held	   areas	  while	   the	  offensive	  intensified.496	  Criticism	  of	  the	  MPLA’s	  leadership	  resurfaced.	  When	  Agostinho	  Neto	   visited	   East	   Berlin	   for	   talks	   with	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Socialist	   Unity	   Party	   of	  Germany	   (SED;	   Sozialistische	   Einheitspartei	   Deutschlands)	   in	   November	   1971,	   he	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  MPLA	  was	  experiencing	  serious	  problems,	  but	  was	  undergoing	  a	  military	  reorganization	  in	  order	  to	  create	  larger	  and	  better-­‐armed	  units.	  He	  also	  said	  that	  the	  MPLA	  was	  planning	  to	  hold	  a	  party	  congress	  the	  following	  year.497	  	  Moscow	  observed	  those	  developments	  with	  some	  concern,	  worried	  especially	  by	   Neto’s	   rapprochement	   with	   China.	   “The	   Soviet	   comrades	   believe	   the	   MPLA	   has	  returned	  to	  the	  Chinese	  sphere	  of	  influence,”	  reported	  the	  Polish	  Solidarity	  Committee	  in	   their	  conversations	  with	   their	  Soviet	   counterparts	   in	  November	  1971.	  The	  Soviets	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   199	  told	  the	  Polish	  Committee	  that	  Neto	  had	  spent	  three	  weeks	  in	  China,	  during	  which	  time	  he	  had	  received	  assurances	  of	   substantial	   support.	  Moscow	  was	  also	  concerned	  with	  internal	  developments	  in	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  Soviet	  cadres	  urged	  their	  Polish	  colleagues	  to	  pay	  attention	   to	  what	   transpired	  during	   the	  MPLA	  Congress,	   supposedly	  planned	   for	  the	   following	   February	   or	   March,	   warning	   that	   the	   Congress	   could	   reveal	   internal	  disagreements	  or	  even	  lead	  to	  a	  split	  within	  the	  movement.498	  If	  the	  Soviets	  were	  full	  of	  optimism	  about	   the	  MPLA’s	  prospects	   in	  1970,	   this	  was	  no	   longer	   the	   case	  one	  year	  later.	  The	  MPLA	  failed	  to	  proceed	  to	  a	  more	  active	  phase	  of	  war	  and	  also	  showed	  signs	  of	  internal	  discontent,	  which	  was	  known	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  Neto’s	  1971	  visit	  to	  Beijing	  was	  also	   disturbing	   because	   it	   was	   yet	   another	   sign	   that	   the	   Chinese	   leadership	   had	  intensified	  their	  campaign	  to	  win	  over	  allies	  at	  Moscow’s	  expense;	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  extent	  or	  nature	  of	  Soviet	  assistance	  changed	  dramatically	  during	  this	  period.	  Moscow	  again	  adopted	  a	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	  approach,	  waiting	  for	  events	  to	  play	  out.	  	  
The	  MPLA	  in	  Crisis,	  1972-­‐74	  The	   Portuguese	   offensive	   against	   the	  MPLA	   in	   the	   southeast	   acquired	   a	   new	  intensity	  in	  1972.	  The	  culmination	  of	  the	  offensive	  was	  known	  as	  “Operation	  Attila.”	  By	  raining	  napalm	  and	  defoliants	  onto	  the	  nationalist	  villages,	   the	  armed	  forces	   inflicted	  serious	  damage	  on	  the	  MPLA	  forces	  in	  the	  southeast.	  By	  late	  1972,	  colonial	  authorities	  estimated	  that	  the	  offensive	  had	  reduced	  insurgent	  strength	  by	  more	  than	  half	  of	   the	  total	   recorded	   in	   1970.499	  Costa	   Gomes	   also	   made	   a	   clandestine	   deal	   with	   Jonas	  Savimbi	   to	   join	   forces	   against	   the	  MPLA.	   Having	   split	   with	   Holden	   Roberto	   and	   the	  FNLA	  in	  1963,	  Savimbi	  had	  established	  a	  third	  liberation	  movement,	  called	  UNITA,	  in	  1966.	  Rooted	  in	  the	  Ovimbundu	  community	  of	  southeast	  Angola,	  Savimbi	  had	  acquired	  a	   devoted	   if	   small	   following,	   but	   the	   much	   better	   equipped	   and	   trained	   MPLA	  represented	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  UNITA	  in	  the	  southeast.	  In	  early	  1972,	  Costa	  Gomes	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   200	  and	  Savimbi	  agreed	  that	  they	  would	  not	  fight	  each	  other,	  but	  would	  cooperate	  in	  other	  zones	   to	   eliminate	   the	   MPLA,	   with	   UNITA	   providing	   intelligence	   support.	   One	  Portuguese	   officer	   remarked	   that	   UNITA	   “gave	   the	   Portuguese	   forces	   the	   decisive	  weapon	   in	   that	   kind	   of	   war:	   information	   about	   the	   guerrilla	   base	   camps	   [of	   the	  MPLA].”500	  Meanwhile,	  the	  MPLA	  began	  a	  process	  known	  as	  “readjustment,”	  which	  called	  on	   party	   cadres	   to	   examine	   their	   actions	   in	   the	   light	   of	   military	   failures.	   Daniel	  Chipenda	  recalled	  that	  the	  idea	  for	  the	  movement	  came	  from	  a	  group	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  party	   cadres,	   such	   as	   Julião	   Mateus	   Paulo	   (nome	   de	   guerre	   Dino	   Matross),	   Manuel	  Alexandre	   Rodrigues	   (nome	   de	   guerre	   “Kito”),	   Zacarias	   Pinto	   (nome	   de	   guerre	  “Bolingo”),	   João	   Luís	   Neto	   (nome	   de	   guerre	   “Xietu”),	   and	   Manuel	   da	   Costa	   António	  Kiaku	  (nome	  de	  guerre	  “Mundo	  Real),	  amongst	  others,	  who	  had	  returned	  from	  China	  where	  they	  had	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  “criticism”	  and	  “self-­‐criticism”	  movement	  of	  the	  Cultural	   Revolution.	   Chipenda	   opposed	   this	   idea,	   stating	   that	   the	   people	   were	   not	  sufficiently	   politicized	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   theoretical	   discussion.	   He	   claimed	   that	  “readjustment”	  would	  only	   lead	   to	   racist	  accusations,	   in	   that	   there	  would	  be	  charges	  that	   the	  war	  was	   not	   going	  well	   because	   the	  whites	   in	   the	   leadership	   positions	   had	  betrayed	   the	   liberation	   struggle.	   Chipenda	   argued	   that	   what	   was	   required	   was	   not	  simply	   a	   theoretical	   discussion,	   but	   a	   real	   structural	   adjustment	  of	   the	  movement	   to	  adapt	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   MPLA’s	   membership	   and	   sphere	   of	   operation	   in	   the	  previous	   years. 501 	  Criticism	   of	   the	   leadership	   intensified.	   On	   a	   visit	   to	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville	   in	   August	   1972,	   the	   Soviet	   Solidarity	   Committee	   noticed	   that	   some	  prominent	  members,	   such	   as	  Mário	  de	  Andrade,	  wanted	   to	   keep	   their	   distance	   from	  the	  leadership,	  indicating	  an	  increase	  in	  disagreements	  within	  the	  MPLA.502	  Furthermore,	   the	   Soviets	   became	   increasingly	   concerned	   with	   Neto’s	  announcement	   of	   9	   June	   1972,	   in	   which	   he	   proposed	   reconciling	   with	   Holden	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  Roberto’s	  FNLA.	  Given	  that	  the	  eastern	  front	  was	  under	  a	  severe	  strain,	  Neto	  renewed	  his	  attempts	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  Congo,	  which	  was	  vital	  for	  access	  to	  Angola’s	  north.	  The	  Congolese	  president,	  Joseph	  Desire	  Mobutu,	  would	  only	  agree	  for	  the	  MPLA	  to	  use	  their	   territory	   if	   they	   forged	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   FNLA.	   On	   24	   October	   1972,	  speaking	  to	  Kurt	  Kruger	  of	  the	  GDR’s	  Solidarity	  Committee	  at	  a	  conference	  in	  Tashkent,	  Alexander	  Dzasokhov	  revealed	  that	  Neto	  had	  recently	  forged	  an	  alliance	  with	  Holden	  Roberto	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   his	   position	  within	   the	  movement.	  Dzasokhov	   added	  that	   not	   everyone	   in	   the	   MPLA	   agreed	   with	   the	   decision,	   which	   was	   probably	   the	  reason	   why	   Neto	   kept	   postponing	   the	   long-­‐overdue	   convocation	   of	   the	   party	  congress.503	  On	  12	  December	  1972,	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  FNLA	  signed	  a	  unity	  agreement,	  which	   established	   the	   Supreme	   Council	   for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Angola,	   in	   order	   to	  coordinate	   a	   Unified	   Military	   Command	   and	   Political	   Council	   of	   Angola,	   with	   Neto	  agreeing	  to	  a	  secondary	  role	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Council.	  Moscow	  was	  highly	  skeptical.	  As	  Petr	  Yevsyukov	  wrote,	  the	  form	  of	  the	  agreement	  “completely	  disorientated	  the	  MPLA	  members	  and	  supporters,	  as	  well	  as	  us.”504	  Visiting	  Moscow	  in	  January	  1973	  with	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  Neto	  tried	  to	  convince	  his	  Soviet	  interlocutors	  that	  the	  MPLA	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  unity	  agreement.505	  	  Finally,	   in	   early	   1973,	   several	   years	   of	   built-­‐up	   tensions	   burst	   into	   the	   open	  when	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  arrested	  a	  group	  of	  men,	  all	  of	  them	  of	  Ovimbundu	  ethnic	  origin,	   on	   charges	   of	   plotting	   to	   assassinate	   Neto.	   Very	   few	   details	   regarding	   the	  circumstances	  of	  these	  events	  are	  known,	  but	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  all	  of	  these	  people	  were	   interrogated	   and	   confessed	   that	   Daniel	   Chipenda	   masterminded	   the	  assassination	   attempt.	   Subsequently,	   four	   men	   were	   executed	   for	   treason	   on	   Neto’s	  orders.	   Chipenda	   always	   denied	   involvement	   in	   the	   coup	   attempt,	   arguing	   that	   the	  Neto	  and	  his	  supporters	  extracted	  these	  confessions	  under	  torture.	  Chipenda	  claimed	  that	  he	  was	  in	  Lusaka	  when	  Iko	  Carreira	  arrived	  with	  orders	  for	  Chipenda	  to	  depart	  for	  the	   front.	   Naturally	   on	   the	   alert,	   Chipenda	   refused	   to	   leave	   and	   stayed	   on	   in	   Lusaka	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  under	   the	   protection	   of	   Zambia’s	   president	  Kenneth	  Kaunda.506	  Chipenda	   attracted	   a	  group	  of	   followers	  among	  the	  MPLA’s	  Ovimbundu	  supporters,	  maintaining	  an	  uneasy	  standoff	   with	   Neto.	   Several	   reports	   from	   Zambia	   spoke	   of	   rebellions	   in	   the	   MPLA’s	  camps,	  with	  some	  turning	  violent.507	  	  Moscow	   grew	   increasingly	   impatient	   with	   the	   MPLA’s	   internal	   situation	   and	  with	  Neto’s	  leadership	  style,	  as	  evident	  from	  a	  top-­‐secret	  note	  for	  the	  CC	  CPSU,	  signed	  by	  Viktor	  Kulikov,	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  Soviet	  General	  Staff,	  on	  23	  December	  1973.	  Kulikov	  criticized	  Neto	   for	  disregarding	  ethnic	  considerations	   in	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  MPLA’s	  leadership	   structures,	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   dictatorial	   leadership	   style,	   and	   the	  underestimation	   of	   political	  work,	   all	   of	  which	   had	   led	   to	   the	   split	  within	   the	   party.	  Kulikov	   also	   blamed	   Neto	   for	   the	   heavy-­‐handed	   management	   of	   the	   crisis.	   Kulikov	  argued	  that	  he	  did	  not	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  its	  eruption,	  but	  tried	  to	  use	  brutal	   force	   to	   quell	   the	   growing	   frustration,	   claiming	   to	   have	   discovered	   a	   coup	  attempt	   against	   him	   and	   using	   this	   as	   a	   pretext	   to	   executive	   five	   of	   his	  most	   active	  rivals.	  Neto	  accused	  Chipenda	  of	   complicity	   in	   the	   coup,	   and	  only	   the	   interference	  of	  the	  Zambian	  authorities	   saved	  Chipenda	   from	  physical	   annihilation,	   according	   to	   the	  report.508	  In	  August	  1973,	   the	  majority	  of	  guerrillas	   in	  Zambian	  base	  camps	   rebelled,	  urging	   the	   convocation	  of	   the	  Regional	  Conference	   to	   elect	  new	   leadership,	   but	  Neto	  refused	   to	   accede	   to	   their	   demands	   and	   cut	   supplies	   in	   retaliation.	   Kulikov	   also	  criticized	   Neto’s	   unity	   agreement	   between	   the	   MPLA	   and	   Holden	   Roberto’s	   FNLA,	  made	  in	  hopes	  of	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  Congo	  and	  undermining	  the	  FNLA	  from	  within.	  However,	   the	   opposite	   outcome	  was	   the	   result.	  While	   the	   FNLA’s	   prestige	   rose,	   the	  MPLA	   did	   not	   gain	   any	   access	   to	   the	   Congo,	   and	   remained	   torn	   by	   internal	  contradictions.	   Eventually,	  Kulikov	   concluded	   that	   all	   these	  mistakes	  had	   resulted	   in	  the	  semi-­‐cessation	  of	  all	  military	  operations,	  and	  proposed	  that	  Soviet	  ambassadors	  in	  Zambia	  and	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  should	  impress	  upon	  Neto	  and	  Chipenda	  that	  Soviet	  aid	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   203	  was	   contingent	   upon	   them	   overcoming	   the	   internal	   crisis	   and	   renewing	   the	   armed	  struggle.509	  The	   CC	   CPSU	   International	   Department	   seemed	   to	   agree	   with	   Kulikov’s	  evaluation	   of	   Neto.	   This	   was	   not	   particularly	   surprising.	   Neto’s	   relations	   with	   some	  members	   of	   the	   International	   Department	   including	   with	   Petr	   Yevsyukov,	   were	  complicated,	  while	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  was	  a	  charismatic	  and	  young	  leader,	  who	  was	  well	  known	  in	  Moscow	  and	  whose	  criticism	  of	  Neto	  seemed	  justified.510	  On	  7	  January	  1974,	  Rostislav	  Ulyanovskiy	  authored	  a	  follow-­‐up	  note	  repeating	  Kulikov’s	  criticism	  of	  Neto’s	  crisis	   management	   skills,	   advising	   that	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Central	   Committee	   instruct	   the	  Soviet	  ambassador,	  Dmitry	  Belokolos,	   to	  convey	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Soviet	   leadership	   in	  conversations	   with	   Neto	   and	   Chipenda	   in	   Lusaka.	   Three	   days	   later,	   the	   CC	   CPSU	  approved	  the	  decision.	  Petr	  Manchkha,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  African	  section	  at	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department,	   thus	   cabled	  Ambassador	  Belokolos,	   instructing	   him	   to	   tell	  Neto	   that	   MPLA’s	   internal	   contradictions	   made	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   to	  continue	  its	  support.511	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin	  wrote	  that	  the	  KGB	  rezidentura	  in	  Lusaka	  was	  also	   ordered	  no	   longer	   to	   give	   assistance	   to	  Neto,	   and	   to	   hand	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	  “financial	  means”	   to	   Chipenda.	   Nazhestkin	   recalled	   that	   the	   decision	  was	   a	   shock	   to	  Neto,	   who	   expressed	   his	   utmost	   dissatisfaction	   to	   the	   Soviet	   rezident	   in	   Conakry,	  arguing	  that	  even	  a	  temporary	  termination	  of	  Soviet	  aid	  would	  put	  the	  movement	  in	  a	  very	   difficult	   situation,	   which	   the	   MPLA	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   overcome	   in	   a	   short	  period	  of	  time.512	  While	  the	  decision	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  drastic	  measure,	  it	  was	  probably	  meant	   as	   a	  means	   to	   put	   pressure	   on	   Neto	   to	   deliver	   on	   his	   promise	   and	   solve	   the	  internal	   disagreements,	   wrecking	   the	   movement.	   One	   way	   or	   the	   other,	   Moscow’s	  relations	  with	  Neto	  were	  at	  its	  lowest	  point	  since	  1963.	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   204	  FRELIMO’s	   leadership	   had	   become	   dissatisfied	   with	   the	   Soviets	   by	   1970.	  Firstly,	   they	   were	   unhappy	   with	   the	   quantity	   and	   quality	   of	   Soviet	   aid.	   Two	   years	  earlier,	   Mondlane	   had	   complained	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   was	   not	   responsive	   to	   his	  appeals	  for	  financial	  assistance,	  and	  had	  stressed	  that	  they	  required	  regular	  deliveries	  of	  modern	  weapons.513	  The	  movement	  had	  managed	  to	  overcome	  an	  internal	  crisis	  and	  had	  acquired	  greater	  recognition	  following	  Mondlane’s	  death;	  nonetheless,	  the	  nature	  of	  Soviet	  assistance	  had	  not	  changed.	  In	  March	  1970,	  a	  journalist	  from	  the	  GDR,	  Peter	  Spacek,	   toured	   the	  Cabo	  Delgado	  province	   for	   three	  weeks,	  accompanied	  by	   Joaquim	  Chissano.	   He	   also	   interviewed	   Samora	   Machel,	   the	   newly	   elected	   president	   of	  FRELIMO,	  who	  was	  still	  relatively	  unknown	  to	  the	  wider	  world.	  On	  his	  return	  to	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Spacek	  wrote	   to	  Berlin,	   explaining	   that	  while	  FRELIMO’s	   leaders	  praised	   the	  GDR’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  struggle,	  they	  were	  critical	  of	  Soviet	  assistance.	  Chissano	  also	  told	   Spacek	   that	   the	   resistance	   fighters	   had	   constant	   shortages	   of	   ammunition	   for	  Soviet	  weapons.	  They	  felt	  that	  Moscow	  paid	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  to	  Vietnam,	  but	  did	  not	  take	   the	   liberation	   in	  Mozambique	   as	   seriously	   (as	   reported	  by	   Spacek).514	  FRELIMO	  was	  also	   frustrated	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	  access	   to	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  was	   restricted	  because,	   whenever	   a	   delegation	   went	   to	   Moscow,	   it	   could	   only	   negotiate	   with	   the	  representatives	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  Committee.	  One	  of	  FRELIMO’s	   leading	  cadres,	  Sérgio	  Vieira,	  wrote:	  “We	  felt,	   to	  our	  displeasure,	   that	   there	  were	  parties	  and	  movements	  of	  the	   first	   rate	   who	   had	   direct	   relations	   with	   the	   central	   committees	   in	   power	   and	  others,	  of	  the	  second	  rate,	  who	  were	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Solidarity	  Committees.”515	  What	  made	  this	  a	  particularly	  contentious	  issue	  was	  the	  personality	  of	  Samora	  Machel.	  Unlike	  his	  highly	  educated	  and	  well-­‐travelled	  predecessor,	  Eduardo	  Mondlane,	  Machel	   rose	   within	   the	   party	   ranks	   because	   he	   had	   been	   a	   talented	   guerrilla	  commander	  and	  a	  man	  of	  the	  people,	  although	  he	  lacked	  formal	  education	  and	  did	  not	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   205	  have	  any	  experience	  as	   a	  diplomat.	  He	  was	  well	   aware	  of	  his	  personal	   shortcomings	  and,	  perhaps	  partly	  because	  of	   this,	   he	  developed	  an	  acute	   sense	  of	  pride	   that	  many	  took	  to	  be	  an	  inferiority	  complex.	  Machel	  subscribed	  to	  the	  party’s	  explicitly	  non-­‐racist	  ideology,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   have	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   personal	   connections	   with	   white	  Europeans	  because	  he	  had	  never	   lived	   in	  Europe,	  unlike	  many	  of	  his	   colleagues	  who	  had	  studied,	  lived,	  and	  married	  in	  Portugal.	  For	  all	  of	  these	  reasons,	  Samora	  Machel	  felt	  close	  to	  the	  Chinese	  revolutionary	  leaders,	  because	  he	  could	  relate	  to	  their	  ideology	  of	  peasant-­‐based	   guerrilla	   warfare.	   If	   Mondlane	   had	   always	   felt	   uneasy	   with	   Chinese	  radicalism,	   Machel	   would	   come	   to	   be	   inspired	   by	   Maoist	   thought.	   Yevsyukov	   wrote	  that	  Machel	  was	  a	  decisive	   leader	  who	  could	  easily	  relate	  to	  the	  common	  people,	  but	  who	  was	  also	  an	  admirer	  of	  Josef	  Stalin	  and	  who	  was	  greatly	  inspired	  by	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  or	  “leftist	  extremism,”	  as	  Yevsyukov	  called	  it.516	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Portuguese	   army	   unleashed	   a	   massive	   offensive	   against	  FRELIMO,	   which	   was	   known	   as	   Operação	   Nó	   Górdio	   (Operation	   Gordian	   Knot),	  initiated	   by	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Governor	   General	   and	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	  Mozambique,	  General	  Kaúlza	  de	  Arriaga.	  Arriaga	  belonged	  to	  the	  extreme	  right	  wing	  of	  the	   Portuguese	   military	   elite,	   having	   been	   one	   of	   the	   military	   men	   who	   supported	  Salazar	  during	   the	  1961	  coup	  attempt	  by	   the	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	  Botelho	  Moniz.	  By	  the	   time	  of	   Salazar’s	   death,	  Arriaga	  had	  become	  a	   three-­‐star	   general	   and	  was	  one	  of	  Portugal’s	  most	   influential	   politicians.	   Upon	   his	   arrival	   in	  Mozambique,	   he	   vowed	   to	  crush	  the	  insurgency	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  His	  offensive	  plan	  was	  to	  strike	  FRELIMO’s	  stronghold	   in	   Cabo	   Delgado	   and	   to	   cut	   supply	   links	   with	   Tanzania.	   Arriaga	   used	  extensive	  air	  cover	  to	  support	  thirty-­‐five	  thousand	  Portuguese	  troops	  on	  major	  “search	  and	  destroy”	  operations.	  Arriaga	  also	   intensified	  the	  so-­‐called	  psychological	  campaign	  to	  win	   over	   the	   local	   population.	   Special	   operatives	  would	   be	   dispatched	   into	   areas	  under	   Portuguese	   control	   to	   offer	   vaccinations,	   and	   the	   army	   would	   drop	   leaflets	  picturing	   the	   rugged	   guerrillas	   and	   broadcast	   messages	   in	   the	   local	   Shimakonde	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   206	  dialect,	  instructing	  the	  people	  to	  leave	  the	  bush	  and	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  which	  was	  causing	  great	  suffering	  for	  the	  Makonde.517	  The	  “Gordian	  Knot”	  was	   largely	   ineffective,	  as	  became	  apparent	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1970.	  By	  September,	  the	  army	  had	  pushed	  the	  guerillas	  out	  of	  their	  stronghold	  in	  Cabo	  Delgado,	   but	   the	   damage	   to	   FRELIMO	   was	   generally	   limited	   to	   the	   loss	   of	   military	  bases,	  stores,	  and	  equipment,	  because	  the	  guerrillas	  did	  not	  directly	  engage	  the	  armed	  forces	  but	  fled	  to	  the	  bush.	  FRELIMO	  also	  started	  to	  develop	  a	  series	  of	  bases	  along	  the	  Zambian	  border	  and	  moved	  their	  forces	  from	  Cabo	  Delgado	  to	  Tete	  via	  Malawi,	  which	  was	   made	   possible	   through	   the	   tacit	   consent	   of	   the	   Malawian	   president,	   Hastings	  Banda.	  Arriaga	  thus	  shifted	  his	  operations	  to	  the	  Tete	  province	  before	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  suspend	   operations	   because	   of	   the	   rainy	   season.	   Although	   Arriaga	   claimed	   the	  offensive	   was	   a	   success,	   which	   he	   symbolically	   celebrated	   by	   staying	   at	   one	   of	   the	  captured	  bases	  with	  his	  wife	   for	  Christmas,	  Marcelo	  Caetano	  was	  not	  as	  enthusiastic	  about	   the	  spiraling	  costs	  and	   the	  mounting	  casualty	   figures,	  and	  cancelled	  all	   further	  offensives.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   offensive	   was	   hugely	   disruptive	   for	   the	   civilian	  population,	   who	   saw	   their	   crops	   and	   livestock	   destroyed	   by	   the	   army	   raining	  defoliants	  and	  napalm	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  supplies	  to	  the	  insurgents.518	  	  March	  1971	  saw	  Machel	   leave	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	   for	  a	  major	   tour	  of	   the	   socialist	  countries.	  His	  first	  stop	  was	  Moscow.	  It	  was	  his	  first	  trip	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  occasion	  was	   the	  CPSU	  Twenty-­‐Fourth	  Congress,	  which	  was	  held	  between	  30	  March	  and	   9	   April.	   Machel’s	   primary	   goals	   were	   to	   receive	   new	   support	   to	   overcome	   the	  consequences	  of	  the	  “Gordian	  Knot”	  and	  to	  receive	  new	  arms.	  When	  meeting	  Solidarity	  Committee	   General	   Secretary	   Alexander	   Dzasokhov	   and	   Deputy	   Chairman	   Vladimir	  Kudryavtsev	   on	   29	   March,	   Samora	   Machel	   briefed	   them	   about	   the	   situation	   in	  Mozambique,	  explaining	  the	  devastating	  consequences	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  offensive	  and	  outlining	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  arms,	  clothes,	  food	  and	  medicine.	  Machel	  also	  asked	  the	  Solidarity	  Committee	  to	  ensure	  that	  Mozambican	  students	  could	  return	  home	  from	  the	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  Harry	  G.	  West,	  Kupilikula:	  Governance	  and	  the	  Invisible	  Realm	  in	  Mozambique	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2005),	  pp.	  145-­‐146.	  518	  Malyn	  D.	  Newitt,	  A	  History	  of	  Mozambique	  	  (London:	  Hurst,	  1995),	  pp.	  531-­‐532.	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  summer	   holidays	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  military	   operations,	   and	   asked	   that	   they	   send	  regular	   reports	   about	   the	   students'	   performance.519	  Samora	   Machel	   apparently	   also	  met	  with	   the	  Chief	   of	   the	   Soviet	  General	   Staff,	   Viktor	  Kulikov.	   Sérgio	  Vieira	   reported	  that	  Machel	   impressed	  Kulikov	  with	  his	   “honest	  and	  direct	  manner”	  when	  he	  openly	  complained	   that	   they	  did	  not	   receive	  any	  of	   the	  modern	  arms	  on	  display	   in	  Moscow.	  Kulikov	  then	  agreed	  to	  review	  the	  military	  allocations	  for	  FRELIMO.	  520	  Machel’s	   trip	   to	   East	   Berlin	   was	   also	   very	   successful.	   Machel	   arrived	   in	   East	  Berlin	  for	  the	  Eighth	  Congress	  of	  the	  SED	  in	  June,	  but	  he	  was	  only	  interested	  in	  talking	  to	  the	  top	  leadership,	  a	  demand	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  express	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms.	  Given	  that	  FRELIMO	  had	  become	  important	  for	  the	  GDR,	  Machel’s	  interlocutor	  was	  Hermann	  Axen,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  SED	  Politburo	  responsible	  for	  relations.	  Vieira	  wrote:	  “In	  1971	  in	  Berlin	   thus	  ended	   the	  period	  of	  us	  being	   second	  class	   citizens.”521	  The	  GDR	  would	  therefore	   provide	   the	   most	   modern	   weapons	   for	   FRELIMO,	   including	   automatic	  machine	  guns	  and	  rocket-­‐propelled	  grenades.522	  Samora	  Machel	  was	  also	  very	  well	  received	   in	  Sofia,	  where	  he	  held	  talks	  with	  Bulgaria’s	  top	  decision-­‐makers,	  the	  CC	  BCP’s	  General	  Secretary	  Todor	  Zhivkov,	  Defense	  Minister	   Dobri	   Dzhurov,	   and	   Chief	   of	   the	   General	   Staff	   Atanas	   Semerdzhiev.	   Machel	  evidently	  impressed	  his	  hosts	  because,	  shortly	  after	  his	  departure,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  CC	  BCP	   International	  Department,	  Konstantin	  Tellalov,	   proposed	   spending	  675,100	   leva	  to	   satisfy	   FRELIMO’s	   requirements.523	  “Although	   Machel	   is	   not	   versed	   in	   theory,	   his	  sensibility	  and	  realistic	  approach	  made	  a	  good	  impression,”	  stated	  the	  report	  attached	  to	  Tellalov’s	  proposal.	  During	  conversations	  in	  Sofia,	  Machel	  apparently	  underlined	  his	  belief	   that	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   develop	   revolutionary	   ideology	   during	   the	   liberation	  struggle,	   and	   that	   he	   saw	   the	   socialist	   countries	   as	   allies	   not	   only	   because	   they	  supplied	   weapons,	   but	   also	   because	   the	   they	   wanted	   to	   build	   a	   new	   society	   after	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  Samora	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  Guebuza	  on	  29	  March	  1971,	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	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  Samora	  Machel	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  March	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  Vieira,	  Participei,	  pp.	  598-­‐599.	  Vieira	  writes	   these	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  “B-­‐10”	  recoilless	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   “Grad-­‐P”	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  rocket	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  (Head	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  the	  CC	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  International	  Department)	  to	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  23	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  1971,	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  independence.524	  On	  7	  July,	  CC	  BCP	  approved	  Tellalov’s	  proposals.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  sum	  (457,000	  of	  675,100	  leva)	  would	  be	  spent	  on	  weapons,	  and	  the	  rest	  on	  humanitarian	  aid,	  such	  as	  food,	  tools,	  medicines,	  and	  stationery	  supplies.525	  	  Despite	   his	   successes	   in	   Europe,	   it	   was	   his	   tour	   of	   Beijing,	   Hanoi,	   and	  Pyongyang	   that	   made	   the	   greatest	   impression	   upon	   Samora	   Machel.	   In	   all	   three	  capitals,	  FRELIMO	  delegation	  was	  received	  at	  the	  highest	  level,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  its	  past	   experiences	   in	  Moscow.	   Sérgio	   Vieira,	   for	   example,	   recalled	   their	  meeting	   with	  Zhou	   Enlai	   in	   September	   1971,	   a	   meeting	   which	   apparently	   lasted	   for	   ten	   hours	  because	  of	  just	  how	  much	  the	  PRC’s	  Premier	  cared	  for	  FRELIMO’s	  liberation	  struggle:	  “Zhou	  Enlai	  brought	  maps.	  He	  placed	  the	  maps	  on	  the	  floor,	  he	  and	  Samora	  began	  their	  discussion,	  squatting.	  He	  made	  questions	  about	  each	  of	   the	  operations,	  how	  we	  were	  organized,	   the	   disposition	   of	   the	   attacking	   and	   the	   defending	   forces,	   the	   logistics.”	  Moreover,	   the	   following	  day,	   the	  Chinese	   informed	   the	  delegation	   that	  a	   shipment	  of	  10	  thousand	  tons	  of	  arms,	  munitions,	  uniforms,	  four-­‐by-­‐four	  vehicles	  and	  trucks	  would	  be	   delivered.526	  In	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   in	   October,	   Machel	   met	   with	   the	   GDR	   consul	   in	  Tanzania,	  Erich	  Butzke,	   and	  asked	   that	   the	  GDR	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  offer	   the	   same	  kind	  of	  reception	  of	  and	  attention	  to	  FRELIMO	  that	  had	  been	  afforded	  their	  delegations	  in	  China,	  North	  Vietnam	  and	  North	  Korea.	  FRELIMO	  did	  not	  only	  need	  assurance,	  said	  Machel,	   but	   expected	   an	   improvement	   of	   material	   assistance	   from	   all	   the	   socialist	  countries.	  527	  	  
Military	  Stalemate	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   was	   the	   theatre	   of	   war	   in	   which	   the	   Portuguese	   devised	   the	  boldest	   attempt	   to	   break	   the	   military	   stalemate.	   By	   1970,	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   and	  Governor	  General	  António	  de	  Spínola	  had	  become	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  Despite	  Spínola’s	   carefully	   constructed	  program	  to	  win	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  Zenker	  (GDR	  vice-­‐consul	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam)	  to	  Berlin,	  12	  December	  1971,	  	  BA-­‐SAPMO,	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   209	  over	   the	   population	   with	   a	   scheme	   designed	   to	   improve	   basic	   social	   services	   and	  introduce	   a	   measure	   of	   local	   autonomy,	   the	   war	   continued,	   and	   the	   PAIGC	   did	   not	  show	  any	  signs	  of	  weakening	  its	  grip	  on	  the	  rural	  areas.	  Around	  1969,	  Alpoim	  Calvão,	  one	  of	  Spínola’s	  most	  imaginative	  commanders,	  developed	  a	  plan	  that	  initially	  involved	  sending	  a	  raiding	  party	  to	  Conakry	  under	  the	  cover	  of	  darkness,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  freeing	  Portuguese	   captives	   held	   at	   the	   PAIGC’s	   “La	  Montagna”	   prison	   in	   Conakry,	   including	  António	  Lobato,	   a	  Portuguese	  pilot,	   and	  destroying	  Soviet	  project	  183	   torpedo	  boats	  (NATO	   reporting	   name	   P-­‐6)	   and	   the	   six	   to	   eight	   Guinean	   MIG-­‐15	   (NATO	   reporting	  name	   Fagot)	   and	   MIG-­‐17	   (Fresco)	   fighters	   at	   the	   airport.	   Eventually,	   Spínola	   and	  Calvão	  also	  decided	  to	  use	  about	  147	  soldiers,	  belonging	  to	  Sékou	  Touré’s	  opposition,	  in	  order	  to	  stage	  a	  coup	  d’état.	  The	  key	  goal	  of	  the	  coup	  was	  to	  capture	  President	  Sékou	  Touré	  and	  Amílcar	  Cabral,	  and	  to	  shoot	  them	  if	  they	  resisted	  arrest.	  On	  17	  November	  1970,	  Marcello	  Caetano	  approved	   the	  plan	  presented	   to	  him	  by	  Calvão,	   on	   condition	  that	  Portugal	  would	  not	  leave	  any	  footprints	  behind.	  Operation	  Mar	  Verde	  (Green	  Sea)	  was	  a	  go.528	  On	  the	  night	  of	  21-­‐22	  November	  1970,	  at	  around	  2	  in	  the	  morning,	  six	  vessels	  with	  approximately	  four	  hundred	  men	  disembarked	  on	  the	  beaches	  of	  Conakry,	  each	  of	  them	   having	   been	   assigned	   a	   specific	   target	  within	   the	   city.	   Pavel	   Danilov,	   the	   First	  Secretary	   at	   the	   Soviet	   embassy	   in	   Guinea	   at	   that	   time,	   recalled	   being	   woken	   by	   a	  member	   of	   the	   embassy	   staff,	   who	   told	   Danilov	   of	   the	   emergency.	   “One	   could	   hear	  shots	  on	  the	  street,”	  wrote	  Danilov.	  “I	   looked	  to	  the	  ocean	  and	  saw	  fire	  at	   the	  villa	  of	  the	  President’s	  wife,”	  he	  continued.	  “It	  became	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  what	  was	  taking	  place	  was	   an	   armed	   intervention	   in	   Guinea’s	   internal	   affairs.” 529 	  The	   raiding	   parties	  proceeded	   to	   destroy	   the	   PAIGC’s	   fast	   boats,	   free	   the	   Portuguese	   prisoners	   from	   La	  
Montagna,	  and	  inflict	  damage	  on	  some	  of	  the	  PAIGC’s	  buildings	  and	  vehicles.	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  The	  operation	  quickly	  turned	  into	  a	  disaster.	  Badly	  organized	  and	  misinformed,	  the	  raiders	  could	  not	  find	  the	  main	  target,	  Sékou	  Touré,	  who	  was	  actually	  hidden	  at	  the	  home	   of	   his	  mistress.	   Meanwhile,	   Cabral	   was	   out	   of	   the	   country.	   One	   of	   the	   groups	  dispatched	  to	  destroy	  the	  MIGs	  at	  the	  airport	  discovered	  that	  the	  jets	  had	  been	  moved.	  It	   also	   seems	   that	   communication	   between	   various	   units	   was	   not	  well	   organized	   or	  secure,	  as	  Danilov	  recalled	  that	  the	  Soviet	  attaché,	  Yuriy	  Chepik,	  was	  able	  to	   listen	  to	  conversations	  between	  “mercenaries”	  on	  an	  ordinary	  radio.530	  At	  around	  nine	  o’clock	  in	   the	   morning,	   Calvão,	   who	   commanded	   the	   operation,	   gathered	   his	   men	   and	  withdrew	  from	  Conakry.	  The	   following	  day,	  Sékou	  Touré	  unleashed	  his	  wrath	  on	   the	  perpetrators,	  both	  real	  and	  imagined.	  Those	  who	  had	  failed	  to	  escape	  were	  questioned	  and	  quickly	  identified	  their	  real	  sponsors.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  international	   community	   immediately	   condemned	   Lisbon’s	   actions.	   Even	   President	  Richard	  Nixon	  sent	  a	  note	  to	  Sékou	  Touré	  deploring	  the	   incident.	  531	  Mar	  Verde	  was	  a	  diplomatic	  disaster	  for	  Portugal.	  Moscow	  benefited	   greatly	   from	   the	   fallout	   from	  Mar	  Verde.	   The	  day	   after	   the	  coup	   attempt,	   a	   Soviet	   naval	   ship	   entered	   Conakry’s	   harbor	   with	   one	   battalion	   of	  marines	  on	  board.	  According	  to	  Danilov,	   the	  arrival	  of	   the	  ship	  was	  precipitated	  by	  a	  message	   they	   had	   apparently	   received	   from	   unofficial	   sources,	   stating	   that	   the	  “mercenaries”	  wanted	  to	  capture	  the	  Cuban,	  Chinese,	  and	  Soviet	  embassies.	  Later,	  the	  marines	  told	  Danilov	  that	  they	  had	  apparently	  received	  an	  urgent	  order	  to	  sail	  towards	  Conakry	  and	  to	  protect	  all	  Soviet	  citizens.532	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  opposition	  wanted	  to	  attack	  the	  embassies	  of	  the	  socialist	  countries	  and	  they	  were	  not	  in	  the	  list	  of	  original	  targets,	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  ship	  was	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  Soviet	  support.	  Sékou	  Touré	  also	  requested	  that	  Moscow	  allow	  Soviet	  naval	  ships	  to	  remain	  near	   Conakry	   harbor	   in	   order	   to	   come	   to	   the	   rescue	   in	   the	   event	   of	   another	   coup	  attempt.	  The	  Soviets,	  with	  Cabral	  acting	  as	  an	  intermediary	  in	  talks	  with	  Sékou	  Touré,	  negotiated	   for	   the	   Soviet	   navy	   to	   dock	   at	   the	   Conakry	   ports.	  Danilov	  wrote	   that	   this	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  agreement	   allowed	   for	  marines	   serving	   in	   the	   Atlantic	   to	   dock	   at	   Conakry	   for	   short	  breaks.533	  Mar	  Verde	  thus	  reinforced	  the	  Soviet	  presence	  in	  the	  Atlantic.	  	  	  Moreover,	   Guinean	   authorities	   directly	   accused	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	  Germany	  of	  participating	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  attempted	  coup.	  Pavel	  Danilov	  retold	  the	  story	  of	  an	  FRG	  intelligence	  officer	  who	  was	  supposed	  to	  act	  as	  an	  intermediary	  and	  who	  allegedly	  passed	  on	  a	  signal	  for	  a	  general	  uprising	  against	  Sékou	  Toure.	  The	  agent	   failed	  to	  complete	  his	  mission,	  according	  to	  Danilov,	  because	  he	  was	   driving	   from	  while	   he	  was	   driving	   from	  Meniere	   to	   the	   city	  with	   his	   female	  secretary,	   the	   agent	   was	   stopped	   by	   anti-­‐government	   opposition,	   as	   their	   white	  ‘Volkswagen’	   was	   mistaken	   for	   Cabral’s,	   and	   they	   were	   shot. 534 	  The	   Guinean	  authorities	   charged	   a	   West	   German	   citizen,	   a	   brewery	   manager	   named	   Adolf	   Marx,	  who	  had	  allegedly	  been	  instructed	  to	  give	  Sekou	  Touré	  poisoned	  beer.	  Bonn	  vigorously	  denied	  all	  such	  accusations,	  pointing	  to	  the	  GDR	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  stories.	  In	  fact,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  none	  of	  them	  were	  true.	  Whichever	  story	  one	  believes,	  the	  outcome	  was	   extremely	   convenient	   for	   the	   Soviets.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year,	   the	  West	   German	  community	   had	   been	   expelled	   from	   Conakry	   and,	   in	   January	   1971,	   the	   Guinean	  government	   broke	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	   Bonn.	   Thus,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   Soviet	  competitors	  in	  Guinea	  was	  eliminated.535	  	  The	  failure	  of	  Mar	  Verde	  was	  a	  political	  and	  moral	  victory	  for	  the	  PAIGC,	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  changed	  little	  in	  its	  aftermath.	  The	  PAIGC	  still	  held	  the	  rural	  areas,	  including	  the	  eastern	  region	  around	  Madina	  do	  Boé,	  but	  the	  Portuguese	  still	   possessed	   aerial	   superiority.	   On	   17	  March	   1971,	   a	   Czechoslovakian	   Intelligence	  officer	  in	  Conakry	  going	  by	  the	  name	  of	  “Chmelar”	  informed	  Prague	  of	  his	  conversation	  with	  a	  PAIGC	  functionary,	  Rogério	  Oliveira,	  codenamed	  “RIGOLETO,”	  a	  regular	  source	  for	  Czechoslovakian	   intelligence.	  Oliveira	  said	   there	  was	  permanent	   tension	  between	  the	   powerful	   Comissão	   Permanente	   (Permanent	   Commission),	   comprised	   of	   Amílcar	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  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  Mar	  Verde	  for	  West	  German	  relations	  with	  Guinea,	  see:	  Rui	  Lopes,	  "Between	  Cold	  War	  and	  Colonial	  Wars,"	  PhD	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  Cabral,	   Luís	   Cabral,	   and	   Aristides	   Pereira,	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   high-­‐ranking	   party	  members.	   He	   argued	   that	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   tension	   was	   Cabral’s	   favoritism	   with	  regard	   to	   cadres	   from	   Cape	   Verde,	   the	   lack	   of	   information	   received	   by	   other	   well-­‐respected	   members	   of	   the	   PAIGC,	   and	   poor	   supply	   of	   military	   detachments	   in	   the	  liberated	  areas,	  despite	  regular	  aid	  from	  abroad.	  Moreover,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  crews	  manning	  the	  PAIGC	  naval	  vessels	  stationed	   in	  Conakry	  disobeyed	  orders	  and	  wanted	  to	  leave	  for	  the	  liberated	  areas;	  even	  the	  two-­‐day	  negotiations	  between	  the	  crews	  and	  Cabral	  did	  not	  bring	  about	  any	  results.	  The	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  guerrillas	  were	   increasingly	  inclined	  to	   leave	  the	  movement,	  but	  only	  their	  dedication	  to	  war	   leaders,	  such	  as	  the	  popular	   guerrilla	   commanders	   João	  Bernardo	   “Nino”	   Vieira	   and	  Osvaldo	   Vieira,	   kept	  them	  from	  quitting.	  There	  was	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  fear	  in	  the	  headquarters	  at	  Conakry,	  including	   the	   fear	   of	   being	   accused	   of	   plotting	   against	   the	   leadership,	   argued	  Oliveira.536	  We	  cannot	  assume	  that	  this	  record	  of	  a	  conversation	  provides	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	  the	  situation,	  but	  it	  is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  tensions	  that	  existed	  within	  the	  PAIGC	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  protracted	  war.	  	  Cabral	   knew	   well	   that,	   for	   the	   final	   push,	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   to	   overcome	   the	  Portuguese	   aerial	   advantage.	   The	   Portuguese	   used	   aircraft	   not	   only	   to	   attack	   the	  guerrillas’	   strongholds	   from	   air,	   but	   also	   to	   provide	   cover	   for	   naval	   vessels	   and	   to	  resupply	  the	  urban	  centers	  and	  remote	  fortified	  posts.	  A	  few	  years	  earlier,	  the	  Soviets	  had	  developed	  a	   lightweight	   surface-­‐to-­‐air	  man-­‐portable	  missile	   known	  as	   “Strela-­‐2”	  (NATO	  classification	  SA-­‐7	  Grail),	  which	  came	  into	  series	  production	  in	  1970.	  Although	  its	   operation	   required	   special	   training,	   it	  was	   highly	  mobile	   and	   thus	   easy	   to	   use	   in	  heavily	   forested	   or	   swampy	   areas.	   Strela-­‐2	   could	   reach	   low-­‐flying	   planes	   and	   was	  mainly	  used	  to	  shoot	  down	  helicopters	  and	   low-­‐flying	  aircraft.	  Thus,	  Strela-­‐2	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  to	  the	  PAIGC’s	  advantage.	  	  It	   is	   still	   not	   certain	   when	   exactly	   Cabral	   first	   requested	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  provide	  “Strela-­‐2”	  for	  the	  PAIGC.	  Luís	  Cabral	  thought	  that	  this	  happened	  in	  late	  1972,	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  when	   Amílcar	   visited	   Moscow	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   acquiring	   “Strela-­‐2.”537	  However,	  there	   are	   indications	   that	  negotiations	   to	   transfer	   “Strela-­‐2”	   to	   the	  PAIGC	  had	  begun	  before	  1972.	  In	  November	  1971,	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  and	  his	  wife	  Anna	  Maria	  attended	  the	  celebration	   of	   the	   fifty-­‐fourth	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Bolshevik	   Revolution	   in	   Moscow.	  Cabral	  also	  used	  the	  occasion	  to	  negotiate	   for	   further	  military	  requirements	  with	  the	  Soviet	   cadres,	  who	  allegedly	  promised	   to	   satisfy	  his	  new	  request	   for	   light	   and	  heavy	  weapons,	  including	  gunboats,	  vehicles,	  and	  antiaircraft	  defense	  systems.538	  We	  also	  do	  not	  exactly	  who	  pushed	  the	  decision	  forward,	  but	  a	  story	  from	  Petr	  Yevsyukov,	   a	   senior	   specialist	   on	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies	   in	   the	   International	  Department,	  is	  illuminating.	  Yevsyukov	  wrote	  that	  when	  Cabral	  came	  to	  Moscow	  with	  his	  wife	   on	   the	   occasion	   of	   some	   state	   celebrations	   (Yevsyukov	   does	   not	   specify	   the	  date),	  he	  asked	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  weapons,	  but	  the	  Soviet	  Defense	  Minister,	  Marshal	  Andrey	  Grechko,	  did	  not	  approve	  Yevsyukov’s	  draft	  proposal	  granting	  those	  requests.	  Yevsyukov	   then	   spoke	   to	   GRU	   chief	   Petr	   Ivashutin,	  who	   agreed	   that	  Moscow	   should	  satisfy	  the	  request.	   Ivashutin	  then	  proposed	  that	  Yevsyukov	  introduce	  Cabral	  and	  his	  wife	  directly	  to	  Grechko	  at	  the	  upcoming	  banquet	  at	  the	  Kremlin.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  the	   two	   did	   at	   the	   banquet.	   Yevsyukov	  wrote:	   “I	   did	   not	   lift	  my	   eyes	   from	   the	   table	  where	  the	  Marshal	  [Grechko]	  was	  sitting	  together	  with	  General	  [Ivashutin].	  By	  the	  end	  of	   the	   evening	   Petr	   Ivanovich	   [Ivashutin]	   signaled	   for	   us	   to	   approach.	   Amílcar	  introduced	   himself.	   Quite	   excited	   and	   in	   a	   good	   mood,	   the	   Marshal	   responded	   in	   a	  genuinely	   friendly	   tone	   and	   said:	   ‘So,	   you	   are	   the	   Amílcar	   Cabral;	   I	   know	   I	   declined	  your	   request	   but	   tomorrow	   I	  will	   sign.	  However,	   I	   have	   to	   tell	   you	   that	   you	   have	   to	  introduce	   the	   lady	   first	  and	   then	  yourself.’”	  Cabral	  was	  apparently	  very	  pleased	  with	  the	   conversation,	   and	   Grechko	   indeed	   approved	   the	   proposal	   the	   following	   day.539	  Even	   if	   this	   incident	   does	   not	   refer	   to	   the	   1971	   celebration	   when	   Cabral	   allegedly	  received	  a	  promise	  for	  Strela-­‐2,	  it	  reveals	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  person	  who	  advocated	  on	  Cabral’s	  behalf	   in	  Moscow.	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department	  and	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   214	  Petr	  Yevsyukov	  clearly	  very	  interested	  in	  seeing	  the	  PAIGC	  succeed	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  but	  so	  was	  Petr	  Ivashutin.	  	  Yevsyukov	  also	  wrote	  that,	  at	  some	  time	  in	  1972,	  he	  travelled	  to	  the	  liberated	  areas	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	  with	   Generals	   Ivan	   Plakhin	   and	   Nikolay	   Tyazhev	   in	   order	   to	  evaluate	   the	   military	   situation	   first-­‐hand.	   Yevsyukov	   was	   very	   impressed	   by	   the	  PAIGC’s	   progress.	   He	   recalled	   sailing	   calmly	   past	   an	   illuminated	   Portuguese	  military	  post	  at	  Guiledge	  without	  any	  precautions.	  “The	  Portuguese	  must	  have	  seen	  us,”	  wrote	  Yevsyukov.	   “If	   only	   anyone	   had	   thrown	   a	   grenade	   from	   the	   shore,	   our	  whole	   squad	  would	  have	  been	  eliminated.	  But	  honestly,	  we	  swam	  by	  without	  any	  precautions,	  as	  if	  we	  were	   on	   a	   boat	   trip	   in	   a	   park.”540	  Cabral	   apparently	   told	   Yevsyukov	   that	   he	   had	  been	   in	   touch	  with	   some	  Portuguese	  officers,	   and	   that	   they	  had	  been	  having	   regular	  meetings	   to	   discuss	   the	   “rules	   of	  war.”541	  This	   is	  why	   they	   could	   pass	   right	   past	   the	  Portuguese	  post,	   in	   full	  view	  of	   the	  enemy.	  This	   trip	  apparently	  convinced	   the	  Soviet	  delegation	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  did	  indeed	  require	  the	  deployment	  of	  Strela-­‐2.	  	  One	   way	   or	   another,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1972,	   negotiations	   were	   complete.	   In	  December,	   twenty-­‐four	  PAIGC	  militants	  arrived	  at	   the	  Perevalnoye	   training	  center	   in	  Crimea	   to	   learn	   how	   to	   operate	   the	   Strela-­‐2	   complex.	   Vladimir	   Sukhorukov,	   who	  worked	   as	   an	   interpreter	   at	   Perevalnoye	   at	   that	   time,	   recalls	   that	   the	   twenty-­‐four	  students	  practiced	  “day	  and	  night	  on	  real	  targets.”	  Two	  Soviet	  anti-­‐aircraft	  specialists	  taught	   the	   combatants	   how	   to	   “lock	   on	   and	   track”	   commercial	   and	  military	   aircraft	  lifted	   into	   the	   air	   specifically	   for	   this	   purpose;	   the	   students	   practiced	   firing	   at	  Perevalnoye’s	  shooting	  range.542	  The	  leader	  of	  the	  group	  was	  a	  thirty-­‐year-­‐old	  named	  Manuel	   “Manecas”	   dos	   Santos.	   Born	   on	   the	   island	   of	   Sao	   Vicente	   in	   Cape	  Verde,	   dos	  Santos	   had	   studied	   electromechanical	   engineering	   in	   Lisbon,	   where	   he	   had	   become	  involved	  in	  the	  underground	  nationalist	  movement,	  and	  in	  1967	  had	  moved	  to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   then	   joined	   the	   PAIGC.	   Manuel	   already	   distinguished	   himself	   as	   head	   of	  artillery	  in	  the	  south	  of	  the	  country	  between	  1970	  and	  1972,	  and	  had	  been	  promoted	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  Kucherova,	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  to	  the	  Higher	  Council	  of	  the	  Struggle	  (CSL;	  Conselho	  Superior	  da	  Luta).	  543	  The	  choice	  of	  a	  highly	  experienced	  commander	  who	  was	  also	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CSL	  as	  group	  leader	  reflects	  the	  high	  importance	  that	  Cabral	  placed	  on	  Strela-­‐2.	  	  The	   PAIGC	  was	   not	   significantly	   affected	   by	   Spínola’s	   high-­‐risk	   assault	   on	   22	  November	  1970.	  Operação	  Mar	  Verde	  did	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  intelligence	  to	  ensure	  its	   success	  and,	   thus,	   it	   failed	   in	   its	  primary	  objective	  of	  decapitating	   the	  PAIGC.	  Mar	  
Verde	   weakened	   western	   influence	   in	   Guinea	   and	   provided	   the	   Soviets	   with	   an	  opportunity	  to	  strengthen	  their	  relations	  with	  Sékou	  Touré,	  thus	  increasing	  their	  naval	  presence	  in	  the	  Atlantic.	  Perhaps	  more	  dangerous	  for	  the	  PAIGC	  were	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  protracted	  war,	  which	  had	  turned	  into	  a	  mutually	  exhausting	  stalemate.	  A	  protracted	  war	  intensified	  internal	  criticism	  leveled	  at	  the	  top	  party	  leadership	  by	  those	  guerrilla	  commanders	  who,	  unlike	   the	   first	   cohort	  of	   recruits,	  were	  not	  personally	  devoted	   to	  Cabral.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  growing	  feeling	  that	  those	  who	  grew	  up	  in	  Cape	  Verde	  held	  all	  the	   power	   in	   the	   party,	   whereas	   all	   the	   actual	   fighting	   was	   done	   by	   natives	   from	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  Notwithstanding	  those	  difficulties,	  Moscow	  agreed	  to	  supply	  the	  Strela-­‐2	  complex	  to	  the	  PAIGC,	  and	  this	  event	  was	  supposed	  to	  break	  the	  military	  stalemate.	  	  
The	  PAIGC:	  Tragedy	  and	  Triumph,	  1973-­‐1974	  On	   Saturday	   13	   January	   1973,	   the	   Czechoslovakian	   Intelligence	   officer	   Peták	  returned	  to	  Conakry.	  Peták	  had	  been	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  Cabral	  before	  1968,	  working	  in	  an	  advisory	  role	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  leadership	  in	  Conakry,	  but	  contacts	  had	  become	  quite	  rare	  afterwards,	  both	  due	  to	  events	  in	  Prague	  and	  because	  Cabral	  was	  very	  often	  out	  of	  Conakry,	   almost	   continuously	   travelling	   either	   to	   the	   interior	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   or	  abroad.	   This	   time,	   however,	   Peták	   arrived	   to	   rekindle	   the	   StB	   links	  with	  Cabral.	   The	  next	  morning,	  Peták	  went	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  headquarters,	  where	  he	  met	  Osvaldo	  Vieira	  and	  Otto	   Schacht,	   and	   also	   saw	  Cabral	   and	  Aristides	   Pereira	  working	   at	   the	   office.	   Peták	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  passion,	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  speak	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  experiences	  at	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   216	  reported	   to	  Prague	   that	  Cabral	   looked	   “somewhat	  on	  edge,”	   but	  he	   thought	   that	   this	  stemmed	   from	   his	   role	   as	   the	   party	   leader	   and	   not	   because	   he	   was	   uneasy	   about	  Peták’s	   arrival.	   Peták	   then	   explained	   the	   situation	   in	   Czechoslovakia	   “according	   to	  instructions”	   and	   thus	   answered	   their	   question	   as	   to	   why	   he	   “could	   not	   pay	   much	  attention	  to	  them”	   in	  the	  previous	  years.	   “All	   the	  people	  I	   talked	  to	  received	  me	  very	  well,”	   wrote	   Peták,	   concluding	   that	   the	   attitude	   towards	   Czechoslovakia	   had	   not	  changed.544	  Cabral	  asked	  Peták	  whether	  they	  could	  meet	   later	  that	  week,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  known	  whether	  this	  meeting	  ever	  took	  place	  because,	  on	  20	  January	  1973,	  Cabral	  was	  shot	  dead.	  The	  outline	  of	  the	  events	  of	  that	  evening	  is	  known	  from	  an	  account	  provided	  by	  Cabral’s	   wife,	   Anna	  Maria.	   Cabral	   and	   Anna	  Maria	   drove	   back	   to	   their	   apartment	   in	  Conakry	  after	  attending	  a	  reception	  at	  the	  Polish	  embassy.	  Suddenly,	  a	  group	  of	  armed	  men	  appeared	  arrived	  in	  a	  jeep.	  One	  of	  them	  was	  Inocêncio	  Kani,	  a	  former	  student	  at	  the	   college	   for	   naval	   officers	   at	   Poti,	   Georgia.	   He	   had	   been	   fired	   for	   personal	  misconduct	   and	   abuse	   of	   power,	   but	   shortly	   before	   the	   events	   of	   the	   night	   of	   20	  January,	   he	   was	   exonerated	   and	   placed	   in	   charge	   of	   a	   PAIGC	   vessel.	   Anna	   Maria	  recognized	  a	  man	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Mamadou	  N’Djai,	  who	  had	  been	  placed	  in	  charge	  of	  security	  only	  a	  few	  weeks	  earlier.	  Kani	  ordered	  Cabral	  to	  get	  out	  of	  his	  car,	  and	  when	  he	   did,	   Kani	   began	   tying	   him	   with	   a	   piece	   of	   rope.	   This	   was	   unsuccessful	   because	  Cabral	  resisted,	  and	  the	  ropes	  fell	  to	  the	  ground.	  Anna	  Maria	  recalled:	  At	   this	  moment,	   Inocêncio	  shot	  at	  Amílcar,	  and	  my	  husband	   fell,	  but	   then	  he	  lifted	  himself	  up	  and	  sat	  down.	  Pressing	  his	  hands	  to	  the	  wound	  on	  his	  side,	  he	  exclaimed,	   ‘What	   are	   you	  doing?	  The	  Portuguese	   still	   have	  not	   left	   our	   land.	  You	   are	   serving	   them,	   traitors!’	   They	   dragged	  me	   to	   the	   car,	   and	   Inocêncio	  ordered	  Bakar,	  a	  man	  who	  had	  been	  working	  as	  an	  accountant	  at	  the	  [PAIGC]	  office:	   ‘Finish	   him.’	   Bakar,	   who	   stood	   behind	   Amílcar,	   fired	   a	   round.	   This	   is	  how	  they	  killed	  my	  husband.	  545	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  Peták	  (Conakry)	  to	  Prague,	  18	  January	  1973,	  ABS,	  11853.	  The	  Soviet	  journalist	  Oleg	  Ignatyev	  was	  reporting	  on	  the	  war	  from	  the	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  and	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  Oleg	  Ignatyev,	  "Kto	  Ubil	  Amilkar	  Kabrala:	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  [Bisau],"	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  6	  March	  1973,	  	  p.	  4.	  
	   217	  Cabral’s	   assassination	   was	   the	   first	   act	   of	   what	   was	   yet	   another	   attempt	   at	   a	   coup	  d’etat,	   arranged	   by	   the	   Portuguese	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   paralyzing	   the	   movement	   by	  arresting	   the	   entire	   leadership.	   The	   plotters	   were	   supposed	   to	   arrest	   the	   entire	  leadership,	   transport	   them	  on	   a	   boat	   to	   Bissau,	   and	   give	   them	  up	   to	   the	   Portuguese	  authorities.	  Having	  shot	  Cabral	   in	  a	  panic,	  Kani	  and	  Mamadou	  N’Djai	  seized	  Aristides	  Pereira,	   transferred	   him	   to	   the	   port,	   and	   threw	   him	   in	   a	   boat.	   Meanwhile,	   another	  group	   of	   rebellious	   PAIGC	   combatants,	   led	   by	   Momo	   Turé	   and	   Aristides	   Barbosa,	  arrested	   Jose	  Araujo	   and	  Vasco	  Cabral	   and	  placed	   them	   in	   the	  PAIGC’s	  La	  Montagna	  prison.	  	  The	   coup	   attempt	   quickly	   unraveled	   hereafter	   thanks	   to	   quick	   action	   of	   the	  Guinean	   authorities	   and	   decisiveness	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Ambassador,	   Anatoliy	   Ratanov.	  Sékou	  Touré	  found	  out	  about	  events	  at	  the	  PAIGC’s	  headquarters	  at	  Miniere	  when	  one	  of	  the	  foreign	  diplomats,	   living	  nearby,	  called	  the	  presidential	  office	  after	  hearing	  the	  gunshots.	  Touré	  ordered	  the	  army	  to	  head	  immediately	   for	  La	  Montagna,	  where	  they	  freed	  the	  imprisoned	  Jose	  Araujo	  and	  Vasco	  Cabral	  and	  arrested	  the	  conspirators.	   	  By	  this	  point,	  a	  boat	  holding	  Aristides	  Pereira	  had	  already	  sailed	  offshore.	  Given	  that	  the	  Guinean	  authorities	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  chase	  the	  boats,	  they	  asked	  for	  Soviet	  assistance.	   Pavel	   Danilov	   writes	   that	   Anatoliy	   Ratanov	   responded	   by	   driving	   to	   the	  port	  and	  convincing	  the	  captain	  of	  the	  Soviet	  navy	  vessel	  that	  was	  stationed	  in	  Conakry	  to	  chase	  the	  boat.	  The	  Soviet	  captain	  agreed,	  and	  after	  several	  hours	  of	  traversing	  the	  seas,	   they	   managed	   to	   locate	   Aristides	   Pereira	   on	   board	   one	   of	   the	   vessels	   and	  transport	  him	  safely	  back	  to	  Conakry.546	  	  There	  has	  been	  much	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  failed	  coup.	  The	  Portuguese	   authorities	   clearly	   provided	   inspiration	   because	   the	   war	   was	   at	   a	  stalemate,	   while	   any	   prospects	   of	   negotiations	   with	   the	   PAIGC	   initiated	   by	   General	  António	   de	   Spínola	   had	   failed	   because	   Prime	   Minister	   Caetano	   rejected	   the	   idea	   of	  negotiating	  with	  terrorists.	  Moreover,	  Lisbon	  feared	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  was	  on	  the	  brink	  of	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  81-­‐83.	  
	   218	  proclaiming	  itself	  the	  provisional	  government	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  and	  any	  international	  recognition	   that	   was	   likely	   forthcoming	   would	   have	   delivered	   a	   severe	   blow	   to	  Lisbon’s	   prestige.	   What	   seems	   less	   clear	   is	   the	   motivation	   of	   the	   plotters.	   Petr	  Yevsyukov	   believed	   that	   the	   Portuguese	   successfully	   exploited	   the	   tensions	   between	  the	  natives	  of	  Cape	  Verde	  and	  those	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  in	  order	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  PAIGC.	  He	  writes,	  “Throughout	  all	  of	  his	  life,	  Cabral	  tried	  to	  eradicate	  the	  hatred	  of	  the	  blacks	  towards	  mulattos,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  succeed,	  and,	  thus,	  he	  became	  a	  victim	  of	  a	  conspiracy	  of	  blacks	  against	  the	  mulattos.”547	  	  Cabral’s	  assassination	  shocked	  everybody	  who	  knew	  him	  and	  who	  believed	  in	  his	  cause.	  Not	  only	  did	  he	  command	  loyalty	  among	  the	  top	  leadership,	  but	  he	  was	  also	  greatly	  admired	  by	  the	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  members.	  Vladimir	  Sukhorukov,	  who	  served	  as	  an	  interpreter	  at	  Perevalnoye	   in	   the	  early	  1970s,	  witnessed	  the	  reaction	  of	   the	  group	  of	  recruits	  who	  had	  arrived	  at	  the	  center	  for	  military	  training	  a	  few	  months	  earlier:	  “For	  several	   days,	   grown-­‐up	   men	   were	   weeping.	   Sincerely,	   like	   children.” 548Aristides	  Pereira	  could	  not	  remember	  any	  details	  of	  what	  had	  transpired	  that	  night,	  and	  once	  in	  the	   hospital	   kept	   asking	   what	   had	   happened	   to	   Amílcar,	   but	   nobody	   would	   give	   a	  straight	   answer,	   on	   doctors’	   instructions.	   Only	   after	   a	   few	   days	   did	   the	   Cuban	  ambassador	  to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  Oscar	  Oramas,	  break	  the	  news	  to	  Pereira,	  as	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  bear	  the	  questioning.	  “Once	  I	  was	  told	  that	  Amílcar	  had	  died,	  I	  wanted	  to	  go	  and	  see	  the	  body	  in	  order	  to	  verify,”	  remembers	  Pereira.549	  Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  who	  arrived	  at	  Conakry	  for	  Cabral’s	  funeral	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Soviet	  delegation,	  writes:	  “I	  won’t	  describe	  my	  feelings;	   I	  was	  deeply	   sad.	   It	  was	   incredibly	  difficult	   to	   see	  an	   intelligent	  and	  not-­‐so-­‐recently	  highly	  energetic	  man	  lying	  in	  a	  coffin	  with	  a	  bullet	  hole	  in	  his	  head.”550	  Cabral’s	  murder	  did	  not	  change	  Soviet	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  PAIGC.	  Yevsyukov	  writes	  that	  shortly	  after	  the	  funeral,	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  met	  with	  the	  leadership	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  547	  Yevsyukov,	   "Natsionalno-­‐osvoboditelnaya	  Borba	  v	  Gvinee-­‐Bissau,"	  p.	  148.	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	   the	  reasons	  for	  the	  failed	  coup,	  see:	  Chabal,	  Amilcar	  Cabral,	  pp.	  132-­‐142.	  548	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  p.	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   219	  confirmed	   their	  willingness	   to	  provide	   “all-­‐sided	  assistance.”551	  Not	  much	  changed	   in	  the	   party	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   Cabral’s	   death.	   Aristides	   Pereira	   assumed	  Cabral’s	   position	   as	   the	   General	   Secretary,	   while	   Amílcar’s	   brother	   Luís	   became	   his	  deputy.	  There	  was	  no	  party	  reshuffle	  or	  change	  of	  course.	  On	  7	  August	  1973,	  speaking	  to	  Jaroslav	  Kozák,	  the	  Czechoslovak	  chargé	  d'affaires	  at	  Conakry,	  Anatoliy	  Ratanov	  said	  the	  PAIGC	  possessed	  a	  “healthy	  core”	  and	  continued	  following	  Cabral’s	  political	  line.552	  Ratanov’s	  replacement	  at	  Conakry,	  Leonid	  Musatov,	  spoke	  to	  Kozák	  on	  14	  December,	  confirming	   that	   Aristides	   Pereira	   had	   a	   cautious	   attitude	   towards	   China,	   just	   like	  Cabral.553	  	  The	  FARP	  managed	   to	  break	   the	  military	   stalemate	   in	  1973,	   shortly	   after	   the	  first	  group	  of	  recruits,	  trained	  to	  use	  Strela-­‐2,	  had	  returned	  to	  Guinea	  from	  the	  training	  course	  at	  Perevalnoye.	  The	  PAIGC	  started	  downing	  aircraft	  with	  Strela-­‐2	  in	  March,	  thus	  severely	   limiting	   the	   Portuguese	   aerial	   advantage.	  Manuel	   “Manecas”	   dos	   Santos	   led	  the	  first	  anti-­‐aircraft	  group,	  christened	  after	  one	  of	  Cabral’s	  pen	  names,	  “Abel	  Djassi.”	  On	  28	  March,	  the	  PAIGC	  shot	  down	  the	  Fiat	  G-­‐91	  belonging	  to	  Almeida	  Brito,	  the	  chief	  of	   the	   Portuguese	   air	   force,	   and	   by	   July,	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   downed	   twelve	   Fiats,	   three	  Harvard	   bombers,	   and	   three	   Dornier	   DO-­‐67s.	   In	   May,	   the	   PAIGC	   took	   Guiledge,	   a	  Portuguese	   post	   on	   the	   border	   with	   Guinea,	   the	   same	   one	   that	   the	   FARP	   could	   not	  capture	  for	  years.554	  Manuel	  dos	  Santos	  recalled	  that	  the	  Portuguese	  did	  not	  expect	  the	  PAIGC	   to	   obtain	   such	   weapons,	   and	   he	   seized	   control	   of	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   aerial	  operations	   after	   Brito’s	   death.555	  General	   Costa	   Gomes,	  who	   visited	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   in	  late	  1973	  as	  the	  new	  Chief	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Armed	  Forces,	  recalled,	  “We	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  a	  military	  defeat.”556	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   220	  These	  military	  advances	  allowed	   for	  a	   favorable	  opportunity	   for	   the	  PAIGC	  to	  declare	   the	   independence	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  on	  24	  September	  1973.	  One	  year	   earlier,	  the	   party	   leadership	   had	   organized	   elections	   to	   the	   “National	   Assembly,”	   and	   on	   24	  September,	   the	   120	   elected	   deputies	   convened	   at	   Madina	   de	   Boé	   to	   approve	   the	  formation	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  approve	  the	  new	  constitution.	  Oleg	  Ignatyev	  covered	  the	  ceremony	  for	  Pravda,	  describing	  Lúcio	  Soares,	  a	  young	  military	  commander	  and	  recent	  graduate	   of	   a	   university	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   who	   trembled	   with	   emotion	   whilst	  reading	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  The	  next	  speaker	  was	  João	  Bernardo	  “Nino”	  Vieira,	  who	  asked	  for	  deputies	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  by	  a	  show	  of	  hands.	  “150	  raised	  hands.	  150	  vote	  in	  favor.	  In	  looking	  at	  my	  watch,	  it	  is	  8	  o’clock	  and	  55	  minutes,	  local	  time.	  This	  is	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  new	  state	  in	  Africa	  is	  born:	  1973,	  24	  September,	  8	  o’clock	  and	  55	  minutes.”557	  	  	  
Conclusion	  Leonid	   Brezhnev	   and	   other	   high-­‐ranking	   Soviet	   leaders	   believed	   that	  superpower	  détente	  provided	  a	  way	  to	  avoid	  conflict,	  but	  that	  it	  by	  no	  means	  signified	  an	   end	   to	   ideological	   competition	   between	   socialism	   and	   capitalism.	   The	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   dogma	   simply	   did	   not	   allow	   for	   a	   change	   of	   goal,	   given	   the	   belief	   in	   the	  permanence	   of	   class	   struggle	   and	   the	   inevitability	   of	   a	   socialist	   victory	   around	   the	  world.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1960s,	   the	   Soviet	   functionaries	   believed	   that	   the	  West	  was	  changing	   its	   tactics	   in	  the	  Third	  World,	  even	  though	  the	  goal	  of	  stifling	  revolutionary	  change	  remained	  unaltered.	  While	  the	  West	  may	  have	  abandoned	  its	  tactics	  of	  plotting	  the	   overthrow	   of	   radical	   African	   leaders	   by	  military	  means,	   not	   least	   because	   of	   the	  Vietnam	   War,	   the	   theory	   went	   that	   leaders	   in	   the	   West	   were	   now	   using	   other,	  economic	  means	   for	   the	   same	   purpose.	   This	   set	   of	   beliefs	   became	   quite	  widespread	  among	   the	   Soviet	   diplomatic	   community,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   in	   Guinea	   and	   among	   the	  intelligence	  organizations,	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  GRU.	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  Nevertheless,	   Soviet	   officials	   were	   optimistic	   about	   the	   prospects	   for	   the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  as	  of	  1970.	  One	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  liberation	  movements	  –	  especially	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  –	  had	  made	  some	  military	  progress	   in	   the	   previous	   few	   years.	   Yet	   another	   reason	   was	   that	   the	   Soviet	   cadres,	  especially	   at	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   International	   Department,	   believed	   that	   the	   liberation	  movements	  were	  moving	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  given	  the	  desire	  of	  their	  leaders	  to	  transform	   their	   movements	   into	   “vanguard”	   parties	   of	   the	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   type.	  Therefore,	   the	   International	   Department,	   the	   KGB,	   and	   the	   GRU	   argued	   for	   an	  expansion	  of	  Soviet	  engagement	   in	  Africa,	  which	   translated	   into	  qualitatively	  greater	  assistance	  for	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  However,	  optimistic	  Soviet	  expectations	  failed	  to	  materialize,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  to	  make	  any	  significant	  military	  progress,	  except	  for	   the	   PAIGC.	   By	   1974,	   the	  MPLA	  was	   practically	   paralyzed,	   incapable	   of	   resolving	  many	   internal	   contradictions,	   exacerbated	   by	   a	   successful	   Portuguese	   offensive.	   In	  1970,	   the	   Soviet	   cadres	   argued	   for	   augmentation	   of	   assistance	   to	   the	   MPLA,	   but	   in	  1974,	   they	   decided	   on	   temporary	   termination.	   FRELIMO’s	   performance	   was	   much	  better,	   but	   relations	   remained	   complicated,	   largely	  because	  Samora	  Machel	   felt	   their	  movement	   had	   much	   more	   in	   common	   with	   the	   Chinese	   rather	   than	   the	   Soviet	  leadership.	  Only	   the	  PAIGC	  was	  an	   indisputable	   success	   story.	   Soviet	   commitment	   to	  the	  PAIGC	  remained	  very	  high	  even	  after	  Cabral’s	  death.	  	  The	  military	   situation	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   contributed	   to	   the	  Portuguese	   army’s	  weariness	  of	  the	  war.	  There	  emerged	  a	  clandestine	  organization	  known	  as	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  Movement	   (MFA;	  Movimento	  das	  Forças	  Armadas),	  which	   consisted	  of	   junior	  military	  officers	  who	  were	  originally	  dissatisfied	  with	   the	  new	  system	  of	  promotions	  and	   privilege	   adopted	   in	   the	   army.	   Their	   agenda	   soon	   changed,	   as	   they	   started	  preparing	   for	   a	   coup	   to	   overthrow	   the	   dictatorship.	   Dissatisfaction	   with	   Caetano’s	  colonial	   policy	   was	   also	   widespread	   among	   high-­‐ranking	   military	   figures,	   such	   as	  Generals	   António	   de	   Spínola	   and	   Francisco	   da	   Costa	   Gomes.	   In	   early	   1974,	   Spínola	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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
	  
Triumph:	  Revolution	  in	  Portugal	  and	  Its	  Fallout,	  1974-­‐75	  	  On	  24	  April	   1974,	   at	   10:55	  p.m.,	   a	   song	  known	   to	  many	  Portuguese	   aired	  on	  Lisbon	  radio.	  It	  was	  “E	  Depois	  do	  Adeus”	  ("After	  We	  Say	  Goodbye"),	  a	  romantic	  song	  by	  Paulo	  de	  Carvalho	  and	  Portugal’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Eurovision	  Song	  Contest.	  A	  few	  weeks	  earlier,	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   Movement	   (MFA;	   Movimento	   das	   Forças	   Armadas)	   had	  agreed	  to	  use	  the	  song	  to	  signal	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  coup	  against	  the	  dictatorship.	  First	  of	   all,	   the	   MFA	   seized	   all	   key	   strategic	   locations	   in	   Lisbon,	   including	   radio	   and	  television	  stations,	  the	  airport,	  and	  bridges.	  At	  12:20	  a.m.,	  Radio	  Renascença	  broadcast	  “Grândola,	   Vila	   Morena,”	   a	   song	   by	   popular	   musician	   José	   Afonso,	   whose	   work	   had	  been	   forbidden	   for	   its	   left-­‐wing	   content.	   This	   song	   had	   been	   designated	   as	   another	  password,	   designed	   to	   alert	   MFA	   loyalists	   in	   the	   army	   to	   join	   in.	   One	   of	   those	   was	  Captain	  Fernando	  José	  Salgueiro	  Maia,	  who	  led	  a	  column	  of	  10	  armored	  cars	  from	  their	  station	  in	  Santarem	  to	  Lisbon.	  The	  MFA	  encountered	  very	  little	  resistance,	  and	  by	  the	  morning	   they	   learnt	   that	   Prime	   Minister	   Marcelo	   Caetano	   had	   fled	   to	   the	   Carma	  barracks,	   the	  headquarters	  of	   the	  National	  Republican	  Guard	   in	   the	  center	  of	  Lisbon.	  Maia’s	   detachment	   besieged	   this	   position	   from	   a	   narrow	   square	   in	   front	   of	   the	  barracks,	   where	   thousands	   gathered	   in	   support.	   After	   several	   hours	   of	   negotiation,	  Caetano	  agreed	  to	  surrender	  to	  a	  senior	  military	  officer.	  MFA’s	  first	  choice	  was	  General	  Francisco	   da	   Costa	   Gomes,	   but	   the	   publication	   of	   Portugal	   and	   the	   Future	   switched	  their	  preference	  to	  António	  de	  Spínola.	  On	  25	  April,	  at	  17.45pm,	  Spínola	  arrived	  at	  the	  Carma	  barracks	  and	  accepted	  Caetano’s	  resignation,	  becoming	  the	  new	  de	  facto	  head	  of	  state.	  In	  a	  late-­‐night	  appearance	  on	  national	  television,	  Spínola	  announced	  that	  the	  newly	  established	  “Junta	  of	  National	  Salvation”	  would	  abolish	  censorship	  and	  hold	  free	  elections	  to	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly.	  Meanwhile,	   jubilant	  crowds	  swamped	  the	  city,	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  festooning	  soldiers	  with	  red	  carnations,	  plentiful	  in	  Lisbon’s	  flower	  market	  at	  that	  time	  of	  year.	  In	  less	  than	  twenty-­‐four	  hours,	  the	  coup	  developed	  into	  a	  popular	  movement	  for	   the	   democratization	   of	   society,	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   “Carnation	  Revolution.”560	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  looked	  at	  the	  Carnation	  Revolution	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  dogma,	  which	  dictated	  that	  class	  struggle	  would	  continue	  and	  that	  the	  conservative	  forces	  would	  try	  to	  stifle	  a	  possible	  socialist	  transformation.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  Soviets	  urged	  Alvaro	  Cunhal,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Communist	  Party	  (PCP),	  to	  join	  the	  coalition	  government	  and	  exercise	  caution	  in	  his	  political	  demands	  in	  order	  to	   avoid	   a	   rightist	   backlash.	   Moscow	   was	   therefore	   quick	   to	   recognize	   the	   new	  provisional	   government.	   This	   decision	   alienated	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   whose	  main	  tactic	  was	  to	  continue	  putting	  pressure	  on	  Lisbon	  to	  ensure	  rapid	  decolonization.	  The	   Soviets	   did	   not	   play	   any	   major	   role	   in	   the	   negotiations	   leading	   to	   the	  independence	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   Mozambique,	   where	   power	   was	   quickly	  transferred	  to	  the	  PAIGC	  and	  FRELIMO	  respectively.	  The	  situation	  in	  Angola,	  where	  the	  liberation	  movement	  was	  represented	  by	  three	  movements	  –	  the	  MPLA,	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  UNITA	  –	  was	  much	  more	  complicated.	  In	  early	  January	  1975,	  Lisbon	  finally	  brokered	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  between	  the	  MPLA,	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  UNITA,	  which	  intended	  to	  outline	  a	   roadmap	   to	  elections	  and	   independence,	   scheduled	   for	  11	  November	  1975.	  The	   Soviets	   evaluated	   the	   situations	   in	   Portugal	   and	   Angola	   in	   very	   similar	   terms.	  While	   in	   Portugal	  Alvaro	  Cunhal	   and	   the	  PCP	  played	   the	   key	   role	   as	   a	   revolutionary	  force,	  in	  Angola	  it	  was	  Neto	  and	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  Soviets	  believed	  that	  the	  MPLA	  should	  work	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  negotiated	  between	   the	  rival	  factions	  under	  Lisbon’s	  patronage	  at	  Alvor,	  Portugal,	  in	  late	  1974.	  However,	  that	  promise	   was	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   keep	   because	   the	   FNLA,	   boosted	   by	   Joseph	  Mobutu’s	   Zaire	   (formerly	   known	   as	   Congo-­‐Léopoldville,	   renamed	   in	   1971)	   was	  seemingly	   set	   on	   taking	  power	  by	   force.	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	   along	  with	  other	   socialist	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   225	  countries,	   therefore	   started	   providing	   the	  MPLA	  with	   arms	   and	   training.	   The	  MPLA	  embarked	  on	  a	  major	  campaign	   to	   internationalize	   the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War,	  eventually	  securing	  assistance	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Cuba,	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  managed	   to	   seize	  power	  on	  11	  November	  1975.	  While	  Moscow	  was	  originally	  much	  more	   focused	   on	   developments	   in	   Portugal,	   by	   early	   1975	   their	   focus	   shifted	   to	   the	  increasingly	  violent	  competition	  among	  rival	  factions	  in	  Angola.	  	  	  
The	  Carnation	  Revolution	  and	  Negotiations	   for	   Independence	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  
and	  Mozambique,	  April-­‐September	  1974	  “A	  huge	  event,”	  noted	  Anatoliy	  Chernyaev	  in	  his	  private	  diary	  on	  13	  May	  1974,	  referring	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Lisbon.561	  Chernyaev	  had	  joined	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department	   in	  1961,	   and	  by	   the	  1970s	  he	  had	  become	  one	  of	   the	   senior	   advisers	   to	  Head	  of	  Department	  Boris	  Ponomarev.	  Chernyaev	  compared	  Cunhal’s	  return	  to	  Lisbon	  to	   Lenin’s	   arrival	   at	   the	   “Finlyandskiy”	   railway	   station	   in	   April	   1917	   and	   noted	   the	  huge	  transformative	  potential	  of	  the	  “Carnation	  Revolution.”	  Chernyaev	  had	  long	  been	  frustrated	  with	  his	  superiors,	  who	  lacked,	  as	  he	  believed,	  any	  political	  imagination	  and	  were	   incapable	   of	   devising	   the	   bold	   and	   imaginative	   schemes	   necessary	   to	   provide	  effective	  leadership	  of	  the	  international	  communist	  movement.	  He	  therefore	  lamented	  the	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   to	  make	   bolder	   statements	   in	   support	   for	  Alvaro	   Cunhal.	  While	   the	   social	   democratic	   governments	  were	  making	   strong	   public	  statements	  in	  support	  of	  Mário	  Soares,	  complained	  Chernyaev,	  the	  Soviets	  were	  doing	  very	  little	  to	  help	  Cunhal.562	  	  There	   were	   reasons	   for	   Moscow’s	   restraint.	   The	   Soviet	   leadership	   was	   very	  uncertain	   about	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   transformation	   in	  Portugal.	  Alvaro	  Cunhal	   and	   the	  PCP	  remained	  extremely	   insecure,	   fearing	  a	  right-­‐wing	  backlash.	  The	  PCP	  thus	   toned	  down	   their	   demands	   for	   increases	   in	   workers’	   wages	   and	   removed	   the	   term	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   226	  “dictatorship	   of	   the	   proletariat”	   from	   its	   program	   at	   the	   party	   congress	   in	   October.	  Cunhal	  also	  established	  an	  informal	  alliance	  with	  Mário	  Soares,	  his	  former	  student	  and	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Socialist	  Party,	  who	  was	  appointed	  foreign	  minister	  in	  the	  first	   provisional	   government.	   Cunhal	   also	   accepted	   Spínola’s	   offer	   to	   join	   the	   first	  coalition	  government	  as	  minister	  without	  portfolio.	  The	  Soviets	  believed	  that	  only	  by	  working	  within	   a	   coalition	   government	   could	   the	   PCP	   build	   up	   its	   support	   network	  without	   provoking	   a	   counter-­‐coup.	   On	   16	   May,	   Pravda	   published	   a	   statement	  highlighting	   the	  role	  of	   the	  PCP	   in	  bringing	  down	  Caetano’s	  regime	  and	  calling	  on	  all	  left-­‐wing	  democratic	  forces	  to	  unite	  in	  order	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  colonial	  wars	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  in	  Africa.563	  	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  liberation	  movements	  also	  did	  not	  know	  what	  to	  make	  of	  the	  25	  April	  coup	  in	  Portugal.	  Aristides	  Pereira	  recalls:	  “We	  only	  knew	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Portugal	   through	   the	  press	   at	   that	   time.	  We	  were	   following	   those	   [developments]	  through	   a	  magnifying	   glass.”564	  Members	   of	   the	   junta	   did	  not	   always	   give	   clear	   signs	  about	   decolonization.	   When	   Carlos	   Soares	   Fabio	   arrived	   in	   Bissau	   as	   the	   new	  governor-­‐general	   on	   7	   May,	   he	   proclaimed	   that	   Lisbon	   planned	   to	   create	   a	   “Guinea	  governed	   by	   Guineans”	   as	   soon	   as	   “the	   colonizers	   and	   colonized	   achieve	   the	   same	  socio-­‐cultural	   level.”565	  This	   is,	   of	   course,	   not	   what	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   waged	   armed	  struggle	  for	  nor	  something	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  accept.	  	  The	   PAIGC	   responded	   by	   inviting	   their	   closest	   allies	   to	   establish	   formal	  diplomatic	   relations.	   In	  April	   the	   Soviet	   ambassador	   to	  Guinea,	   Leonid	  Musatov,	  was	  appointed	   the	   ambassador	   to	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   On	   9	   May,	   Musatov,	   along	   with	   his	  colleagues	   from	   Algeria,	   Romania,	   Guinea,	   and	   Yugoslavia,	   set	   out	   on	   an	   overnight	  journey	  from	  Conakry	  across	  the	  border	  into	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  to	  present	  their	  diplomatic	  credentials	  to	  Luís	  Cabral.	  Musatov	  remembers	  that	  they	  first	  reached	  the	  border	  town	  of	   Boke,	   crossed	   over	   and	   then	   drove	   until	   they	   reached	   the	   village	   of	   Guideke,	   just	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   227	  inside	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   The	   lively	   ceremony	   that	   greeted	   them	   was	   marked	   by	   short	  speeches,	   singing,	   and	   dancing	   performed	   by	   the	   partisan	   ensemble.566	  The	   act	   of	  recognition	   clearly	   demonstrated	   the	   close	   relationship	   that	   had	   developed	   between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  over	  the	  years.	   It	  also	  reflected	  the	  military	  situation	  on	   the	   ground:	   by	   1974,	   the	   PAIGC	   had	   almost	   won	   the	   war	   in	   military	   terms.	  Moreover,	   the	   organization	   enjoyed	   broad	   popular	   support	   among	   the	   population.	  When	   the	   colonial	   authorities	   authorized	   the	   operation	   of	   rival	   groups	   connected	   to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  tiny	  white	  settler	  community,	  the	  PAIGC	  warned	  that	  they	  were	  the	  only	  representatives	  of	  the	  people.	  The	  next	  day	  a	  large	  crowd	  rallied	  in	  support	  of	  the	  PAIGC	  in	  front	  of	  the	  government	  palace	  in	  Bissau.567	  The	   appointment	   of	   Mário	   Soares	   as	   foreign	   minister	   was	   a	   clear	   sign	   that	  Lisbon	   was	   serious	   about	   decolonization.	   On	   the	   day	   after	   his	   appointment,	   Soares	  flew	   to	   Dakar,	   Senegal	   to	  meet	   the	   PAIGC’s	   Secretary	   General	   Aristides	   Pereira.	   The	  two	  agreed	  to	  begin	  negotiations	  in	  London	  on	  25	  May.568	  It	  did	  not	  seem	  the	  Soviets	  had	   any	   influence	   over	   the	   negotiations	   process.	   The	   PAIGC	   delegation,	   led	   by	   Cape	  Verdean	  Pedro	  Pires,	  stopped	  in	  Algiers	  on	  their	  way	  to	  London	  for	  negotiations	  with	  the	   Algerian	   government.	   The	   Algerians	   apparently	   advised	   the	   delegates	   to	   keep	  pressure	  upon	  the	  Portuguese	  until	  they	  had	  secured	  an	  acceptable	  settlement.569	  The	  London	   talks	   quickly	   came	   to	   a	   standstill.	   According	   to	   Aristides	   Pereira,	   the	   main	  stumbling	  block	  was	  Spínola’s	  attitude:	  he	  believed	  that	  there	  had	  to	  be	  a	  referendum	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  and	  he	  wanted	  to	  personally	  go	  to	  the	  former	  colony	  to	  “hand	  over	  sovereignty”	  in	  a	  public	  ceremony.570	  The	  PAIGC	  could	  not	  accept	  either	  of	  these	   conditions.	   “We	  were	  not	   afraid	  of	   the	   referendum,”	   recalled	  Aristides	  Pereira.	  “Our	   problem	  was	   with	   the	   effect	   it	   would	   have	   in	   the	   other	   colonies,	   especially	   in	  Angola	   and	   Mozambique.	   The	   OAU	   pressured	   the	   PAIGC	   not	   to	   accept	   the	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  referendum.”571	  Not	   satisfied	   with	   the	   result,	   the	   PAIGC	   withdrew	   from	   the	   London	  talks.	  	   In	   the	   midst	   of	   these	   negotiations,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   established	   diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Portugal	  on	  10	   June.	  The	  OAU	  and	   the	   liberation	  movements	   resented	  the	  Soviet	  move,	  since	  their	  strategy	  centered	  around	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐recognition	  of	   the	   Portuguese	   government	   until	   it	   agreed	   to	   negotiate	   on	   terms	   that	   were	  acceptable	  to	  the	  liberation	  movements.572	  	  In	   mid-­‐June,	   talks	   moved	   to	   Algeria,	   but	   the	   PAIGC	   again	   withdrew	   their	  delegation.	  The	  main	  reason	  was	   that	   the	  Portuguese	  negotiators	  would	  not	  agree	   to	  accept	   the	   “principle	   of	   self-­‐determination”	   for	   Cape	   Verde.	   Lisbon	   signaled	   to	  Washington	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  behind	  the	  breakdown.	  Speaking	  to	  US	  embassy	  officials	  in	  Lisbon,	  General	  Costa	  Gomes	  hinted	  that	  the	  PAIGC	  had	  pulled	  out	  “due	  to	  outside	  pressure,”	  while	  Spínola’s	  closest	  aide	  Almeida	  Bruno	  stated	  point	  blank	  that	  the	   PAIGC	   had	   withdrawn	   due	   to	   pressure	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union.573	  There	   is	   no	  evidence	   to	   prove	   that	   this	   was	   the	   case.	   Independence	   for	   Cape	   Verde	   had	   always	  been	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  PAIGC	  program,	  and	  Portuguese	  unwillingness	   to	  cede	  this	   point	   presented	   a	   serious	   impediment	   to	   further	   negotiations.	   Increasingly	  concerned	  about	  the	  communist	  influence	  in	  Portugal,	  Spínola	  tried	  to	  use	  the	  specter	  of	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  to	  gain	  American	  support	  for	  his	  bid	  for	  power.	  On	  19	  June	  he	  met	  US	  president	  Richard	  Nixon	  at	  the	  Azores	  military	  base.	  He	  warned	  Nixon	  that	  Moscow	  was	   “subsidizing	   communist	   subversion	   in	   Portugal”	   and	   asked	   for	   US	   assistance.574	  The	   Soviet	   leadership	   supplied	   the	   PCP	   with	   cash,	   but	   did	   little	   more	   than	   that	   to	  support	  Cunhal,	  as	  Chernyaev	  lamented	  in	  his	  memoirs	  discussed	  above.	  	  Spínola	  was	  correct	  to	  predict	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  in	  government,	  even	  though	  he	  grossly	  exaggerated	  the	  Kremlin’s	  role.	  On	  13	  July,	  Colonel	  Vasco	  dos	  Santos	  Gonçalves	   replaced	  Palma	  Carlos,	   a	   center-­‐right	   politician	   close	   to	   Spínola,	   in	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  the	  post	  of	  prime	  minister.	  Gonçalves	  was	  known	  to	  be	  close	  with	  Alvaro	  Cunhal,	  and	  his	   appointment	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   victory	   for	   the	   radical	   left	   wing	   within	   the	   MFA.	   In	  Moscow	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  hugely	  positive	  development.	  On	  19	  July	  Pravda	  heralded	  the	  inauguration	   of	   the	   second	   provisional	   government	   as	   a	   “new	   step	   towards	  democratization	  of	  socio-­‐political	  life	  in	  the	  country.”575	  	  Spínola	   and	   his	   right-­‐wing	   supporters	   played	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   blocking	   a	  settlement	  with	  the	  PAIGC.	  When	  Vasco	  Gonçalves	  was	  appointed	  prime	  minister,	  the	  balance	   of	   forces	  within	   the	   provisional	   government	   shifted	   to	   the	   left,	   breaking	   the	  deadlock.	  On	  4	  August,	  Lisbon	  released	  a	  communiqué	  accepting	  immediate	  transfer	  of	  power	   to	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   recognizing	   the	   “right	   to	   independence”	   in	   all	   other	  colonial	   territories,	   including	   Cape	   Verde.576	  Speaking	   to	   US	   officials	   in	   Conakry,	  Aristides	   Pereira	   confirmed	   that	   the	   communiqué	   had	   removed	   a	  major	   obstacle	   to	  further	   negotiations.577 	  Mário	   Soares	   resumed	   talks	   between	   the	   PAIGC	   and	   the	  Portuguese	   government	   in	   Algiers,	   quickly	   striking	   an	   acceptable	   settlement.	   On	   26	  August	   both	   sides	   agreed	   that	   Portugal	  would	   extend	  de	   jure	   recognition	   to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  on	  10	  September	  and	  would	  withdraw	  all	   their	  military	   forces	  by	  31	  October,	  while	   the	   future	   of	   Cape	   Verde	   would	   be	   settled	   in	   a	   referendum.578	  (Cape	   Verde	  became	  independent	  in	  July	  1975.)	  Soares	   then	   turned	  his	  attention	   to	  FRELIMO.	  Speaking	   to	  Western	  diplomats	  on	  5	  August,	  he	  explained	  that	  although	  “FRELIMO	  wants	  immediate	  power,”	  that	  was	  impossible	   since	   “the	   organization	   was	   not	   yet	   accepted	   in	   some	   areas	   [of	  Mozambique].”579	  Indeed,	   while	   FRELIMO	   had	   waged	   armed	   struggle	   in	   northern	  Mozambique,	   its	   reach	   never	   really	   extended	   into	   central	   or	   southern	  Mozambique.	  The	  organization	  also	  faced	  opposition	  from	  former	  members-­‐turned-­‐critics	  and	  bitter	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  Wikileaks.	  
	   230	  rivals	  who	  returned	  to	  Mozambique	  after	  the	  coup	  d’état	  in	  Portugal.580	  In	  mid-­‐August,	  Mário	   Soares	   travelled	   to	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   Tanzania,	   to	   conduct	   negotiations	   with	  President	   Samora	  Machel.	   Soares	   returned	   to	   Lisbon	  with	   a	   preliminary	   agreement:	  there	  would	  be	  no	  referendum	  in	  Mozambique	  and	  that	  power	  would	  be	  transferred	  to	  a	  mixed	  FRELIMO–Portuguese	  provisional	  government.	  “Either	  power	  is	  transferred	  to	  FRELIMO	  or	  the	  war	  goes	  on,	  but	  it	  will	  be	  a	  war	  in	  which	  the	  Portuguese	  troops	  will	  refuse	  to	   fight	  and	  the	  end	  result	  will	  be	  an	   independent	  Mozambique	  governed	  by	  a	  FRELIMO	  hostile	  to	  Portugal,”	  explained	  Mário	  Soares	  to	  US	  officials.581	  	  It	  seems	  the	  Soviets	  had	  no	  role	  in	  the	  negotiations	  process,	  and	  could	  not	  have	  one	  as	  their	  main	  concern	  was	  with	  Portugal.	  One	  of	  FRELIMO’s	  functionaries,	  Sérgio	  Vieira,	  remembered	  that	  in	  August,	  Moscow	  asked	  FRELIMO	  for	  an	  urgent	  meeting	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  Samora	  Machel	  eagerly	  accepted,	  since	  negotiations	  with	  Mário	  Soares	  had	   gone	   well	   and	   he	   wanted	   to	   tell	   his	   “good	   comrades”	   about	   the	   successful	  completion	  of	  the	  preliminary	  agreement.	  This	   is	  not	  how	  it	   turned	  out.	  According	  to	  Vieira,	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  Soviet	  delegation,	  whose	  name	  he	  could	  not	  remember,	  read	  out	  a	  “forty-­‐five	  minute	  sermon”	  accusing	  FRELIMO	  of	  endangering	  the	  “conquests	  of	  the	  Portuguese	   democracy”	   because	   of	   their	   assumption	   of	   a	   belligerent	   negotiating	  position.	   Then	   he	   told	   FRELIMO	   leadership	   that	   they	   should	   assume	   a	   conciliatory	  approach	  and	  pursue	  serious	  negotiations	  with	  Portugal.582	  “For	  us,	  it	  was	  like	  a	  splash	  of	  ice-­‐cold	  water,”	  Vieira	  writes.	  “We	  expected	  anything	  but	  not	  such	  sheer	  arrogance	  coupled	   with	   ignorance.”	   For	   Vieira,	   this	   attitude	   did	   not	   make	   sense	   because	   the	  Soviets	  must	  have	  known	  about	  the	  secret	  negotiations	  through	  their	  contacts	  with	  the	  MFA	  and	  the	  PCP.583	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  verify	  the	  story	  and	  ascertain	  the	  full	  extent	   of	   Soviet	  motivations,	   it	   does	   fit:	   the	   Soviets	  were	   not	   particularly	   up	   to	   date	  with	  the	  negotiations	  process	  and	  urged	  caution	  on	  the	  liberation	  movements	  in	  order	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  not	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  PCP	  and	  the	  provisional	  government.584	  After	  negotiations	  in	  Dar	  es	   Salaam,	   talks	   moved	   to	   Lusaka.	   On	   7	   September	   the	   two	   sides	   published	   an	  agreement	  to	  form	  a	  provisional	  government	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  full	  independence	  for	  Mozambique	  on	  25	  June	  1975.585	  	  The	  Soviets	  did	  not	  have	  a	  comprehensive	  strategy	  to	  reconcile	  their	  interest	  in	  a	   transformation	   in	   Portugal	  with	   their	   support	   for	   the	   liberation	  movements.	   They	  rightly	   assumed	   that	   developments	   in	   the	   colonies	   had	   direct	   implications	   on	   the	  constellation	  of	  power	  in	  Lisbon,	  and	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  communists	  within	  the	  provisional	  government.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	   that	   Moscow	   was	   uninterested	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   Mozambique.	   The	   Soviet	  Union,	   along	  with	   other	   Eastern	   European	   countries,	  would	   become	   instrumental	   in	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  developmental	  programs	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   Mozambique.	   Both	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	   Mozambique	   would	   adopt	  elements	   of	   the	   socialist	   planned	   economy	   as	   the	  model	   for	   economic	   development,	  and	   at	   its	   Third	   Congress	   in	   February	   1977	   FRELIMO	   would	   officially	   become	   a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	   Party.	   The	   outcome	   of	   decolonization	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   and	  Mozambique	   was	   thus,	   from	   the	   Soviet	   perspective,	   a	   victory	   for	   the	   international	  communist	  movement.	  	  One	  man	  who	  was	   deeply	   dissatisfied	  with	   the	   outcome	   of	   decolonization	   in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  and	  Mozambique	  was	  General	  António	  de	  Spínola.	   In	  September	  1974,	  he	  promised	  to	  take	  personal	  control	  over	  decolonization	  in	  Angola.	  In	  a	  conversation	  with	   the	   US	   ambassador	   to	   Portugal,	   Stuart	   Nash	   Scott,	   Spínola’s	   aide	   Nunes	   Barata	  passed	   a	   message	   to	   Washington:	   “Barata	   said	   Angolan	   independence	   will	   not	   be	  handled	   precipitously	   and	   noted	   that	   since	   difficulties	   between	   various	   guerrilla	  groups	  vying	  for	  power	  are	  well	  known	  to	  the	  world,	  Portugal	  will	  have	  more	  time	  to	  deal	  with	  Angola	  than	  it	  had	  with	  the	  other	  two	  territories.”586	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The	  Search	  for	  Unity	  in	  Angola,	  April	  1974–January	  1975	  Until	  September	  1974,	  the	  Portuguese	  did	  not	  seriously	  consider	  negotiations	  on	   Angolan	   decolonization.	   The	   Angolan	   national	   liberation	   movement	   was	   divided	  into	   three	   rival	   factions	   –	   UNITA,	   led	   by	   Jonas	   Savimbi;	   the	   FNLA,	   led	   by	   Holden	  Roberto;	  and	  the	  MPLA,	  led	  by	  Agostinho	  Neto.	  It	  was	  thus	  unclear	  exactly	  who	  would	  represent	  Angola	   in	   negotiations	  with	  Portugal.	   As	  General	   Costa	  Gomes	   told	   the	  US	  ambassador	   shortly	   after	   the	   coup,	   in	   Angola	   there	   was	   less	   antagonism	   between	  races,	  and	  since	  there	  was	  no	  single	  nationalist	  movement	  that	  dominated	  the	  political	  scene,	  there	  was	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  blacks	  would	  opt	  for	  some	  form	  of	  confederation	  with	  Portugal.587	  The	  Portuguese	  were	  in	  a	  relatively	  strong	  military	  position	  in	  Angola	  and	   thus	   were	   not	   under	   extreme	   pressure	   to	   negotiate.	   Mário	   Soares,	   the	   main	  Portuguese	   negotiator,	   was	   busy	  making	   a	   deal	   with	   the	   PAIGC	   and	   FRELIMO.	   This	  further	  delayed	  negotiations	  for	  independence	  in	  Angola.	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   power	   vacuum	   in	   Angola	   created	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   25	  April	   coup	   led	   to	   the	   intensification	   of	   local	   and	   regional	   rivalries.	   The	   smallest	  nationalist	   group	   was	   UNITA.	   The	   group	   had	   a	   small	   following	   in	   the	   south	   and	  southeast	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  have	  any	  sizeable	  guerrilla	  force,	  especially	  in	  comparison	   to	   its	   rivals.	   However,	   UNITA	   did	   have	   Jonas	   Savimbi.	   A	   charismatic	  Ovimbundu	  leader,	  Savimbi	  fashioned	  himself	  as	  a	  man	  of	  the	  people,	  but	  he	  was	  also	  a	  shrewd	  diplomat	  keenly	  aware	  of	  what	  his	  interlocutor	  was	  willing	  to	  hear.	  In	  1972	  he	  had	  signed	  a	  deal	  with	   the	  Angolan	  governor-­‐general,	  Costa	  Gomes,	  by	  which	  UNITA	  would	   help	   eliminate	   the	   MPLA	   in	   eastern	   Angola.	   When	   the	   junta	   called	   on	   the	  Angolan	  nationalist	  movements	  to	  cease	  fire	  after	  25	  April,	  Savimbi	  was	  the	  only	  one	  who	  signed	  the	  agreement	  in	  June.	  	  The	  second	  contender	  for	  power	  in	  Angola	  was	  the	  MPLA.	  Led	  by	  the	  Mbundu	  intellectual	  and	  poet	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  exhibited	  an	  explicitly	  non-­‐
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  racist	  ideology	  based	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  redistributive	  justice	  that	  was	  prevalent	  among	  the	  Luanda	   middle	   class.	   Neto	   enjoyed	   long-­‐standing	   contacts	   with	   PCP	   leader	   Alvaro	  Cunhal,	  who	  had	  helped	  him	  escape	   from	  prison	   in	  1962.	  The	  MPLA	  had	  mounted	   a	  formidable	  military	  challenge	   to	   the	  Portuguese	  colonial	  army	   in	  eastern	  Angola,	  but	  by	   1974	   the	   organization	   was	   in	   a	   weak	   position	   due	   to	   military	   defeats	   and	   a	  leadership	   crisis.	   One	   breakaway	   faction	   under	   informal	   patronage	   of	   Zambia’s	  President	  Kenneth	  Kaunda,	  known	  as	  “Eastern	  revolt”,	  was	   led	  by	  Daniel	  Chipenda,	  a	  charismatic	  Ovimbundu	  leader	  who	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  MPLA’s	  elitism	  and	  of	  mistakes	  during	  the	  campaign	  in	  eastern	  Angola.	  Yet	  another	  faction,	  known	  as	  “Active	  Revolt”,	  led	  by	  Mário	  de	  Andrade	  and	  his	  brother	  Pinto	  de	  Andrade,	  found	  support	  from	  Marien	  Ngouabi,	  the	  president	  of	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville.	  Although	  Ngouabi	  had	  allowed	  the	  MPLA	  to	  use	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  as	  a	  launching	  pad	  for	  guerrilla	  operations	  in	  neighboring,	  oil-­‐rich	  Cabinda,	  Ngouabi	  was	  not	  a	  neutral	  observer	  of	  Angolan	  politics.	  Revenues	   from	  oil	  sales	  in	  the	  exclave	  had	  reached	  $450	  million	  a	  year	  by	  1974,	  and	  Ngouabi	  was	  keen	  to	  keep	  a	  stake	  in	  Cabinda.588	  However,	   Ngouabi	   could	   not	  match	   the	   ambition	   of	   his	   closest	   neighbor	   and	  main	   rival,	   the	  Zairian	  president,	   Joseph	  Mobutu.	   Since	   the	   early	  1960s,	  Mobutu	  had	  been	  grooming	  his	  protégé	  and	  close	  friend	  Holden	  Roberto,	  with	  whom	  he	  had	  long-­‐standing	  ties	  of	  kinship,	  culture,	  and	  aversion	  to	  communism.	  Roberto	  and	  Mobutu	  had	  cooperated	  to	  exclude	  the	  MPLA	  from	  Bakongo-­‐dominated	  northern	  Angola,	  which	  led	  to	   the	   first	  armed	  clashes	  between	   the	  MPLA	  and	  FNLA	   in	   the	  early	  1960s.	  With	   the	  MPLA	  linked	  to	  the	  pro-­‐Lumumbist	  opposition,	  Mobutu	  believed	  that	  having	  the	  MPLA	  in	  power	  would	  constitute	  a	  great	  danger	  to	  his	  personal	  rule.	  Moreover,	  with	  Holden	  Roberto	  in	  power,	  Zaire	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  Cabindan	  oil.	  The	  FNLA	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  political	  program,	  but	  Roberto	  was	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  communism,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  he	  had	  secured	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  and	  a	  limited	   financial	   contribution	   from	   the	   CIA.	   Roberto	   had	   been	   building	   his	   armed	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   234	  forces:	   with	  Mobutu’s	  mediation,	   he	   had	   secured	   a	   large	   consignment	   of	   arms	   from	  China	  and	  Romania.	  China	  also	  provided	  instructors	  to	  train	  the	  FNLA	  armed	  forces	  at	  the	  main	  military	  base	  at	  Kinkuzu.589	  	  Regional	   and	   intra-­‐Angolan	   rivalries	   became	   immediately	   apparent	  when	   the	  four	  presidents	  –	  Kenneth	  Kaunda,	  Marien	  Ngouabi,	  Joseph	  Mobutu,	  and	  the	  Tanzanian	  president	   Julius	  Nyerere	  –	   tried	   to	  unite	   the	  Angolan	   factions	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  coup	   in	   Lisbon.	   At	   a	   meeting	   supervised	   by	   the	   four	   presidents	   in	   Bukavu,	   Zaire,	  Agostinho	  Neto,	  Holden	  Roberto,	  and	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  signed	  an	  agreement	  to	  form	  a	  common	   front	   shortly	   after	   the	   MPLA	   conference	   that	   was	   supposed	   to	   resolve	   the	  leadership	  crisis.	  Nyerere	  was	  probably	  the	  most	  neutral	  of	  the	  four,	  and	  it	  was	  he	  who	  insisted	   that	  Neto	   attend.	   The	  meeting	   of	   all	   the	  MPLA’s	   factions	   on	   12	  August	   near	  Lusaka	  did	  not	  solve	  the	  leadership	  crisis.	  After	  eleven	  days	  of	  bickering,	  Neto	  and	  his	  supporters	   left,	   while	   the	   remaining	   delegates	   elected	   Chipenda	   as	   the	   new	   MPLA	  leader.	  When	  Chipenda	  moved	  to	  Kinshasa	  and	  formed	  a	  tentative	  alliance	  with	  Holden	  Roberto,	  Mobutu	  welcomed	  the	  move.	  Mobutu	  was	  playing	  the	  game	  on	  many	  levels.	  On	  one	  hand,	  he	  sheltered	  Luís	  Ranque	  Franque	  and	  Alexander	  Taty,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Cabindan	  separatist	  movement	  known	  as	  the	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  the	  Enclave	  of	  Cabinda	  (FREC;	  Frente	  para	  a	  
Libertação	   do	   Enclave	   de	   Cabinda).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   he	   supported	   Roberto	   and	  starting	  putting	  pressure	  on	  Washington	   to	   increase	   its	   support	   for	   the	  FNLA.	  When	  Zairian	   foreign	  minister	   Jean	  Umba-­‐di-­‐Lutete	  visited	  Washington	   in	  August,	  he	  asked	  secretary	  of	  state	  Henry	  Kissinger	  to	  increase	  support	  for	  Holden	  Roberto.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  shown	  great	  interest	  in	  Angola,	  and	  they	  were	  pressuring	  the	  Portuguese	  to	  deal	   with	   Neto	   alone.	   “Perhaps	   the	   United	   States	   could	   assist	   us	   in	   our	   efforts	   to	  counter	   this	   pressure,”	   Umba-­‐di-­‐Lutete	   argued.	   Kissinger	   responded	   that	   he	   had	   not	  yet	  studied	  the	  problem,	  but	  assured	  him	  that	  any	  suggestions	  Mobutu	  might	  have	  on	  the	  subject	  would	  be	  studied	  sympathetically.590	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   235	  It	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   evaluated	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola	  immediately	   after	   the	   coup	   in	   Lisbon.	   Oleg	   Nazhestkin	   writes	   that,	   as	   early	   as	   June	  1974,	   the	  KGB	  warned	   the	  CC	  CPSU	   International	  Department	   that	   the	  United	  States,	  its	  NATO	  allies,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Zaire	  were	  worried	  that	  immediate	  decolonization	  in	  Angola	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  MPLA	  victory,	  which	  went	  against	  their	  economic	  and	  strategic	  interests	   in	   the	   region.	   The	   KGB	   apparently	  warned	   that	   the	  Western	   powers	   could	  resort	   to	   military	   intervention	   in	   order	   to	   block	   Neto	   from	   gaining	   power.591	  While	  Yevsyukov	  who	  did	  not	  relate	  to	  Neto	  on	  a	  personal	  level,	  Nazhestkin	  had	  established	  a	  personal	   connection	   with	   Neto	   since	   1962,	   when	   he	   was	   stationed	   at	   the	   KGB	  
rezidentura	   in	   Léopoldville.	  Given	   that	   the	   Soviets	   had	   threatened	   shortly	   before	   the	  coup	  to	  cut	  assistance	  to	  Neto	  if	  he	  did	  not	  reconcile	  with	  Daniel	  Chipenda,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	   that	   they	   were	   still	   expecting	   some	   form	   of	   reconciliation	   between	   the	   two.592	  Nazhestkin,	  the	  KGB	  officer	  responsible	  for	  Angola	  at	  this	  point,	  also	  writes	  that	  Soviet	  intelligence	  reports	  indicated	  that	  Mobutu	  was	  making	  plans	  to	  annex	  Cabinda.593	  	  Chipenda’s	  deal	  with	  Joseph	  Mobutu	  sealed	  his	  political	  fate.	  "Chipenda	  and	  his	  supporters	  have	  been	  discredited	  because	  of	  their	  open	  compromise	  with	  Mobutu	  and	  the	  FNLA,”	  argued	  the	  first	  secretary	  of	  the	  Soviet	  embassy	  in	  Brazzaville,	  Boris	  Putilin,	  in	   conversation	   with	   his	   Polish	   counterpart,	   Bojko.	   Boris	   Putilin	   was	   a	   military	  intelligence	  (GRU)	  officer	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  Brazzaville	  a	  year	  earlier,	  specifically	  to	  liaise	  with	  the	  MPLA	  leadership.	  As	  he	  explained	  to	  Bojko,	  Neto	  enjoyed	  support	  from	  the	  OAU,	  the	  PCP,	  and	  Mário	  Soares;	  he	  was	  also	  in	  the	  best	  position	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Portuguese	  due	  to	  his	  “racial	  and	  tribal	  affinity”	  and	  could	  be	  the	  best	  man	  to	  unite	  the	  diverse	  Angolan	  factions.594	  	  Moscow	  did	  not	  miscalculate:	  between	  12	  and	  21	  September,	  Neto	  assembled	  his	  supporters	  at	  a	  conference	   in	  southeastern	  Angola.	  The	  conference	  elected	  a	  new	  thirty-­‐five-­‐member-­‐strong	  central	  committee	  headed	  by	  a	   ten-­‐member	  politburo	  and	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   236	  revived	  the	  MPLA	  military	  wing,	  the	  Popular	  Armed	  Force	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola	  (FAPLA;	   Forças	   Armadas	   Popular	   para	   Libertação	   de	   Angola).595	  By	   the	   time	   Lisbon	  turned	   its	   attention	   to	   Angola	   in	   September,	   there	   was	   still	   no	   unity	   between	   the	  Angolan	  factions.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Spínola	  was	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  with	   the	  MFA.	   In	  September,	  he	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  take	  personal	  charge	  of	  the	  decolonization	  negotiations	  and	  travelled	   to	   Cape	   Verde	   to	   meet	   president	   Mobutu	   for	   discussions	   on	   the	   future	   of	  Angola.	  Rumors	   emerged	   that	   the	   agreement	   struck	  between	  Mobutu	   and	   Spínola	   at	  the	   secret	   talks	   was	   to	   transfer	   power	   in	   Angola	   to	   a	   coalition	   of	   Holden	   Roberto,	  Daniel	  Chipenda,	  and	  Jonas	  Savimbi.	  Simultaneously,	  Spínola	  called	  for	  broad	  support	  of	  his	  policies	  from	  the	  “silent	  majority.”	  Communists,	  socialists,	  and	  the	  MFA	  united	  to	  barricade	  Lisbon	  against	  what	  looked	  like	  a	  rightist	  coup.	  On	  30	  September,	  after	  two	  days	  of	   unrest	   in	   Lisbon,	   Spínola	   resigned	   and	  was	   replaced	   as	   interim	  president	  by	  General	   Costa	   Gomes,	   who	   proclaimed	   his	   intention	   to	   proceed	   immediately	   with	  decolonization	   in	   Angola.	   On	   12	   and	   21	   October	   Lisbon	   signed	   separate	   ceasefire	  agreements	  with	  the	  FNLA	  and	  the	  MPLA	  respectively.	  In	   Angola,	   this	   strengthened	   Vice	   Admiral	   António	   Alva	   Rosa	   Coutinho,	   who	  had	  been	  head	  of	  the	  Angolan	  junta	  since	  July.	  Coutinho	  was	  close	  to	  the	  radical	  faction	  within	  the	  MFA,	  for	  which	  he	  was	  nicknamed	  ‘Red	  Rosa’	  by	  his	  opponents.	  He	  believed	  the	   MPLA	   espoused	   an	   explicitly	   non-­‐racist	   ideology	   and	   enjoyed	   broad	   support	  among	   the	  Angolan	   bureaucracy	   and	   intelligentsia.	   Furthermore,	   he	   did	   not	   hide	   his	  dislike	  for	  Zairians.	  In	  1961	  Coutinho	  had	  been	  captured	  by	  Zairian	  troops,	  accused	  of	  spying,	  and	  imprisoned	  in	  Kinshasa,	  where	  he	  was	  “treated	  like	  a	  spy,”	  as	  he	  recounted	  in	  an	  interview.	  Although	  he	  was	  released	  after	  four	  months,	  the	  experience	  made	  him	  believe	   the	   Zairians	   were	   “black	   racists”	   and	   that	   with	   Roberto	   in	   power,	   Mobutu	  would	   have	   de	   facto	   control	   of	   Angolan	   politics.	   “Spínola	   and	   Mobutu	   wanted	   to	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  John	  Marcum,	  The	  Angolan	  revolution/	  Vol.2,	  Exile	  politics	  and	  guerrilla	  warfare	  (1962-­‐1976).	  Studies	  in	  communism,	  revisionism,	   and	   revolution	   (Cambridge:	   M.I.T.	   Press,	   1978),	   p.	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   The	   Politburo	   included	   Agostinho	   Neto	   as	  President,	  Lopo	  do	  Nascimento,	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  Carlos	  Rocha,	  José	  Eduardo	  dos	  Santos,	  Joaquim	  Kapango,	  Rodriques	  João	  Lopes,	  Pedro	  Maria	  Tonha,	  Jacob	  Caetano,	  and	  Henrique	  Teles	  Carreira.	  
	   237	  establish	   FNLA	   dominance	   upon	   Angolan	   Independence,	   which	   for	   me	   would	   be	   a	  disaster	   since	   it	   would	   transform	   Angola	   into	   a	   Zairian	   province,”	   he	   recalled.	  596	  Following	   Spínola’s	   resignation,	   Rosa	   Coutinho	   was	   given	   the	   power	   to	   negotiate	  directly	  with	   the	  national	   liberation	  movements,	   and	  he	  would	  use	  his	   power	   as	   the	  head	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  army	  in	  Angola	  to	  shield	  the	  MPLA.	  	  Unilateral	   ceasefire	   agreements	   actually	   opened	   up	   opportunities	   for	   open	  competition	  between	  the	  MPLA	  and	  FNLA.	  Even	  before	  the	  official	  ceasefire,	  the	  FNLA	  was	   allowed	   to	   enter	   northern	   Angola,	   where	   they	   would	   gradually	   become	   the	  predominant	   political	   and	   military	   presence. 597 	  Meanwhile,	   the	   MPLA	   and	   the	  Portuguese	   army	   launched	   a	   joint	   operation	   to	   assert	   control	   over	   Cabinda,	   where	  FLEC	   had	   taken	   control	   of	   the	   local	   administration.	  On	   2	   November	   the	   joint	   force	  entered	   Cabinda	   city,	   secured	   the	   telephone	   and	   telegraph	   exchanges,	   radio	   station,	  and	   the	   airport,	   and	   arrested	   district	   governor	   Themudo	   Barata,	   known	   to	   be	  sympathetic	  to	  FLEC.598	  	  Competition	  between	  the	  MPLA,	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  UNITA	  quickly	  developed	  over	  control	  of	  Luanda,	  where	  all	  three	  movements	  set	  up	  officers	  in	  early	  November.	  The	  FNLA	   possessed	   a	   clear	   military	   superiority,	   as	   they	   were	   better	   armed	   and	   could	  easily	  transport	  armed	  loyalists	  from	  northern	  Angola	  and	  Zaire.	  However,	  the	  MPLA	  enjoyed	  the	  overwhelming	  support	  of	  the	  Luandan	  population,	  as	  became	  clear	  when	  a	  large	  crowd	  cheered	  for	  Lúcio	  Lara	  upon	  his	  arrival	  in	  the	  city	  on	  8	  November.	  Rumors	  quickly	  spread	  that	  both	  the	  MPLA	  and	  FNLA	  had	  smuggled	  in	  guns	  and	  men	  to	  bolster	  their	   positions	   in	   the	   capital.	   The	   first	   violent	   outburst	   took	   place	   on	   10	  November,	  when	   sporadic	   shooting	   led	   to	   fifty	   dead	   and	   a	   hundred	   wounded.	   The	   US	   consul	  general,	   Tom	  Killoran,	   attributed	   the	   violence	   to	   “MPLA	  hotheads”	  who	   had	   taken	   it	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  Interview	  with	  Rosa	  Coutinho	  in	  Jaime	  and	  Barber,	  eds.,	  Angola,	  	  p.	  270.	  597	  Killoran	   (U.S.	  Consul	  General,	   Luanda)	   to	  Washington,	  16	  October	  1974,	   "FNLA	  Strengthens	   its	  Political	  Position",	  Wikileaks.	  The	  US	  Consul	  General	  Tom	  Killoran	  was	  a	  fairly	  objective	  observer	  of	  the	  Angolan	  political	  scene,	  from	  1974	  to	   1975.	   His	   views	   were	   however	   largely	   ignored	   in	   Washington.	   See:	   Donald	   Easum,	   "Assistant	   Secretary	   Donald	  Easum:	  Hard	  Times	  for	  the	  African	  Bureau,	  1974-­‐1975:	  A	  Diplomatic	  Adventure	  Story."	  Fifty	  Years	  Of	  U.S.	  Africa	  Policy:	  
Reflections	  of	  Assistant	  Secretaries	  of	  African	  Affairs	  and	  U.S.	  Embassy	  Officials.	  Ed.	  Claudia	  E.	  Anyaso.	  Kindle	  ed	  Xlibris,	  2011).	  	  598	  Marcum,	  Angolan	  Revolution,	  pp.	  253-­‐254.	  Also	  see	  Porter	  (U.S.	  Embassy,	  Luanda)	  to	  Washington,	  4	  November	  1974,	  "Mini-­‐coup	  in	  Cabinda",	  Wikileaks.	  
	   238	  upon	   themselves	   to	   stage	   a	   show	   of	   force	   after	   the	   UNITA	   delegation	   had	   entered	  Luanda	  earlier	  that	  day.	  The	  FNLA	  immediately	  released	  a	  strongly	  worded	  statement	  saying	  that	  they	  could	  bring	  in	  “ten	  thousand	  men	  within	  twenty-­‐four	  hours”	  to	  restore	  order.	   On	   13	  November,	   Killoran	   cabled	   the	   US	   State	   Department:	   “A	   siege	   complex	  began	   to	   take	  over	  Luanda	   in	   the	  past	   two	  days,	  and	  many	  people	  are	  hoarding	   food	  and	  supplies.”599	  	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  of	  rising	  tensions	  in	  Luanda	  that	  the	  MPLA	  appealed	  for	  arms	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   October	   or	   November.	   Georgiy	   Kornienko,	   who	   was	  responsible	   for	   negotiations	   with	   the	   United	   States	   and	   who	   would	   become	   deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	   in	   1975,	   recalls	   that	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Politburo	   initially	   agreed	   only	   to	  provide	   “political	   and	   some	  material	   support	   for	   the	   MPLA”	   but	   refused	   to	   become	  entangled	   in	   Angola	   in	   military	   terms,	   an	   agreement	   that	   perhaps	   implied	   that	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   would	   not	   send	   any	  more	   arms	   to	   the	   MPLA.	   “Only	   a	   few	   days	   later,”	  Kornienko	   continues,	   the	   International	   Department	   received	   the	  MPLA’s	   request	   for	  arms	   and	   drafted	   a	   resolution	   to	   grant	   a	   limited	   amount	   of	   weapons. 600 	  Boris	  Ponomarev,	  the	  Head	  of	  the	  International	  Department,	  Andrey	  Grechko,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	   and	   Yuriy	   Andropov,	   the	   KGB	   Chairman,	   signed	   the	   resolution	  without	   any	  qualms.	  Kornienko	  writes	  that	  he	  tried	  to	  persuade	  his	  boss,	  Foreign	  Minister	  Andrey	  Gromyko,	  not	  to	  sign	  the	  resolution	  because	  escalation	  of	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA	  might	  jeopardize	   relations	   with	   the	   United	   States.	   Gromyko	   hesitated,	   but	   nevertheless	  signed	   the	   resolution	  because,	  Kornienko	  believed,	  he	  did	  not	  want	   to	   clash	  with	  his	  colleagues.601	  	  We	  do	  not	  know	  who	  was	  the	  key	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  decision	  to	  satisfy	  the	  MPLA’s	   request	   for	   arms,	   nor	  why	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Politburo	   reversed	   their	   earlier	  agreement	  not	  to	  become	  embroiled	  in	  Angola’s	  conflict	  in	  military	  terms,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  trust	  Kornienko’s	  account.	  Kornienko	  attributes	  key	  responsibility	   for	   the	  reversal	  of	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  Killoran	  (US	  Consul	  General,	  Luanda)	  to	  Washington,	  13	  November	  1974,	  "Assessment	  of	  Recent	  Wave	  of	  Violence	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  Luanda",	  Wikileaks.	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  Kornienko,	  Kholodnaia	  Voina,	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  211.	  
	   239	  decision	   to	   Boris	   Ponomarev	   and	   his	   subordinates	   at	   the	   International	   Department,	  while	   he	   portrays	   Gromyko	   as	   an	   unwilling	   participant,	   hesitant	   to	   challenge	   his	  colleagues	   in	   their	   bureaucratic	   sphere	   of	   influence.	   The	   cadres	   of	   the	   International	  Department	  had	  bureaucratic	  as	  well	   as	  personal	   interests	   in	   supporting	   the	  MPLA’s	  request,	  since	  most	  of	  them	  had	  known	  Neto	  and	  his	  associates	  since	  the	  early	  1960s.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  KGB	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  were	  also	  actively	  supportive	  of	  this	  decision,	   as	   Kornienko’s	   account	   and	   future	   events	   would	   suggest.	   The	   situation	   in	  Portugal	   might	   have	   also	   played	   a	   role.	   In	   early	   November,	   Alvaro	   Cunhal	   made	   a	  publicized	   visit	   to	   Moscow,	   where	   he	   spoke	   with	   Boris	   Ponomarev.	   Anatoliy	  Chernyaev,	  who	  was	  present	  at	   the	  meeting,	  wrote	   in	  his	  diary	  on	  3	  November:	  “You	  are	  present	  at	  history	   in	   the	  making.	  A	   lot	  depends	  on	   this	  man	  now	  and	  not	  only	   in	  Portugal.”602	  Although	  Chernyaev	  does	  not	  make	  any	  direct	   references	   to	  Angola,	   the	  situation	   in	   the	   country	   must	   have	   been	   on	   the	   agenda.	   Cunhal	   had	   previously	  intervened	   on	   Neto’s	   behalf,	   and	   his	   support	   was	   important	   to	   Soviet	   calculations.	  Ponomarev	  might	   have	   also	   calculated	   that	   by	   strengthening	   the	  MPLA,	   they	  would	  also	  reinforce	  Cunhal’s	  position	  in	  the	  new	  provisional	  government.603	  	  We	  also	  still	  do	  not	  know	  when	  exactly	  this	  decision	  took	  place,	  nor	  why	  only	  in	  May	   1975	   did	   the	   first	   sizable	   shipment	   of	   Soviet	   arms	   reach	   Luanda.	   Arne	  Westad,	  who	  had	   the	  opportunity	   to	   see	  Russian	  documents	   that	  are	  now	  reclassified,	  writes	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  in	  early	  December	  1974,	  after	  Soviet	  ambassador	  Yevgeniy	  Afanasenko	   had	   received	   consent	   for	   the	   operation	   from	   Marien	   Ngouabi,	   the	  president	   of	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville.604	  The	   logistics	   of	   arms	   transfers	   hinged	   on	  Ngouabi,	  because	  arms	  could	  not	  be	  directly	   flown	  in	  or	  shipped	  to	  Luanda:	  the	  Soviets	  would	  have	   to	   fly	   them	   first	   to	   Brazzaville	   or	   ship	   them	   to	   the	   port	   of	   Pointe-­‐Noire,	   from	  where	  they	  would	  be	  smuggled	  undercover	  and	  loaded	  on	  to	  the	  smaller	  MPLA-­‐owned	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  Iskhod,	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  is	  indirect	  archival	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  to	  support	  this	  claim.	  In	  March	  1975,	  the	  Head	  of	  the	  Polish	  Solidarity	  Committee	  Kwiryn	   Grela	   made	   this	   argument	   after	   his	   return	   from	   a	   joint	   consultation	   meeting	   of	   solidarity	   committees.	   See	  Kwiryn	   Grela	   do	   Jan	   Czapla,	   undated,	   "Dot.	   Pomocy	   dla	   Ruchow	   Narodowo-­‐wyzwolenczych	   w	   Afryce,"	   AAN,	   PZPR,	  LXXVI.541.	  	  604	  Westad,	  "Short	  Moscow	  and	  the	  Angolan	  Crisis,	  1974-­‐1976:	  A	  New	  Pattern	  of	  Intervention,"	  p.	  24.	  
	   240	  vessels	   close	   to	   the	   Angolan	   shore.605	  While	   Ngouabi	   agreed	   to	   support	   the	   Soviet	  operation,	  it	  seemed	  that	  he	  remained	  hesitant	  to	  give	  all-­‐out	  support,	  which,	  coupled	  with	   the	   overall	   logistical	   problems,	   provides	   a	   possible	   explanation	   for	   the	  delay	   in	  arms	  shipments	  to	  the	  MPLA	  until	  May.	  	  Meanwhile,	   Moscow	   sought	   to	   investigate	   the	   situation	   in	   Luanda,	   since	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  have	  any	  intelligence	  or	  diplomatic	  presence	  in	  Angola.	  In	  1974,	  the	   KGB	   proposed	   that	   the	   rezidenturas	   in	   Algiers,	   Rabat,	   Brazzaville,	   Bamako,	  Mogadishu,	   Lusaka,	   Nairobi,	   and	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   prepare	   and	   send	   their	   agents	   and	  trusted	  contacts	  to	  Angola	  and	  Mozambique	  to	  receive	  information	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  both	  countries.606	  The	  first	  Soviet	  to	  arrive	  in	  Luanda	  in	  1974	  was	  Oleg	  Ignatyev,	  in	  September,	  followed	  by	  Mikhail	  Zenovich,	  also	  a	  correspondent	  for	  Pravda.	  We	  do	  not	  know	   if	   Zenovich	   had	   any	   connection	  with	   the	  KGB,	   but	   his	   report	   submitted	   to	   the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  on	  27	  December	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  Soviet	  officials	  were	  getting	  out	  of	  Luanda	  at	  that	  point.	  “Legalization	  of	  political	  parties	  has	  created	  completely	  new	  conditions	  in	  Angola,	  whereby	  prospects	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  will	  be	  determined	   by	   [the]	   presence	   of	   well-­‐trained	   political	   cadres,	   opportunities	   to	  organize	   political	   and	   propaganda	   work,	   and	   their	   ability	   to	   form	   military	  detachments,	   trained	   for	  combat	   in	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas,”	  Zenovich	  begins.607	  While	  the	  MPLA	  enjoyed	  support	  among	  the	  “city	  proletariat,	  the	  students	  and	  a	  large	  section	  of	   the	   intelligentsia,”	   the	   FNLA	   had	   an	   eight-­‐thousand-­‐strong	   army	   “well	   equipped	  with	   Chinese	   arms	   and	   trained	   with	   Chinese	   instructors,”	   Zenovich	   reported	   to	   the	  Foreign	  Ministry.608	  Mobutu	  was	  another	  big	  player	  in	  Angola:	  he	  was	  courting	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  and	   Jonas	  Savimbi,	   both	  of	  whom	  he	  envisioned	  would	  enter	   a	  provisional	  government	  led	  by	  his	  protégée	  Holden	  Roberto.	  Cabindan	  secession	  was	  his	  “back-­‐up	  plan.”609	  Rosa	   Coutinho	   informed	   Zenovich	   that	   the	   Soviets	   should	   establish	   direct	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	  pp.	  70-­‐71.	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  economic	  and	  trade	  contacts	  with	  Angola.610	  We	  do	  not	  know	  if	  Mikhail	  Zenovich	  went	  to	  Luanda	  before	  or	  after	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  Politburo	  decided	  to	  supply	  arms	  to	  the	  MPLA,	  but	  his	  report	  must	  have	  confirmed	  that	  the	  military	  prowess	  of	  the	  parties	  concerned	  would	  define	  the	  political	  outcomes	  in	  Angola.	  	  Soviet	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA	  strengthened	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1974,	  when	  Henrique	  “Iko”	  Carreira	  and	  Pedro	  van	  Dunem,	  the	  two	  MPLA	  members	  responsible	  for	  military	  operations	  and	  logistics,	  visited	  Moscow	  in	  late	  December.	  That	  the	  two	  men	  came	  to	  discuss	  military	  matters	  is	  clear	  from	  that	  fact	  that	  they	  had	  lengthy	  discussions	  with	  General	  Ivan	  Plakhin,	  a	  veteran	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  who	  had	  coordinated	  military	  aid	   to	   the	   liberation	   movements	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1960s.	   The	   message	   that	   the	   MPLA	  delegation	   pushed	   forward	   in	   Moscow	   was	   that	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola	   was	   an	  extension	  of	  the	  struggle	   in	  Portugal:	   the	  MPLA	  had	  entered	  into	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  MFA,	  while	  the	  right-­‐wing	  forces	  in	  Portugal	  were	  behind	  the	  FNLA.	  Carreira	  also	  said	  that	  the	  FNLA	  was	  in	  a	  much	  stronger	  military	  position	  and	  was	  getting	  ready	  to	  seize	  power	   by	   force,	   while	   the	   Portuguese	   army	   was	   war-­‐weary	   and	   thus	   would	   not	  intervene.	  “The	  battles	  are	  waiting	  for	  us,”	  he	  warned.611	  We	  do	  not	  know	  the	  details	  of	  the	  discussions	  that	  took	  place;	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  Soviets	  promised	  Ike	  Carreira	  and	   Pedro	   van	   Dunem	   that	   they	   would	   provide	   training	   for	   a	   group	   of	   the	   MPLA	  militants	  –	  a	  group	  that	  would	  indeed	  be	  trained	  in	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  following	  months	  and	  would	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Ninth	  Brigade”.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Portuguese	  government	  negotiated	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  between	   the	  MPLA,	   the	   FNLA,	   and	   UNITA.	   Talks	   between	   the	   liberation	  movements	  and	  the	  Portuguese	  took	  place	  at	  the	  Penina	  Hotel,	  near	  Alvor,	  and	  on	  15	  January,	  all	  parties	  signed	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  outlining	  a	  schedule	  for	  the	  decolonization	  of	   Angola,	   known	   as	   the	   Alvor	   Agreement.	   The	   three	   liberation	  movements	   and	   the	  Portuguese	  authorities	  would	   form	  the	   transitional	  government,	  which	  would	  be	  run	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  jointly	  by	   the	  Portuguese	  high	  commissioner	  and	   the	   three-­‐man	  presidential	   council.	  The	  agreement	  also	  called	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  mixed	  military	  force	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Portuguese	  troops.	  Elections	  would	  be	  held	  in	  October	  with	  de	  jure	  independence	  to	  follow	  on	  11	  November	  1975.	  	  Moscow	   saw	   clear	   parallels	   between	   developments	   in	   Portugal	   and	   Angola.	  Mobutu,	  a	  well-­‐known	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  conniving	  with	  António	  de	  Spínola	  to	   exclude	   the	  MPLA	   from	   sharing	  power	   in	  Angola.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  US	  was	  backing	  Spínola’s	   attempts	   to	   reverse	   the	   revolution	   in	   Portugal.	   The	  MPLA	   played	   into	   this	  vision	  and	  reinforced	  it:	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola	  mirrored	  the	  struggles	  in	  Portugal,	  and	  military	  reinforcements	  were	  necessary	  because	  Mobutu,	  backed	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  ready	  to	  seize	  power	  by	  force.	  Although	  Neto	  himself	  did	  not	  have	  a	  good	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Soviet	  officials,	  he	  had	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  left-­‐wing	  coalition	  in	  Lisbon	  (Mário	   Soares,	   Alvaro	   Cunhal,	   Rosa	   Coutinho),	   and	   was	   thus	   the	   best	   candidate	   to	  negotiate	   with	   the	   Portuguese.	   Moscow	   decided	   to	   satisfy	   the	   request	   for	   military	  assistance,	  although	  there	  was	  no	  sense	  of	  urgency.	  Moscow	  had	  very	  little	  knowledge	  of	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola,	   while	   the	   Alvor	   Agreement	   provided	   a	   framework	   for	   a	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  independence.	  There	  was	  still	  time	  to	  observe	  the	  situation	  and	  work	  out	  the	  details.	  	  
	  
The	  Alvor	  Agreement	  Unravels,	  January–June	  1975	  In	   late	   January,	   Igor	   Uvarov,	   an	   employee	   of	   the	   Soviet	   information	   agency	  TASS	   in	   Algeria,	   flew	   to	   Luanda.	  He	   arrived	   shortly	   before	   Rosa	   Coutinho	  was	   to	   be	  replaced	   by	   the	   new	   governor,	   António	   da	   Silva	   Cardoso.	   Uvarov,	   who	   had	   been	  instructed	  to	  report	  on	  daily	  developments	   in	  Angola,	  checked	  into	  the	  famous	  Tivoli	  Hotel	  and	  started	  sending	  regular	  telex	  messages	  to	  TASS.612	  Gradually	  he	  became	  well	  acquainted	  with	  the	  MPLA	  leadership	  and	  was	  allowed	  to	  use	  their	  radio	  channels	  to	  wire	   confidential	   messages	   to	   the	   Soviet	   embassy	   in	   Brazzaville. 613 	  Alexander	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   243	  Dzasokhov,	   who	   arrived	   in	   Luanda	   in	   February	   1975,	   first	   believed	   that	   he	   and	   his	  partner	  were	   the	   only	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   Angola,	   but	   upon	   his	   return	   to	  Moscow,	   he	  discovered	  that	  Uvarov	  was	  working	  for	  the	  GRU,	  Soviet	  military	  intelligence,	  and	  that	  he	  was	  also	  in	  Luanda	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  trip.614	  Dzasokhov	  writes	  that	  the	  GRU	  and	  its	   chief,	   Petr	   Ivashutin,	  were	   very	   interested	   in	   Angola	   because,	   as	   he	   explains,	   the	  problems	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Namibia,	  and	  other	  southern	  African	  countries	  “centered	  on	  Luanda.”615	  The	   MPLA	   victory	   in	   Angola	   could	   open	   up	   possibilities	   for	   military	  surveillance	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   further	   impetus	   for	   the	   liberation	   of	  Namibia,	  Zimbabwe,	  and	  maybe	  even	  South	  Africa.	  While	  the	  roles	  of	   the	  GRU	  and	  of	  Ivashutin	   in	   this	   story	   are	   not	   yet	   fully	   clear,	   Uvarov	   was	   definitely	   the	   main	   man	  responsible	   for	   observing	   the	   developments	   in	   Luanda	   and	   reporting	   what	   he	   saw	  back	  to	  Moscow.	  	  Meanwhile,	   violence	   in	   the	   capital	   continued	   even	   after	   the	  Alvor	  Agreement	  entered	  into	  force.	  One	  problem	  was	  the	  agreement	  did	  not	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  troops	  the	   liberation	  movements	  were	   allowed	   to	  maintain	   outside	   the	   joint	  military	   force.	  Yet	   another	  was	   that	   the	   rival	   parties	  were	   allowed	   to	   keep	   their	   separate	   barracks	  and	  installations	  in	  the	  city.	  The	  MPLA,	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  UNITA	  thus	  continued	  to	  try	  and	  increase	  their	  troop	  strengths.616	  On	  25	  January	  the	  FNLA	  kidnapped	  and	  beat	  up	  the	  deputy	   director	   of	   a	   local	   radio	   station,	   who	   was	   believed	   to	   be	   an	   MPLA	  sympathizer. 617 	  Shooting	   resumed	   after	   the	   inauguration	   of	   the	   provisional	  government	   on	  31	   January,	   provoking	   a	   series	   of	   belligerent	   communiqués	   from	   the	  FNLA	  directed	  against	   the	  MPLA.618	  Holden	  Roberto	  refused	  to	  come	  back	   to	  Luanda,	  but	  Agostinho	  Neto	  was	  expected	  to	  arrive	  on	  4	  February,	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  1961	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  thousand	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  Agostinho	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  thousand,	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  Jonas	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  on	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  thousand.	  These	  numbers	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  exaggerated.	  	  617	  Killoran	   (U.S.	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  General,	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  uprising	  in	  the	  capital.	  The	  MPLA	  thus	  invited	  delegates	  from	  the	  socialist	  countries	  to	  participate	  in	  celebrations	  of	  the	  anniversary	  and	  of	  Neto’s	  arrival	  at	  the	  capital.	  Moscow	  instructed	  Alexander	  Dzasokhov	  and	  his	  colleague	  Sergey	  Vydrin	  to	  fly	  to	  Luanda	  with	  the	  task	  of	  “reconnecting	  with	  Neto”	  and	  assessing	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  capital.	   Dzasokhov	   recalls	   that	   when	   they	   landed	   in	   the	   city	   on	   4	   February,	   the	  situation	  was	   very	   tense.	   The	   two	  moved	   into	   a	   hotel	   only	   to	   find	   unknown	   people	  knocking	  on	   their	  hotel	  door	   in	   the	  middle	  of	   the	  night	  asking	   for	  political	   asylum,	  a	  move	  that	  Dzasokhov	  believed	  was	  a	  provocation.	  The	  next	  day	  they	  decided	  to	  move	  to	   a	   different	   hotel,	   and	   stayed	  under	   a	   cover	   story	   of	   being	   “experts	   in	   citrus	   fruit”	  until	   they	   were	   found	   by	   the	   MPLA	   and	   brought	   to	   Neto’s	   safe	   house,	   which	   was	  surrounded	  by	  armed	  guards.619	  The	  MPLA	  leadership	  were	  clear	  about	  their	  message	  to	   Dzasokhov:	   their	   movement	   enjoyed	   broad	   popular	   support	   and	   commanded	  around	  eight	  thousand	  supporters	  under	  arms,	  but	  there	  was	  an	  imminent	  danger	  that	  Zaire	  would	  seize	  power	  by	  force.620	  	  The	  MPLA	  had	  a	  similar	  message	  for	  Lucjan	  Wolniewicz,	  the	  Polish	  ambassador	  to	  Zaire,	  who	  also	  arrived	  in	  Luanda	  in	  February	  for	  the	  celebrations.	  Carlos	  Rocha,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  MPLA	  office	  in	  Luanda,	  told	  Wolniewicz	  that	  the	  MPLA	  did	  not	  expect	  such	  “strong	   attacks	   from	   international	   monopolies,	   such	   brutal	   attacks	   from	   the	   FNLA,	  inspired	   by	   the	   USA,	   France,	   Great	   Britain,	   Belgium,	   and	   Zaire.”	   The	   FNLA	   had	  smuggled	  well-­‐trained	  guerrilla	  units	  into	  Luanda	  who	  were	  terrorizing	  the	  population	  at	  night,	  and	  the	  FNLA	  wanted	  to	  start	  a	  civil	  war	  and	  would	  liquidate	  the	  MPLA	  if	  they	  did	  not	  respond,	  Rocha	  continued.	  Lopo	  de	  Nascimento	  and	  Agostinho	  Neto	  repeated	  the	   same	  message.	   Neto	   asked	   for	   transport	   and	   material	   assistance	   and	   requested	  that	  the	  socialist	  countries	  set	  up	  representative	  offices	  in	  the	  city.	  Wolniewicz,	  writing	  to	  Warsaw,	  advised	  the	  Polish	  government	  to	  satisfy	  Neto’s	  request	  for	  assistance.	  He	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   245	  also	  warned	  about	  the	  continuing	  violence	   in	  the	  city:	  “Although	  Luanda	  seems	  calm,	  one	  can	  feel	  tension,	  fear.	  Shooting	  at	  night	  is	  considered	  normal.”621	  	  The	  MPLA	   resorted	   to	   a	  more	   aggressive	   strategy	   to	   build	   up	   its	   presence	   in	  Luanda	   following	   Neto’s	   return	   on	   4	   February.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   leadership	   organized	  “popular	   power”	   and	   “neighborhood	   committees”	   consisting	   of	   its	   supporters	   in	   the	  suburbs	   of	   Luanda.	   Holden	   Roberto	   immediately	   attacked	   the	   committees	   as	  “embryonic	   Soviets”	   whose	   purpose	   was	   to	   establish	   the	   “dictatorship	   of	   the	  proletariat”,	   warning	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   civil	   war	   if	   the	   committees	   were	   not	  immediately	  disbanded.622	  On	  13	  February,	  the	  MPLA	  launched	  a	  military	  operation	  to	  dislodge	   Chipenda’s	   faction	   from	   Luanda.623	  General	   Antonio	   da	   Silva	   Cardoso,	   the	  newly	  appointed	  Portuguese	  High	  Commissioner	  in	  Luanda,	  speaking	  to	  Tom	  Killoran	  that	  same	  day,	  expressed	  his	  deep	  concern	  about	   the	  situation	   in	  Angola,	   saying	   that	  civil	  war	  would	  be	  inevitable	  if	  Daniel	  Chipenda	  joined	  the	  FNLA.	  Cardoso	  thus	  urged	  Killoran	   to	   seek	  US	  pressure	  on	  Mobutu	   to	  prevent	   such	  an	  alliance.624	  In	  March,	   the	  MPLA	   contingent	   undertook	   military	   training	   at	   Perevalnoye	   and	   the	   higher	   officer	  courses	  in	  Solnechnogorsk,	  near	  Moscow.625	  From	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  MPLA	  also	  received	  $100,000	  to	  transport	  weapons	  stockpiled	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  to	  Angola.626	  In	   March,	   the	   Solidarity	   Committees	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   Bulgaria,	  Czechoslovakia,	  the	  GDR,	  and	  Hungary	  assembled	  for	  one	  of	  their	  regular	  joint	  sessions	  in	   Berlin.	   The	   head	   of	   the	   Soviet	   delegation,	   Alexander	   Dzasokhov,	   informed	   his	  colleagues	   that	   the	  USSR	  would	  provide	  additional	   “special	  military	  assistance	   to	   the	  MPLA”	  given	  its	  extraordinary	  needs.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Polish	  committee,	  Kwiryn	  Grela,	  recommended	   that	   Poland	   also	   render	   aid	   because	   their	   colleagues	  were	   doing	   just	  that,	   because	   it	  would	  also	  be	  an	  expression	  of	   “proletarian	   internationalism”	  before	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   246	  the	   party	   congress,	   and	   because	   it	   would	   help	   “progressive	   and	   left-­‐wing	   forces	   in	  Portugal.”	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Polish	  International	  Department,	  Richard	  Frelek,	  agreed	  to	  allocate	  5	  million	  zloty	  in	  equipment,	  but	  the	  first	  shipment	  would	  not	  arrive	  until	  the	  next	  November.627	  The	  GDR	  became	   the	   largest	   provider	   of	   humanitarian	   assistance:	  between	   January	   and	   June,	   Berlin	   dispatched	   four	   ships	   containing	   food,	   medicines,	  medical	  equipment,	  textiles,	  and	  clothing.628	  	  In	   Luanda,	   the	   violence	   continued.	   One	   important	   episode	   took	   place	   in	   late	  March,	   when	   the	   MPLA	   and	   FNLA	   confronted	   each	   other	   with	   mortars	   and	   rocket-­‐propelled	   grenades,	   leaving	   over	   two	   hundred	   dead.	   Reports	   also	   emerged	   that	   the	  FNLA	  had	  been	  ordered	  to	  attack	  the	  MPLA	  throughout	  the	  city,	  and	  that	  the	  FNLA	  had	  massacred	  MPLA	  soldiers	  and	  civilians.629	  The	  situation	  remained	  relatively	  quiet	  for	  a	  month,	   but	   urban	   fighting	   erupted	   again	   on	  28	  April	  when	   the	  MPLA	  units	   allegedly	  attacked	  the	  FNLA	  headquarters.	  The	  next	  day	  the	  Yugoslav	  freighter	  Postoyna	  docked	  at	  Luanda	  port,	  carrying	  weapons	  and	  supplies	  for	  the	  MPLA.630	  Tom	  Killoran	  reported	  to	  Washington	  that	  the	  fighting	  was	  part	  of	  an	  attempted	  coup	  planned	  by	  the	  MPLA	  to	  coincide	   with	   the	   Labor	   Day	   celebrations:	   the	   MPLA	   allegedly	   planned	   to	   instigate	  ethnic	   violence,	   which	  would	   lead	   to	   a	   “bloodbath”	   during	   the	  May	   Day	   parade	   and	  would	  give	   a	  pretext	   for	   a	   takeover	  of	  power	   from	   the	  Portuguese.	  He	   also	   reported	  that	  Neto	  had	  allegedly	  asked	  Savimbi	  to	  join	  in	  on	  the	  plot,	  but	  the	  latter	  had	  refused.	  Killoran	  believed	  that	   the	  MPLA	  had	  gone	  ahead	  with	  certain	  parts	  of	   the	  plan:	   there	  was	   a	   new	  white–black	   element	   to	   the	   violence	   and	  weapons	   had	   arrived	   alongside	  “Russian	  and	  Bloc	  personnel,	  perhaps	  to	  direct	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  coup.”631There	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  Killoran’s	  source	  was	  indeed	  accurate.	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   247	  There	  were	  indeed	  Soviet	  citizens	  in	  Luanda	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  March,	  Navy	  captain	  Aleksey	  Dubenko	  visited	  Luanda	  and	  stayed	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  months.632	  The	  aim	  of	  his	  visit	   is	   unclear:	   he	  was	   clearly	   there	   to	   survey	   the	  military	   situation,	   but	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	   that	   he	  was	   helping	   the	  MPLA	   to	   direct	   the	   coup.	  As	  May	  Day	   approached,	  another	  high-­‐level	  delegation	  –	  Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  Eduard	  Kapskiy,	  and	  Gennadiy	  Yanaev	  –	   flew	   to	   Angola	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   celebrations.	   All	   three	  were	   highly	   important.	  Yevsyukov,	   the	  main	  expert	  on	  Portuguese	  colonies	   in	   the	   International	  Department,	  had	   been	  well	   acquainted	  with	   the	  MPLA	   leadership	   since	   the	   early	   1960s.	   Kapskiy	  was	  an	  Africa	  expert;	  he	  would	  later	  supersede	  Evsyukov	  as	  the	  main	  authority	  on	  the	  former	   Portuguese	   colonies	   in	   the	   International	   Department.	   As	   the	   head	   of	   the	  Committee	  for	  Youth	  Organizations,	  Yanaev	  was	  responsible	  for	  developing	  links	  with	  the	  international	  youth	  movement.	  These	  men's	  experiences	  in	  Luanda	  would	  become	  crucial	  in	  determining	  Soviet	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  developing	  crisis	  in	  Angola.	  	  Yevsyukov,	  Kapskiy,	  and	  Yanaev	   flew	  to	  Luanda	  shortly	  before	   the	  Labor	  Day	  parade	  scheduled	   for	   the	  First	  of	  May.	  On	  their	  approach	  to	   the	  airport,	   they	  already	  realized	   there	   was	   heavy	   fighting	   in	   the	   city:	   looking	   down	   from	   the	   airplane,	   they	  could	  not	  see	  the	   landing	  strip	  because	  of	  smoke	  and	  could	  hear	  short	  bursts	  of	  sub-­‐machine	   gunfire	   from	   all	   directions.633	  From	   conversations	  with	   Agostinho	  Neto,	   the	  delegation	  learned	  that	  the	  MPLA	  had	  tried	  but	  failed	  to	  establish	  contacts	  with	  UNITA,	  and,	  given	   the	  recurrent	  provocation	   from	  the	  FNLA,	  armed	  action	  was	   the	  only	  way	  out.634	  On	   their	   return	   to	   Moscow,	   Kapskiy,	   Yanaev,	   and	   Yevsyukov	   concluded	   that	  armed	   conflict	   loomed	   inevitably,	   especially	   after	   the	   departure	   of	   the	   Portuguese	  army,	  and	  recommended	  appealing	  to	  the	  African	  leaders	  to	  broaden	  their	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA.635	  	  Their	  predictions	  proved	  correct.	   In	  May,	  violence	  between	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  FNLA	   spread	   from	   the	   capital	   to	   the	   interior	   of	  Angola.	   The	  FNLA	   cleared	   the	  MPLA	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  Shubin,	  Hot	  Cold	  War,	  p.	  40.	  The	  record	  of	  this	  trip	  is	  not	  unavailable.	  633	  Ibid.,	  p.	  41.	  634	  Ibid.,	  p.	  42.	  635	  Quoted	  in	  ibid.,	  p.	  43.	  Arne	  Westad	  provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  Soviet	  embassy	  in	  Brazzaville	  as	  of	  mid-­‐April	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  an	  all-­‐out	  civil	  war	  would	  break	  out	  in	  Angola	  before	  independence.	  The	  violence	  that	  Evsyukov,	  Kapskiy	  and	  Yanaev	  experienced	  in	  Luanda	  must	  have	  altered	  their	  perspective.	  See	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War.	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  from	   northern	   Zaire	   and	   Uíge,	   a	   large	   coffee-­‐producing	   province	   bordering	   Zaire.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   MPLA	   received	   a	   first	   shipment	   of	   Soviet	   weapons,	   including	   small	  arms,	  82mm	  mortars,	  and	  some	  portable	  rocket	  launchers	  known	  as	  GRAD-­‐P.636	  Thus	  armed,	   they	   retaliated	   against	   the	   FNLA	   in	   Cuanza	   Norte,	   a	   district	   about	   hundred	  miles	  northeast	   of	   Luanda.	   In	   June	   the	  FNLA	   took	  over	  Carmona,	   the	   capital	   of	  Uíge.	  Heavy	   fighting	   was	   concentrated	   around	   the	   town	   of	   Caxito,	   an	   important	   strategic	  location	  to	  the	  north	  of	  Luanda.637	  	  On	  5	  June,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Africa	  Section	  at	  the	  International	  Department,	  Petr	  Manchkha,	   participated	   in	   a	   closed-­‐door	   session	   of	   the	   presidium	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Solidarity	   Committee.	   His	   evaluation	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola	   was	   highly	   critical:	  “Undeniably,	   there	   will	   be	   bloodshed,”	   said	  Manchkha.	   “In	   this	   circle,	   I	   can	   say	   that	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  of	  a	  Zairian	  scenario,	  when	  all	  ours	  [our	  friends]	  will	  be	  beaten,”	  he	   stated.638	  Then	   he	   explained	   that	   what	   was	   going	   on	   in	   Angola	   was	   a	   “serious	  international	   imperialist	   conspiracy.”	   Having	   suffered	   a	   series	   of	   defeats	   in	   Asia,	  Manchkha	  continued,	  the	  “imperialist	  circles”	  had	  decided	  to	  strike	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   in	  Africa.639	  What	  he	  meant	  by	   this	  was	   that	   the	   final	   loss	  of	  South	  Vietnam	  to	  the	  North	  Vietnamese	  forces	  with	  the	  occupation	  of	  Saigon,	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  Cambodia	  to	  the	   Chinese-­‐backed	   “Khmer	   Rouge”	   in	   April,	  were	   considered	   serious	   defeats	   for	   US	  interests	  in	  the	  region	  and	  to	  US	  global	  prestige.	  Manchkha	  continued:	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	   invested	   “enormous	  material	   resources”	   into	   the	   MPLA,	   and	   it	   would	   be	   bad	   if	  those	  resources	  were	  lost	  in	  vain,	  but	  it	  was	  important	  in	  a	  different	  sense	  too.	  “Forces	  of	  socialism	  and	  capitalism	  are	  concentrated	  there	  now,”	  he	  argued.	  Thus,	  he	  urged	  the	  committee	  to	  harness	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA	  through	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	   People’s	   Solidarity	   Organization	   (AAPSO)	   and	   the	   OAU.	   This	   was	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  Shubin,	   Hot	   Cold	  War,	   p.	   44.	   The	   portable	   rocket	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   known	   as	   „Grad-­‐P”	   were	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   heavily	   to	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  Vietnam.	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  Porter	   (U.S.	   Embassy,	   Luanda)	   to	   Washington,	   30	   May	   1975,	   "Major	   Fighting	   Breaks	   in	   the	   Interior	   of	   Angola",	  Wikileaks;	  Porter	  (U.S.	  Embassy,	  Luanda)	  to	  Washington,	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  "MPLA	  May	  have	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  its	  Offensive,"	  Wikileaks.	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  Transcript	  of	  the	  SCSCAA	  Presidum	  Meeting,	  5	  June	  1975,	  GARF,	  f.	  9540,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  387,	  pp.	  24-­‐25.	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  Ibid.,	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  particularly	   important	   because	   the	  MPLA	   had	   been	   “somewhat	   unfairly”	   branded	   as	  pro-­‐communist	  and	  pro-­‐Soviet,	  which	  harmed	  its	  image,	  Manchkha	  argued.640	  	  By	  June,	   the	  Soviets	  believed	  that	  Angola	  had	  become	  a	  Cold	  War	  conflict	  and	  initiated	   their	   response.	   The	   note	   of	   21	   June	   delivered	   from	   Moscow	   to	   the	   PUPW	  Politburo	  read:	  	  The	  reactionary	  FNLA	  led	  by	  Holden	  Roberto	  acting	  with	  support	  from	  the	  Zairian	  President	   Mobutu,	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   China	   are	   striving	   to	   seize	   power	   by	  force…	   The	   MPLA	   has	   already	   received	   part	   of	   the	   Soviet	   weaponry	   and	   other	  assistance	   via	   the	  People's	  Republic	   of	   Congo	   [Congo-­‐Brazzaville].	   In	   the	   nearest	  future,	   it	   will	   receive	   larger	   quantities	   of	   weapons	   and	   means	   of	   transport.	  The	  Soviet	   government	   has	   turned	   to	   leaders	   of	   several	   African	   countries	   with	   the	  words	   of	   concern	   about	   the	   situation	   in	   Angola	   and	   has	   appealed	   for	   them	   to	  investigate	  whether	  they	  could	  offer	  the	  MPLA	  political	  and	  other	  assistance.641	  	  Soviet	  views	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Angolan	  conflict	  changed	  quite	  dramatically	  between	  January	  and	  June	  1975.	  While	  there	  were	  concerns	  about	  the	  strength	  of	   the	  FNLA	  relative	   to	   the	  MPLA,	  by	   June	   the	   International	  Department	  believed	  there	  was	  an	  international	  conspiracy	  directed	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  that	   bloodshed	  was	   very	   likely.	   The	  main	   source	   of	   information	  must	   have	   been	   the	  MPLA:	   during	   the	   few	   fact-­‐finding	   missions,	   the	   MPLA	   leadership	   continually	  emphasized	   the	   threat	   of	   imminent	   danger	   from	   the	   Zaire-­‐backed	   FNLA,	   from	   the	  United	   States,	   and	   from	   “reactionary	   forces”	   of	   all	   kinds.	  What	   the	  MPLA	   leadership	  claimed	  was	  happening	  in	  Angola	  fit	  with	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   Cold	  War.	   It	   also	  matched	   their	   personal	   experiences	   in	   Luanda.	   The	   Congolese	  crisis	   and	   the	   “Zairian	   scenario”	   provided	   useful	   reference	   points.	   The	   trip	   that	   Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  Eduard	  Kapskiy,	  and	  Gennadiy	  Yanaev	  undertook	  to	  Luanda	  in	  April	  1975	  seems	   to	   have	   been	   crucial	   in	   confirming	   Soviet	   fears	   that	   the	   MPLA	   was	   being	  aggressively	  pushed	  out	  of	  Luanda	  by	  the	  FNLA,	  judging	  by	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  that	  all	  three	  witnessed	  during	  their	  stay.	  It	  was	  after	  this	  trip	  that	  the	  Soviets	  started	  shipping	  their	  first	  weapons	  to	  the	  MPLA,	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  there	  was	  a	  serious	  international	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  26.	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  "Informacja	   o	   Sytuacji	   w	   Angoli	   Przekazana	   Czlonkowi	   Biura	   Politycznego,	   Sekretarzowi	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   -­‐	   Janowi	   Szydlakowi	  przez	  Ambasadora	  ZSRR	  -­‐	  St.	  Pilotowicza,"	  21	  June	  1975,	  AAN,	  PZPR,	  LXXVI.679.	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  conspiracy	   in	   Angola.	   However,	   any	   serious	   US	   aid	   to	   the	   FNLA/UNITA,	   the	  “conspiracy”	  that	  Petr	  Manchkha	  spoke	  about	  in	  June,	  would	  not	  materialize	  until	  July.	  	  
Washington	  and	  Pretoria	  Intervene	  in	  Angola,	  June–September	  1975	  An	   embattled	   Henry	   Kissinger	   finally	   turned	   his	   attention	   to	   Angola	   in	   June.	  Embittered	  by	  what	  he	   saw	  as	  American	  defeats	   in	  Cambodia	   and	  Vietnam,	   a	   strong	  American	   response	   to	   what	   Kissinger	   believed	   was	   an	   imminent	   Soviet	   takeover	   in	  Angola	  was	  his	  way	  of	  showing	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  not	  been	  defeated	  in	  the	  face	  of	   the	   communist	  victories.	  Kissinger	  was	  never	  particularly	   interested	   in	  Africa,	  but	  Mobutu	   was	   an	   important	   ally	   in	   the	   region	   and	   had	   been	   pushing	   Kissinger	   to	  increase	   support	   for	   Holden	   Roberto	   since	   August	   1974.642	  On	   22	   January,	   the	   40	  Committee,	   which	   was	   responsible	   for	   discussing	   and	   approving	   major	   covert	  operations	   in	   the	   US,	   approved	   $300,000	   for	   Holden	   Roberto.643	  Zambian	   president	  Kenneth	   Kaunda	   pushed	   Kissinger	   to	   intervene,	   but	   on	   the	   side	   of	   Jonas	   Savimbi,	  whom	  Kaunda	   had	   come	   to	   believe	  was	   the	   best	   compromise	   leader.644	  The	   Chinese	  also	   exerted	   indirect	   pressure:	   in	   May,	   Kissinger	   had	   spoken	   to	   Huang	   Chen,	   the	  Chinese	   liaison	   chief	   in	  Washington.	   Chen	   had	   told	   Kissinger	   that	   détente	   had	   given	  Moscow	  a	  chance	  to	  pursue	  expansionist	  policies	  in	  Africa.645	  However,	  Kissinger	  faced	  opposition	   from	   the	   State	  Department	   and	   especially	   the	  African	  Bureau.646	  Even	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  40	  Committee	  –	  Under-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  Joseph	  Sisco	  and	  Director	  of	  Bureau	   of	   Intelligence	   and	   Research	   William	   Hyland	   –	   questioned	   whether	   Angola	  mattered	   enough	   to	   justify	   direct	   intervention.	   Kissinger,	   however,	   was	   determined	  that	   the	   US	   could	   not	   let	   the	   “Communists	   win.”647	  Then	   Mobutu	   stepped	   up	   the	  pressure.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  642	  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  99.	  643	  Ibid.,	  Document	  102.	  644	  Ibid.,	  Document	  103.	  645 	  Jussi	   M.	   Hanhimäki,	   The	   Flawed	   Architect:	   Henry	   Kissinger	   and	   American	   Foreign	   Policy	   	   (New	   York:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  pp.	  408-­‐409.	  646	  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  106.	  647	  Ibid.	  
	   251	  On	   15	   June,	   the	   Zairian	   daily	   Elima	  published	   an	   article	   accusing	   the	   United	  States	  of	  a	   failed	  coup	  against	  President	  Mobutu.	  Shortly	  afterwards,	  US	  Ambassador	  Deane	   Hinton	   was	   declared	   persona	   non	   grata	   and	   ordered	   to	   leave	   the	   country.	  Kissinger	  was	  deeply	  concerned	  that	  this	  could	  mean	  a	  break	  with	  the	  most	  important	  US	  ally	  in	  the	  region	  and	  immediately	  dispatched	  Sheldon	  Vance,	  a	  former	  ambassador	  to	  Zaire	  known	  for	  his	  close	  relations	  with	  Mobutu,	   to	  Kinshasa	  to	  mend	  fences.648	  In	  Kinshasa	  on	  23	  June,	  Mobutu	  told	  Vance	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Yugoslavia	  had	  been	  “pouring	  in”	  arms	  and	  money	  to	  Neto	  through	  Brazzaville	  and	  that	  Zaire	  was	  running	  low	   on	   arms	   and	   money	   for	   Holden	   Roberto.	   Like	   Kenneth	   Kaunda,	   Mobutu	   also	  believed	  that	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  was	  the	  man	  most	  suitable	  to	  become	  president.649Back	  in	  Washington	   on	   27	   June,	   Vance	   impressed	   upon	   Kissinger	   his	   view	   that	   Mobutu	  expected	   substantially	  more	  money	   and	   also	   arms	   for	  Roberto	   and	  Savimbi.650At	   the	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  later	  that	  day,	  Kissinger	  tried	  to	  convince	  his	  colleagues	   that	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   supply	   arms	   to	   Roberto	   and	   Savimbi.	   Control	   of	  Luanda	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  great	  urgency,	  because	   if	   the	  MPLA	  managed	   to	   take	   it	  over,	  then	  they	  could	  gradually	  obtain	  international	  recognition.	  “In	  the	  Congo	  civil	  war,	  the	  reason	  we	  came	  out	  on	   top	   is	  because	  we	  never	   lost	  Léopoldville,”	   argued	  Kissinger.	  Yet	   again	   he	   faced	   objections	   from	   his	   colleagues,	   from	   CIA	   director	  William	   Colby,	  who	  was	  afraid	  of	  the	  CIA	  being	  criticized	  by	  Congress	  over	  arms	  transfers,	  and	  from	  Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Arthur	   Schlesinger,	   who	   questioned	   whether	   Roberto	   was	  effective	  as	  a	  military	  leader.	  However,	  Gerald	  Ford	  supported	  Kissinger:	  “It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  doing	  nothing	  is	  unacceptable,”	  concluded	  the	  president.651	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   MPLA	   was	   pushing	   the	   FNLA	   out	   of	   Luanda.	   In	   a	   three-­‐day	  battle,	   MPLA	   detachments	   took	   control	   of	   the	   roads	   leading	   into	   the	   city	   and	   then	  attacked	   the	   FNLA	   barracks	   and	   headquarters	   in	   the	   city	   center. 652 	  At	   the	   40	  Committee	  meeting	  on	  14	  July,	  Colby	  confirmed:	  “Neto	  was	  on	  the	  offensive.”	  Yet	  again	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  On	  American	   relationship	  with	  Mobutu	   see	   Götz	   Bechtolsheimer,	  Breakfast	  with	  Mobutu:	  Congo,	   the	  United	  States	  
and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1964-­‐1981	  	  (PhD	  dissertation:	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  2012).	  649	  Vance	  to	  Washington,	  "Breakfast	  with	  Mobutu,"	  23	  June	  1975,	  WikiLeaks.	  650	  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  112.	  651	  Ibid.,	  Document	  113.	  652	  Killoran	  to	  Washington,	  11	  July	  1975,	  "MPLA	  Moves	  to	  Throw	  FNLA	  out	  of	  Luanda",	  Wikileaks.	  
	   252	  his	   colleagues	   voiced	   their	   objections	   to	   sending	   arms,	   and	   yet	   again	   Kissinger	  dismissed	   them:	   “If	   all	   the	   surrounding	   areas	   see	   Angola	   go	   Communist,	   they	   will	  assume	   that	   the	   US	   has	   no	   will.	   Coming	   on	   top	   of	   Vietnam	   and	   Indochina	   their	  perception	  of	  what	  the	  US	  can	  and	  will	  do	  will	  be	  negative.”653	  Kissinger	  did	  not	  have	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	   the	  region.	  He	  saw	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   and	  believed	   it	  was	  his	  duty	   to	   show	   that	   the	  US	  was	  willing	   to	   act	   against	   the	  Soviets.654	  On	   18	   July,	   President	   Ford	   approved	   a	   covert	   operation	   in	   Angola,	   along	  with	  $6	  million	   to	  cover	  expenses.	   “I	   think	  we	  can	  defend	   it	   to	   the	  public.	   I	  won’t	   let	  someone	   in	   Foggy	   Bottom	   deter	   me,”	   commented	   Ford	   to	   Kissinger	   and	   Brent	  Scowcroft.	  “Now,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  think	  we	  are	  pushing	  détente,	  they	  [the	  Soviets]	  will	  keep	  their	  heads	  down,”	  responded	  Kissinger	  to	  the	  President.655	  The	  covert	  operation,	  codenamed	  IAFEATURE,	  surged	  ahead.	  	  Helping	   Zaire	   to	   defeat	   the	   MPLA	   constituted	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   the	   plan.	  Following	   presidential	   approval,	   Sheldon	   Vance	   flew	   to	   Kinshasa	   to	   work	   out	   the	  details	  with	  the	  Zairians.	  Mobutu	  told	  him	  he	  urgently	  needed	  5,000	  M-­‐16	  assault	  rifles	  with	   two	   months'	   ammunition	   and	   anti-­‐tank	   guns	   to	   counter	   the	   Soviet-­‐supplied	  armored	  vehicles.	  Vance	  believed	  that	  more	  money	  was	  needed	  to	  make	  a	  “real	  impact	  in	   Angola.”	   Kissinger	   himself	   believed	   as	   much.656	  On	   27	   July,	   Ford	   approved	   an	  additional	   $8	   million	   for	   the	   operation.657	  Zaire	   would	   release	   weapons	   to	   Holden	  Roberto,	  while	   the	  CIA	  would	  resupply	   the	  Zairian	  armed	   forces.	  Kissinger	  urged	   the	  CIA	  to	  act	  fast	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  weapons	  to	  Angola	  immediately.658	  Colby	  obliged:	  the	  CIA	  arranged	  the	  transport	  of	  weapons	  from	  the	  CIA	  warehouse	  in	  San	  Antonio,	  Texas	  to	  Charleston,	  South	  Carolina.	  From	  there,	  US	  Air	  Force	  C-­‐141	  Starlifters	  would	  fly	  the	  weapons	  to	  Kinshasa.659	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  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  115.	  654	  Ibid.,	  p.	  117.	  On	  Kissinger’s	  motivation	  also	  see:	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies,	  p.	  43.	  655	  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Document	  118.	  “Foggy	  Bottom”	  is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  metonym	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  because	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  neighborhood	  in	  Washington,	  where	  its	  headquarters	  are	  located.	  On	  Kissinger’s	  policy	  in	  the	  third	  world,	  see	  Hanhimäki,	  Flawed	  Architect.	  656	  Burton,	  ed.,	  FRUS,	  1969-­‐1976	  -­‐	  Southern	  Africa,	  	  Documents	  120-­‐121.	  	  657	  Ibid.,	  Document	  122.	  658	  Ibid.,	  Document	  121.	  659	  Stockwell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Enemies,	  p.	  58.	  
	   253	  At	  around	   the	   same	   time,	   South	  Africa	  escalated	   its	   aid	  program	   to	   the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA.	  The	  general	  outline	  of	  South	  African	  involvement	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA	  is	  well	  known.	  In	  early	  1975,	  officers	  from	  the	  South	  African	  Defense	  Force	  (SADF)	   established	   first	   contacts	   with	   Holden	   Roberto,	   Jonas	   Savimbi,	   and	   Daniel	  Chipenda,	   who	   promised	   they	   would	   not	   support	   the	   South	   West	   African	   People’s	  Organization	   (SWAPO),	   the	   national	   liberation	   movement	   for	   the	   independence	   of	  Namibia.	   On	   14	   July,	   Prime	   Minister	   John	   Vorster	   approved	   an	   assistance	   package	  including	  weapons,	  supplies,	  and	  equipment	  for	  Savimbi	  and	  Roberto	  worth	  20	  million	  rand.	   In	   early	   August,	   the	   SADF	   seized	   control	   of	   Calueque	   Dam	   and	   the	   Ruacana	  hydroelectric	   installations	   across	   the	   Angola–Namibia	   border,	   supposedly	   to	   protect	  the	   contract	   workers	   who	   had	   complained	   of	   harassment	   by	   UNITA.	   In	   early	  September,	   the	   SADF	   started	   training	   Daniel	   Chipenda’s	   branch	   of	   the	   FNLA	   and	  UNITA.	  	  It	   is	   less	   clear	   who	   was	   driving	   involvement	   from	   inside	   the	   Vorster	  government	  and	  how	  much	  coordination	  existed	  between	  Pretoria	  and	  Washington.	  So	  far,	   the	  broad	  agreement	  has	  been	   that	   the	   impetus	   for	  Pretoria’s	   involvement	   came	  from	  Washington.660	  Recently,	  Jamie	  Miller	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  South	  African	  decision	  to	  intervene	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  SADF,	  P.	   W.	   Botha,	   who	   pushed	   the	   escalation	   of	   involvement.	   Botha	   was	   particularly	  concerned	  that	  Angola	  under	  the	  MPLA	  would	  become	  a	  safe	  haven	  for	  SWAPO,	  a	  belief	  that	   fit	   his	   vision	   of	   a	   communist-­‐inspired	   “total	   onslaught.”	   It	   was	   Botha	   who	  convinced	   Vorster	   to	   provide	   arms	   and	   training	   for	   the	   FNLA	   and	   UNITA	   and	   who	  ordered	   the	   SADF	   to	   seize	   the	   border	   sites	   in	   early	   July,	   behind	   the	   backs	   of	   his	  colleagues,	   Secretary	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Brand	  Fourie	  and	   the	  head	  of	   the	  Bureau	  of	  State	  Security	  (BOSS),	  Hendrik	  van	  den	  Bergh.661	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  Hermann	   Giliomee	   has	   argued	   that	   Vorster	   was	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   to	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   Ford	   and	   Kissinger	   in	   fighting	  Communism	   in	   Southern	   Africa.	   Hermann	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   Afrikaner	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   a	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   in	   Southern	   African	   History	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   VA:	   University	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   Press,	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   Also	   see	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions;	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  Global	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  661	  Jamie	  Miller,	  "Yes,	  Minister:	  Reassessing	  South	  Africa’s	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War,	  1975–1976,"	  Journal	  of	  
Cold	  War	  Studies,	  15	  3	  (Summer	  2013).	  
	   254	  Kissinger	  saw	  the	  Angolan	  conflict	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  Cold	  War:	  he	  believed	   that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  behind	  the	  MPLA,	  and	  he	  was	  determined	  to	  counter	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  Soviet	   influence	   in	   southern	  Africa.	  Mobutu	   consistently	   pushed	   for	  US	   involvement,	  because	  Angola	  was	   crucial	   to	  his	   security	  and	  economic	   interests	   in	   the	   region,	   and	  for	   that	   reason	   he	   portrayed	   the	  MPLA	   as	   pro-­‐Soviet	   and	   exaggerated	   the	   extent	   of	  Soviet	  aid	   to	   the	  MPLA.	   It	   seems	  that	  not	  only	  Kissinger	  but	  also	  his	  colleagues,	  with	  the	   exception	   of	   the	   African	   Bureau,	   bought	   into	   that	   paradigm,	   although	   they	  questioned	  whether	  Angola	  was	   important	  enough	   to	  risk	   the	  money,	   resources,	  and	  criticism	   from	   Congress	   and	   the	   public.	   For	   Kissinger,	   Angola	   assumed	   such	  importance	  because	  the	  perception	  of	  American	  strength	  was	  crucial	   to	  his	  notion	  of	  détente.	  Kissinger	  believed	  that	  the	  US	  should	  only	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  important	  matters	  from	  a	  position	  of	  strength	  or	  leverage.	  This	  desire	  for	  leverage	  lay	  at	   the	   foundation	   of	   American	   rapprochement	   with	   China,	   the	   centerpiece	   of	  Kissinger’s	   triangular	   diplomacy.	   However,	   Kissinger	   did	   not	   think	   that	   he	   had	   any	  leverage	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Angola,	  and	  thus	  he	  feared	  that	  the	  “diplomatic	  option”	  favored	  by	  the	  State	  Department	  could	  have	  exposed	  American	  weakness	  to	  the	  world.	  In	  view	  of	   the	   recent	   defeats	   in	   Vietnam	   and	   Cambodia,	   he	   could	   not	   afford	   this.	   He	   also	  believed	  that	  détente	  would	  act	  as	  a	  constraining	  influence	  on	  Soviet	  actions	  in	  Angola.	  In	  a	  way,	  he	  proved	  to	  be	  right.	  	  
Moscow	  between	  Havana	  and	  Luanda,	  August–October	  1975	  	  In	   July	   and	   August,	   the	   MPLA	   continued	   campaigning	   for	   additional	   military	  aid.	   Speaking	   to	   the	   Soviet	   ambassador	   to	   Congo-­‐Brazzaville,	   Yevgeniy	   Afanasenko,	  Neto	   said	   that	   the	  MPLA	  was	  no	  weaker	   than	   the	  FNLA	   in	  military	   terms,	  but	   that	   it	  still	  needed	  to	  build	  up	  its	  forces,	  and	  thus	  passed	  on	  a	  request	  for	  additional	  military	  and	   financial	   aid.662	  The	  MPLA	  also	   reiterated	   its	   request	   for	  assistance	   to	   the	  Cuban	  leadership.663	  This	   is	  when	   the	   Cubans	   became	   involved	   in	   Angola.	   On	   3	   August,	   the	  head	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Décima	  Dirección	  (Tenth	  Directorate),	  Diaz	  Argüelles,	  led	  a	  mission	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  662	  Westad,	  "Short	  Moscow	  and	  the	  Angolan	  Crisis,	  1974-­‐1976:	  A	  New	  Pattern	  of	  Intervention,"	  p.	  33.	  663	  For	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  for	  the	  delay,	  see	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  pp.	  246-­‐250.	  
	   255	  to	   investigate	  what	   assistance	   the	  MPLA	   required.	  Neto	  wanted	   instructors,	   but	   also	  weapons,	  clothing,	  and	  food	  for	  recruits,	  and	  Argüelles	  drafted	  a	  proposal	  along	  these	  lines.	  “In	  general,	  he	  [Neto]	  wants	  to	  make	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola	  a	  vital	  issue	  between	  the	   systems	   of	   Imperialism	   and	   Socialism	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   aid	   from	   the	   whole	  Socialist	  Camp,”	  Argüelles	  reported	  to	  Cuban	   leader	  Fidel	  Castro	  on	  11	  August,	  when	  he	  was	  back	  in	  Havana.664	  	  Castro	   took	  a	  personal	   interest	   in	  Angola.	   In	  mid-­‐August,	   therefore,	   following	  up	  on	  Neto’s	  request	  and	  recommendations	  from	  Diaz	  Argüelles,	  Castro	  decided	  on	  a	  large	  Cuban	  mission	  in	  Angola.	  His	  proposal	  was	  to	  send	  480	  Cuban	  instructors,	  who	  would	   create	   four	   training	   centers,	   all	   supplied	   with	   enough	   arms,	   food,	   clothing,	  medicines,	   and	   other	   necessary	   supplies	   for	   six	   months.665	  Moreover,	   on	   15	   August,	  Castro	  sent	  a	   letter	   to	  Leonid	  Brezhnev	   informing	  him	  of	   the	  Cuban	  decision	   to	  send	  instructors	  to	  Angola.	  Castro	  asked	  Brezhnev	  for	  Soviet	  assistance	  with	  transportation	  and	   for	   Soviet	   staff	   officers	   to	   be	   based	   both	   in	   Havana	   and	   Luanda	   to	   help	   with	  military	  planning.666	  Back	   in	  Luanda	  on	  21	  August,	  Diaz	  Argüelles,	  who	  was	  now	   the	  head	   of	   the	   Cuban	  military	  mission	   in	   Angola,	   informed	  Neto	   of	   the	   Cuban	   decision.	  “Comrade	  Neto	  accepted	  our	  offer	  with	  great	  emotion.	  He	  was	  moved,”	  he	  recalled.667	  Meanwhile,	   an	   MPLA	   delegation	   led	   by	   Henrique	   Carreira,	   Pedro	   Van	   Dunem,	   and	  Fernando	   Costa	   had	   set	   out	   on	   a	   major	   tour	   of	   Berlin,	   Moscow,	  Warsaw,	   Sofia,	   and	  Budapest	  to	  harness	  additional	  assistance	  for	  the	  war	  effort.668	  	  The	  tone	  of	  the	  MPLA	  delegation	  was	  upbeat.	  Vladimir	  Shubin,	  who	  took	  part	  in	  discussions	  with	  Henrique	  Carreira	  and	  Pedro	  van	  Dunem	  in	  Moscow,	  writes	  that	  the	  two	  men	  were	  quite	  optimistic:	  FAPLA	  had	  successfully	  managed	  to	  counter	  Roberto’s	  advances	  on	  Luanda	  in	  July,	  and	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  clear	  the	  coastal	  areas	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  664	  From	  Diaz	   Arguelles	   to	  Minister	   of	   the	   Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces	   ,	   11	   August	   1975,	   National	   Security	   Archive	  Website.	  665	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  256.	  666	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War,	  p.	  232.	  Nazhestkin	  confirms	  that	  Castro	  sent	  such	  a	  letter.	  He	  writes	  that	  Castro	  informed	  him	   about	   the	   decision	   to	   send	   Cuban	   instructors	   and	   asked	   for	   coordination	  with	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	   Nazhestkin,	   "V	  Ognennom	  Koltse	  Blokady,"	  pp.	  245-­‐246.	  667	  Quote	  in	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  259.	  668	  The	  MPLA	  mission	  was	  already	  in	  Moscow	  on	  19	  August.	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  northern	  provinces	  with	  extra	  material	  assistance.669	  When	  Iko	  Carreira	  and	  Pedro	  van	  Dunem	  came	  to	  Warsaw,	  they	  likewise	  spoke	  about	  their	  military	  victories,	  informing	  their	  Polish	  interlocutors	  that	  the	  MPLA	  was	  in	  control	  of	  all	  the	  main	  strategic	  points,	  including	   Luanda,	   the	   ports	   of	   Lobito	   and	   Mocamedes,	   the	   Benguela	   railway,	   the	  diamond-­‐rich	  Lunda	  province,	  and	  the	  oil-­‐rich	  Cabinda	  enclave.	  At	  15,000	  men,	  FAPLA	  was	   in	  possession	  of	  a	  number	  of	  naval	  units	  and	   four	  planes.	  The	  USSR	  had	  already	  armed	   one	   troop	   brigade	   and	   several	   battalions,	   while	   Algeria	   and	   Yugoslavia	   had	  armed	   several	   battalions.	   Recently,	   the	   USSR	   had	   also	   delivered	   combat	  reconnaissance	   patrol	   vehicles	   with	  machine	   guns;	   Algeria	   had	   delivered	   six	   trucks,	  according	   to	   Pedro	   van	  Dunem.	   The	  MPLA	  would	   still	   need	   a	   forty-­‐thousand-­‐strong,	  well-­‐trained	   and	   equipped	   army	   (including	   militia)	   in	   order	   to	   decisively	   turn	   the	  military	   situation	   in	   their	   favor.	   Thus	   they	   asked	   the	   Polish	   leadership	   to	   provide	  automatic	  firearms,	  means	  for	  coastal	  transportation,	  military	  training,	  and	  university	  scholarships.	   The	   USSR	   and	   the	   GDR	   had	   already	   agreed	   to	   provide	   further	  military	  and	  civilian	  aid,	  and	  more	  was	  expected	  from	  Hungary,	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  Bulgaria,	  they	  explained.670	  	  The	  MPLA’s	   expectation	   proved	   correct.	   On	   3	   September,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   CC	  BCP	  International	  Department,	  Radenko	  Grigorov,	  submitted	  a	  draft	  resolution	  to	  the	  Politburo	  of	  the	  Bulgarian	  Communist	  Party,	  proposing	  that	  Bulgaria	  hand	  over	  a	  one-­‐off	   cash	   payment	   of	   $50,000	   to	   the	   MPLA	   and	   allocate	   1,243,882	   leva	   worth	   of	  weapons	  and	  supplies	  for	  it.671Humanitarian	  aid	  would	  be	  shipped	  directly	  to	  Luanda,	  while	  weapons	  would	   be	   flown	   first	   to	   Brazzaville	   and	   from	   there	   be	   transferred	   to	  Angola.672The	   Polish	   leadership	   allocated	   trucks,	   motorcycles,	   uniforms,	   means	   of	  communication,	   and	   medicines,	   which	   were	   to	   arrive	   at	   Pointe	   Noire	   by	   mid-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  669	  Shubin,	  Hot	  Cold	  War,	  p.	  47.	  670"Notatka	  z	  pierwszej	  części	  rozmów	  z	  delegacja	  MPLA,	  przeprowadzonych	  w	  Polskim	  Komitecie	  Solidarności	  w	  dniu	  28	   sierpnia	  1975”,	  AAN,	  PZPR	  LXVI.682	   ;	   "Notatka	   z	  drugiej	   części	   rozmów,	  przeprowadzonych	   z	  delegacja	  MPLA	  w	  Polskim	   Komitecie	   Solidarności	   w	   dniu	   28	   sierpnia	   1975”,	   AAN,	   PZPR	   LXVI.682	   ;	   Informacja	   o	   Wizycie	   w	   Polsce	  Delegacji	  Ludowego	  Ruchu	  Wyzwolenia	  Angoli/MPLA/,	  AAN,	  PZPR	  LXVI.682	  	  671R.	  Grigorov	  do	  Politburo	  na	  ZK	  na	  BKP,	  "Dokladna	  Zapiska,"	  3	  September	  1975,	  TsDA,	  f.	  1b,	  op.	  64,	  а.е.	  459.	  672Politburo	  CC	  BCP	  Resolution	  "B"	  №	  7,	  3	  September	  1975,	  TsDA,	  f.	  1b,	  op.	  64,	  	  а.е.	  458;	  Politburo	  CC	  BCP	  Resolution	  "B"	  №	  8,	  4	  September	  1975,	  TsDA,	  f.	  1B,	  op.	  64,	  a.e.	  459.	  The	  weapons	  included	  Kalashnikov	  automatic	  rifles,	  portable	  anti-­‐tank	  grenade	   launchers	  (RPG-­‐7),	  hand	  grenades	  (RG-­‐42	  and	  F-­‐1),	  76	  mm.	  divisional	  guns,	  82	  mm.	  mortars,	  anti-­‐tank	  and	  anti-­‐personnel	  mines,	  explosives,	  and	  uniforms,	  while	  humanitarian	  aid	  consisted	  of	  canned	  food,	  cigarettes,	  and	  medicines.	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  November.673Following	   Iko	   Carreira’s	   trip	   to	   East	   Berlin,	   the	   SED	   Politburo	   also	  approved	   the	  allocation	  of	   six	  million	  marks	  worth	  of	  military	  aid.	   In	  September,	   the	  cargo	  was	  shipped	  to	  Pointe	  Noire.674	  	  The	  Soviets	  were	  willing	  to	  provide	  arms	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  but	  they	  were	   not	   ready	   send	   Soviet	   instructors	   or	   support	   the	   Cuban	   operation.	   On	   25	  September,	  FAPLA	  chief	  of	  staff	  João	  Luís	  Neto	  informed	  Diaz	  Argüelles	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  promised	  to	  provide	  five	  multiple	  rocket	  launchers	  (BM-­‐21),	  ten	  T-­‐34	  tanks,	  twenty-­‐five	   76mm	   artillery	   pieces,	   ten	   armored	   cars,	   and	   two	   planes	   by	   11	  November.675The	   MPLA	   remained	   unsatisfied	   with	   the	   extent	   of	   Soviet	   aid.	   On	   2	  September	  Diaz	  Argüelles	  relayed	  Neto’s	  plea	  for	  Castro	  to	  ask	  the	  Soviets	  to	  provide	  more	   effective	   aid	   for	   the	   MPLA.676Castro	   had	   already	   sent	   a	   request	   to	   Brezhnev	  asking	   him	   to	   provide	   transportation	   assistance	   and	   Soviet	   staff	   to	   help	   the	   Cubans,	  but	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  refused.	  	  Most	  probably,	  Brezhnev	  did	  not	  want	  to	  jeopardize	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	   –	   sending	   Soviet	   staff	   meant	   a	   direct	   intervention	   in	   Angola.	   He	   also	   did	   not	  want	   to	   endanger	  détente:	   the	   second	   round	  of	   the	  Strategic	  Arms	  Limitations	  Talks	  (SALT	   II)	   was	   underway,	   and	   it	   was	   important	   for	   the	   CC	   CPSU	   Politburo	   and	   for	  Brezhnev	  personally	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement	  before	   the	  Twenty-­‐Fifth	  Congress	   of	   the	  CPSU,	   in	  early	  1976.	   It	   is	  also	  very	   likely	   that	   the	  Soviets	  did	  not	  believe	  such	  a	   step	  was	  really	  necessary:	  when	  Henrique	  Pedro	  van	  Dunem	  and	  Fernando	  Costa	  Andrade	  toured	  Eastern	  Europe,	   they	  painted	   an	  optimistic	  picture	  of	   their	  military	   situation,	  and	  hence	   the	  Soviet	   cadre	  might	  have	  assumed	   that	   limited	  engagement	  could	  have	  been	   sufficient.677	  In	   August,	   the	   MPLA	   was	   also	   negotiating	   with	   Jonas	   Savimbi.	   If	  those	  talks	  had	  been	  successful,	   the	  MPLA	  would	  have	  been	  in	  the	  position	  to	  form	  a	  provisional	  government	  in	  a	  tactical	  alliance	  with	  Savimbi.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  673"Dotychczasowa	  pomoc	  Polskiego	  Komitetu	  Solidarności	  z	  Narodami	  Azji	  i	  Afryki	  dla	  MPLA/Angola,"	  24	  September	  1975,	  AAN,	  PZPR,	  LXXVI.541.	  674	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  350.	  The	  SED	  Politburo	  approved	  the	  aid	  package	  on	  9	  September.	  	  675	  Ibid.,	  p.	  266.	  676	  Quoted	  in	  ibid.,	  p.	  260.	  677	  Westad,	  Global	  Cold	  War,	  p.	  233.	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  September	   proved	   a	   trying	   month	   for	   the	   MPLA.	   While	   the	   first	   Cuban	  instructors	  arrived	  in	  Brazzaville	  by	  air	  in	  late	  August,	  their	  numbers	  remained	  fairly	  low	   until	   October.	   Supplies	   from	   Eastern	   Europe	   were	   expected	   to	   arrive	   by	  November.	  Negotiations	  with	  UNITA	  failed,	  and	  the	  MPLA	  had	  to	  face	  their	  adversaries	  reinforced	  with	  heavy	  arms	  and	  equipment.678	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month,	  the	  FNLA	  had	  taken	  over	  Caxito	  in	  the	  north,	  while	  UNITA	  was	  active	  in	  the	  south.	  On	  2	  October	  Tom	  Killoran	  cabled	  to	  Washington:	  “The	  increased	  flow	  of	  arms	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  UNITA	  and	  FNLA/Chipenda	  appears	  to	  have	  stemmed	  the	  MPLA	  advances	  in	  the	  center	  and	  south,	  but	   the	  big	  unknown	  at	   this	   time	   is	  whether	   they	  have	   the	  ability	   to	  push	   the	  MPLA	  back.”679	  GRU’s	  Boris	  Putilin	  recalls	  a	  few	  “tough	  conversations”	  with	  Lúcio	  Lara,	  who	  was	  unhappy	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  Soviet	  support:	  “Lara	  was	  shouting:	   ‘You	  have	  divided	  the	  world	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Angola	  is	  not	  under	  your	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  You	  are	   not	   helping	   us	   properly.’	   It	   was	   impossible	   to	   calm	   him	   down.”680	  Conventional	  military	   estimates	   were	   rather	   futile	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Angolan	   civil	   war	   at	   that	  point,	   as	   an	   MPLA	   commander	   explained	   to	   Ryszard	   Kapuscinski,	   a	   famous	   Polish	  journalist	  who	  travelled	  to	  southern	  Angola	  in	  October	  1975:	  “There	  are	  hundreds	  of	  fronts	  because	  there	  are	  hundreds	  of	  units.	  Every	  unit	  is	  a	  front,	  a	  potential	  front.	  If	  our	  unit	  runs	   into	  an	  enemy	  unit,	   those	   two	  potential	   fronts	   turn	   into	  real	   fronts	  …	   if	  we	  are	  ambushed,	  we	  become	  a	  real	  front.”681	  Nevertheless,	   Pretoria	   decided	   that	   supplying	   arms	   and	   training	   to	   Savimbi’s	  UNITA	   and	   Chipenda’s	   FNLA	   was	   no	   longer	   sufficient,	   and	   that	   South	   Africa	   would	  have	   to	   send	   regular	   forces	   if	   the	   FNLA	   and	   UNITA	  were	   to	   have	   a	   chance	   to	   enter	  Luanda	  before	  11	  November	  1975.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  debate	  as	  to	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	   escalation	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   Angolan	   Civil	   War.	   Gleijeses,	   for	  example,	  writes	  that	  Henry	  Kissinger	  personally	  communicated	  with	  the	  South	  African	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  On	  12	  September,	   the	  US	  American	  Champion	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   rocket	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   Search	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  From	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  leadership	  via	  back-­‐channel	  communication	  and	  pushed	  Pretoria	  to	  intervene.682	  Jamie	  Miller	  argues	  that	  Pretoria	  acted	  on	  its	  own	  accord,	  and	  with	  the	  impetus	  for	  escalation	  emanating	   from	   the	   defense	   minister,	   P.	   W.	   Botha.	   On	   5	   October,	   in	   a	   skirmish	   at	  Norton	   de	   Matos,	   near	   Nova	   Lisboa,	   a	   UNITA	   detachment	   dispersed	   under	   heavy	  gunfire	  from	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  SADF’s	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Kaas	  Van	  der	  Waals,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  UNITA	  training	  program,	  advised	  his	  superiors	  that	  South	  Africa	  could	  never	  achieve	  its	  aims	  through	  covert,	  small-­‐scale	  intervention.	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Jan	  Breytenbach,	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  training	  Chipenda’s	  men	  at	  Mpupa	  in	  southern	  Angola,	  concurred.	  On	  8	  October,	  Miller	  writes,	  the	  SADF’s	  upper	  echelons	  agreed	  that	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  Luanda	  before	  11	  November	  without	  intervention	  of	  regular	  troops.683	  	  The	   outcome	   of	   this	   decision	   was	   that	   on	   14	   October	   a	   military	   column	   of	  around	   500	   black	   Angolans,	   led	   by	   a	   smaller	   group	   of	   white	   South	   African	   soldiers,	  crossed	   the	   Namibia–Angola	   border,	   initiating	   Operation	   Savannah.	   The	   military	  column	   –	   “Task	   Force	   Zulu”	   –	   consisted	   of	   Daniel	   Chipenda’s	   men,	   who	   had	   been	  trained	   by	   Breytenbach	   at	   Mpupa,	   and	   Bushman	   soldiers,	   many	   of	   whom	   had	   been	  fighting	  for	  the	  Portuguese	  during	  the	  colonial	  wars	  in	  military	  detachments	  known	  as	  “flechas”	   (arrows).	  Meeting	   little	  resistance,	  Zulu	  overran	  the	  MPLA-­‐controlled	  towns	  in	  the	  south,	  including	  Roçadas,	  Pereira	  D’Eça,	  and	  Sá	  da	  Bandeira.	  On	  28	  October,	  Zulu	  captured	  Moçâmedes,	  a	  major	  port	  in	  southern	  Angola.684	  Soviet	   attitudes	   towards	   the	   crisis	   in	   Angola	   did	   not	   significantly	   change	  between	   July	   and	   October.	   The	   MPLA	   kept	   pushing	   for	   additional	   assistance,	   but	  Moscow	   did	   not	   think	   that	   a	   qualitative	   escalation	   of	   support	   was	   necessary	   or	  justified.	  When	  the	  MPLA	  delegation	  toured	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Yugoslavia	  to	  harness	  additional	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA,	  they	  painted	  a	  rather	  positive	  picture	  of	  the	  military	  situation.	   Although	   the	   impact	   of	  Havana’s	   decision	   to	   provide	   instructors	   to	  Angola	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   260	  had	   not	   yet	  materialized,	   the	   difference	   in	   approaches	  was	   readily	   apparent.	   Castro	  believed	   that	   the	   MPLA	   could	   win	   if	   Cuba	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   provided	   decisive	  support,	   including	  weapons,	   supplies,	   and	   instructors.	   Castro	   fashioned	   himself	   as	   a	  great	  revolutionary	  leader;	  this	  idea	  constituted	  part	  of	  his	  personal	  identity,	  popular	  legitimacy,	   and	   international	   prestige.	   Brezhnev,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   did	   not;	   his	  domestic	  politics,	  the	  “Brezhnev	  Doctrine”	  in	  relations	  with	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  and	  his	  support	   for	   détente	  with	   the	  United	   States	  were	   designed	   to	   solidify	   the	   status	   quo.	  The	  Soviet	   leadership	   therefore	   limited	   its	   involvement	   to	   increasing	  arms	   transfers,	  hoping	   that	   the	   MPLA	   would	   be	   able	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   Luanda	   until	   11	   November.	  Intervention	  by	  South	  Africa’s	  regular	  forces	  transformed	  Soviet	  calculations.	  	  	  
Moscow	  and	  Havana	  Escalate	  their	  Support,	  October–December	  1975	  The	   Soviet	   intelligence	   services	   knew	   about	   the	   South	   African	   invasion	   in	  advance.	  In	  early	  October,	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  apparently	  received	  an	  analytical	  note,	  signed	   by	   Viktor	   Chebrikov,	   that	   warned	   of	   an	   imminent	   military	   intervention	   and	  concluded	   that	   the	   MPLA	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   Luanda	   without	   outside	  support.685	  Most	  likely,	  the	  Soviets	  knew	  about	  Pretoria’s	  preparations	  for	  intervention	  from	   Dieter	   Gerhardt,	   a	   commodore	   in	   the	   South	   African	   navy	   who	   worked	   for	   the	  GRU.	  Shortly	  prior	  to	  the	  invasion,	  Pretoria	  had	  dispatched	  Gerhardt	  to	  Israel	  to	  learn	  about	   their	   recent	   battlefield	   experience	   during	   the	   1973	   Yom	   Kippur	   War	   and	   to	  collect	   information	   about	   contemporary	   Soviet	   weaponry.686	  For	   Gerhardt,	   it	   was	  probably	   not	   difficult	   to	   connect	   the	   dots;	   however,	   it	   seems	   Moscow	   did	   not	  immediately	   react	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   troops	   from	  South	  Africa.	  There	  are	   several	  possible	  explanations	  for	  this.	  October	  was	  a	  busy	  month:	  Boris	  Ponomarev,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department,	  was	  trying	  to	  organize	  a	  second	  conference	  of	   European	   workers’	   and	   communist	   parties.	   Meanwhile,	   Leonid	   Brezhnev	   was	  hosting	   the	   French	   president,	   Giscard	   d’Estaing,	   in	   a	   highly	   publicized	   state	   visit	   to	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  Moscow.687	  Most	  probably,	  Angola	  was	  not	   at	   the	   top	  of	   the	  agenda	   for	   the	  CC	  CPSU.	  Moreover,	   the	   significance	   of	   Zulu’s	   advance	   might	   not	   have	   been	   immediately	  apparent.	   Above	   all,	   Moscow	   wanted	   to	   maintain	   plausible	   deniability	   of	   any	  suggestion	  of	  their	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  MPLA	  in	  Angola	  before	  11	  November.	  Despite	   this	   goal,	   however,	   in	   late	   October	   the	   Soviets	   upped	   their	   support	   for	   the	  MPLA.	  	  On	  1	  November,	  two	  Soviet	  An-­‐22	  “Antei”	  cargo	  planes	  (NATO	  reporting	  name	  “Cock”)	   arrived	   in	   Brazzaville	   with	   four	   BM-­‐21s	   (“Grad”)	   multiple	   rocket	   launchers.	  Boris	  Putilin	  recalls	  that	  transportation	  of	  the	  BM-­‐21s	  was	  a	  logistical	  nightmare:	  the	  Congolese	  rail	  cars	  were	  too	  small	  to	  transport	  the	  heavy	  “Grads”	  from	  Brazzaville	  to	  Pointe	  Noire	  by	  railway,	  while	  Moscow	  would	  not	  grant	  permission	  to	  fly	  them	  directly	  to	  Luanda.	  Thus,	   the	  Soviet	  mission	  came	  up	  with	  a	  risky	  plan	   to	   fly	  only	   two	  rocket	  launchers	   from	   Brazzaville	   to	   Pointe	   Noire,	   even	   though	   the	   landing	   strip	   at	   Pointe	  Noire	   was	   not	   suitable	   for	   the	   heavy	   Antei.	   Soviet	  military	   advisers	   in	   Pointe	   Noire	  were	  supposed	  to	  roll	  up	  in	  tanks	  and	  pull	  the	  plane	  out	  of	  the	  ground	  in	  case	  it	  went	  over	   the	   short	   landing	   strip.	   The	   Congolese	   authorities	   were	   reluctant	   to	   give	  permission	   for	   the	   operation,	   and	   the	   Soviet	   embassy	   appealed	  directly	   to	  President	  Ngouabi.	  He	  gave	  the	  go-­‐ahead,	  and	  the	  two	  Grads	  were	  flown	  in	  to	  Pointe	  Noire.688	  Also,	  in	  late	  October,	  Moscow	  dispatched	  a	  group	  of	  Soviet	  weapons	  specialists	  accompanied	  by	   interpreters	   to	  Brazzaville.	  Andrey	  Tokarev,	  one	  of	   the	   interpreters,	  recounts	   that	   at	   the	   General	   Staff	   headquarters	   in	   Moscow	   they	   were	   told	   that	   the	  MPLA	   controlled	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   provinces	   and	   the	   capital,	   but	   that	   that	   control	  was	   not	   secure.	   Zaire	   had	   bought	   Mirage	   fighter	   jets	   from	   France,	   and	   those	   were	  expected	  to	  arrive	  any	  minute;	  there	  was	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  Mirages	  would	  take	  part	  in	  bombing	  raids	  on	  Luanda.	  Their	  task	  was	  to	  fly	  to	  Luanda	  and	  teach	  someone	  how	  to	  handle	  “Strela-­‐2,”	  the	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  system	  used	  to	  shoot	  down	  planes	  flying	  at	  low	   altitudes	   that	   had	   helped	   the	   PAIGC	   in	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   It	   is	   not	   absolutely	   clear	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   262	  whom	   they	   were	   supposed	   to	   teach	   and	   if	   the	   recruits	   received	   any	   more	   specific	  information.	  On	  1	  November	  the	  group,	  led	  by	  Captain	  Yevgeniy	  Lyashenko,	  landed	  in	  Brazzaville.	  “We	  spent	  around	  a	  week	  in	  the	  capital;	  Moscow	  probably	  did	  not	  have	  a	  concrete	  plan	  as	  to	  what	  to	  do	  with	  us,”	  speculated	  Tokarev.689	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	   was	   still	   uncertain	   exactly	   how	   to	   respond,	   waiting	   to	   see	   how	   events	  unfolded.	  	  	  Oleg	   Nazhestkin’s	  memoirs	   testify	   to	   this.	   He	  writes	   that	   in	   late	   October	   the	  chief	   of	   the	  KGB	  First	  Directorate,	   Vladimir	  Kryuchkov,	   invited	  him	   into	  his	   office	   to	  say	  that	  he	  was	  to	  fly	  to	  Luanda	  in	  order	  to	  “establish	  contacts	  with	  Neto”	  and	  gather	  urgently	   required	   information	   about	   the	   situation	   on	   the	   ground.	   Nazhestkin	   claims	  that	  before	  his	  departure,	  he	  spoke	  to	  cadres	   from	  the	  International	  Department	  and	  the	   Foreign	   Ministry,	   who	   told	   him	   to	   try	   and	   influence	   Neto	   to	   “make	   peace	   with	  Roberto	   and	  Savimbi”	   and	   recreate	   the	   tripartite	   coalition.	  Nazhestkin,	  who	  believed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  should	  provide	  all-­‐out	  support	  for	  Neto,	  was	  stunned.	  “I	  was	  flying	  to	  Brazzaville	  with	  dark	  thoughts,”	  he	  recalled;	  however,	  when	  he	  arrived	  in	  Brazzaville,	  on	   1	   November,	   his	   instructions	   changed.	   The	   decree	   that	   ambassador	   Yevgeniy	  Afanasenko	  handed	  him	  shortly	  before	  departure	  for	  Luanda,	  and	  that	  Nazhestkin	  had	  to	  pass	  on	   to	  Neto,	   stated	   that	  after	  Angola	  declared	   independence,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  recognize	  it	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  exchange	  embassies,	  and	  open	  negotiations	  for	  mutual	  cooperation,	  including	  military	  assistance.690	  	  This	   account	   presents	   a	   double	   dilemma.	   Why	   would	   the	   cadre	   of	   the	  International	  Department	  try	  to	  persuade	  Neto	  to	  restore	  the	  tripartite	  coalition	  with	  Holden	  Roberto	  and	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  during	  a	  civil	  war?	  And	  why	  had	  Moscow	  changed	  their	   instructions	  at	   the	   last	  minute?	  Nazhestkin	  writes	  that	   this	  revealed	  the	  closed-­‐mindedness	  and	   lack	  of	  understanding	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  Soviet	  cadre	  about	   the	  real	  situation	   in	  Angola,	  while	   the	   change	   in	   instructions	  he	   attributes	   to	   the	   “victory”	   of	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  those	  who	  supported	  Neto,	  presumably	  the	  KGB.	  However,	  there	  was	  another	  possible	  explanation	   for	   the	   advice	   Nazhestkin	   received	   from	   members	   of	   the	   International	  Department:	  the	  need	  to	  buy	  time	  for	  the	  MPLA.	  One	  may	  recall	  that	  in	  late	  October,	  Idi	  Amin,	   who	  was	   the	   president	   of	   Uganda	   and	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   OAU	   at	   that	   time,	  called	  on	  all	  sides	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  ceasefire.	  The	  MPLA	  leadership	  actually	  agreed	  to	  this,	  but	   UNITA	   and	   the	   FNLA	   refused,	   saying	   it	   was	   a	   tactical	   maneuver.691	  One	   way	   or	  another,	  what	  matters	  is	  that,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  believe	  Nazhestkin’s	  account,	  at	  some	  time	  in	  late	  October	  or	  early	  November,	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  decided	  to	  recognize	  the	  MPLA	  as	   the	   government	   of	   Angola	   and	   step	   up	   support	   after	   the	   official	   declaration	   of	  independence	  on	  11	  November.	  	  On	  2	  November,	  Nazhestkin	  flew	  to	  a	  besieged	  Luanda	  to	  pass	  the	  message	  of	  Soviet	   support	   to	   Neto.	   He	   checked	   into	   the	   Tivoli	   Hotel,	   where	   he	   met	   two	   Soviet	  journalists:	  Igor	  Uvarov	  and	  Oleg	  Ignatyev.	  Late	  at	  night,	  all	  three	  men	  drove	  to	  Neto’s	  residence	   in	  a	  small	   car.	  Nazhestkin	  recalled	   that	  Neto	  was	  still	  working	   in	  his	  office	  and	   that	   he	   was	   very	   surprised	   to	   see	   “Comrade	   Oleg”,	   as	   he	   affectionately	   called	  Nazhestkin,	   since	   the	   two	   had	   known	   each	   other	   since	   the	   early	   1960s.	   Nazhestkin	  admitted	  to	  Neto	  there	  were	  some	  officials	  in	  Moscow	  who	  wanted	  to	  convince	  him	  to	  unite	   with	   Roberto	   and	   Savimbi,	   but	   that	   others	   in	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   thought	  differently.	  Nazhestkin	  writes:	  From	  memory,	  I	  am	  reading	  the	  decree	  of	  the	  Soviet	  government.	  On	  Neto’s	  face	  –	   surprise,	   which	   turns	   to	   happiness,	   exhilaration.	   ‘Finally,	   we	   have	   been	  understood.	  Thus	  we	  will	   cooperate	  and	   fight	   together.	  The	  Cubans	  and	  other	  friends	  are	  helping	  us,	  but	   it	  was	  very	  difficult	  without	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Now	  we	  will	  certainly	  win.’692	  	  	  Neto	  and	  Nazhestkin	  talked	  through	  the	  night.	  Neto	  explained	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola;	  he	  also	  said	  that	  the	  Portuguese	  were	  ready	  to	  hand	  over	  power	  to	  the	  MPLA.	  Neto	  told	  Nazhestkin	   to	   put	   in	   his	   report	   to	  Moscow	   that	   the	   civil	   war	   in	   Angola	  was	   not	   the	  result	  of	  “tribal	  warfare”	  but	  of	  external	  military	  intervention.	  He	  told	  him	  that	  moral	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  support	  was	  not	  enough,	  and	  that	  the	  MPLA	  needed	  military	  aid	  to	  defeat	  the	  regular	  military	   forces	   of	   South	   Africa	   and	   Zaire.	   The	   Cubans	   were	   doing	   everything	   they	  could,	  but	  they	  were	  short	  of	  arms.	  Thus,	  Neto	  asked	  Nazhestkin	  to	  immediately	  meet	  the	   Cuban	   representatives	   and	   discuss	   with	   them	   all	   the	   details	   of	   the	   military	  situation	   and	   those	   measures	   necessary	   for	   its	   stabilization.	   The	   Cubans	   told	  Nazhestkin	  that	  they	  were	  waiting	  for	  a	  special	  message	  from	  Havana	  about	  assistance	  to	  the	  MPLA	  and	  that	  a	  battalion	  of	  Cuban	  Special	  Forces	  had	  already	  been	  dispatched	  to	  Luanda.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Cuban	  mission	  (probably	  Diaz	  Argüelles)	  then	  handed	  over	  a	   list	   of	   weapons	   and	   asked	   Nazhestkin	   to	   pass	   it	   on	   to	   the	   Soviet	   government	  immediately.693	  	  Nazhestkin	  arrived	   in	  Luanda	  at	  a	  critical	   juncture	  of	   the	  war.	  On	  28	  October,	  the	   South	   African	   Zulu	   force	   overran	   Moçâmedes	   and	   raced	   towards	   Benguela	   and	  Lobito,	  two	  major	  ports	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  coast.	  On	  2	  November,	  FAPLA	  and	  around	  forty	  Cuban	   instructors	   ambushed	   the	   advancing	   column	   with	   heavy	   artillery	   fire	   at	   the	  town	   of	   Catengue,	   on	   the	   way	   to	   Benguela.	   The	   South	   Africans	   brought	   in	  reinforcements	   and	  managed	   to	   push	   forward	   after	   a	   grueling	   nine-­‐hour	   battle.	   The	  Cuban	   instructors	   had	   already	   participated	   in	   fighting	  with	   the	   FAPLA	   troops,	   but	   it	  was	   at	   Catengue	   that	   they	   suffered	   first	   serious	   casualties:	   four	   Cubans	   were	   dead;	  seven	  wounded,	  and	  thirteen	  were	  missing	  in	  action.694	  The	  road	  to	  the	  coastal	  cities	  of	  Benguela	  and	  Lobito	  was	  open	  to	  the	  South	  Africans,	  FAPLA	  were	  rapidly	  withdrawing	  to	   the	   north,	   and	   the	   seizure	   of	   Luanda	   before	   11	   November	   was	   imminent.	   When	  news	   of	   the	   defeat	   reached	   Luanda,	   the	   MPLA	   Steering	   Committee	   discussed	   the	  situation	  with	  Diaz	  Argüelles.	  There	  was	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  need	  for	  reinforcements,	  and	   Diaz	   Argüelles	   allegedly	   telegraphed	   Fidel	   Castro	   to	   report	   an	   imminent	  disaster.695	  	  Castro	   was	   quick	   to	   respond.	   Defeat	   at	   Catengue	   and	   the	   first	   Cuban	   deaths	  posed	  an	  obvious	   threat	   to	  Luanda	  and	   the	  whole	  Cuban	  mission	   in	  Angola.	   Castro’s	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  personal	  image	  as	  a	  great	  revolutionary	  leader	  and	  military	  commander	  was	  at	  stake.	  Therefore,	  on	  4	  December,	  Castro	  decided	  to	  send	  regular	  troops	  to	  Angola:	  a	  battalion	  of	  elite	  Special	  Forces	  numbering	  652	  men	  would	  be	  urgently	  airlifted	  first,	  while	  the	  bulk	   of	   the	   Cuban	   troops	   would	   follow	   by	   boat.696	  This	   was	   around	   the	   time	   when	  Nazhestkin	  met	   Neto	   and	   spoke	   to	   the	   Cuban	   commander,	   who	   told	   him	   they	  were	  expecting	  a	  decision	  from	  Havana.	  If	  Nazhestkin’s	  timetable	  and	  story	  is	  accurate,	  then	  Moscow	   had	   decided	   to	   extend	   unilateral	   recognition	   to	   the	   MPLA	   and	   provide	  additional	  aid	  before	  Castro’s	  decision	  to	  send	   in	  regular	   troops.	  On	  4	  December,	   the	  first	   “Cubana”	   Bristol	   175	   Britannia	   turboprop,	   with	   around	   hundred	   Cuban	   Special	  Forces	   on	   board,	   left	   Havana	   on	   a	   forty-­‐eight	   hour	   journey	   to	   Angola,	   initiating	   a	  mission	  codenamed	  Operation	  Carlota.	  Moscow	   found	  out	   about	  Castro’s	  decision	  by	   chance.	  Georgiy	  Kornienko,	   the	  Soviet	   deputy	   foreign	  minister	   at	   the	   time,	   recalls	   that	   one	   day	   a	   telegram	   from	   the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  in	  Guinea	  caught	  his	  attention:	  the	  ambassador	  mentioned	  that	  his	  Cuban	   colleague	   had	   informed	   him	   that	   a	   Cuban	   plane	  with	   troops	   on	   board	  would	  make	   a	   stop-­‐over	   in	   Guinea	   the	   next	   day.	   Kornienko	   immediately	   went	   to	   see	   the	  foreign	   minister,	   Andrey	   Gromyko.	   For	   Gromyko,	   it	   was	   a	   total	   surprise.	   He	  immediately	   called	  Andropov	  and	  Grechko.	  They	  did	  not	  know	  anything.	  Apparently,	  all	   three	   men	   agreed	   it	   was	   a	   rash	   step	   and	   that	   it	   would	   increase	   international	  tensions,	   and	   urgently	   drafted	   a	   response	   trying	   to	   dissuade	   Castro.	   It	  was	   too	   late;	  Cuban	   troops	  were	   already	   “flying	   across	   the	  Atlantic.”697	  Castro	   believed	   that,	   faced	  with	   a	   fait	   accompli,	   the	   Soviets	   would	   not	   refuse	   to	   help.	   He	   did	   not	   miscalculate:	  Kornienko	  writes	   that	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  decided	   to	  back	  up	   the	  Cuban	  operation	  because	  of	   a	   sense	  of	   “international	  duty”	   and	  because	   there	  was	  a	   real	   intervention	  materializing	  from	  South	  Africa,	  backed	  by	  the	  United	  States.698	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  696	  Ibid.	  697	  Kornienko,	  Kholodnaia	  Voina,	  p.	  211.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  Kornienko	  means	  Guinea	  as	  in	  Guinea	  or	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  because	   first	   Cuban	   plans	   on	   their	   way	   to	   Brazzaville	   refueled	   in	   Bissau.	   The	   Guinean	   President	   Sékou	   Touré	   also	  permitted	  Cuban	  planes	  refuel	  in	  Conakry.	  698	  Ibid.,	  p.	  212.	  
	   266	  Soviet–Cuban	   cooperation	   to	   boost	   the	   Luandan	   defenses	   began	   shortly	  afterwards.	  On	  6	  November,	   the	   first	  plane,	  carrying	  a	  hundred	  Cuban	  Special	  Forces	  troops,	  arrived	   in	  Brazzaville:	  one	  group	  went	   to	  Pointe	  Noire	   for	   training,	  while	   the	  bulk	  flew	  to	  Luanda.699	  Soviet	  weapons	  specialists,	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  Brazzaville	  on	  1	  November,	   were	   dispatched	   to	   Pointe	   Noire,	   where	   they	   would	   train	   the	   Cubans	   to	  handle	  the	  “Strela-­‐2M”	  man-­‐portable	  air-­‐defense	  system.700	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Cuban	  ship	  
La	  Plata	  transported	  the	  Soviet	  BM-­‐21s	  from	  Pointe	  Noire	  to	  Luanda	  on	  7	  November.	  On	   5	   and	   8	   November,	   FAPLA	   successfully	   repelled	   attacks	   from	   Roberto’s	   forces	  concentrated	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  city,	  near	  Morro	  do	  Cal	  and	  Caxito.	  Roberto,	  however,	  pledged	   that	   he	   would	   take	   the	   capital	   by	   11	   November.	   Luanda	   fell	   into	   anxious	  silence,	  as	  another	  attack	  was	  expected	  any	  time.701	  On	  10	  November,	  Roberto	   initiated	   a	   frontal	   assault	   on	  Luanda.	  The	  decision	  allegedly	  met	  with	  strong	  opposition	  from	  his	  South	  African	  advisers,	  who	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  terrain	  was	  unsuitable:	  the	  only	  viable	  approach	  to	  the	  city	  ran	  along	  a	  narrow	  stretch	   of	   road	   surrounded	   by	   marshes	   and	   exposed	   to	   view	   from	   the	   hills	   of	  Quifangondo.	   However,	   Roberto	   decided	   to	   take	   charge,	   because	   he	   realized	   that	  without	  control	  of	  Luanda	  his	  claim	  to	  power	  was	  shaky.	  On	  10	  November,	  the	  attack	  began,	   when	   three	   Canberra	   bombers	   flew	   over	   Luanda	   and	   dropped	   a	   few	   bombs.	  There	  were	  no	  casualties,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  the	  FNLA	  military	  column	  set	  out	  to	  march	  towards	  Quifangondo,	   the	   FNLA,	   supported	   by	   about	   120	   Cuban	   Special	   Forces,	   had	  managed	  to	  reassemble	  their	  heavy	  artillery	  behind	  the	  hills.	  FAPLA	  unleashed	  heavy	  artillery	   fire	   on	   the	   advancing	   column,	   forcing	   Holden	   Roberto	   to	   retreat	   to	   his	  temporary	  headquarters	  at	  Ambriz.	  Many	  observers	  suggest	  that	  heavy	  arms	  fire	  from	  the	   Soviet	   BM-­‐21s	   had	   the	   biggest	   psychological	   impact	   on	   the	   FNLA	   troops,	   while	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  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions,	  p.	  308.	  Gleijeses	  writes	  that	  the	  Cubans	  had	  to	  be	  trained	  to	  use	  the	  newer,	  modified	  version	  of	  Stela-­‐2	  known	  as	  Strela	  2M.	  	  700	  Tokarev,	  Komandirovka	  v	  Angolu.	  701	  For	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  city	  in	  those	  days,	  see:	  Kapuscinski,	  Another	  Day,	  pp.	  83-­‐128.	  
	   267	  others	  point	  out	  that	  other	  weapons	  such	  as	  the	  76mm	  anti-­‐tank	  gun	  and	  the	  portable	  Grad-­‐P	  were	  used	  in	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  city	  and	  may	  have	  been	  more	  decisive.702	  	  That	   night,	   the	   MPLA	   celebrated	   victory.	   Governor	   General	   Silva	   Cardoso	  handed	  Angolan	   sovereignty	   to	   the	   “Angolan	  people”	   and	   sailed	  off.	   Igor	  Uvarov	  and	  Oleg	   Ignatyev	   reported	   that	   at	   midnight	   crowds	   gathered	   at	   the	   Luanda	   stadium	   to	  celebrate	   Angolan	   independence.	   To	   the	   singing	   of	   the	   new	  Angolan	   hymn,	   “Angola,	  Avante,”	   the	   new	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  Angolan	   flag	  was	   raised	   on	   a	  mast.	   The	  new	   state	  was	  born	  to	  the	  sound	  of	  gunfire	  as	  the	  excited	  crowd	  fired	  shots	  into	  the	  night	  sky.703	  	  
The	  Final	  Round	  The	  next	  morning,	  Yevgeniy	  Afanasenko	  and	  Boris	  Putilin	  flew	  to	  Luanda	  for	  a	  ceremony	   inaugurating	   Agostinho	   Neto	   as	   the	   first	   Angolan	   president.704	  That	   same	  day,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  recognized	  the	  MPLA	  as	  the	  government	  of	  Angola.	  The	  Soviets	  pushed	  for	  diplomatic	  recognition	  of	  the	  MPLA,	  while	  Kissinger	  ordered	  all	  diplomatic	  posts	   to	   exert	  pressure	   and	  block	   recognition.	  Boris	  Putilin	   recalls	   that	  Moscow	  was	  pushing	   Ugandan	   president	   Idi	   Amin,	   in	   particular,	   to	   support	   the	   MPLA	   because	   it	  wanted	   recognition	   from	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   OAU.705	  Washington	   also	   unleashed	   a	  campaign	  to	  deny	  Cuban	  aircraft	  refueling	  rights,	  first	  in	  Barbados,	  then	  in	  Guyana	  and	  the	  Azores.	  The	  MPLA	   celebrated	  victory,	   but	   the	  military	   situation	   remained	  precarious.	  At	  his	  temporary	  capital	  in	  Nova	  Lisboa,	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  proclaimed:	  “these	  celebrations	  may	  last	  a	  day,	  but	  our	  war	  for	  final	  victory	  –	  through	  blood	  and	  tears	  –	  will	  take	  much	  longer.”706	  The	  South	  African	  Zulu	  force	  took	  Novo	  Redondo	  on	  13	  November	  and	  was	  pushing	  towards	  Port	  Amboim,	  a	  major	  port	  only	  250	  kilometers	  from	  Luanda.	  On	  16	  November,	   a	   group	   of	   Soviet	   instructors,	   now	   larger	   due	   to	   reinforcements	   from	  Moscow,	   flew	   to	   Luanda.	   Andrey	   Tokarev	   recalls	   that	   the	   airport	   was	   “surprisingly	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  For	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   battle,	   see:	  Willem	   	   Steenkam,	  Borderstrike!:	   South	  Africa	   Into	  Angola	  1975-­‐1980.	   3rd	  (Durban:	   Just	   Done	   Productions	   Publishing,	   2006),	   pp.	   104-­‐107;	   George,	   Cuban	   Intervention,	   pp.	   88-­‐90;	   Gleijeses,	  
Conflicting	  Missions.	  703	  Oleg	  Ignatyev	  and	  Igor	  Uvarov,	  "Rozhdenie	  Novogo	  Gosudarstva,"	  Pravda,	  12	  November	  1975,	  	  p.	  5.	  704	  Putilin,	  "My	  Obespechivali,"	  p.	  23.	  705	  Ibid.	  706	  Quoted	  in	  "Angola:	  A	  Brief	  Ceremony,	  a	  Long	  Civil	  War."	  
	   268	  quiet	   and	   empty;	   nobody	   was	   there	   to	   greet	   us.”	   The	   head	   of	   their	   group,	   most	  probably	  Colonel	  Vasiliy	  Trofimenko,	  assembled	  everyone	  at	  an	  abandoned	  warehouse	  and	   said	   that	   nobody	   knew	   about	   the	   real	   situation	   in	   the	   country	   and	   that	   it	   was	  possible	   they	   would	   have	   to	   take	   part	   in	   military	   action.707	  Alexander	   Grigorovich,	  another	   interpreter	  who	   had	   arrived	   in	   Luanda	  with	   Tokarev,	   remembers:	   “Nobody	  was	  there	  to	  meet	  us.	  We	  had	  a	  feeling	  that	  we	  would	  be	  captured.	  For	  two	  hours	  we	  were	  inside	  the	  plane.	  The	  engines	  were	  on,	  we	  were	  ready	  to	  take	  off	  any	  minute.”708	  Finally,	   a	   Soviet	   representative	   (probably	   Aleksey	  Dubenko	   or	   Igor	   Uvarov)	   arrived,	  and	   after	   consultation	   with	   the	   MPLA	   leadership,	   they	   received	   alarming	   news:	   the	  enemy	   wanted	   to	   surround	   and	   lay	   siege	   to	   the	   capital,	   while	   forces	   hostile	   to	   the	  MPLA	   were	   organizing	   an	   uprising	   in	   the	   city.709	  The	   Soviet	   instructors	   set	   up	  mini	  learning	  centers	  at	   the	  Luandan	  airport,	  where	  they	  would	  provide	  weapons	  training	  to	  the	  FAPLA	  soldiers.	  	  It	  is	  well	  known	  how	  FAPLA	  managed	  to	  halt	  the	  advance	  of	  the	  South	  African	  troops	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Special	  Forces.	  Between	  Novo	  Redondo	  and	  Port	  Amboim,	  the	  Cuban	  forces	  blew	  up	  the	  bridge	  over	  the	  Queve	  River,	  thus	  forcing	  Zulu	  to	  change	  course	  in	  search	  of	  an	  alternative	  route	  towards	  Luanda.	  On	  24	  November,	  another	  South	  African	  column,	   “Foxbat,”	  was	  ambushed	  at	   the	  village	  of	  Ebo,	   leaving	  hundreds	   killed	   and	  wounded.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  bulk	   of	   the	  Cuban	   troops	   (numbering	  1,254	   overall)	   arrived	   in	   Luanda	   between	   27	   November	   and	   1	   December,	   together	  with	  supplies,	  weapons,	  and	  a	  whole	  regiment	  of	  T-­‐55	  tanks.710	  The	  onset	  of	  the	  rainy	  season	  also	  helped:	  the	  terrain	  inland	  became	  muddy	  and	  it	  became	  impossible	  for	  the	  South	  African	  Eland	  armored	  cars	  to	  venture	  off	  the	  main	  roads.	  In	  the	  north,	  FAPLA’s	  “Ninth	   Brigade”	   pushed	   the	   FARP	   beyond	   Caxito.	   In	   Cabinda,	   a	   joint	   Cuban–FAPLA	  effort	  managed	  to	  stop	  Mobutu’s	  attempt	  to	  seize	  it.	  In	  the	  south,	  the	  front	  stabilized	  to	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  Tokarev,	  Komandirovka	  v	  Angolu.	  708	  Gennady	  Shubin,	  ed.	  Ustnaya	  Istoriya	  Zabytykh	  Voin:	  Vospominaniya	  Veteranov	  Voyny	  v	  Angole	   	  (Moscow:	  Memories,	  2007),	  	  p.	  18.	  709	  Tokarev,	  Komandirovka	  v	  Angolu.	  710	  For	  details	  about	  this	  stage	  in	  the	  war,	  see:	  Gleijeses,	  Conflicting	  Missions;	  George,	  Cuban	  Intervention,	  pp.	  94-­‐98.	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  the	  north	  of	  Novo	  Redondo	  as	  both	  sides	  reached	  rough	  technical	  and	  numerical	  parity	  by	  the	  end	  of	  December.	  Cooperation	   between	   the	   Soviet	   instructors	   and	   the	   Cuban	   troops	   was	   very	  tight,	  and	  relations	  were	  amicable.	  Grigorovich	  recalls	  that	  at	  first	  the	  General	  Staff	  did	  not	  make	  provisions	  to	  supply	  them	  with	  adequate	  food,	  and	  that	  the	  Cubans	  came	  to	  help.	   “For	   three	  weeks,	  we	   lived	   off	   the	   Cubans,	  who	   shared	   last	   bits	   –	   rice,	   broth	   –	  with	  us,	  so	  that	  we	  would	  not	  die	  from	  hunger.	  It	  came	  to	  this,	  that	  I	  was	  assigned	  to	  drive	   around	   Luanda	   looking	   for	   food.”711	  There	  were	   regular	  meetings	   between	   the	  Soviet	  staff,	  the	  Cubans,	  and	  the	  MPLA.	  The	  Cubans	  did	  most	  of	  the	  fighting,	  and	  Fidel	  Castro	   personally	   oversaw	  military	   operations	   from	  Havana.	   By	   early	   December	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   had	   airlifted	   ten	   BM-­‐21s,	   twenty	   76mm	   artillery	   pieces,	   and	   twenty	  82mm	   mortars.712	  Havana	   and	   Moscow	   also	   agreed	   that	   Cuba	   would	   dispatch	   old	  Soviet	  weapons	  to	  Angola,	  and	  that	  Moscow	  would	  compensate	  them	  with	  brand-­‐new	  ones.713	  	  The	  least	  clear	  aspect	  of	  the	  Soviet–Cuban	  cooperation	  concerns	  when	  Moscow	  first	  provided	  long-­‐range	  IL-­‐62	  (NATO	  reporting	  name	  “Classic”)	  planes	  to	  support	  the	  airlift	   of	   Cuban	   troops.	   Piero	   Gleijeses	   argues	   that	   the	   first	   IL-­‐62	   left	   Havana	   on	   9	  January	   1976,	   after	   high-­‐level	   negotiations	   between	   the	   Cubans	   and	   the	   Soviet	  leadership	  in	  late	  December.714	  At	  least	  one	  report,	  from	  the	  American	  Consul	  in	  Ponta	  Delgada	  in	  the	  Azores,	  claims	  the	  US	  detected	  “Cuban	  Airlines”	  flying	  Il-­‐62s	  on	  20,	  21,	  24,	   and	   27	   December	   1975.715	  Grigorovich	   recalls:	   “They	  would	   arrive	   in	   December,	  end	  of	  December,	  I	  do	  not	  remember	  exactly,	  almost	  every	  night.	  A	  Cuban	  Il-­‐62	  would	  arrive	  with	  Cuban	  airhostesses	  and	  soldiers	  in	  full	  military	  gear	  but	  without	  weapons.	  They	  were	   immediately	  driven	  off	   to	   their	  detachments,	  where	  they	  would	  be	  armed	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  ed.,	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  Conflicting	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  Putilin,	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  Gleijeses,	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  Missions,	  p.	  368.	  The	  Cubans	  had	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  Soviets	  because	  first	  Barbados,	  then	  Guyana	  and	  the	  Azores	  refused	  to	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  refueling	  rights	  to	  Britannia	  aircraft	  following	  pressure	  from	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  US	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  and	  sent	  to	  the	  front	  at	  night.”716	  However,	  without	  access	  to	  Russian	  documents,	   the	  question	  of	  when	  exactly	  the	  Soviets	  decided	  to	  provide	  their	  long-­‐range	  IL-­‐62	  aircraft	  for	  the	  airlift	  of	  Cuban	  troops	  remains	  unresolved.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   CIA	   chief,	   Colby,	   was	   increasingly	   concerned	   about	  developments	   in	   Angola.	   On	   14	   November,	   when	   briefing	   his	   colleagues	   at	   the	   40	  Committee,	  Colby	  explained	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  to	  match	  the	  $81	  million	  that,	  according	  to	   his	   estimates,	   the	  USSR	  had	   already	  provided	   for	   the	  MPLA,	  warning	   that	   the	   full	  effect	  of	  Cuban	  involvement	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  made	  manifest.	  The	  CIA	  urgently	  needed	  more	   money,	   and	   possibly	   Redeye	   missiles	   to	   counter	   the	   Soviet	   MIGs	   that	   could	  appear	   in	   Angola.	   As	   a	   cheaper	   option,	   Colby	   urged	   his	   colleagues	   to	   put	   diplomatic	  pressure	   on	   the	   Soviets	   to	   disengage	   from	   Angola.717	  However,	   Henry	   Kissinger	   and	  Brent	  Scowcroft,	  the	  newly	  appointed	  national	  security	  adviser	  to	  the	  president,	  were	  determined	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   game.	   During	   yet	   another	   discussion	   of	   Angola	   on	   19	  November,	  Kissinger	  agreed	  that	  the	  US	  should	  match	  the	  Cuban	  effort	  and	  discussed	  bringing	   in	   French	   mercenaries	   to	   fight	   with	   the	   FNLA/UNITA.718	  On	   28	   November,	  President	  Ford	  approved	  another	  $7	  million	  for	  IAFEATURE.719	  	  Kissinger	  and	  Ford	  faced	  a	  dilemma.	  Pretoria	  was	  asking	  for	  urgent	  support	  for	  their	   effort	   in	  Angola,	   but	   association	  with	   the	   South	  African	   regime	   in	  Pretoria	  was	  highly	   problematic.	   When	   President	   Ford	   tried	   to	   enlist	   Chinese	   support	   for	  engagement	  in	  Angola,	  Vice	  Premier	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  explained	  that	  China	  would	  not	  get	  involved.	  In	  fact,	  China	  had	  already	  been	  reprimanded	  for	  its	  support	  for	  the	  FNLA	  by	  some	   of	   its	   African	   partners,	   such	   as	   the	   Guinean	   president,	   Sékou	   Touré.	   Kissinger	  engaged	  in	  frantic	  shuttle	  diplomacy	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  get	  other	  sponsors	  to	  support	  the	  Zairian	  effort.	   In	  mid-­‐December	  he	   flew	   to	  Paris	   for	   talks	  with	   the	  French	  president,	  Giscard	  d’Estaing.	  In	  Paris,	  Kissinger	  also	  met	  with	  Zairian	  foreign	  minister	  Bula	  Nyati,	  Zambian	  minister	   for	   foreign	  affairs	  Rupiah	  Banda,	  and	  Kenneth	  Kaunda’s	  right-­‐hand	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  The	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  man,	  Mark	  Chona,	  who	  urged	  him	  to	  match	  the	  Russians	  in	  Angola.	  Kissinger	  reassured	  them	  that	  Giscard	  d’Estaing	  would	  provide	   “people,	  guns,	  and	  helicopters,”	  while	   the	  US	  would	  finance	  the	  whole	  thing.720	  	  Kissinger	  could	  not	  deliver	  on	  his	  promise,	  because	  on	  19	  December	  Congress	  refused	  to	  approve	  any	  additional	  funds	  for	  any	  covert	  operations	  in	  Angola.	  Kissinger	  then	   approached	   the	   Shah	   of	   Iran,	   the	   Saudi	   Arabian	   government,	   and	   Egyptian	  president	   Anwar	   Sadat	   to	   provide	   additional	   funds	   for	   Zaire.721	  The	   central	   problem	  was	   that	   there	   could	   be	   no	   substitute	   for	   South	   Africa.	   The	   involvement	   of	   regular	  South	   African	   troops	   was	   not	   initially	   apparent,	   but	   in	   November	   and	   December	   a	  series	  of	  articles	  emerged	  in	  the	  American	  press,	  clearly	  identifying	  the	  South	  Africans	  as	  regular	  and	  not	  mercenary	  troops.	  CIA	  support	  for	  Holden	  Roberto	  also	  leaked	  into	  the	  press.722	  Pretoria	  was	   feeling	   increasingly	   isolated,	   as	   not	   only	   the	  United	   States,	  but	   also	   those	   African	   countries	   who	   welcomed	   South	   African	   intervention	   –	   Zaire,	  Zambia,	   and	   even	   Jonas	   Savimbi	   himself	   –	   publicly	   condemned	   the	   invasion.	   On	   23	  December,	  the	  South	  African	  National	  Security	  Council	  decided	  to	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  from	  Angola.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Kissinger	  decided	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Soviets	  to	  withdraw	  their	  support	   for	   the	   MPLA	   by	   using	   détente.	   In	   mid-­‐November	   the	   State	   Department	  drafted	  a	  harsh	  note,	  which	  accused	  Moscow	  of	  surpassing	  “all	  bounds	  of	  restraint”	  in	  Angola	  and	  warned	   that	   the	   incident	   could	   “set	  back	   the	  progress	  of	  détente.”723	  The	  Soviets	   responded	   by	   pointing	   out	   the	   extent	   of	   Washington’s	   involvement. 724	  Kissinger	   and	   Ford	   had	   a	   few	  meetings	   with	   the	   Soviet	   ambassador	   in	  Washington,	  Anatoliy	   Dobrynin,	   trying	   to	   convince	  Moscow	   to	   pressure	   Havana	   to	   withdraw	   the	  Cuban	   troops.725	  Even	   after	   Congress	   cut	   all	   funding	   for	   the	   covert	   action	   in	   Angola,	  Kissinger	   continued	   to	   believe	   that	   continuous	   diplomatic	   pressure	   would	   lead	   to	   a	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  form	  of	  power-­‐sharing	  between	  the	  MPLA,	  the	  FNLA,	  and	  UNITA:	  “If	  we	  keep	  going	  and	  the	  Soviets	  don’t	   think	   there	   is	   a	   terminal	  date	  on	  our	   efforts	   and	  we	   threaten	   them	  with	   the	   loss	  of	  détente,	  we	  can	  have	  an	  effect,”	  he	  declared	  at	   the	  National	  Security	  Council	  meeting	  on	  22	  December.726	  Washington	  thus	  continued	  applying	  pressure	  on	  the	  African	   states	   to	   forgo	   recognition	   of	   the	  MPLA.	  However,	  with	   Pretoria	   backing	  away	   from	   active	   involvement	   and	  with	   no	   funds,	   by	   early	   1976	   Kissinger	   could	   do	  very	  little	  to	  prevent	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  	  Kissinger’s	  strategy	  of	  linking	  détente	  to	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  Angola	  backfired.	  Brezhnev	  was	  personally	  invested	  in	  détente.	  He	  truly	  believed	  that	  a	   Third	  World	  War	   should	   be	   avoided	   at	   all	   costs	   and	   that	   peace	  was	   necessary	   for	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  USSR.	  However,	  he	  also	  believed	  in	  the	  eventual	  triumph	  of	  socialism,	  and	  never	  envisioned	  that	  détente	  should	  preclude	  peaceful	  competition	  between	   the	   two	   systems.	   In	   the	   early	   1970s,	   détente	   proceeded	   apace,	   despite	   the	  many	  setbacks	   in	   the	  Middle	  East,	  Chile,	  and	  elsewhere.	  Moreover,	  Brezhnev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  reconciled	  themselves	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  competition	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  would	  continue.	  Therefore,	  Brezhnev	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo	  considered	  Kissinger’s	   stance	   on	   Angola	   hypocritical.	   The	   Soviet	   leadership	   knew	   well	   that	  Washington	  supplied	  money	  and	  arms	  to	  the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA	  via	  Zaire,	  and	  they	  also	  knew	   much	   more	   than	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   about	   the	   extent	   of	   South	   African	  involvement	  in	  Angola,	  most	  probably	  thanks	  to	  their	  informant,	  Dieter	  Gerhardt.	  Kissinger’s	   stern	   notes,	   which	   accused	   Moscow	   of	   escalation	   in	   Angola,	  predictably	   looked	   hypocritical	   and	   inaccurate	   to	   the	   Soviet	   leadership.	   Anatoliy	  Dobrynin	  recalls	  that	  the	  head	  of	  the	  International	  Department,	  Boris	  Ponomarev,	  told	  him	  that	  détente	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  US	  from	  consolidating	  its	  positions	  in	  Egypt	  and	  overthrowing	  the	  legitimate	  government	  in	  Chile.727	  Even	  the	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Andrey	  Gromyko,	  who	  was	   not	   particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   Third	  World	   and	  who	  was	   not	  particularly	   enthusiastic	   about	   Soviet	   involvement	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   believed	   that	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  ideology	  was	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy	   and	   that	   the	   USSR	   should	   be	  treated	  as	  an	  equal	  on	  the	  world	  stage.728	  In	  November,	  commenting	  on	  the	  Politburo’s	  decision	  to	  break	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Uganda	  over	  President	  Idi	  Amin’s	  stance	  on	  Angola	   to	   a	   group	   of	   colleagues,	   Gromyko	   stated:	   “We	   are	   ready	   to	  walk	   along	  with	  those	  who	  speak	  for	  relaxation	  of	  tensions,	  for	  improvement	  of	  relations.	  But	  if	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  change	  the	  principles	  of	  our	  policy,	  we	  put	  up	  a	  red	  flag;	  we	  draw	  a	  line	  that	  we	  will	  not	  cross.	  We	  told	  Amin	  that	  we	  would	  not	  change	  our	  stance.	  He	  swallowed	  it,	  even	  though	  we	  could	  expect	  an	  explosion.”729	  Brezhnev	  likewise	  believed	  that	  Angola	  was	  an	  excuse	   to	  put	  détente	  on	  hold.	  Anatoliy	  Chernyaev,	  who	  came	   to	  Zavidovo	   in	  late	   1975	   to	   work	   on	   Brezhnev’s	   speech	   at	   the	   Twenty-­‐Fifth	   CPSU	   Congress	   due	   to	  convene	  in	  a	  few	  months,	  found	  the	  ailing	  General	  Secretary	  distressed	  about	  the	  state	  of	   superpower	  relations.	  According	   to	  Chernyaev,	  Brezhnev	  burst	   into	  a	   long	  speech,	  lamenting	  the	  state	  of	  relations	  with	  the	  US:	  Now,	  even	  after	  Helsinki,	  Ford	  and	  Kissinger	  and	  various	  Senators	  demand	   to	  arm	   America,	   they	   demand	   that	   America	   becomes	   the	   strongest.	   They	   are	  threatening	  us	  –	  either	  because	  of	  our	  fleet	  or	  because	  of	  Angola,	  or	  they	  make	  up	   something	   else	   altogether.	   So,	   Grechko	   comes	   to	  me.	   So,	   he	   says,	   they	   are	  building	   it	  up	  here,	   threatening	  to	  escalate	  there.	  Give	  me,	  he	  says,	  156	  billion	  instead	   of	   140.	   So	   how	   should	   I	   respond?	   I	   am	   the	   Chairman	   on	   the	  Military	  Council;	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  national	  security!730	  	  
Conclusion	  Angola	   turned	   into	   a	   Cold	  War	   hotspot	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   ambitions	   of	   local	  actors.	  Mobutu	  wanted	  to	  keep	  Angola	  within	  his	  sphere	  of	  influence	  for	  political	  and	  economic	  reasons,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  he	  could	  achieve	  this	  goal	  was	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  his	  long-­‐time	  protégé,	  Holden	  Roberto,	  remained	  a	  predominant	  political	  force	  in	  post-­‐independent	   Angola.	   Therefore,	   early	   in	   1974,	   Mobutu	   started	   pushing	   America	   to	  support	   the	  FNLA,	  and	  the	  best	  way	  he	  could	   justify	  his	  calls	   for	  action	  was	  to	   frame	  the	   situation	   in	   Angola	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   global	   competition	   between	   the	   superpowers.	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  Washington	  was	   reluctant	   to	   intervene	   in	   any	   significant	   way	   beyond	   the	   $300,000	  dollars	   that	   the	   40	   Committee	   approved	   for	   Holden	   Roberto	   in	   January	   1975.	   Only	  when	   Washington	   lost	   the	   final	   struggle	   over	   Vietnam	   and	   Cambodia	   in	   April,	   and	  when	  Mobutu	  used	  bullying	  tactics	  to	  show	  his	  displeasure	  with	  American	  inaction,	  did	  Kissinger	   embark	   on	   an	   ambitious	   face-­‐saving	   project	   aimed	   at	   supporting	   the	  Congolese	  dictator	  in	  his	  endeavor.	  	  The	  MPLA	  used	  a	  very	  similar	  strategy	  on	  the	  Soviets.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1974,	  faced	  with	  an	  increasingly	  violent	  challenge	  from	  the	  FNLA,	  the	  MPLA	  tried	  to	  persuade	  their	  Soviet	   interlocutors	   that	   violence	   in	   Luanda	  was	  not	   just	   an	   outcome	  of	   local	   power	  rivalries,	   but	   of	   an	   international	   conspiracy,	   spearheaded	   by	   Zaire	   and	   supported	  directly	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Neto	  urged	  the	  Soviets	  to	  assist,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  MPLA's	   very	   survival	   relied	   on	   support	   from	   the	   socialist	   countries.	   The	   MPLA’s	  interpretation	   of	   events	   coincided	   with	   the	   Soviet	   understanding	   of	   the	   world.	   The	  Soviet	  Union	  thus	  agreed	  to	  provide	  arms	  and	  training	  to	  the	  MPLA	  cadres.	  On	  the	  few	  occasions	   when	   Soviet	   representatives	   arrived	   in	   Luanda	   –	   Mikhail	   Zenovich	   in	  November	   1974,	   Alexander	   Dzasokhov	   and	   Igor	   Uvarov	   in	   January	   1975,	   and	  Yevsyukov	   in	   May	   1975	   –	   they	   witnessed	   unending	   violence	   in	   the	   capital	   that	   the	  MPLA	  explained	  as	  part	  of	  an	  international	  conspiracy.	  Yevsyukov’s	  trip	  to	  Luanda	  in	  May	   1975	   was	   a	   particularly	   important	   turning	   point	   as	   far	   as	   the	   Soviets	   were	  concerned,	   because	   what	   he	   and	   his	   colleagues	   saw	   first-­‐hand	   was	   a	   dramatic	  escalation	  of	  tensions	  in	  the	  city,	  which	  made	  them	  conclude	  that	  a	  civil	  war	  was	  most	  likely	  inevitable.	  By	  June	  1975	  the	  International	  Department	  believed	  that	  in	  Angola,	  the	  US	  and	  its	   allies	   were	   engaged	   in	   a	   “serious	   international	   conspiracy,”	   fuelled	   by	   their	  frustrations	   in	  Vietnam	  and	  Cambodia.	  At	   least	  a	   few	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  at	   the	  CC	  CPSU	  held	  such	  views	  much	  earlier	   than	  sizable	  US	  support	   for	   the	  FNLA	  and	  UNITA	  actually	  materialized.	   However,	   Soviet	   involvement	   in	   Angola	  was	   still	   quite	   limited	  because	   neither	   Brezhnev	   nor	   Gromyko	  wanted	   to	   jeopardize	   détente,	   which	   was	   a	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  priority,	   and	   because	   they	   believed	   the	   MPLA	   would	   be	   able	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   Luanda.	  Moscow	   intensified	   support	   after	   the	   South	   African	   invasion,	   but	   the	   cumbersome	  nature	   of	   Soviet	   bureaucracy	   and,	   again,	   Soviet	   unwillingness	   to	   be	   blamed	   for	   an	  escalation	   of	   the	   crisis	  meant	   that	   the	   bulk	   of	   Soviet	   support	   came	   after	   the	   official	  declaration	  of	  independence	  on	  11	  November	  1975.	  While	  Castro’s	  decision	  to	  send	  a	  group	   of	   Special	   Forces	   and	   regular	   troops	   to	   Angola	   might	   have	   speeded	   up	   that	  decision,	   analysis	  of	  newly	  available	  evidence	  and	  eyewitness	  accounts	   suggests	   that	  Moscow	  must	  have	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  extend	  official	  recognition	  to	   the	  MPLA	  and	  step	  up	  support.	  	  	  Once	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   decided	   to	   recognize	   the	  MPLA	   on	   11	   November	  1975	  and	  step	  up	  their	  support,	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  possible	  to	  go	  back,	  since	  a	  consensus	  among	   the	   KGB,	   the	   military,	   and	   the	   International	   Department	   had	   already	  materialized	   that	   it	   was	   their	   “sacred	   duty”	   to	   aid	   a	   Cuban	   effort	   in	   support	   of	   the	  MPLA.	   Soviet	   prestige	   was	   on	   the	   line.	   On	   25	   December,	   Deputy	   Foreign	   Minister	  Leonid	  Ilyichev	  received	  OAU	  Deputy	  General	  Secretary	  Peter	  Onu.	  Speaking	  about	  the	  forthcoming	   OAU	   summit	   in	   January,	   Onu	   urged	   continued	   Soviet	   support	   for	   the	  Angolan	   people.	   He	   also	   informed	   Ilyichev	   that	   some	   African	   leaders	   feared	   that	  détente	   with	   the	   US	   would	   mean	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   would	   forego	   its	   struggle	  against	   colonialism	   and	   racism.	   Ilyichev	   responded	   to	   Onu	   with	   a	   clear	   statement,	  emphasizing	   that	   the	   goal	   of	   détente	   was	   to	   solve	   disagreements	   through	   peaceful	  means	  and	  not	  war,	  but	  that	  détente	  did	  not	  mean	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  abandoning	  its	  commitment	  to	  ideological	  struggle.	  “It	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  reject	  struggle	  against	  imperialism,	  for	  liquidation	  of	  colonialism,	  it	  does	  not	  give	  freeway	  for	  aggression	  and	  suppression	  of	  people’s	  struggle	  for	  freedom	  and	  independence,	  it	  does	  not	  put	  an	  end	  to	   ideological	   struggle,”	   explained	   Ilyichev. 731 	  On	   16	   January	   1975,	   Havana	   and	  Moscow	  signed	  a	  military	  protocol,	  with	   the	  Soviets	  pledging	   to	   transport	  35	  million	  rubles	  ($25	  million	  dollars)	  worth	  of	  weapons	  directly	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Military	  Mission	  in	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  Angola	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   month,	   thus	   initiating	   a	   new	   stage	   of	   close	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	  military	  cooperation	  in	  the	  country.732	  Therefore,	  by	  early	  1976,	  Moscow’s	  cautious	  attitude	  towards	  Angola	  had	  been	  supplanted	   by	   a	   consensus	   that	   dictated	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   had	   a	   “sacred	   duty”	   to	  protect	  a	  faraway	  ally	  from	  the	  global	  imperialist	  forces	  with	  all	  necessary	  means,	  with	  the	   middle-­‐ranking	   officials,	   who	   had	   first	   formed	   personal	   bonds	   with	   the	   MPLA’s	  leadership	  since	  1961,	  playing	  a	  decisive	  role.	  The	  top	  Soviet	  leadership	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  Angola	  was	   important	  and	  thus	  they	  did	  not	  believe	  Kissinger	  was	  sincere	  when	  he	   threatened	   downgrading	   relations	   over	   Soviet	   involvement,	   suspecting	   that	   was	  just	   a	   useful	   excuse	   to	   slow	   down	   negotiations.	   The	   failure	   of	   negotiations	   in	   1975	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  further	  internationalization	  of	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War.	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CONCLUSION	  
	  Time	   and	   again,	   I	   ask	   former	   Soviet	   officials	   to	  what	   extent	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  ideology	   shaped	   their	   views	   of	   the	   world.	   I	   receive	   a	   muddled	   response	   somewhat	  dismissive	   of	   ideology	   as	   an	   important	   factor	   and	   often	   presented	   in	   an	   apologetic	  manner,	   hiding	   an	   embarrassment	   of	   affiliation	  with	   and	   allegiance	   to	   the	   system	  of	  beliefs	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   represented.	   A	   similar	   sense	   of	   unease	   permeates	  discussions	  of	   ideological	  motives	   in	   the	  writings	  of	   the	   former	  Soviet	   cadres.	   I	  have	  always	  found	  this	  sense	  of	  anxiety	  or	  guilt	  to	  frustrate	  historical	  research.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  surprising	  sentiment,	  considering	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  just	   lead	   to	   the	  disintegration	  of	  an	  empire;	   it	  also	  signified	   the	   failure	  of	  a	  universal	  utopian	   project	   and	   the	   coming	   of	   a	   new	   era,	   which	   many	   believed	   ushered	   in	   the	  victory	  of	  Western	   liberal	  democracy,	  as	   famously	  described	  by	  Francis	  Fukuyama	  in	  his	  1989	  article,	  the	  End	  of	  History.733	  	  While	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	  might	  have	  become	  defunct	  after	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  Soviet	   Union,	   historians	   cannot	   ignore	   the	   importance	   of	   ideology	   in	   understanding	  what	   this	   project	   entailed,	   why	   so	   many	   people	   believed	   in	   it,	   and	   why	   it	   was	   so	  attractive	  to	  many	  beyond	  the	  geographical	  confines	  of	  the	  USSR.	  We	  should	  be	  equally	  reluctant	   to	   consider	   ideology	   as	   a	   deterministic	   force	   that	   predetermined	   behavior,	  but	  should	  view	  it	  rather	  as	  an	  ideational	  construct,	  which	  shaped	  individual	  actions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  life	  experiences,	  personal	  preferences,	  and	  the	  environment	  a	  given	  person	  faced.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  framework	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  story	  of	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	   liberation	   movements	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies:	   as	   a	   story	   of	   personal	  relationships	  between	  people,	  whose	  defining	   international	   environment	  was	   that	   of	  decolonization	  and	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Although	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   give	   precise	   figures	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   overall	  assistance,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   it	   would	   have	   been	   impossible	   for	   the	   liberation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  733	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  and	  the	  Last	  Man	  	  (London:	  Hamish	  Hamilton,	  1992);	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  "The	  End	  of	  History?,"	  The	  National	  Interest,	  	  	  (Summer	  1989).	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  movements	   to	   conduct	   anti-­‐colonial	   uprisings	  without	   the	   stream	  of	   assistance	   from	  the	   Warsaw	   Pact	   countries.	   Perevalnoye,	   for	   example,	   fulfilled	   the	   acute	   need	   for	  weapons	   training,	   even	   if	   the	   geographic	   conditions	   in	  Crimea	  did	  not	   fully	   replicate	  the	   conditions	   of	   armed	   struggle	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   colonies.	   The	   most	   important	  contribution,	   of	   course,	   consisted	   of	   advanced	   heavy	   weapons,	   which	   could	   only	   be	  procured	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   a	   leading	   designer	   and	   manufacturer	   of	   advanced	  weapons	  systems	  at	  that	  time.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  for	  example,	  the	  provision	  of	   the	  Strela-­‐2	   complex	   for	   the	  PAIGC	  actually	   led	   to	  a	  breakthrough	   in	  a	   stalemated	  war,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  Empire	  in	  Africa.	  Nikita	   Khrushchev	   was	   the	   main	   instigator	   of	   Soviet	   involvement	   with	   the	  liberation	   movements,	   as	   he	   believed	   it	   was	   his	   responsibility	   –	   a	   sacred	   duty	   –	   to	  support	   struggles	   for	   national	   liberation	   in	   the	   Third	   World.	   If	   Khrushchev’s	  predecessor,	   Joseph	   Stalin,	   had	   been	   primarily	   concerned	  with	   Soviet	   relations	  with	  Europe,	   Japan,	   and,	   increasingly,	   with	   the	   United	   States,	   Khrushchev	   turned	   his	  attention	   to	   the	  Third	  World,	   driven	  by	   the	   belief	   that	   it	  was	   there	   that	   competition	  between	   the	   socialist	   and	   capitalist	   systems	   would	   be	   played	   out.	   By	   pledging	  assistance	  to	  the	   liberation	  movements,	  Khrushchev	  wanted	  to	  revive	  the	   idealism	  of	  the	   early	   post-­‐revolutionary	   years,	   and	   to	   resuscitate	   the	   universal	   goals	   of	   the	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	   doctrine,	   which	   envisioned	   the	   extension	   of	   socialism	   around	   the	  world	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  class	  struggle.	  He	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  to	  support	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	   movements,	   and	   that	   this	   could	   be	   done	   through	   peaceful	  competition	  with	  the	  West.	  One	  has	  to	  remember	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  1950s,	  the	  movements	   for	   national	   liberation	   were	   mainly	   peaceful,	   which	   is	   why	   supporting	  them	  was	  not	   incompatible	  with	  Khrushchev’s	   concept	   of	   peaceful	   competition.	  As	   a	  consequence,	   he	   was	   initially	   rather	   reluctant	   to	   provide	   military	   assistance	   to	   the	  anti-­‐colonial	  movements.	  	  Khrushchev’s	   perspective	   on	   peaceful	   competition	   changed	   as	   he	   became	  increasingly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  By	  1961,	  having	  grown	  restless	  over	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  his	   inability	   to	   achieve	   his	   foreign	   policy	   goals,	   Khrushchev	   adopted	   an	   increasingly	  aggressive	   strategy	   in	   the	  Third	  World,	  which	   entailed	  providing	   support	   for	   violent	  anti-­‐colonial	   movements.	   Unsurprisingly,	   when	   popular	   resentment	   against	  Portuguese	   rule	   exploded	   in	  1961,	  Khrushchev	   authorized	   an	   assistance	  package	   for	  the	  MPLA,	   justified	   in	  his	  eyes	  by	  Western	   intransigence	  and	  unwillingness	   to	  accept	  him	  as	  an	  equal	  partner	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  The	  1961	  Angolan	  Uprising	  coincided	  with	  the	   Berlin	   Crisis,	   yet	   another	   spike	   in	   superpower	   tensions,	   thus	   providing	   an	  additional	   push	   for	   Khrushchev	   to	   approve	   an	   aid	   package	   for	   the	   MPLA	   and	   for	  Czechoslovakia	  to	  decide	  to	  recruit	  Cabral	  as	  a	  trusted	  ally	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  is	  how,	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  heightened	  tensions	  between	  Moscow	  and	  Washington	  during	  the	  peak	  of	   the	   Berlin	   Crisis,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   the	   United	   States	   became	   invested	   in	   the	  political	   fate	   of	   two	   rival	   liberation	   movements,	   thus	   setting	   the	   stage	   for	   the	  internationalization	  of	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War.	  1961	  was	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies,	  the	  whole	  region,	  and	  for	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Africa	  in	  general.	  While	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  vacillated	  between	  his	  world-­‐making	  project	  and	  the	  pursuit	   of	   peace	   and	   cooperation	   with	   the	   United	   States,	   Leonid	   Brezhnev	   and	   his	  closest	  associates	  at	   least	   initially	   fell	  back	  on	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  dogma	  as	  a	  backdrop	  for	   their	   foreign	   relations.	   If	   Khrushchev	   was	   reluctant	   to	   authorize	   direct	   arms	  shipments	   to	   the	   liberation	   movements,	   the	   Brezhnev	   leadership	   readily	   sponsored	  arms	  shipments	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  military	  training	  program	  in	  1965.	  The	  early	  1970s	   ushered	   in	   a	   new	   era	   of	   superpower	   détente,	   but	   Brezhnev	   and	   other	   top-­‐ranking	  Soviet	  officials	  did	  not	  actually	  change	  their	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	   as	   driven	   by	   competition	   between	   two	   world	   systems.	   Under	   these	  circumstances,	  they	  continued	  to	  believe	  it	  was	  Soviet	  duty	  to	  support	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  movements	   as	   an	   inevitable	   force	   of	   progress.	   In	   a	   way,	   this	   signified	   a	   return	   to	  Khrushchev’s	   concept	   of	   peaceful	   competition	   with	   the	   West,	   but	   with	   the	   added	  confidence	   granted	   by	   the	   overall	   increase	   in	   Soviet	   military	   capabilities	   and	   the	  successes	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	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  However,	   neither	   for	   Khrushchev	   nor	   for	   Brezhnev	   was	   support	   for	   anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  a	  high	  priority.	  The	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles	  in	   the	  Portuguese	  colonies	  were	  merely	  a	  sideshow	  for	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  and	   for	  Brezhnev	   personally,	   whose	   attention	   was	   focused	   on	   events	   in	   Vietnam	   and	   the	  Middle	  East	   and,	   increasingly	   in	   the	   early	  1970s,	   on	   the	   superpower	  détente.	  This	   is	  precisely	  why	  it	  was	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	   in	  the	  Soviet	  bureaucracy	  who	  assumed	  such	   an	   important	   role	   in	   setting	   the	   terms	   of	   involvement	   with	   the	   liberation	  movements,	  starting	  from	  the	  late	  1950s	  when	  the	  first	  personal	  relations	  were	  forged	  between	   the	   Soviet	   cadres	   and	   the	   radical	   African	   nationalists	   from	   the	   Portuguese	  colonies.	   This	   group	   of	  middle-­‐ranking	   officials	  working	   across	   the	   bureaucracy	   –	   at	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  International	  Department,	   the	  Soviet	  Solidarity	  Committee,	   the	  KGB,	   the	  Foreign	   Ministry,	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Defense	   –	   shared	   the	   fundamental	   sense	   of	  history	   that	   saw	   the	   eventual	   dissolution	   of	   colonial	   empires	   as	   inexorable,	   and	  became	  personally	  invested	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles.	  	  The	  countries	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Soviet	  bloc	  –	  Czechoslovakia,	  the	  GDR,	  Bulgaria,	  and	  Poland	  –	  became	  involved	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  for	  similar	  reasons,	  but	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  Czechoslovakia	  was	  a	  crucial	  player	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  as	  the	  key	  deliverer	  of	  military	  assistance	  and	  training	  to	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  Over	  the	   course	   of	   the	   1960s,	   Prague	  was	   superseded	   as	   the	   key	   donor	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements	   by	   other	   socialist	   states,	   such	   as	   Bulgaria	   and	   the	   GDR,	   which	   reflected	  growing	  economic	  problems	  and	   the	  country’s	   turn	   inwards	  after	   the	  1968	   invasion.	  Nevertheless,	   Czechoslovakia	   remained	   a	   key	   foreign	   ally	   of	   the	   PAIGC,	   given	   the	  special	  relations	  between	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  and	  Czechoslovak	  intelligence.	  Bulgaria	  came	  in	  a	  close	  second,	  becoming	  one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  to	  offer	  arms,	  cash,	  and	  training	  for	   the	  MPLA	  and	  FRELIMO.	  While	  every	  member	  of	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  had	   their	  own	  reasons	  for	  engaging	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements,	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  coordinating	   policy	   and	   releasing	   informal	   guidelines	   at	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	  levels.	  Policy	  coordination	  took	  place	  at	  regular	  meetings	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  Committees	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  and	   the	   International	   Departments,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   assume	   that	   Moscow	  “handed	  out”	  instructions	  to	  its	  satellites.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	   came	   up	  with	   their	   own	   policy	   recommendations	   and	   solutions,	   which	   did	   not	  have	   to	  be	  dictated	  by	  Moscow.	  For	   them,	   supporting	   the	   liberation	  movements	  was	  also	   a	   “sacred	  duty,”	   but	   they	  defined	   it	   in	   terms	   that	   did	  not	   necessarily	   satisfy	   the	  agenda	  in	  Moscow.	  	  From	  the	  outset,	  ideology	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  that	  shaped	  the	  attitudes	  of	  Soviet	  cadres	  and	  their	  counterparts	  from	  other	  socialist	  countries,	  with	  relation	  to	  the	  MPLA,	  FRELIMO,	  and	  the	  PAIGC.	  The	  reason	  behind	  Soviet	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA	  lay	  in	  their	  awareness	  that	  the	  leadership	  was	  influenced	  by	  Marxists	  ideas	  and	  was	  close	  to	  the	   Portuguese	   communists.	   The	   case	   of	   Soviet	   and	   Czechoslovak	   involvement	   with	  Amílcar	  Cabral	  and	  the	  PAIGC	  is	  even	  more	  revealing.	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  was	  a	  small	  and	  insignificant	   country,	   but	   Cabral,	   who	   was	   thought	   to	   be	   heavily	   influenced	   by	  scientific	   socialism,	   was	   expected	   to	   influence	   African	   opinion	   towards	   what	   they	  considered	   to	   be	   a	   left-­‐wing	   and	   “progressive	   direction.”	   This	   explains	   why	  Czechoslovak	  intelligence	  maintained	  close	  relations	  with	  Cabral	  and	  why	  they	  initially	  offered	  such	  extensive	   support	   to	   the	  PAIGC.	   It	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	   the	  attitudes	  of	   the	  Soviet	   cadres	  were	  particularly	   idealistic.	   There	  were	  no	   very	   strict	   criteria	   to	   judge	  whether	   any	   particular	   individual	  was	   indeed	   a	   convinced	  Marxist-­‐Leninist,	   and	   the	  Soviet	  bureaucrats	   in	  fact	  encouraged	  relations	  with	  non-­‐communist	  nationalists,	  but	  only	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  any	  possibility	  of	  turning	  them	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  For	  this	  reason,	   the	   Soviets	   were	   at	   first	   reluctant	   to	   support	   FRELIMO	   because	   they	  considered	   Eduardo	   Mondlane	   to	   be	   pro-­‐American,	   but	   provided	   assistance	  nevertheless	  because	  Marcelino	  dos	  Santos	  (among	  others)	  was	  a	  well-­‐known	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  and	  therefore	  a	  man	  who	  could	  influence	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  movement	  from	  the	  inside.	  The	  military	  efficiency	  of	  a	  movement	  and	  its	  internal	  coherence	  was	  also	  a	  very	   important	   consideration,	   which	   is	   another	   reason	   why	   the	   PAIGC	   –	   the	   only	  movement	  which	  had	  a	  real	  chance	  of	  defeating	  the	  Portuguese	  army	  on	  the	  ground	  –	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  received	   aid	   disproportionate	   to	   the	   size	   and	   significance	   of	   Guinea-­‐Bissau.	   One	   can	  conclude,	  therefore,	  that	  ideological	  compatibility	  was	  an	  essential,	  if	  not	  a	  completely	  sufficient,	  criterion	  for	  determining	  Soviet	  policy	  towards	  the	  liberation	  movements.	  	  The	  various	  stages	  of	  Soviet	  involvement	  with	  the	  liberation	  movements	  were	  by-­‐products	  of	  an	  interactive	  relationship	  between	  the	  Soviet	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	  and	   the	  Third	  World	   revolutionaries	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   international	   environment	  they	  faced.	  By	  1966,	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	  advocated	  the	  expansion	  of	  aid	  to	  the	  liberation	  movements	   in	   response	   to	   the	   vigorous	   diplomacy	   pursued	   by	   Third	   World	  revolutionaries	  as	  they	  unleashed	  their	  military	  campaigns	  in	  1963-­‐1965.	  By	  providing	  assistance	  to	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles,	  the	  Soviets	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  counter	  the	  various	   challenges	   from	   the	   left	   –	   China	   and	   Cuba	   –	   that	   argued	   that	   the	   Soviet	  leadership	   had	   abandoned	   revolution.	   While	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   anti-­‐colonial	  campaigns	  gave	   the	   impetus	   for	   the	  extension	  of	  Soviet	  military	  aid	   to	   the	   liberation	  movements,	   it	   was	   the	   ideological	   transformations	   of	   these	   movements	   in	   the	   late	  1960s	   that	   made	   these	   middle-­‐ranking	   officials	   at	   the	   International	   Department	  increasingly	   optimistic	   about	   their	   prospects,	   thus	   paving	   the	   way	   for	   further	  expansion	   of	   aid	   in	   the	   early	   1970s.	   This	   sense	   of	   optimism,	   of	   course,	   cannot	   be	  understood	  without	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  War	   in	   Vietnam,	  which	   accentuated	   the	  role	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  protector	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  revolutionary	  movement.	  One	  can	   therefore	   conclude	   that	   by	   the	   1970s,	   the	  middle-­‐ranking	   Soviet	   cadres	   and	   the	  Third	   World	   revolutionaries	   formed	   an	   “epistemic	   community,”	   a	   transnational	  network	  of	   people	  who	   increasingly	   saw	   their	   goals	   and	   interests	   align	   around	   their	  shared	  ideals	  and	  increasingly	  close	  personal	  relations.734	  The	   Soviet	   involvement	   in	   the	   Angolan	   Civil	  War	   grew	   out	   of	   these	   personal	  relationships	  as	  they	  developed	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  the	  early	  1970s.	  From	  the	  outset,	  the	  Soviets	   believed	   that	   events	   in	   Angola	   represented	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   post-­‐revolutionary	   struggles	   in	   Portugal,	   where	   the	   FNLA	  was	   closely	   linked	  with	   Joseph	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  734 	  Peter	   Haas,	   "Introduction:	   Epistemic	   communities	   and	   International	   Policy	   Coordination,"	   International	  
Organisation,	  46	  1	  (1992).	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  Mobutu	  and	  therefore	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Their	  emotional	  reference	  point	  was	  the	  1960-­‐1961	  Congo	  Crisis.	  In	  1974-­‐1975,	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola	  looked	  very	  similar,	  and	  in	   fact	   the	   same	  people	  who	  were	  on	   “opposing	   sides”	  during	   the	  Congo	  Crisis	  were	  again	  on	  “opposing	  sides”	  during	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  Angolan	  Civil	  War.	  As	  the	  Soviet	  cadres	   observed	   the	   Alvor	   Agreement	   unraveling	   in	   January-­‐April	   1975,	   they	  increasingly	  saw	  the	  situation	  in	  Angola	  as	  the	  result	  of	  international	  conspiracy.	  The	  MPLA	  leadership	  reinforced	  this	  perspective,	  arguing	  that	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Angola	  was	   not	   a	   regional	   or	   an	   inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict,	   but	   a	   global	   one.	   It	   was	   upon	  recommendations	  of	  middle-­‐ranking	  officials	  such	  as	  Petr	  Yevsyukov,	  Oleg	  Nazhestkin,	  and	  others	  that	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  made	  a	  decision	  to	  step	  up	  support	  for	  the	  MPLA.	  By	   11	  November	   1975,	   a	   consensus	   had	   formed	   that	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   had	   a	   “sacred	  duty”	  to	  defend	  the	  MPLA	  despite	  the	  possible	  risks	  to	  détente.	  	  Angola’s	  slide	  into	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1975	  was	  a	  major	  failure,	  on	  the	  parts	  of	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  negotiate	  directly	  for	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  before	  the	  militarization	  of	  both	  the	  MPLA	  and	  the	  FNLA	  in	  Luanda	  fuelled	   the	   cycle	   of	   violence	   that	   ultimately	   led	   to	   a	   total	   breakdown	   of	   the	   Alvor	  Accords	  and	  the	  eruption	  of	  a	  full-­‐on	  civil	  war	  by	  July	  1975.	  The	  MPLA’s	  declaration	  of	  11	   November,	   proclaiming	   itself	   the	   government	   of	   Angola,	   further	   decreased	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  because	  both	  Holden	  Roberto	  and	  Jonas	  Savimbi	  both	  realized	   that	   nothing	   short	   of	   an	   all-­‐out	   military	   victory	   would	   ensure	   their	  participation	  in	  the	  future	  governance	  of	  Angola.	  The	  intervention	  of	  Cuba,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	   and	   the	   socialist	   countries	   on	   the	   side	  of	   the	  MPLA,	   and	  of	   Zaire,	   the	  US,	   and	  South	  Africa	  on	  the	  side	  of	  FNLA/UNITA	  ensured	  that	  each	  of	  the	  rival	  groups	  believed	  they	  had	  a	  good	  chance	  to	  emerge	  victorious,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  desirability	  of	  peaceful	  negotiations.	   Henry	   Kissinger’s	   heavy-­‐handed	   attempt	   to	   come	   to	   some	   kind	   of	  arrangement	  on	  Angola	  by	  using	  détente	  as	  a	  yardstick	  actually	  helped	  strengthen	  the	  arguments	  of	   those	  cadres	   in	  the	  Soviet	   leadership	  who	  argued	  that	  Washington	  was	  no	  longer	  serious	  about	  détente.	  While	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  1974-­‐75	  was	  a	  success	  in	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